F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 12 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RICK PETER BECK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-7082
(D.C. No. 98-CV-327-S)
CITY OF MUSKOGEE POLICE (E.D. Okla.)
DEPARTMENT; COUNTY OF
MUSKOGEE SHERIFF’S OFFICE;
MUSKOGEE OFFICE OF THE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, BRISCOE, and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Rick Peter Beck brought this action asserting federal civil rights
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law claims surrounding his arrest
and eventually dismissed prosecution on a rape charge. The district court
determined that Beck’s claims were either premature or barred by the statute of
limitations, and it dismissed the action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On appeal,
this court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded three of Beck’s claims
to the district court for further proceedings. Beck v. City of Muskogee Police
Dep’t , 195 F.3d 553 (10th Cir. 1999). On remand, the district court granted
defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and Beck again appeals. Reviewing
the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, Trujillo v. Univ. of Colo.
Health Sciences Ctr. , 157 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir.1998), we affirm.
The three claims we remanded to the district court were § 1983 claims for
malicious prosecution, Brady 1
violations, and due process violations relating to
the alleged conversion of Beck’s vehicle. The district court rejected the
malicious prosecution claim because Beck failed to meet his burden of proving
the lack of probable cause to bring the rape charge against him. The court
rejected the Brady claim because there was no undisclosed exculpatory evidence,
and even if there had been, Beck was not prejudiced by its nondisclosure, since
the charge against him was dismissed. The court rejected the due process claim
1
Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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because there was no evidence that defendants were involved in the private
towing service’s sale, and eventual return to Beck, of his vehicle. Alternatively,
the court held that there was no basis for municipal liability on the part of the
City of Muskogee.
On appeal, Beck challenges the court’s dismissal of all three claims. We
have reviewed the record and considered his arguments, and we conclude he has
not demonstrated that the district court erred. Therefore, for substantially the
reasons as the district court stated in its July 13, 2000 order, we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in defendants’ favor and dismissal of the
action.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue
forthwith. We remind Beck that the district court granted his motion to proceed
in forma pauperis on appeal, payable in partial payments, and that this obligation
continues until the entire fee is paid.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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