F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 15 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JACK L. REGENNITTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 02-4133
v.
(D.C. No. 01-CV-167-TC)
(Utah)
JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster
General, United States Postal Service,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, McKAY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Jack Regennitter brings this appeal challenging the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to defendant United States Postal Service (“USPS”). Mr.
Regennitter brought an action against USPS under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 633a (“ADEA”), claiming age discrimination
arising out of incidents occurring on April 18, 2000. The district court dismissed
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Mr. Regennitter’s claim as untimely under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). On
appeal, Mr. Regennitter contends that, due to his alleged mental incapacity, the
district court erred in refusing to equitably toll applicable time limitations.
Finding equitable tolling inappropriate on these facts, we AFFIRM.
Mr. Regennitter was an USPS employee from January 21, 1984 to April 18,
2000. As a postal employee, Mr. Regennitter had two avenues by which to raise a
claim under ADEA, each of which had its own time limitation. An employee may
“invoke the EEOC’s administrative process and then file a civil action in federal
district court if he is not satisfied with his administrative remedies.” Stevens v.
Dep’t of the Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 5 (1991). If a postal employee chooses this
administrative route, he or she must contact USPS’ Equal Employment
Opportunity Office (“EEO”) within forty-five days of the alleged discrimination.
29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). If the EEO’s attempts to resolve the employee’s
dispute through counseling fail, the employee may file a formal administrative
complaint with the EEO. Alternatively, the employee “may bring the action
directly to a federal district court in the first instance, so long as the employee
gives the [EEO] notice of intent to sue within 180 days of the alleged
discriminatory act and then waits thirty days before filing the action.” Jones v.
Runyon, 32 F.3d 1454, 1455 (10th Cir. 1994).
In March 1999, Mr. Regennitter contacted USPS’ EEO claiming age
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discrimination arising out of allegedly adverse employment actions taken and
humiliating statements made by his USPS supervisor. At that time, the EEO
provided Mr. Regennitter with a booklet entitled “What You Need to Know About
EEO,” which included information concerning avenues for and time limitations on
filing a complaint. The EEO then attempted informal dispute resolution. On
April 29, 1999, the EEO contacted Mr. Regennitter by letter, informing him of its
inability to resolve his dispute and of his right to file a formal complaint with that
office within fifteen days. Mr. Regennitter took no further action on that claim.
Mr. Regennitter’s employment with USPS ended April 18, 2000, after he
again suffered from alleged adverse employment action by his supervisor. As a
result of these incidents, Mr. Regennitter left work, began drinking, and drove to
Reno, Nevada. On April 19, 2000, in the midst of severe mental distress, Mr.
Regennitter checked himself into a Veteran’s Administration hospital in Reno.
After a seven-day hospitalization, Mr. Regennitter received out-patient treatment
for major depression, panic disorder, post-traumatic stress, paranoia, and violent
ideation, among other conditions. His violent ideation was related to his
employment with USPS. Due to the stress caused by his dealings with USPS, Mr.
Regennitter’s psychiatrist advised him to avoid contact with his former employer
for the safety of himself and others.
Following his doctor’s advice, Mr. Regennitter refrained from interaction
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with USPS until September 13, 2000, when he sent the EEO a letter regarding his
age discrimination claim. On October 30, 2000, invoking the ADEA’s
administrative remedy, Mr. Regennitter filed a formal complaint with the EEO.
This filing, however, was well outside the forty-five day time limitation on
administrative complaints. In a final agency decision dated January 10, 2001,
USPS dismissed the complaint as untimely. As provided by ADEA, on March 13,
2001, Mr. Regennitter appealed the USPS decision in district court. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of USPS, agreeing with the EEO that
Mr. Regennitter’s claims were untimely.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Simms v. Okla. ex rel.
Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir.
1999). Summary judgment is appropriate where the “pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c).
On appeal, Mr. Regennitter argues that the time limitation on his age
discrimination claim should be equitably tolled. He asserts his mental state
between April 18, 2000 and September 13, 2000 constitutes an “exceptional
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circumstance” justifying equitable relief. 1 Mr. Regennitter does not dispute his
failure to comply with ADEA time limitations. Rather, he contends his mental
condition at the time of these events rose to the level of “exceptional
circumstances” justifying equitable tolling of those limitations. We need not
answer that question in deciding this case.
“Federal courts have typically extended equitable relief only sparingly.”
Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). Essential to the
equitable tolling of time limitations is a party’s active pursuit of his or her claim.
Equity will be “much less forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant
failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights.” Id.
Mr. Regennitter was aware of applicable time limitations for both the
administrative and district court remedies under ADEA based on information
provided to him by EEO. The actions underlying his claim took place on April
18, 2000. To successfully invoke ADEA’s administrative remedy, Mr.
Regennitter should have filed a formal complaint with the EEO within forty-five
days, or by June 2, 2000. His September 13, 2000 complaint, therefore, was three
months late. In September 2000, however, the ADEA’s alternative remedy, a suit
1
The Tenth Circuit has never held mental incapacity to be sufficient
grounds for tolling a statute of limitations. This court has noted, however, that
“the few courts which have recognized an exception for mental incapacity have
limited the application of this equitable doctrine to exceptional circumstances.”
Biester v. Midwest Health Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 1996).
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filed directly in district court, remained open. If the acts of alleged
discrimination took place on April 18, 2000, Mr. Regennitter had 180 days, or
until October 16, 2000, to notify the EEO of his intent to sue. He then could have
filed his suit in district court thirty days later. Mr. Regennitter did not take
advantage of this alternative remedial route. By the time he actually filed his
administrative action on October 30, 2000, and then his district court suit on
March 13, 2001, time limitations for both avenues of redress had run. This failure
to pursue available remedies cannot be construed as due diligence, and as such,
equitable tolling is not an appropriate remedy.
In light of Mr. Regennitter’s acknowledged failure to comply with ADEA
time limitations on his administrative remedy and his equal failure to directly and
timely file suit in district court, summary judgment was proper. The district
court’s decision is therefore AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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