F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 28 2000
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BRENDA SATTERFIELD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 99-7048
v. (D.C. No. 98-CV-518-B)
(E.D. Okla.)
OLSTEN KIMBERLY QUALITY
CARE,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Brenda Satterfield appeals from the district court’s order
dismissing her Title VII complaint against her former employer, Olsten Kimberly
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Quality Care. In a prior complaint, plaintiff claimed that defendant had
terminated her employment in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act
(FMLA). The district court dismissed the FMLA action with prejudice upon
motion of plaintiff. The court subsequently dismissed plaintiff’s Title VII action
on the basis of res judicata. On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the district court
erred in dismissing her Title VII complaint. Specifically, she claims that her
Title VII complaint, alleging national origin discrimination, arose from a different
cause of action than her earlier FMLA complaint, and therefore, was not subject
to res judicata preclusion. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.
I.
In her first action, filed March 8, 1998, plaintiff asserted that defendant
terminated her employment in violation of the FMLA because she took medical
leave in order to receive treatment for a medical condition. On June 15, 1998,
plaintiff received her right to sue letter from the EEOC authorizing her to pursue
her Title VII action. On July 8, 1998, the district court dismissed her FMLA
complaint with prejudice upon stipulation of both parties. On September 15,
1998, plaintiff filed her Title VII action in Oklahoma state court, alleging that
defendant discriminated against her based on her national origin as an American
Indian as to wages, hours, working conditions, and termination. Defendant
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removed the matter to federal court and moved for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) on res judicata grounds.
In granting defendant’s motion to dismiss, the district court determined that
all of plaintiff’s claims arose from the same cause of action and could have been
brought in the original lawsuit. Acknowledging that plaintiff had not yet received
her right to sue letter at the time she filed her FMLA action, the court observed
that she received the letter before she requested voluntary dismissal of the action,
and, at that point, could have filed an amended complaint to include the Title VII
claims.
II.
The legal sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law; hence, a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal is reviewed de novo. See Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf &
Blind , 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999). As in this case, where the facts are
not in dispute, we also review de novo the district court’s application of the
substantive law of res judicata. See Nwosun v. General Mills Restaurants, Inc. ,
124 F.3d 1255, 1257 (10th Cir. 1997) .
“Res judicata is an affirmative defense on which the defendant has the
burden to set forth facts sufficient to satisfy the elements.” Id. ; see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). In order to support dismissal on res judicata grounds,
defendant must satisfy four elements: “(1) the prior suit must have ended with
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a judgment on the merits; (2) the parties must be identical or in privity; (3) the
suit must be based on the same cause of action; and (4) the plaintiff must have
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in the prior suit.” Nwosun ,
124 F.3d at 1257 .
“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, precludes a party . . . from relitigating
issues that were or could have been raised in an earlier action, provided that the
earlier action proceeded to a final judgment on the merits.” King v. Union Oil
Co. , 117 F.3d 443, 445 (10th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). When, as here, the
subsequent claim was not, but could have been, brought in the earlier suit, we
do not focus primarily on whether the precluded claim is based on similar
operative facts or legal theories as those raised in the earlier suit, but instead
focus on whether both actions arise from the same “cause of action.” King ,
117 F.3d at 445.
Here, plaintiff does not dispute that the voluntary dismissal with prejudice
of her first action constitutes a judgment on the merits. See Clark , 953 F.2d
at 1238. She also does not dispute that the parties to both suits were identical.
What plaintiff primarily challenges is the district court’s determination that the
two suits were based on the same cause of action. This circuit has adopted the
following transactional approach from Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24
(1982) to determinations of this question:
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[A] final judgment extinguishes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the
action arose. What constitutes a “transaction” or a “series” is to be
determined pragmatically considering whether the facts are related in
time, space, origin, or motivation, and whether they form a
convenient trial unit.
King , 117 F.3d at 445 (further quotation and citation omitted); see also Clark ,
953 F.2d at 1238.
Plaintiff contends that the two actions arose out of different causes of
action because, in the first, she alleged a violation of the FMLA, and, in the
second, she alleged a violation of Title VII. This argument is not persuasive.
Plaintiff cannot defeat the application of res judicata “by simply alleging new
legal theories.” Clark , 953 F.2d at 1238. Here, the transaction was plaintiff’s
employment relationship with defendant. If plaintiff had raised all of her claims
of discrimination during her employment and her claims of unlawful termination
in her first lawsuit, all of her allegations would have been heard and decided.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) (in an original claim, a party may join “as many claims,
legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has against an opposing party”).
Plaintiff complained of unlawful discharge in her first complaint. This
claim reappeared in her second complaint, albeit under a different legal theory.
Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the fact that, in her second complaint, she also
alleged discrimination in defendant’s handling of her wages, hours, and working
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conditions, does not change the fact that her alleged unlawful termination was the
nucleus of both complaints. Where, as here, both the facts and the claims relate
exclusively to plaintiff’s employment relationship, see Clark , 953 F.2d at 1239,
we agree with the district court’s determination that plaintiff’s second suit arose
from the same cause of action or “series of connected transactions which resulted
in her separation from employment.” Appellant’s App. at 37.
Finally, whether plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate all her
claims in the first suit is determined “by examining any procedural limitations, the
party’s incentive to fully litigate the claim, and whether effective litigation was
limited by the nature or relationship of the parties.” Nwosum , 124 F.3d at 1257-
58. In a somewhat nebulous fashion, plaintiff appears to argue that she was
procedurally precluded from bringing the Title VII claims in the initial lawsuit
because she had not yet received her right to sue letter from the EEOC. We do
not agree. Plaintiff does not dispute the fact that she received her right to sue
letter a number of weeks before she moved the court for voluntary dismissal of
the FMLA suit. We agree with the district court that at the time she received the
letter, she could have amended her complaint to include her Title VII claims, an
action she eschewed in favor of dismissing her FMLA complaint and refiling in a
different jurisdiction. Consequently, we reject plaintiff’s contention that she was
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hampered by procedural limitations on her ability to bring her Title VII claims in
her original suit.
III.
The main consideration underlying res judicata is the interest in bringing
litigation to an end. “To allow [plaintiff’s] second suit to proceed as framed
would allow precisely the sort of piecemeal litigation, unnecessary expense,
and waste of judicial resources that the doctrine of res judicata is designed to
prevent.” King , 117 F.3d at 447. Therefore, we conclude that the district court
correctly held that plaintiff was barred by res judicata from bringing her second
lawsuit claiming Title VII violations.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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