F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 15 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. Nos. 02-5175, 02-5176, 02-5177,
02-5178, 02-5184
DAVID BRYAN WILLIAMS, (D.C. Nos. 87-CR-174-C,
87-CR-175-C, 87-CR-176-C,
Defendant - Appellant. 88-CR-53-C, 87-CR-68-C)
(N.D. Okla.)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
David Bryan Williams pled guilty to various charges of bank fraud, one
charge of making a false statement to a bank, and one charge of bail jumping, and
was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling eighteen years. He
now appeals his convictions and sentence. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 1 affirm the conviction, and dismiss
Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In 1987, Williams was indicted on several federal bank-fraud charges under
18 U.S.C. § 1344 and one charge of making a false statement to a bank under 18
U.S.C. § 1014, stemming from acts committed in three different states. By
agreement, the cases were consolidated for plea and sentencing in the Northern
District of Oklahoma. Williams pled guilty to all counts, but failed to appear for
sentencing, and was subsequently indicted for bail jumping in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1). After spending fourteen years as a fugitive, Williams was
arrested in 2002, and pled guilty to the bail-jumping charge. Williams was
sentenced to five years in each bank-fraud case, two years in the false-statement
case, and one year in the bail-jumping case, with all sentences to be imposed
consecutively. 2 Williams now appeals each conviction and sentence, and we
consolidate the five appeals for review.
On appeal, counsel for Williams filed an Anders brief and moved to
withdraw as counsel. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967)
1
In his response to the government’s answer brief, Williams contends that
the district court lacked jurisdiction over his case. We hold that the district court
properly exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 20.
2
Because the bank-fraud charges were brought prior to the effective date
of the Sentencing Guidelines, the district court applied the Guidelines only to the
bail-jumping case.
-2-
(permitting counsel who considers an appeal to be wholly frivolous to advise the
court of that fact, request permission to withdraw from the case, and submit a
brief referring to portions of the record that arguably support the appeal). In the
Anders brief, counsel stated that he found no error in the district court’s
imposition of Williams’s various sentences, and he accordingly referred to no
portion of the record that might support Williams’s appeals.
As is his right, Williams filed a response to the Anders brief. Williams
contends that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) his guilty
pleas were not knowing and voluntary. As to Williams’s first claim, we have held
that “[i]neffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral
proceedings, not on direct appeal.” United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239,
1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). We see no reason to depart from this general
rule. Id. at 1241 (“[T]here is only a slight chance that we will forego the
development of a factual record or at least an opinion by the district court on the
subject in the first instance.”). As to Williams’s second claim, we note that the
district court addressed Williams in open court and explained to him the nature of
the charges against him as well as the possible penalty he might face, to ensure
that Williams’s decision to plead guilty was voluntary. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
(discussing facts that must be disclosed to the defendant to ensure that his plea is
-3-
voluntary). Williams’s claim that he was somehow tricked into pleading guilty
lacks merit.
We have fully examined the proceedings as required by Anders, 386 U.S. at
744, and conclude that these appeals are wholly frivolous. We see no issues in
this case that might properly be the subject of an appeal. Accordingly, counsel’s
motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Williams’s conviction is AFFIRMED.
Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is DISMISSED.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
-4-