F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 5 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 01-2147
DARREN HOWELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. NO. CR-99-904-LH)
Michael A. Keefe, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico,
for Defendant-Appellant.
Clay G. Guthridge, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C. (Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Jessica Dunsay Silver, Attorney, United States
Department of Justice, Washington D.C.; David Iglesias, United States Attorney,
Albuquerque, New Mexico; Tara C. Neda, Assistant United States Attorney,
Albuquerque, New Mexico; with him on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before BRISCOE , ALARCON , * and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
ANDERSON , Circuit Judge.
*
The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Darren Howell was convicted by a jury of two counts of deprivation of
rights under color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242, committed during the
course of his employment as a correctional officer at the San Juan County
Detention Center in Aztec, New Mexico. He was sentenced to 87 months
imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Because we
conclude that the district court violated Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) in refusing to
admit evidence for impeachment purposes of the nature of the prior felony
convictions of numerous witnesses without first conducting the required
balancing test under Rule 403, we reverse Howell’s conviction and sentence and
remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.
BACKGROUND
The incidents of which Howell was convicted occurred in late 1997 at the
Detention Center. Elizabeth Stallings was booked into the Center on October 27,
1997. The guards had difficulty managing her because she was apparently under
the influence of drugs or alcohol. Inmate Sandra Lucero testified that Howell
asked her to start a fight with Stallings, but Lucero refused. Inmate Belinda
Serrano testified that Howell asked her do the same thing, and she then hit
Stallings twice in the jaw. Serrano testified that Howell asked her to beat
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Stallings because Stallings was “giving the guards a hard time.” R. Vol. IV, Tr.
of Proceedings 8/15/00 at 136.
Inmate Levester Steen testified that he and Howell had a relationship
involving drugs. Steen testified that Howell told him that inmate Randy Gilmore
was a “snitch” and that he (Howell) and Gilmore had a prior problem concerning
a drug deal. Steen testified that Howell indicated to him that he wanted Steen to
beat up Gilmore. When Steen asked for proof that Gilmore was a “snitch,” Steen
testified that Howell gave Steen a copy of a probable cause statement showing
Gilmore was a “snitch.” Steen stated he held the statement up against the window
of the adjoining cell block in which Gilmore resided, and the inmates in
Gilmore’s cell block proceeded to beat him up until Steen directed them to stop.
Steen further testified that Howell rewarded him with cigarettes and marijuana.
Steen also testified that Howell asked him to beat up inmate Paul Collette
because Collette owed Howell money for drugs and cigarettes. Steen stated he
declined and another inmate beat up Collette. Inmate Mitch Westbrook testified
to the same basic facts involving Howell, Steen and Gilmore. Westbrook also
testified that Howell took him to visit with some police detectives to whom he
was giving information and, after Westbrook returned to his cell, Westbrook’s
cellmate told him that Howell had told inmates that he (Westbrook) was talking
with detectives, and soon thereafter several inmates beat up Westbrook.
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Howell was indicted for the beatings of Stallings and Gilmore. In all,
twelve inmates testified in support of the government’s case against Howell. The
defense presented testimony from five inmates. At a pretrial hearing to resolve
contested issues concerning the admission of evidence at trial, there was a
discussion about the admissibility under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a) of evidence of
various witnesses’ prior felony convictions, for impeachment purposes. Rule 609
provides as follows:
(a) General rule . For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the
crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence
that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted
if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
Fed. R. Evid. 609(a). Rule 403, in turn, provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
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During the course of the discussion, the prosecutor opined that the fact that
a witness has a prior felony conviction is admissible under Rule 609, but not the
nature of the conviction. Defense counsel disagreed, responding affirmatively
when the court asked him if “what you want to do is to prove the nature of every
conviction [and] the date of every conviction.” R. Vol. III, Tr. of Proceedings
8/14/2000 at 10. Defense counsel also asked the court to determine the extent of
the information admissible about a witness’ felony conviction on a witness-by-
witness basis. Id. at 9.
The court ruled on this issue as follows:
“[A]fter having thought back to other cases in which this issue came
up, I have limited the testimony about convictions to the fact of
conviction, unless there was no objection to it by the other side. And
I think that that is the basis given in the federal rules of evidence for
even permitting the evidence, that is, the fact of conviction, not what
the conviction was for, with the exception of those convictions that
are based upon fraud or dishonesty, failure to tell the truth, those
kinds of convictions.
. . . So I’m going to limit the testimony with respect to impeachment
based upon convictions to the fact of conviction, and if you want the
date of conviction, number of convictions.
Id. at 50.
Howell argues on appeal that the district court’s blanket exclusion of
evidence of the “nature of [the] government witnesses’ felony convictions without
any reference to Rule 403, any discussion or findings concerning the pertinent
factors, or any apparent awareness of the need to balance the probative value of
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the evidence against the risk of prejudice” was an error which was not harmless
and requires a reversal of his conviction. Br. of Appellant at 17. Because we
agree with Howell on this point, we need not address the other issues he raises on
appeal.
DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Lugo , 170 F.3d 996, 1005 (10th Cir. 1999).
A court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an error of law.
United States v. Tan , 254 F.3d 1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001).
In interpreting the scope of Rule 609, we begin with the Rule’s relevant
language. Rule 609 states “ evidence that a witness . . . has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403 .” Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) (emphasis
added). The questions this case presents are (1) whether the “evidence” of the
prior conviction necessarily includes information about the nature of the
conviction, or whether the mere fact of conviction is sufficient; (2) whether,
before admitting such “evidence,” the court must always conduct a Rule 403
balancing and whether it did so in this case; and (3) if we conclude that the court
erred in excluding evidence about the nature of the government witnesses’ felony
convictions, whether that error necessitates reversal of Howell’s conviction.
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I. Whether evidence of prior conviction includes the nature
of the conviction
We have held in several cases involving the admissibility of prior
convictions of the accused , that “[o]rdinarily, it is improper for the prosecution to
examine into the details of the crime for which the accused was convicted. The
cross-examination should be confined to a showing of the essential facts of
convictions, the nature of the crimes , and the punishment.” United States v.
Albers , 93 F.3d 1469, 1479-80 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Wolf ,
561 F.2d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added)). While those statements
in Albers and Wolf involved introduction of evidence of the accused ’s former
felony conviction, not that of a simple witness, the Rule in fact demonstrates a
greater concern about admitting potentially prejudicial information about the
accused than about a mere witness. 1
Thus, we see no reason why we should
interpret Rule 609(a)(1) to permit introduction of evidence of the nature of an
accused’s prior felony conviction, but not evidence of the nature of a witness’s
prior felony conviction. Accordingly, our relatively sparse case law supports
1
The Rule provides that evidence of a prior conviction of a witness shall be
admitted unless, pursuant to Rule 403, its probative value is substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. In contrast, evidence of a prior conviction of
the accused shall be admitted unless its probative value is merely outweighed by
its prejudicial effect. See 28 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 6134 at 230 (1993) (“Rule 609(a)(1) is intended to make
it harder to admit conviction evidence when offered against an accused than it is
when offered against another witness.”).
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Howell’s argument that the “evidence” of a felony conviction for impeachment
purposes under Rule 609(a)(1) ordinarily should include the nature of that felony
conviction.
Furthermore, other circuits, as well as commentators, considering this issue
have also held that “Rule 609(a)(1) requires a district court to admit evidence of
the nature and number of a non-defendant witness’ prior felony convictions.”
United States v. Burston , 159 F.3d 1328, 1336 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added);
see also United States v. Fawley , 137 F.3d 458, 473 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that
the court “has previously held that a prosecutor’s questions on cross-examination
must be limited to only whether the witness ‘had previously been convicted of a
felony, to what the felony was and to when the conviction was obtained’”)
(quoting United States v. Dow , 457 F.2d 246, 250 (7th Cir. 1972)) (emphasis
added); Doe v. Sullivan County , 956 F.2d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that, in
a section 1983 action, evidence surrounding a witness’s prior felony conviction
should include “the nature of the crime , the number of counts, and the date of the
disposition.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Guerue , 875 F.2d 189, 190 (8th
Cir. 1989) (holding that, with respect to a prior felony conviction of the
defendant, “the district court should have admitted evidence of both the earlier
conviction and its nature”). See also generally , 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret
A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 609.20[2] at 609-57 to -60 (“When a
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prior conviction is admissible for impeachment, the impeaching party is generally
limited to establishing the bare facts of the conviction: usually the name of the
offense, the date of the conviction, and the sentence. . . . It may also be improper
for the trial court to limit impeachment to the mere fact of a prior conviction,
without allowing the impeaching party to specify the nature and number of
offenses involved. Circuits that have considered the impeachment of a non-
defendant witness have concluded that Rule 609(a)(1) requires the trial court to
admit evidence of the nature and date of each conviction, subject to Rule 403
balancing.”); Wright & Gold, supra n.1, § 6134 at 221-27 (examining the various
approaches and concluding that the best one, and the one most favored by courts
and commentators, limits admissibility to the “essential facts” of the conviction,
which include the number of convictions, the nature of each underlying crime, the
time and place of each conviction, and the punishment).
Furthermore, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit’s explanation of why
information about the nature of a witness’s felony conviction is relevant:
The implicit assumption of Rule 609 is that prior felony
convictions have probative value. Their probative value, however,
necessarily varies with their nature and number. Evidence of a
murder conviction says something far different about a witness’
credibility than evidence of a conviction for a minor drug offense,
although both may constitute a prior felony conviction. Furthermore,
evidence of fifteen murder convictions says something different
about a witness’ credibility than evidence of only one such
conviction. We are not certain what evidence of two convictions for
theft by taking, one conviction for armed robbery, and one conviction
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for aggravated assault says about [the witness’] credibility, but we
are certain that the jury should have been given the opportunity to
make that decision.
Burston , 159 F.3d at 1335 (footnote and citation omitted). We therefore conclude
that the district court erred in adopting a blanket rule that the nature of the
government witnesses’ felony convictions was categorically inadmissible. We
hold that, ordinarily, evidence of a witness’s felony conviction shall include
information about the nature of that conviction unless, after Rule 403 balancing,
the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
II. Rule 403 balancing
Rule 609 expressly states that the evidence of a felony conviction “shall be
admitted, subject to Rule 403.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). Our cases have
emphasized the mandatory nature of that Rule 403 balancing. See , e.g. , Gust v.
Jones , 162 F.3d 587, 596 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Rule 609(a)(1) requires , in addition
to a threshold length and severity of punishment, an application of the balancing
test of Federal Rule of Evidence 403.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Begay ,
144 F.3d 1336, 1338 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Rule 403 balancing applies unless the
prior crime involves dishonesty or false statements.”) (emphasis added); cf.
United States v. Mejia-Alarcon , 995 F.2d 982, 987 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[A]ny
final determination as to admissibility under Rule 609(a)(1) rests on a balancing
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of the probative value and prejudicial effect of the conviction.”) (emphasis
added); United States v. Linn , 31 F.3d 987, 992 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting in dicta
that “[i]n 609(a)(1), the rule requires the judge to weigh prejudice.”); United
States v. Owens , 723 F.2d 64, 65 (10th Cir. 1983) (“[A]n automatic decision by a
trial court to permit the Government to cross-examine an inmate-witness
concerning any or all prior criminal convictions, without carefully applying the
balancing test we set forth in [ United States v.] Rosales [,680 F.2d 1304, 1306
(10th Cir. 1981)], would in and of itself be a clear abuse of discretion.”). 2
Moreover, we have indicated that we are more deferential to the district
court’s decision concerning the admissibility of evidence of a felony conviction
where the court has conducted such balancing. See Begay , 144 F.3d at 1338 (“We
While Mejia-Alarcon involved the attempted use of a prior felony
2
conviction for impeachment of the accused, not a witness, Begay and Gust
involved, respectively, the attempted use of a conviction to impeach a government
witness and the attempted use of a conviction to impeach the plaintiff in a civil
case. Thus, we have interpreted the Rule’s statement that evidence of a witness’s
felony conviction shall be admitted “subject to Rule 403” to require 403
balancing.
Likewise, the Advisory Committee Note to the 1990 Amendments to Rule
609, in which the Rule 403 language was added, explains that “[t]he amendment
reflects the view that it is desirable to protect all litigants from the unfair use of
prior convictions, and that the ordinary balancing test of Rule 403, which
provides that evidence shall not be excluded unless its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs its probative value, is appropriate for assessing the
admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment of any witness other than a
criminal defendant.” Fed. R. Evid. 609, Advisory Committee Note.
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. . . afford substantial deference when the district court has engaged in the
balancing required by Federal Rule of Evidence 609.”); United States v. Smith , 10
F.3d 724, 727 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e give considerable deference to the district
court where the court has engaged in the weighing process prescribed by” Rule
609.). We therefore conclude that the district court in this case should have
conducted a Rule 403 balancing before determining to exclude all evidence of the
witnesses’s prior convictions other than the fact and date of such convictions. We
now consider whether we are satisfied that it did in fact engage in such weighing.
In addressing situations involving the balancing of probative value against
prejudicial effect of felony convictions used to impeach an accused, we have held
that “this circuit has not adopted a requirement that trial courts make explicit
findings in determining the admissibility of prior convictions. While explicit
findings enable the appellate court to ensure the proper application of Rule 609,
explicit findings are not ‘an absolute requirement the nonperformance of which
mandates reversal.’” United States v. Sides , 944 F.2d 1554, 1561 (10th Cir.
1991) (quoting United States v. Jackson , 627 F.2d 1198, 1208-09 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(further citations omitted)).
This is not a case, however, where we are confident the district court
conducted the required balancing but simply failed to make explicit findings in
the record. Rather, it appears the judge made a blanket ruling that the fact and
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date of the witnesses’ felony convictions could be admitted but nothing else and
implicitly determined that no Rule 403 balancing was required. We hold that
such a ruling was an abuse of discretion. In determining which essential facts,
such as the nature of the conviction and their number, are admissible to impeach a
witness, the court must conduct a Rule 403 balancing to weigh the probative value
of such evidence against its prejudicial effect, its potential to confuse or mislead
the jury, and any other pertinent Rule 403 considerations. While we do not
require explicit findings in the record, we must be able to satisfy ourselves that
the court engaged in such balancing before ruling on the admissibility of the
evidence of a prior felony conviction. We can obtain no such satisfaction in this
case. 3
Finally, we do not suggest that courts must always admit evidence of the
nature of a prior felony conviction. After conducting the Rule 403 balancing, the
The government suggests that the district court must have agreed with the
3
prosecutor’s argument that the nature of the felony convictions of all the
witnesses should be excluded to avoid “tit for tat” arguments, “battling out who’s
got the worst witness.” R. Vol. III, Tr. of Proceedings 8/14/2000 at 15, 17. That,
however, is a potential problem whenever there are witnesses testifying for
different parties, each of whom has a prior felony conviction. That cannot, by
itself, justify a blanket exclusion of evidence of the nature of all witnesses’ felony
convictions. Moreover, while the district court could, in conducting the Rule 403
balancing, determine that the admission of such evidence would, in the particular
circumstances of the case before it, confuse, mislead or distract the jury, we
simply cannot conclude that the court in this case conducted the required analysis
to reach that conclusion.
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court may determine that evidence of the conviction, or certain aspects of
evidence of the conviction, are properly excluded. See United States v. Ford , 17
F.3d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 1994) (“It is within the district court’s discretion to
conclude that the nature of [the witness’s prior felony conviction] might inflame
the jury.”). We simply hold that the court must conduct a Rule 403 balancing
before determining what information about a witness’s prior felony conviction,
including its nature, should be admitted or excluded.
III. Harmless error
Ordinarily, once we have determined that the court erred in its decision
concerning the admission or exclusion of evidence concerning prior felony
convictions of witnesses, we would “consider whether the error was harmless.
Because defendant alleges no constitutional error, we [would] apply the harmless-
error analysis of Kotteakos v. United States , 328 U.S. 750 (1946).” Mejia-
Alarcon , 995 F.2d 982, 990 (10th Cir. 1993). Kotteakos provides that a non-
constitutional error is harmless unless “the error . . . had substantial influence” on
the outcome of the trial “or if one is left in grave doubt” as to its influence.
Kotteakos , 328 U.S. at 765. “In the context of Rule 609, error is harmless if the
witness’ credibility was sufficiently impeached by other evidence, or if the
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Government’s case was strong enough to support a conviction even apart from the
witness’ testimony.” Burston , 159 F.3d at 1336.
However, this is not the typical case where we simply evaluate the entire
record to determine whether the exclusion of the particular pieces of evidence had
a substantial influence on the jury. Rather, this is a case where the court
categorically excluded all reference to the nature of the witnesses’ prior felony
convictions. It therefore did no 403 balancing at all, and, as a result, we cannot
tell from the record the exact nature of those felony convictions, nor can we
assess their potential influence on the jury’s evaluation of the witnesses’
credibility. Lacking any basis in this record for determining what would have
been admissible, in whole or in part, had the court conducted the Rule 403
balancing, we are obliged to proceed on the assumption that all of the evidence of
the nature of the witnesses’ felony convictions would have been admissible.
Assuming that all such evidence should have been admitted, we have little
trouble concluding that its exclusion had a substantial influence on the outcome
of this case. The evidence against Howell was not overwhelming, and the jury
encountered considerable difficulty reaching its verdict. As Howell argues, there
was little evidence of motive for Howell to order the beating of Stallings, and
there was evidence that many inmates had their own motive for beating Gilmore
because several witnesses testified that there was a general awareness of the fact
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that Gilmore was a “snitch” and that “snitches” were routinely beaten. Moreover,
the jury deliberated for some seventeen to eighteen hours, and then informed the
court that it was unable to reach a verdict. After going home for the evening, the
jury was given an Allen instruction the following morning and deliberated for
approximately an hour and one-half more before returning a guilty verdict on both
counts.
Additionally, the vast majority of the evidence in support of the
government’s case was the testimony of the inmates with prior felony convictions.
Twelve of the government’s total of seventeen witnesses were those inmates.
Their testimony was obviously crucial to the government’s case against Howell.
These inmate witnesses had prior convictions for, among other things,
intimidation of a witness, aggravated battery, burglary, drug offenses and firearms
offenses. R. Vol. III, Tr. of Proceedings 8/14/00 at 8-9. The prosecutor indicated
that one or two of them had homicide convictions. Id. at 18. 4 Although we note
that there was some impeaching evidence presented with respect to some of these
witnesses, 5 given the fact that the government’s entire case rested primarily on the
4
As indicated above, because of the court’s ruling, we do not know the
exact nature of all the witnesses’ prior felony convictions.
5
A guard testifying for the government said that witnesses Serrano and
Lucero were probably not honest people. Two guards testifying for the defense
stated that Steen was probably not truthful. The jury also learned that several
inmate witnesses had received immunity in exchange for their testimony against
(continued...)
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testimony of inmates with multiple prior felony convictions, and that the jury
obviously found the case to be extremely close, we cannot say it was harmless
error to categorically exclude all evidence, for impeachment purposes, of the
nature of those inmates’ prior felony convictions without conducting the required
Rule 403 balancing. Cf. United States v. Cavender , 228 F.3d 792, 799-800 (7th
Cir. 2000) (holding that exclusion of evidence of prior felony conviction of key
government witness was not harmless with respect to defendant against whom the
government had little other evidence).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we REVERSE Howell’s conviction and sentence
and REMAND this case.
(...continued)
5
Howell and that several had used aliases in the past.
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