United States v. Overholt

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
OCT 10 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. Nos. 00-5074 and 00-5081
MAC DEWAYNE OVERHOLT and
KOTESWARA ATTALURI,

Defendants-Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NOS. 98-CR-161-004-C, 98-CR-161-001-C)

William D. Lunn, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant Attaluri.

Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender, and James P. Moran, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, on the brief for Defendant-Appellant
Overholt.

Todd S. Aagaard, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Environment &
Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellee in Case No.
00-5081 (John C. Cruden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Washington, D.C.,
David E. O’Meilia, United States Attorney, Kevin Leitch, Assistant United States
Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, John A. Bryson and Andrew D. Goldsmith, Attorneys,
United States Department of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division,
Washington, D.C., with him on the brief in both cases).
Before EBEL , BALDOCK , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.

HARTZ , Circuit Judge.

Introduction.

Defendant Koteswara Attaluri was president of Allied Environmental

Services (Allied), which was hired to take petroleum-impacted wastewater from

several Department of Defense installations and dispose of it properly. Allied

employed Overholt Trucking, owned by Defendant DeWayne “Mac” Overholt, to

perform hauling incident to the project. The gist of the charges against

Defendants is that they unlawfully injected the wastewater into disposal wells and

tried to cover up their crimes.

Allied, Attaluri, and Overholt were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 371 on a

charge that they entered into a conspiracy with five objects: (1) improperly

disposing of petroleum-impacted wastewater, in violation of the Safe Drinking

Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h, et seq.; (2) transporting hazardous wastes

without a manifest, in violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1); (3) using the mails in the commission of a

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; (4) using interstate wire communications

in the commission of a fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and (5) defrauding

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the United States by obstructing the lawful environmental protection functions of

the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Defense. In

five special verdicts, the jury found that they conspired to commit each of the

alleged objects of the conspiracy.

All three were also convicted of a substantive count of mail fraud. In

addition, Overholt was convicted on two counts of discharging a pollutant into

United States waters, in violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1311(a), 1319(c)(2)(A); one count of illegally transporting hazardous waste, in

violation of the RCRA; and one count of making false statements to the federal

government in the course of an investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

Although Allied and Attaluri were also charged on the two CWA counts, they

were acquitted. Co-defendant Gary Bicknell, an Allied employee, was acquitted

of all charges against him. Attaluri was sentenced to a 55-month prison term;

Overholt received an 87-month sentence. Each was ordered to pay restitution of

$1,265,078.

Attaluri and Overholt raise numerous issues on appeal. (Allied did not

appeal.) Attaluri claims that the jury instructions (1) did not accurately set forth

the law regarding what wastes could be injected into the disposal wells used by

Defendants, (2) misled the jury regarding what constitutes hazardous waste, and

(3) improperly indicated that the offense of defrauding the United States did not

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require an intent to deceive. He also claims he was entitled to instructions that

(4) the SDWA imposes criminal sanctions only on those who know the law they

are violating and (5) the SDWA does not impose criminal penalties for violations

committed in good faith ignorance of the law. In addition, Attaluri raises several

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conspiracy and mail

fraud convictions; and Overholt challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

support any of his convictions except making false statements.

Both Defendants also claim various errors regarding their sentences.

Attaluri contends on several grounds that the restitution award was improper and

excessive, and complains that the district court did not set a payment schedule.

He also contests two factors used to enhance his sentence under the United States

Sentencing Guidelines, contending that the district court miscalculated the loss

from fraud when applying U.S.S.G. § 2F1.l and should not have applied U.S.S.G.

§ 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A), because the waste was not discharged into the environment and

did not contaminate the environment. Overholt contends that the district court

improperly enhanced his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for his role as an

“organizer or leader of a criminal activity” and improperly considered two

misdemeanors when determining his criminal history category.

Attaluri and Overholt appealed separately. We heard oral argument on

Attaluri’s appeal but, at the request of both the Government and Overholt, no oral

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argument was held in his case. Nevertheless, we consolidate these cases because

of the overlap of facts and issues. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We reverse the mail fraud convictions and affirm all other convictions. We also

affirm the sentences, except that we remand to the district court to set a payment

schedule for restitution by Attaluri.

I. Background.

We begin with the factual background. Additional evidence will be

described as needed in the discussion of the specific issues on appeal.

The Defendants’ Businesses and Disposal Wells.

In 1994 Allied successfully bid to become a subcontractor on four

Department of Defense contracts for the removal of underground petroleum

storage tanks (USTs) at various military sites throughout the Midwest. The

primary contractor would unearth the UST and rinse out any remaining oil sludge

or chemical residue. Allied was responsible for hauling the rinsewater to its

treatment facility at Bonner Springs, Kansas, where it was to remove any refined

petroleum product (which it could sell) and properly dispose of the treated

wastewater.

Allied hired independent trucking companies to fulfill its hauling needs.

Overholt Trucking was hired from November 1994 to May 1995. Although Allied

made representations to the government contractors that it would haul wastewater

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from Bonner Springs to publicly owned wastewater treatment facilities, Overholt

truckers were often instructed to inject untreated wastewater into disposal wells in

Oklahoma. On some occasions Overholt truckers picked up the wastewater from

tanks at Bonner Springs. At other times they would arrive at Bonner Springs and

simply pick up loads directly from other trucks coming in from the government

sites. And at still other times, they would go to the government sites themselves,

pick up the rinsewater, and proceed directly to a disposal well, bypassing Bonner

Springs altogether. Overholt acted to conceal his company’s use of the disposal

wells by instructing his drivers to falsify bills of lading to misrepresent the origin

and characteristics of the loads and by telling drivers to use the disposal wells at

night.

The well owners eventually refused admittance to Overholt’s drivers

because of Overholt’s delinquencies in paying disposal fees and their suspicions

that his drivers were dumping illegal wastes. As an alternative, Overholt used the

Peko tank battery, a collection of a dozen above-ground oil storage tanks (OSTs)

near Drumright, Oklahoma. Despite never receiving permission to use the tanks,

Overholt began instructing his drivers to dump truckloads of wastewater there.

In addition to hauling, Overholt had a side-business trading in “burner

fuel,” a combustible product made from petroleum-based waste. Overholt would

treat sludge built up in the bottom of OSTs with a chemical thinning agent, pump

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out the resulting “blended oil tank bottom” burner fuel, and sell it for use in

industrial furnaces.

The Hillside Dump.

On December 31, 1994, one of Overholt’s drivers, Bob Fleming,

transported a truckload of wastewater from a military site to Oklahoma for

dumping in a disposal well. When he arrived at the well, Fleming was unable to

empty the truck’s contents because the cold weather had frozen its exit valve.

Fleming drove the truck to Overholt’s property and left it there, explaining the

situation to Overholt. Overholt attempted to fix the valve by beating on it with a

hammer. The frozen valve broke, and the truck’s contents started spilling down

the adjacent hillside. Overholt waited for the spill to abate and replaced the

valve. He finished his work around 4:00 a.m. and went to bed.

Early the next morning a neighbor of Overholt’s awoke to find that the

adjacent creek contained a black, smelly substance that gave off a “real forceful,

pungent odor,” and stung his eyes and nose. The neighbor called the local deputy

sheriff and the Army Corps of Engineers to investigate. The spill was traced to

the hill abutting Overholt’s property, where a wide trail of dead vegetation led up

the hill to Overholt’s tanker truck, still parked in his yard.

When Overholt arose that morning, he found the investigators on his

property. While repeatedly disclaiming responsibility for the spill, he offered to

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clean it up and proceeded to vacuum the waste out of the creek. As soon as the

investigators left, the neighbor observed Overholt dumping the pollutants back

into the creek. Four to five days after the spill, the neighbor drove to Lake

Keystone at the end of the creek and observed oil collecting on the shore. No

further investigation into this incident was conducted.

The Carburetor-Cleaner Incident and Subsequent Investigation.

In the conduct of his burner fuel business, Overholt sometimes used as a

thinner a carburetor cleaner containing ortho-dichlorobenzene, a chlorinated

solvent listed as a hazardous material under EPA regulations. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 261.33(f), Hazardous Waste No. U070 (1,2 dichlorobenzene). On May 9, 1995,

an Overholt driver hauled a large quantity of the carburetor cleaner to Bonner

Springs and put it into one of the tanks to help extract the sludge. With some

carburetor cleaner still in his truck, the driver then loaded the contents from

another Bonner Springs tank and took it to Peko.

Later that day an Oklahoma Corporation Commission field inspector was

driving past Peko when he noticed a tanker truck parked next to one of the tanks.

Because he thought Peko had been abandoned, he decided to investigate. He saw a

man next to the cab of the tanker truck, covered in open sores, working diligently

to shovel dirt over a 10-foot puddle of a clear liquid that smelled like carburetor

cleaner. The man said the liquid was oil. The inspector told the man that it was

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not oil and asked who owned it. The man said that he did not know. Frustrated

with the man’s stonewalling, the inspector copied down the tanker’s license plate

number and continued on his rounds.

After the license check revealed that the truck was Overholt’s, the

Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ) launched an

investigation. On May 12, ODEQ investigators first stopped at Peko, where vapor

readings from the tanks’ hatches indicated the presence of organic solvents. The

investigation team then proceeded to Overholt’s residence, where they noticed that

one of the two tanker trucks parked there bore the license tag reported three days

earlier. Overholt told the investigators he was hauling gas, oil, and diesel fuel for

Allied, and that he was going to use these materials to make burner fuel. He stated

that the tanker with the reported license tag contained burner fuel. Although at

first he said the other tanker was empty, he then said it contained diesel fuel. As

an investigator was taking samples, however, Overholt volunteered that he didn’t

know what would be in the oil because “you know how the government is.”

On May 15 an ODEQ investigator contacted Attaluri to inquire about

Allied’s business relationship with Overholt Trucking. She asked him to provide

documentation relating to that relationship. Two days later another ODEQ

investigator followed up on the document request. Attaluri agreed to fax the

requested documents that day, but no fax was sent. That same day Attaluri

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telephoned Overholt’s residence and Overholt then telephoned one of his drivers to

ask him to prepare a number of false, back-dated bills of lading indicating that he

had hauled burner fuel from Bonner Springs to Peko every Wednesday between

March 1, 1995, and April 26, 1995. The driver complied. The Attaluri residence

received a call from Overholt’s residence that evening. The next day Overholt

mailed the falsified bills of lading to Attaluri.

On May 19 an ODEQ investigative team performed tests that revealed ortho-

dichlorobenzene contamination at Peko and at Overholt’s residence. The ODEQ

executed a search warrant for Overholt’s residence on June 22. Additional soil

samples confirmed the presence of ortho-dichlorobenzene. Six days later,

investigators from the ODEQ and the Department of Defense interviewed Overholt

at his home. Overholt told them that he had deposited 20 to 30 drums of

carburetor cleaner into the two small OSTs on his property and that his drivers had

taken some to Peko to clean out the tank bottoms there. The investigators told

Overholt that the tanks contained ortho-dichlorobenzene, a hazardous material, and

that he should not blend or otherwise dispose of anything in his tanker trucks or in

the tanks on his property. When asked about the dead vegetation on his property

and the appearance of a spill or a chemical dump, Overholt denied having

knowledge of any chemical spills or dumps on his property.

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 Immediately thereafter, Overholt called Industrial Oil Service, a waste-oil

hauling company not licensed to carry hazardous materials, and made

arrangements to empty the OSTs on his property. When the driver arrived two

days later, he told Overholt that he suspected the fluid in the OSTs was a solvent.

Overholt insisted that it was diesel fuel. Before leaving, the driver required

Overholt to sign a shipping manifest certifying that the tanker truck did not

contain any hazardous wastes.

An ODEQ investigator further questioned Overholt on July 25. Overholt

admitted to previously letting rinsewater from his trucks run down the hillside but

stated that he would release only five to ten gallons a week, and claimed that he

had not done so in over a year. Shortly thereafter, he admitted he would

occasionally release hundreds of gallons of rinsewater at a time. The investigator

then asked Overholt about the status of the ortho-dichlorobenzene that he had been

told not to move. After initially responding that it was still there, he stated that it

might not be. He explained that he had hired an oil recycler to pick up some oil

from a red tank on his property, but because he was not present when the driver

arrived, the company might have taken waste from the tanker truck containing the

ortho-dichlorobenzene.

On November 15, 1995, an EPA investigative team obtained a warrant to

search Allied’s office. They found a file folder containing a copy of the

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applicable federal regulations for disposal wells. They also found near Attaluri’s

desk an envelope containing the false bills of lading prepared by Overholt’s driver.

The envelope was postmarked from Oklahoma on May 18, 1995, addressed to

Allied, with Overholt and his wife listed on the return sticker. Attaluri told the

investigators that Overholt was transporting usable oil, which he was free to

process into burner fuel for himself. He said that the waste from this process was

to be “deep-welled,” and that there were no hazardous wastes in anything Overholt

was hauling.

II. Challenges to the Convictions.

A. The Conspiracy Count.

Attaluri and Overholt were both convicted of a conspiracy having five

objects. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty of the conspiracy, and in five

special verdicts stated that the Defendants conspired to achieve each of the alleged

objects. Most of Defendants’ challenges to the conspiracy conviction relate to

fewer than all the objects of the conspiracy—usually only one. As a result, we

need not address every challenge. The conviction can be upheld if we find no

error regarding the conviction as to any one of the conspiratorial objects. See

United States v. McNutt, 908 F.2d 561, 565 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding

defendant’s two-object conspiracy conviction when one of the charged objects was

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not a substantive violation of federal law, but the jury indicated by special verdict

that it convicted on both objects).

At the same time, however, we note that the sentencing determinations

challenged by Attaluri relate to more than one object of the conspiracy. The

challenged restitution award is predicated on conduct related to defrauding the

government. One of the challenges to the enhancement of his sentence also relates

to the commission of fraud against the government, but a second challenge relates

to the improper injection of wastes into disposal wells. We therefore will address

his challenges with respect to those two alleged objects of the conspiracy, but we

need not address other challenges to the verdict on the conspiracy count.

1. Violation of SDWA.

a. Class II Disposal Wells.

Attaluri’s first challenge concerns the allegation that he conspired to inject a

nonpermitted liquid waste into a Class II disposal well. He argues that the

injection was lawful under the governing regulations issued by the Oklahoma

Corporation Commission. We reject the argument because the Oklahoma

regulations are no more permissive than the federal law on which the jury was

instructed.

Before addressing Attaluri’s contentions, we review the pertinent provisions

of the SDWA. The SDWA established a federally mandated, state-administered

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regulatory scheme for the protection of natural sources of drinking water. See

HRI, Inc. v. E.P.A., 198 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 2000). The Act delegates

primary enforcement responsibility to the states. Each state was required to submit

for approval by the EPA an “underground injection control program” designed “to

assure that underground injection will not endanger drinking water sources.” 42

U.S.C. § 300h-1(a)-(b). If the EPA did not approve a program, it was to fashion

regulations applicable to the state. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(c).

All state programs must meet the EPA minimum requirements published in

the Code of Federal Regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(a), (b). The EPA regulations

divide underground injection wells into five classes, each defined by what may be

injected into wells of that class. 40 C.F.R. § 144.6. The regulations establish

minimum construction and maintenance standards for each class. 40 C.F.R. pt.

146. This case involves “Class II” wells, which are “[w]ells which inject fluids:

(1) Which are brought to the surface in connection with natural
gas storage operations, or conventional oil or natural gas production
and may be commingled with waste waters from gas plants which are
an integral part of production operations, unless those waters are
classified as a hazardous waste at the time of injection.

(2) For enhanced recovery of oil or natural gas; and

(3) For storage of hydrocarbons which are liquid at standard
temperature and pressure.”

40 C.F.R. § 144.6(b).

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 Oklahoma’s application for primary enforcement power over Class II wells

was approved on December 2, 1981. See 40 C.F.R. § 147.1851. Oklahoma’s

program delegates regulatory authority over Class II wells to the Oklahoma

Corporation Commission (OCC). Id. The OCC regulations divide wells into four

categories: (1) enhanced recovery injection wells, (2) disposal wells, (3) storage

wells, and (4) simultaneous injection wells. Okla. Admin. Code [OAC] 165:10-5-

1. Each category is a type of Class II well. Only the second category, “disposal

wells,” is at issue in this case. “A disposal well is a well which injects, for

purposes other than enhanced recovery, those fluids brought to the surface in

connection with oil or natural gas production.” OAC 165:10-5-1(2).

The SDWA provides criminal penalties for willful violation “of an

applicable underground injection control program.” 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(b). The

Act defines “applicable underground injection control program” as “the program

(or most recent amendment thereof) (1) which has been adopted by the State and

which has been approved [by the EPA] under subsection (b) of this section . . . .”

42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(d).

Attaluri correctly contends that the Oklahoma regulatory scheme is the

“applicable underground injection control program” in this case. He further

contends, however, that the Oklahoma program allows the allegedly unlawful

injections by Defendants. In particular, he contends that the injection wells

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Overholt used were “commercial disposal wells,” which, in his view, could

properly accept the injected chemicals.

Attaluri’s brief-in-chief asserts (incorrectly, as we shall point out) that the

following definition appears in the Oklahoma regulations at OAC 165:10-1-2:

“Commercial disposal well” is one that: (a) is operated primarily for
profit from the disposal of saltwater and/or other deleterious substances
for a fee; and (b) disposes of saltwater and other deleterious substances
transported by truck to the facilities used in conjunction with said
disposal well or is a disposal well for which none of its owners is an
owner in any of the oil and gas wells which produce the saltwater and/or
other deleterious substances which will be disposed into said disposal
well.

Because the chemicals that a commercial disposal well may accept include

“deleterious substances,” Attaluri infers that such a well can accept all deleterious

substances. “[D]eleterious substances” are defined as “[a]ny chemical, salt water,

oil field brine, waste oil, waste emulsified oil, basic sediment, mud, or injurious

substance produced or used in the drilling, development, production,

transportation, refining, and processing of oil, gas and/or brine mining.” OAC

165:10-1-2. Attaluri notes that Allied was in the business of recycling used oil,

and that the Oklahoma regulations define “recycling” as “the reuse, processing,

reclaiming, treating, neutralizing, or refining of materials and by-products into a

product of beneficial use which, if discarded, would be deleterious substances.”

OAC 165:10-1-2 (emphasis added). He concludes that because Allied was an oil

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recycler, the byproducts of the business were deleterious substances, which, by

definition, could be injected into a commercial disposal well.

Based on this argument, Attaluri challenges the following jury instruction

given at trial:

With reference to the conspiracy charged in Count 1, you are
instructed that the government claims in Count 1 at page 7 that the
defendants . . . conspired to violate or cause to be violated Title 42,
United States Code, section 300h-2(b)(2), which provides that:
Any person who violates any requirement of an
applicable underground injection control program . . . if
such violation is willful, such person . . .
shall be guilty of an offense against the laws of the United States.
The applicable underground injection control program the government
claims were violated are:
Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 144.11, which provides:
Any underground injection, except into a well authorized
by rule or except as authorized by permit . . . is
prohibited.
And, Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 144.6(b)(1), which
provides that Class II injection wells are classified as follows:
Wells which inject fluids . . . Which are brought to the
surface in connection with natural gas storage operations,
or conventional oil or natural gas production and may be
commingled with waste waters from gas plants which are
an integral part of production operations, unless those
waters are classified as a hazardous waste at the time of
injection.

He argues that the instruction improperly refers to federal regulations rather than

to Oklahoma law, which he contends was less restrictive, and that the district court

should have given the following tendered instruction:

The government has alleged that the defendants conspired to commit the
crime of Wilful Injection of Liquid Waste Into a Class II Disposal Well

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 without authority. The government must prove as to each defendant that
he intended to break this law by agreeing to commit the following four
(4) essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) Injected or caused to be injected
(2) A non-permitted liquid waste
(3) Into a Class II disposal well in Oklahoma
(4) Without authority from the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission
The defendant must have wilfully agreed to commit each of
the elements of the offense. [emphasis added]

Before addressing Attaluri’s arguments, we note the standard of review.

The argument on appeal was not raised below. Attaluri points to nothing in the

record, nor have we found anything, indicating an objection by any defendant to

the instruction given by the court. As for the proposed instruction, it does not

suggest that the Oklahoma regulations are more permissive than the federal

regulations. Nor have we been directed to, or found, any indication in the record

that anyone so argued in district court. Therefore, we review for plain error. See

United States v. Fabiano, 169 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (10th Cir. 1999) (failure to

object to a given instruction, even when the defendant offers his own instruction,

does not put the district court “clearly on notice as to the asserted inadequacy,”

and thus plain-error review is appropriate). Following Johnson v. United States,

520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997), we have held:

Under [the plain-error] standard, [the appellant] must show: (1)
an error, (2) that is plain, which means clear or obvious under current
law, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If these three requirements
are met, then we may exercise discretion to correct the error if it

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 seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.

Id. at 1303 (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets in original omitted).

The district court’s instruction defined the “applicable underground

injection control program” as the prohibitions mandated in the EPA regulations,

and it specifically incorporated the definition of a Class II well as expressing what

could legally be injected into the wells at issue in this case. The given instruction

informed the jury that Defendants violated the law if they injected into these wells

anything but “fluids . . . [w]hich are brought to the surface in connection with

natural gas storage operations, or conventional oil or natural gas production and

may be commingled with wastewaters from gas plants which are an integral part of

production operations, unless those waters are classified as a hazardous waste at

the time of injection.” Although it may have been preferable for the instruction to

refer to the Oklahoma regulations, the instruction did not mislead the jury because,

as we now explain, the substantive standard set forth in the instruction conforms to

the Oklahoma regulations.

As previously stated, the Oklahoma regulation defines a “disposal well” as

“a well which injects, for purposes other than enhanced recovery, those fluids

brought to the surface in connection with oil or natural gas production.” OAC

165:10-5-1(2). Comparing this definition to the definition of a Class II well in the

jury instruction, it is clear that nothing can be injected into a disposal well that

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cannot be injected into a Class II well. In fact, Class II is a broader category of

wells than disposal wells.

We are not persuaded by Attaluri’s claim that a different result must follow

because the wells here are “commercial disposal wells.” Attaluri fails to recognize

that commercial disposal wells are a subclass of disposal wells. The actual

definition of “commercial disposal wells” in the Oklahoma regulations (not the

misquote in Attaluri’s brief-in-chief) is:

“Commercial disposal well” means a disposal well which: (A) Is
operated primarily for profit from the disposal of salt water and/or other
deleterious substances for a fee; and (B) Disposes of salt water and/or
other deleterious substances transported by truck to the facilities used in
conjunction with said disposal well or is a disposal well for which none
of its owners is an owner in any of the oil and gas wells which produce
the salt water and/or other deleterious substances which will be disposed
into said disposal well.

OAC 165:10-1-2 (emphasis added). (Attaluri’s misquote replaced “a disposal

well” by “one,” an alteration that could lead to the misconstruction that a

commercial disposal well is not necessarily a disposal well.)

The reference to “deleterious substances” in the definition of “commercial

disposal well” does not imply that such a well can accept all deleterious

substances. Because the well is a disposal well, it can accept only those

deleterious substances that can be accepted by disposal wells. A disposal well can

accept “fluids brought to the surface in connection with oil or natural gas

production . . . .” OAC 165:10-5-1(2). These fluids may well contain deleterious

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substances, as recognized by subpart (B) of the definition of “commercial disposal

well,” which speaks of “a disposal well for which none of its owners is an owner

in any of the oil and gas wells which produce the salt water and/or other

deleterious substances which will be disposed into said disposal well.” OAC

165:10-1-2 (emphasis added). But only deleterious substances from oil or gas

production are permitted to be injected.

Our construction of the Oklahoma regulations is based on the natural

reading of the language. Moreover, we would be loath to adopt an interpretation

of the Oklahoma regulations that, as with Attaluri’s interpretation, would make

them more permissive than the minimum requirements set by the EPA, which all

state programs are obliged to satisfy. Thus, we find no plain error in the jury

instruction setting forth what substances could be injected into the wells at issue.

Finally, we note that Attaluri devotes several pages of his brief-in-chief to a

discussion of United States v. Lewis, No. CR-99-50-B, a case from the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. The defendant

in Lewis was also prosecuted on a charge of improperly disposing of fluids down a

commercial disposal well. The district court in that case dismissed the charge,

apparently adopting the view Attaluri urges here regarding what substances are

permitted to be injected into such wells in Oklahoma. Because this court is not

bound by that decision, see Abeyta ex rel. Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch.

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Dist., No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 1996), we have not reviewed the

transcript of that trial (attached as part of the appendix to Attaluri’s brief-in-chief)

to determine whether the facts distinguish that case from this one. See also Boone

v. Carlsbad Bancorporation, Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1549 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992) (court

of appeals will not review documents not before the district court). To the extent

that the reasoning of that court is persuasive, Attaluri was, of course, free to

present that reasoning on this appeal. Otherwise, that decision has no bearing

here.

b. Jury Instruction on Willfulness.

In defining the alleged conspiratorial object of violating the SDWA, the

district court’s instruction to the jury stated:

Any person who violates any requirement of an applicable underground
injection control program . . . if such violation is willful, such person . . .
shall be guilty of an offense against the laws of the United States.

(emphasis added). Attaluri claims that the district court improperly instructed the

jury on the meaning of “willful.”

The jury instruction given at trial states that an act was committed

“willfully” if it “was committed voluntarily and purposefully, with the specific

intent to do something the law forbids; that is with bad purpose either to disobey

or disregard the law.” Attaluri submitted an instruction that reads: “To commit a

crime willfully requires knowledge of the reporting or permit requirement and a

-22-
specific intent to commit the crime, i.e., a purpose to disobey the law.” In other

words, Attaluri would require that the government prove not only that he acted

“with bad purpose either to disobey the law or disregard the law,” but also that he

knew the specific provision of the law he violated.

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning the state of mind required

for a criminal offense does not provide the clearest of guidance in construing

criminal statutes. See generally Note, Mens Rea in Federal Criminal Law, 111

Harv. L. Rev. 2402 (1998). In particular, the word “willfully” has been interpreted

to have different meanings in different statutes. See Spies v. United States, 317

U.S. 492, 497 (1943) (“willful . . . is a word of many meanings”).

Attaluri would have us apply the definition of the term adopted in Ratzlaf v.

United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994). In that case, Ratzlaf needed to pay a

$160,000 gambling debt to a Nevada casino. Id. at 137. He planned to make a

$100,000 cash payment, but a casino official informed him that federal and state

law would require the casino to report any cash payment exceeding $10,000. Id.

The official and others suggested that Ratzlaf could pay the debt without

triggering the reporting requirements if he used his cash to obtain cashiers checks

of $10,000 or less from a variety of banks. Id. Ratzlaf did so, after the casino

supplied a limousine to take him to the banks. Id.

-23-
 Ratzlaf was charged under 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3) for violating

the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act by willfully structuring a

transaction to evade the Act’s reporting requirements. Id. The Supreme Court

held that the statutory requirement of willfulness required proof that the defendant

knew that his conduct was unlawful. Id. at 145-49. It was not enough to know the

reporting requirement and intend to circumvent it by structuring the transaction

into sub-$10,000 transactions; the defendant must also have known that the law

prohibited such structuring. Id.

Attaluri states: “The opinion in Ratzlaf expressed concern that persons

engaged in ‘small businesses’ conducting activities ‘not inevitably nefarious’

could unintentionally become criminally liable for violating ‘the complex of

provisions’ in which currency structuring laws ‘are embedded.’ This rationale

applies to this case.” Reply Br. at 13-14 (citation and miscitation omitted). He

proceeds to argue that environmental regulations are now more complex than the

tax laws and that the government’s interpretation of willfulness would impose an

improper risk on all people—from truckers to warehousemen to clerks—who “have

anything to do with environmental related activities.” Id. at 15.

We reject Attaluri’s argument. He reads too much into Ratzlaf and fails to

distinguish contrary authority. First, Ratzlaf must be understood in light of the

specific statutory language involved. Two statutory provisions had to be construed

-24-
together. Section 5324, which at the time contained no criminal penalty, made it

unlawful to structure a transaction “for the purpose of evading a financial

institution’s reporting requirement.” Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 136. Section 5322 made

it a crime to “willfully violat[e]” § 5324 and several other statutory provisions.

The Supreme Court stated that the willfulness requirement of § 5322 would be

rendered mere surplusage if the only required intent were an intent to evade the

reporting requirements, because that intent was already required in § 5324. Id. at

140-41. The Court pointed out that the willfulness requirement of § 5322 had

been given content by lower courts with respect to violations of other sections

referenced in § 5322, id. at 141-42, and noted the general rule that “[a] term

appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each

time it appears.” Id. at 143.

It was in this context that the Court said that it “view[ed] §§ 5322(a) and

5324(3) mindful of the complex of provisions in which they are embedded.” Id. at

141. The Court’s reference to the “complex of provisions” was not, as presented

in Attaluri’s brief, a suggestion that it was imposing the strict mens rea

requirement because the law governing reporting financial transactions was

complex.

To be sure, later in the opinion the Ratzlaf Court supported its interpretation

of “willfully” by noting that “currency structuring is not inevitably nefarious.” Id.

-25-
at 144. But that discussion does not assist Attaluri, because his jury (unlike

Ratzlaf’s, see United States v. Ratzlaf, 976 F.2d 1280, 1282 (9th Cir. 1992)) was

instructed that he was required to act “with bad purpose either to disobey the law

or disregard the law”—which makes the conduct nefarious.

Rather than following Ratzlaf, we look to the Supreme Court’s most recent

opinion addressing the meaning of willful. In Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S.

184 (1998), the defendant was convicted of willfully dealing in firearms without a

federal license and conspiring to do so. Id. at 189. The jury was instructed:

A person acts willfully if he acts intentionally and purposely and
with the intent to do something the law forbids, that is, with the bad
purpose to disobey or to disregard the law. Now, the person need not be
aware of the specific law or rule that his conduct may be violating. But
he must act with the intent to do something that the law forbids.

Id. at 190. The Supreme Court endorsed the instruction. It acknowledged Ratzlaf,

as well as several tax-evasion cases, such as Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192

(1991), which required the jury to “find that the defendant was aware of the

specific provision of the tax code that he was charged with violating.” 524 U.S. at

194. But it distinguished those cases because they “involved highly technical

statutes that presented the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently

innocent conduct.” Id. “As a result,” the Court continued, “we held that these

statutes ‘carv[e] out an exception to the traditional rule’ that ignorance of the law

is no excuse and require that the defendant have knowledge of the law.” Id. at

-26-
194-95 (quoting Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200). Then, in a sentence that applies equally

to this case, the Court said, “The danger of convicting individuals engaged in

apparently innocent activity that motivated our decisions in the tax cases and

Ratzlaf is not present here because the jury found that this petitioner knew that his

conduct was unlawful.” Id. at 195.

In our view, the charge against Attaluri does not belong within the exception

to the rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse. First, as in Bryan itself, the

willfulness instruction here eliminated “[t]he danger of convicting individuals

engaged in apparently innocent activity . . . because the jury found that [Attaluri]

knew that his conduct was unlawful.” Id. at 195.

Moreover, when addressing laws like the SDWA, the Supreme Court has

been particularly resistant to requiring proof of knowledge of the law. In

United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971), the charge

was that the defendant had shipped sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acid in interstate

commerce but knowingly failed to describe the acids properly on the shipping

papers. The Court rejected the argument that the government must prove that the

defendant knew the regulation it was accused of violating. The opinion concluded,

“[W]here . . . dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste

materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is

-27-
aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to

be aware of the regulation.” Id. at 565.

We assume that Attaluri is correct when he asserts that environmental

regulations are now the most complex of federal regulations, exceeding even tax

regulations. But we strongly doubt that as the federal government has sought to

protect the environment by imposing more and more restrictions on those handling

dangerous chemicals, Congress has intended to reduce the burden on such persons

to inform themselves of what the law requires.

In short, we have no reason to believe that the word “willful” in 42 U.S.C. §

300h-2(b)(2) requires proof of knowledge of the regulation allegedly violated. We

have no occasion to consider whether less is required than was set forth by the jury

instruction in this case.

c. Good Faith Instruction.

Attaluri requested a “mistake of law” or “good faith” instruction with

respect to all objects of the alleged conspiracy. The district court gave a good

faith instruction with respect to the allegations of fraud but otherwise refused the

request. On appeal Attaluri challenges the failure to instruct on the defense that

he in good faith misunderstood the law regarding what liquid waste could be

injected into Oklahoma disposal wells.

-28-
 “A defendant is entitled to a good faith instruction when he has interposed

the defense of good faith, has requested the instruction, and when there is

sufficient evidence to support it.” United States v. Janusz, 135 F.3d 1319, 1322

(10th Cir. 1998). We have held that when those conditions are met, a good faith

instruction is required, even if an instruction on willfulness has been given.

United States v. Hopkins, 744 F.2d 716, 718 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc). On this

issue we are an outlier. See United States v. Sirang, 70 F.3d 588, 594 (11th Cir.

1995) (comparing the 1st, 4th, 5th, 8th, and 11th Circuits, which do not require a

good faith instruction for specific intent crimes, with the 10th Circuit, which

does); see also Green v. United States, 474 U.S. 925 (1985) (White, J., dissenting

from denial of certiorari and noting the circuit split on the issue). We therefore

assume that such an instruction would be required here if the factual predicates

were present.

Attaluri relies on the testimony of several witnesses to support his claim.

The evidence, however, establishes only the witnesses’ opinions regarding the law,

not Attaluri’s. Three of these witnesses described conversations that occurred

during the investigation of Overholt’s hillside dump, yet nothing in the record

suggests Attaluri ever knew about any of the conversations. Another witness was

a former owner of a Class II well who testified that he generally understood that

such wells could accept refined petroleum products, but, contrary to an assertion in

-29-
Attaluri’s brief, there was no evidence that he communicated his belief to Attaluri.

A fifth witness was an Allied employee who stated that she signed bills of lading

directing refined petroleum products to be delivered to disposal wells because she

thought there was nothing wrong with such disposal. Finally, when Attaluri cites

to testimony by an OCC employee who opined that it was difficult to know what

could legally be put into a disposal well, he fails to note that the testimony was in

a different trial. Absent from Attaluri’s discussion is any evidence that he

personally believed that the unlawful injection of chemical wastes into the

Oklahoma disposal wells was actually lawful. Thus, he failed to satisfy the final

element of the Janusz test and the district court was not required to give a mistake-

of-law/good-faith-defense instruction. See Janusz, 135 F.3d at 1322-23.

2. Defrauding the United States.

One of the alleged objects of the conspiracy was “to defraud the

United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful

function of the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the

United States Department of Defense.” Attaluri complains that the jury instruction

and verdict form could lead the jury to believe that conduct, “even though done

honestly or without deceitful purpose, that nevertheless impeded or created

difficulties for a government agency, qualified as a federal crime.” Br. at 37.

The argument is unfounded. The pertinent jury instruction was as follows:

-30-
 With further reference to the conspiracy charged in Count 1, you are
instructed that the government claims the defendants . . . also
conspired to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing,
obstructing, and defeating the lawful functions of the Environmental
Protection Agency and the United States Department of Defense to
limit environmental contamination, to enforce environmental
protection standards and to dispose of military wastes properly. In
regard to this allegation, you are instructed that the government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy had as a purpose
to obstruct a lawful function of the government by deceitful or
dishonest means and at least one act in furtherance of such purpose
was accomplished. [emphasis added]

The instruction clearly conveys the requirement of deceit or dishonesty.

As for the verdict form, it stated simply:

VERDICT FORM # 1
as to KOTESWARA ATTALURI
***
Count 1 NOT GUILTY _____________
GUILTY _____________
If you have found the defendant, KOTESWARA ATTALURI, guilty of Count 1,
please indicate whether you unanimously find the defendant conspired to commit:
***
& Defrauding the United States by Impeding, Impairing, Obstructing, and
Defeating the Lawful Functions of the Environmental Protection
Agency or the United States Department of Defense.

Yes ______ No ______

The purpose of the verdict form is not to repeat the elements of the offense. The

language on the form serves only to identify where the jury should indicate its

-31-
verdict on each count or, in the case of the special verdicts, on each alleged object

of the conspiracy. The form nowhere indicates the elements of a conspiracy

charge, or even names the offenses in the other counts. The jury could not

possibly have been misled into believing that it could ignore the elements

instruction. As we have stated before: “The instructions submitted to the jury

contained the language he argues should have been in the verdict form. The fact

that the question on the verdict form does not contain the language the instructions

contain is immaterial.” Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.3d 1291, 1301 (10th Cir.

1998).

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

a. Attaluri Challenge.

Attaluri challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of fraud against the

government if Overholt’s injection of wastes into Class II wells was lawful.

Because we affirm that the injection was unlawful and Attaluri concedes that such

a ruling would moot this challenge, we need not address it further.

b. Overholt Challenge.

Overholt argues that his conspiracy conviction must be overturned because

there was insufficient evidence to prove he knew of the conspiracy’s alleged

common goal or objective. Stating that “[t]he conspiracy’s goal was to receive

payment from the federal government for services that Allied did not render

-32-
properly,” Br. at 20, he asserts that he was unaware of Allied’s specific contractual

obligations to the government and hence could not have had the goal of defrauding

the United States by illegally disposing of the waste. His only interest, he asserts,

was to make a profit by transporting the waste wherever Allied instructed. This

argument, however, relates to only the “fraud” objects of the alleged conspiracy.

He does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the objects of

violating the SDWA or RCRA. Therefore, we need not consider the argument’s

merits. See McNutt, 908 F.2d at 565.

B. Mail Fraud (Overholt and Attaluri).

To convict of mail fraud, it is necessary to prove a use of the mails. The

government relied on Overholt’s mailing of fraudulent bills of lading to Attaluri

on May 18, 1995. Defendants contend that this mailing did not satisfy the

requirements of the mail fraud statute. Overholt challenges his mail fraud

conviction on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the

bills of lading were false or that they were used or intended to be used to defraud

anyone. Attaluri claims that he was an innocent recipient of Overholt’s false bills

of lading.

We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v.

Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 1999). The test is “whether taking the

evidence—both direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences

-33-
to be drawn therefrom—in the light most favorable to the government, a

reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

On May 15, 1995, an ODEQ investigator contacted Attaluri to inquire about

Allied’s business relationship with Overholt Trucking. She asked Attaluri to

provide her with documentation regarding the relationship. Two days later, ODEQ

investigator Michael Freeman telephoned Attaluri and asked for “shipping papers

of any materials that he had shipped to Mr. Overholt.” Although Attaluri agreed to

fax the requested documents to Freeman later in the day, the fax never came. At

3:18 p.m. on the same day, Attaluri telephoned Overholt’s residence. The content

of that conversation is unknown. At 5:55 p.m. Overholt telephoned one of his

drivers, Bob Fleming. Fleming testified that Overholt “wanted to know if I’d

make him up some bills [of lading] for each Wednesday from one certain date to

another and put on it burner fuel, because he said the OCC was coming to check

his paperwork.” Fleming did so, but testified that “these are fake bill[s] of

lading[],” and that he never made the hauls referred to in the documents. At 7:27

that evening Overholt placed a telephone call to the Attaluri residence. The next

day, May 18, Overholt mailed the falsified bills of lading to Attaluri at Allied.

When EPA investigators searched Allied’s offices on November 15, 1995, they

-34-
found the bills of lading on Attaluri’s desk, in a postmarked envelope with

Overholt as the return addressee.

Fleming’s testimony is sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable

doubt that the bills of lading were false and that Overholt had the requisite intent

to defraud. Likewise, the timing of the mailing in relation to Freeman’s telephone

call to Attaluri, particularly in light of the telephone calls made within a few hours

of Freeman’s call, could properly establish that Attaluri was a knowing participant

in this part of the scheme to defraud.

Nevertheless, we must reverse the convictions for mail fraud. There is no

evidence that Defendants ever used the fraudulent bills of lading. Perhaps this is

merely fortuitous. Attaluri may have intended to provide them to Freeman or any

other ODEQ investigator who followed up on Freeman’s call, but no one followed

up. Regardless, the jury was instructed that “[t]he government must prove beyond

a reasonable doubt, however, that the use of the mails furthered, or advanced, or

carried out, in some way, the scheme or plan to defraud.” Although we are not

certain whether the instruction accurately states the law—the mail fraud statute

says that the mailing must be “for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice

or attempting so to do,” 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (emphasis added), which suggests that it

suffices to have the purpose of advancing the scheme when the mailing occurs, but

see United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 835 (7th Cir. 1991) (mail fraud

-35-
conviction overturned because defendants never used the phony credentials

obtained through the mail)—the government has not challenged the instruction at

trial or on appeal, so we adopt it as the law of the case. See United States v.

Romero, 136 F.3d 1268, 1271-73 (10th Cir. 1998).

Despite our setting aside the convictions for mail fraud, the sentences are

not thereby affected. Elimination of the mail fraud conviction would not change

the ultimate offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines for either Defendant.

Also, because our setting aside the mail fraud conviction would not compel the

sentencing court to change in any way its assessment of the substance of

Defendants’ misconduct, we do not think it is a realistic possibility that

eliminating the mail fraud conviction would alter the sentencing court’s exercise

of discretion in fixing the sentence within the guideline range.

C. Discharging Pollutant into Waters of the United States (Overholt).

Overholt contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the

alleged Clean Water Act violation because the Government did not prove that the

oily substance he dumped down the hillside entered the “waters of the

United States.” He does not challenge the definition of “Waters of the United

States” in 40 C.F.R. § 122.2, which includes:

(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams) . . . or natural ponds the use, degradation, or
destruction of which would affect or could affect interstate or foreign

-36-
 commerce including any such waters: (1) Which are or could be used by
interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes; [and]
...

(e) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this
definition . . . .

Nor does he deny that Keystone Lake, an intrastate body of water, is a “water[] of

the United States.” Overholt’s argument appears to be simply that there was no

evidence that the spill entered the lake.

The argument fails on two grounds. First, it was unnecessary for the

government to prove that the spill entered the lake. Under the regulation, the

creek, too, constituted “Waters of the United States,” because it was a tributary of

the lake. See Quivira Mining Co. v. E.P.A., 765 F.2d 126, 129-30 (10th Cir. 1985)

(noting cases holding that nonnavigable streams are “Waters of the United States”

if they are tributaries of navigable waters). Overholt admits that several witnesses

testified that the spill entered the creek. Second, there was sufficient evidence for

the jury to find that the spill entered Keystone Lake itself. An Overholt neighbor

testified that he drove to the end of the creek four or five days after the spill and

saw oil collecting on the shores of Keystone Lake. Hence Overholt’s conviction

on this count must stand.

D. Transporting Hazardous Waste to Facility Without a Permit
(Overholt).

-37-
 The indictment charged Overholt with knowingly causing the transportation

of hazardous materials (carburetor cleaner) to a facility that was not permitted to

accept them. He argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on this

count because the Government failed to prove he knew that the facility where he

sent the carburetor cleaner lacked a hazardous waste permit.

The RCRA provides criminal penalties for “any person who . . . knowingly

transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste identified or listed

under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit under this

subchapter . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1). Although this circuit has not spoken

directly on the issue, those courts that have considered the “knowingly”

requirement under this statute agree that the Government must show that the

defendant knew the facility did not have a hazardous waste permit. See United

States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795, 796 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hayes Int’l

Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986). Because the government does not

argue otherwise on this appeal, we assume without deciding that the government

had to prove that Overholt knew the hazardous waste was being transported to a

facility without a permit.

ODEQ inspectors told Overholt that his storage tanks contained ortho-

dichlorobenzene (a component of the carburetor cleaner) and instructed him not to

remove it. Despite the inspectors’ warnings, Overholt promptly arranged to

-38-
dispose of the hazardous material. He called a trucking company, falsely telling it

that he needed 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel hauled away. The trucking company

did not have a permit to haul or store hazardous materials. Two days later, when

the driver sent to do the job asked Overholt whether the tanks contained some kind

of solvent, Overholt insisted that the substance was diesel fuel. Overholt signed a

manifest stating that the load contained no hazardous materials. He did not ask

anyone at the trucking company whether it carried a hazardous waste permit for its

trucks or disposal facility. When Overholt was questioned a month later by an

ODEQ investigator about what had happened to the hazardous material, he told a

series of lies.

The jury could properly find beyond a reasonable doubt that Overholt would

have had no reason to engage in his consistent pattern of deceit unless he knew the

trucking company lacked a proper permit. See United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071,

1088 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Certainly, the government may prove a defendant had

actual knowledge of a material and operative fact by proving deliberate acts

committed by the defendant from which actual knowledge can be logically

inferred.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Sentencing Issues.

A. Overholt Challenges.

1. Absence of Factual Findings.

-39-
 United States Sentencing Guideline (U.S.S.G.) § 3B1.1(a) provides for an

increase in offense level if the defendant was the “organizer or leader of a criminal

activity.” Overholt objects to the application of this provision by the sentencing

court because it failed to make specific findings of fact. He relies on Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1), which states that at the sentencing hearing, “[f]or

each matter controverted, the court must make either a finding on the allegation or

a determination that no finding is necessary because the controverted matter will

not be taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing.” (Emphasis added).

Overholt cannot invoke this rule, however, because he did not properly

“controvert” the assertion that he was an organizer or leader. The probation office

delivered Overholt’s presentence report (PSR) to him on February 28, 2000. Yet

he raised no objections to the PSR until his sentencing hearing on April 11,

2000—42 days later. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(b)(6)(B),

objections to the PSR must be submitted within 14 days of receipt; the probation

office must then submit the PSR, together with an addendum responding to any

unresolved objections, at least seven days before the sentencing hearing. Fed. R.

Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(C). Because Overholt’s objections were untimely, the

sentencing court could properly proceed as if no objection had been made. The

court was entitled to rely upon the PSR without making independent factual

findings. See United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1500 (10th Cir. 1996)

-40-
(district court not required to hear government’s objections to PSR first raised at

sentencing hearing); United States v. Chung, 261 F.3d 536, 538-39 (5th Cir. 2001)

(district court not required to hear defendant’s objections to PSR first raised at

sentencing hearing).

2. Criminal History Calculation.

Overholt next challenges the determination of his criminal history category

under the Sentencing Guidelines. The sentencing court set the category at level II

based on two 1987 misdemeanor convictions in Oklahoma: (1) dispensing

nonintoxicating alcoholic beverages without a license and (2) contributing to the

delinquency of a minor. Overholt asserts that consideration of these offenses

violated the Guidelines.

In calculating a defendant’s criminal history category, the sentencing court

must consider not only all felonies but also all misdemeanors and petty offenses,

except as provided in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c). Section 4A1.2 (c)(1) lists fifteen

offenses that “are counted only if (A) the sentence was a term of probation of at

least one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days, or (B) the prior

offense was similar to an instant offense.” Section 4A1.2 (c)(2) lists six offenses

that are never considered: hitchhiking, juvenile status offenses and truancy,

loitering, minor traffic infractions, public intoxication, and vagrancy. Any prior

-41-
offense that is “similar” to a listed offense in either category is also excluded.

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1)-(2).

Because Overholt failed to raise his challenge in district court, we review

only for plain error. United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1308 (10th Cir.

2000). Overholt’s two offenses—dispensing nonintoxicating alcoholic beverages

without a license and contributing to the delinquency of a minor—are not listed in

§ 4A1.2(c)(1) or (2). Therefore, Overholt’s challenge can succeed only if his

offense is “similar” to one listed. In assessing similarity, we “examine whether

the underlying behavior necessary to commit the prior misdemeanor shares the

same general characteristics as the behavior required to commit an offense

expressly listed under (c)(1) or (c)(2).” United States v. Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d

1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2001).

Overholt does not specify which of the twenty-one listed offenses is similar

to distributing non-intoxicating alcoholic beverages without a license or

contributing to the delinquency of a minor. He merely asserts that, like his prior

offenses, all the listed offenses are of “relative insignificance.” Such a vague

argument is hardly helpful.

In any event, we fail to see a listed offense that is plainly similar to either of

Overholt’s prior offenses. The PSR describes the actions that formed the predicate

for both of Overholt’s convictions as “caus[ing], aid[ing], abett[ing], and

-42-
encourag[ing] a planned event for high school students between the ages of sixteen

and seventeen years old whereby the students were permitted to enter an

establishment . . . and pay a $5.00 ‘cover charge’ that permitted them to obtain and

drink all the beer they wish[ed] to drink.” None of the offenses listed in U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2(c) has anything to do with facilitating underage drinking. The Fourth

Circuit has held that the Florida offense of selling alcohol to a minor is not similar

to any of the offenses listed in § 4A1.2(c) because it does not share common

elements with any of them. United States v. Harris, 128 F.3d 850, 855 (4th Cir.

1997) (“none involve selling alcohol; none involve transactions with minors”).

Although we have noted that the Fourth Circuit’s “elements approach” is more

restrictive than our own approach to similarity, see Perez de Dios, 237 F.3d at

1198, we believe the same result is required by our own approach. The district

court did not plainly err when it included Overholt’s prior misdemeanor

convictions in his criminal history calculation.

B. Attaluri Challenges.

1. Restitution.

Attaluri was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $1,265,078. The

probation office calculated this amount as the cost to the Coast Guard of removing

the storage tanks from the Peko property and cleaning up the area.

-43-
 On appeal Attaluri argues that this award is erroneous for several reasons:

(1) the award violates the Ex Post Facto Clause; (2) federal law prohibits

restitution awards from exceeding the value of the property restored; (3) the Coast

Guard costs were unrelated to his conviction, because the Coast Guard was

engaged in only “a routine cleanup operation in the area,” Br. at 53; (4) the

contamination of Peko was caused, at least in part, by persons other than

Defendants; (5) Attaluri could not have reasonably foreseen Overholt’s use of the

Peko tank farm; (6) the cleanup was unnecessary; and (7) the restitution order

failed to set a reasonable payment schedule. In district court Attaluri’s sole

objection to the restitution award was that he did not pollute the Peko property,

Overholt did; he does not reassert that argument here. Thus Attaluri has

abandoned the only argument he had preserved on this issue. We therefore will

review only for plain error. See United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d 1175, 1178-79

(10th Cir. 1999).

Attaluri’s arguments that the Peko cleanup was not related to his offense,

that the damage came from other sources, that Overholt’s use of the tank farm was

not foreseeable, and that the Peko cleanup was unnecessary are all purely factual

issues unraised in district court. The PSR sets forth sufficient information to

support the determination that the cleanup cost was a foreseeable consequence of

Attaluri’s criminal conduct. Attaluri’s failure to raise his factual challenges at

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sentencing prevented the probation office from reviewing any of these disputes

and prevented the district court from resolving them. In such circumstances, we

consider the issue waived and will not find plain error. See United States v.

Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir. 1991) (failure to assert factual challenge

at sentencing waives the challenge), overruled on other grounds, Stinson v.

United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993); see also United States v. Svacina, 137 F.3d

1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 1998) (“This court has held repeatedly that factual disputes

not brought to the attention of the [trial] court do not rise to the level of plain

error.”).

Because the value of the Peko property is a fact issue, we might also be able

to rely on the same ground to dispose of Attaluri’s claim that the restitution award

could not properly exceed the value of the Peko property. Regardless, we find no

plain error because if there was error, it was not “clear or obvious under current

law.” United States v. Hughes, 191 F.3d 1317, 1322 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal

quotation marks deleted) (stating test for plain error). Attaluri relies on a

provision of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) stating that when an

offense results “in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the

offense” and return of the property to the owner is “impossible, impracticable, or

inadequate,” the defendant “shall” be ordered to:

pay an amount equal to–
(i) the greater of –

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 (I) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or
destruction; or
(II) the value of the property on the date of sentencing, less
(ii) the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of
the property that is returned; . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B). (The identical language appears in the Victim and

Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663, except that it makes restitution

discretionary by saying that the defendant “may,” rather than “shall,” be ordered to

pay the designated amount.)

Attaluri contends that the property damaged here is the Peko property, so

that restitution is limited to the value of that property. But the Coast Guard’s loss

was not as an owner of the Peko property. Its loss was a purely financial one; the

property it lost was money. Purely financial losses have been recognized as proper

subjects of restitution under both 18 U.S.C. § 3663 and § 3663A. See

United States v. Sapoznik, 161 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming order

under the MVRA requiring a corrupt city police chief to repay the city one-fourth

of his salary while on the take from the Mafia); United States v. Sanga, 967 F.2d

1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming order under the VWPA requiring an alien

smuggler to pay a victim held in virtual slavery the difference between a fair wage

and the pittance he had paid her); see also United States v. Lowell, 256 F.3d 463

(7th Cir. 2001) (bankruptcy trustee compensated for time expended as a result of

the defendant’s efforts to cover up his crime).

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 Perhaps the above-quoted language in the restitution statutes could be read

to say that when there is physical damage to property, the only permissible

restitution is payment to the property owner of the amount calculated in

accordance with that language, regardless of any financial loss to another victim

who was not an owner of the property. But that perverse reading of the statute is

certainly not “clear or obvious under current law.” If it were, we question whether

the Third Circuit would have upheld an order of restitution under the VWPA

requiring the defendants to pay the Coast Guard’s cost of cleaning up their

pollution of navigable waters. See United States v. West Indies Transp., Inc., 127

F.3d 299, 315 (3d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we find no plain error with respect to

this contention.

Attaluri’s remaining arguments are legal challenges. First is Attaluri’s

claim that the restitution award violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, because his

crime predated the enactment of the MVRA. As Attaluri recognizes, however, we

have previously rejected the argument that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to

restitution, because the purpose of restitution is not punishment. United States v.

Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1279-80 (10th Cir. 1999).

Finally, Attaluri argues that the district court erred by failing to set a

reasonable schedule for payment of the restitution award, as required by 18 U.S.C.

§ 3664(f)(2). The PSR provided an analysis of Attaluri’s financial status. At the

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time of sentencing, the total value of his assets was $73,100. His net worth was

negative because he had unsecured debt of $168,100, not including unpaid attorney

fees in excess of $175,000. Although Attaluri held a graduate degree in chemistry,

he had no monthly income. His wife had gross monthly income of $4,300, but

their household expenses led to a monthly cash flow of negative $443. He was

planning to file both personal and corporate bankruptcy. On the other hand,

Attaluri hoped to obtain employment in the future and his parents had “some

wealth,” a portion of which he expected to inherit sometime in the future. The

PSR concluded: “Any restitution applicable in this case is mandatory. Based on

the defendant’s financial profile, he does not have the ability to pay a fine.”

The district court ordered that the “[r]estitution shall be paid in full

immediately. Any amount not paid immediately shall be paid while in custody

through the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Upon

release from custody, any unpaid balance shall be paid as a condition of supervised

release . . . .” The Government argues that remand for a payment schedule is

unnecessary because the restitution order provides for an appropriate payment

schedule to be set by the Bureau of Prisons while he is incarcerated and by the

probation office during his subsequent supervised release.

The district court well knew that Attaluri could not immediately pay the full

amount of the restitution award. Thus, it was essentially delegating the

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preparation of a payment schedule to the Bureau of Prisons and the probation

office. Our sister circuits are split on whether such delegation is lawful, although

a majority forbid it. Compare United States v. Porter, 41 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir.

1994) (delegation not permitted); United States v. Coates, 178 F.3d 681, 685 (3d

Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808 (4th Cir. 1995)

(same); United States v. Albro, 32 F.3d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1994) (same);

United States v. Mohammad, 53 F.3d 1426, 1438-39 (7th Cir. 1995) (same);

United States v. McGlothlin, 249 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir. 2001) (same); with

Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 360 (6th Cir. 2001) (permitting

delegation); United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 641 (9th Cir. 1988) (same);

United States v. Fuentes, 107 F.3d 1515, 1528 n.25 (11th Cir. 1997) (same, but

criticizing binding circuit precedent). In our view, such delegation is improper

and constitutes plain error.

The governing statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3664, entitled “Procedure for issuance

and enforcement of order of restitution.” This statute, particularly as amended by

the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996, clearly

contemplates judicial control of restitution payment schedules. Section 3664(f)(2)

requires the district court to set a payment schedule based on the defendant’s

financial resources. It states:

Upon determination of the amount of restitution owed to each victim, the
court shall, pursuant to section 3572, specify in the restitution order the

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 manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the restitution is
to be paid, in consideration of--
(A) the financial resources and other assets of the defendant, including
whether any of these assets are jointly controlled;
(B) projected earnings and other income of the defendant; and
(C) any financial obligations of the defendant; including obligations to
dependents.

The court is able to specify such a schedule because of the information provided in

accordance with § 3664(d)(3), which states:

Each defendant shall prepare and file with the probation officer an
affidavit fully describing the financial resources of the defendant,
including a complete listing of all assets owned or controlled by the
defendant as of the date on which the defendant was arrested, the
financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's
dependents, and such other information that the court requires relating
to such other factors as the court deems appropriate.

The court is granted considerable discretion in structuring a payment

schedule. Section 3664(f)(3) provides:

(A) A restitution order may direct the defendant to make a single, lump-
sum payment, partial payments at specified intervals, in-kind payments,
or a combination of payments at specified intervals and in-kind payments.
(B) A restitution order may direct the defendant to make nominal
periodic payments if the court finds from facts on the record that the
economic circumstances of the defendant do not allow the payment of
any amount of a restitution order, and do not allow for the payment of
the full amount of a restitution order in the foreseeable future under any
reasonable schedule of payments.

Of course, the defendant’s economic circumstances may change significantly over

time. Perhaps the most persuasive reason for delegating the preparation or

modification of the payment schedule to the Bureau of Prisons or the probation

-50-
office is to allow for adjustments when economic circumstances change. See

Weinberger, 268 F.3d at 362-64 (Cohn, J., concurring). But § 3664 specifically

addresses what is to happen in such a situation. The court is to be notified of the

change in circumstances and then may adjust the schedule accordingly. Section

3664(k) states:

A restitution order shall provide that the defendant shall notify the court
and the Attorney General of any material change in the defendant's
economic circumstances that might affect the defendant's ability to pay
restitution. The court may also accept notification of a material change
in the defendant's economic circumstances from the United States or
from the victim. The Attorney General shall certify to the court that the
victim or victims owed restitution by the defendant have been notified
of the change in circumstances. Upon receipt of the notification, the
court may, on its own motion, or the motion of any party, including the
victim, adjust the payment schedule, or require immediate payment in
full, as the interests of justice require.

In light of this statutory scheme, we see no room for delegation by the

district court with respect to payment schedules for restitution. We therefore

reverse the restitution award and remand for the sole purpose of establishing a

schedule for Attaluri’s payment of the amount of restitution previously awarded.

Although it may appear obtuse to hold that it is plain error to delegate the task of

setting a payment schedule when there is contrary authority in other circuits, in

each of those decisions either the opinion predated the AEDPA amendments to

§ 3664 or the present provisions of § 3664 were not brought to the attention of the

court.

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2. Enhancement of Sentence.

Attaluri’s offense level was enhanced under U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A),

which provides:

If the offense resulted in an ongoing, continuous, or repetitive discharge,
release, or emission of a hazardous or toxic substance or pesticide into
the environment, increase by 6 levels . . . .”

The district court applied the provision because of the unlawful injection of liquid

wastes into Class II disposal wells. Attaluri contends that his sentence

enhancement under this guideline is improper because (1) he did not discharge

anything into the “environment,” and (2) the enhancement cannot apply unless the

environment was actually contaminated. Although Attaluri argued in district court

against the enhancement, he did so on the basis that he did not make a “repetitive”

discharge. We therefore again review only for plain error.

In support of his first contention, Attaluri cites the CD-ROM dictionary,

Encarta 1999, for the proposition that “environment” means the “natural world in

which people, animals and plants live.” Because the waste was injected 4000 feet

below the surface, where no people or animals or plants live, Attaluri concludes

that he did not dump hazardous waste into the “environment.”

There are, however, broader definitions of the word “environment” than

Encarta provides, such as “surroundings,” Webster’s II New Riverside Dictionary

232 (rev. ed. 1996), and “that which environs; the objects or the region

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surrounding anything,” Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (electronic). The

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(CERCLA) definition of “environment” includes “any other surface water, ground

water, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface strata, or ambient air

within the United States or under the jurisdiction of the United States.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 9601(8) (emphasis added). Such broader definitions certainly allow the

inclusion of the Earth’s upper crust as a part of the “environment.”

The concern of § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A) is harm to life from dangerous chemicals.

We conclude that the “environment” encompasses at least those portions of the

earth’s crust whose contamination can impact human health. Although Attaluri

contends that the waste injected into the disposal wells was trapped far below any

water used for drinking, he misreads the record. The testimony at trial revealed

that the principal function of the restrictions imposed by the Safe Drinking Water

Act on injections into disposal wells is to prevent contamination of potential

sources of drinking water. We therefore hold that injecting chemicals into such a

well is a discharge into the “environment” for purposes of § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A).

With respect to Attaluri’s contention that § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A) applies only

when there is actual contamination of the environment, Attaluri claims to find

support in United States v. Ferrin, 994 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1993). In Ferrin the

defendant deposited hazardous waste into a dumpster. The waste was retrieved

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before the dumpster was emptied. Id. at 660. The court held that simply putting

the waste into the dumpster did not trigger § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A). Id. at 664. It relied

on Application Note 5 to the section, which states in part, that “[s]ubsection (b)(1)

assumes a discharge or emission into the environment resulting in actual

environmental contamination.” The court concluded that the section applies only

when the environment is contaminated. Id. at 663. But see United States v.

Liebman, 40 F.3d 544, 550-51 (2d Cir. 1994) (proof of actual contamination of the

environment is not necessary); United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324, 1331

(5th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Bogas, 920 F.2d 363, 367-68 (6th Cir.

1990) (same); United States v. Cunningham, 194 F.3d 1186, 1201-02 (11th Cir.

1999) (same).

Yet even if we were to reject the majority view and follow Ferrin, Attaluri

would not benefit. Ferrin stated that environmental contamination occurred

whenever “the hazardous waste came into contact with land or water or was

released into the air.” 994 F.2d at 664. The court remanded to the district court to

determine whether any gaseous hazardous waste escaped into the atmosphere. Id.

In short, the simple release of a toxic or harmful substance into the environment

constitutes contamination. By dumping harmful substances into the disposal well,

Defendants contaminated the environment. There was no plain error.

3. Amount of Loss from Fraud.

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 The district court increased Attaluri’s offense level under U.S.S.G.

§ 2F1.1(b)(1)(H), because the loss to the victim—the United States—resulting

from Attaluri’s fraud exceeded $120,000. (Amendment 617 to the Sentencing

Guidelines, effective November 1, 2001, repealed § 2F1.1 and moved its substance

to § 2B1.1) At sentencing Attaluri contended that the loss was not more than

$40,000. If his argument had been adopted, Attaluri’s offense level would have

been 23 instead of 24.

The loss to the United States was the amount paid by the United States to

Allied for disposal of waste that was unlawfully injected into disposal wells. The

presentence report calculated that loss at $132,325.91 by using the figure of

$199,825.91 for the total amount paid to Allied and then giving an offset of

$67,500 for an estimated 150,000 gallons of wastewater disposed of lawfully from

one of the government sites. Attaluri did not contest the $199,825.91 figure for

the total amount paid Allied. But he did challenge the PSR’s conclusions

regarding the amount of wastewater disposed of properly.

We review the sentencing court’s factual findings for clear error.

United States v. Vaziri, 164 F.3d 556, 568 (10th Cir. 1999). The application note

to § 2F1.1 stated, “For the purposes of subsection (b)(1), the loss need not be

determined with precision. The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the

loss, given the available information.” U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment (n.9).

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 On appeal Attaluri directs our attention to a trial exhibit which, he contends,

shows that significantly more than 150,000 gallons of wastewater were disposed of

properly. Yet he did not reference that exhibit in his objection to the PSR. The

sole basis of his objection to the PSR was a document showing how many gallons

of wastewater were delivered by Allied to Waste Water Treatment, Inc., during the

second half of 1995. The document failed, however, to indicate the source of the

wastewater—whether a government facility or otherwise. The PSR response to

Attaluri’s objection was: “The defendant stated that the government’s loss

calculation was closer to $120,000 but did not detail how that number was

calculated. The probation office is unaware of any other adjustments that would

apply . . . .” The sentencing court could properly agree. We refuse to reverse that

determination on the basis of a trial exhibit not brought to the attention of the

court at sentencing, so we need not determine whether the exhibit might have

influenced the court if it had been properly presented.

IV. Conclusion.

We therefore REVERSE the convictions for mail fraud, otherwise AFFIRM

the jury verdicts, and AFFIRM the sentences of both Defendants except that we

REMAND to the district court to set a repayment schedule for the previously

determined amount of restitution to be paid by Attaluri. 1

1
We also grant Attaluri’s Motion to File a Supplemental Appendix.

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