F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 18 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RAJANI K. KANTH, as guardian of
minor children Malini Kanth and
Anjana Kanth,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 04-4080
(D.C. No. 2:03-CV-321-PGC)
v. (D. Utah)
BRUCE LUBECK, Judge; SANDRA
PEULER, Judge; TOM ARNETT,
Commissioner; MICHAEL EVANS,
Commissioner; SUSAN BRADFORD,
Commissioner; AKIKO
KAWAMURA, Guardian Ad Litem;
MARTIN OLSEN, Guardian Ad
Litem; KRISTEN BREWER,
Director, Utah Office of Guardian Ad
Litem; CHRISTINE DURHAM,
Chief Justice, Utah Supreme Court;
NORMAN H. JACKSON, Presiding
Judge, Utah Court of Appeals;
JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge, Utah
Court of Appeals; JAMES DAVIS,
Judge, Utah Court of Appeals;
MARK SHURTLEFF, Attorney
General, State of Utah; ROBIN
ARNOLD-WILLIAMS, Director,
Utah Department of Human Services;
MICHAEL BURTON, Judge; CORY
KANTH; JUDY MEYER; MARVIN
MEYER,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
RONALD NEHRING, Presiding
Judge, Third District Court, Salt Lake
County,
Defendant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, HENRY , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Rajani K. Kanth, appearing pro se , appeals the district court’s
order dismissing his complaint alleging that his civil rights were violated during
the course of his Utah state divorce proceedings. 1
Mr. Kanth’s complaint
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1
Mr. Kanth also purported to bring the complaint on behalf of his two minor
children, but the district court correctly ruled that as a non-lawyer parent,
appearing pro se , he may not represent his minor children in federal court.
Meeker v. Kercher , 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
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requested the federal court to assume jurisdiction over the state divorce
proceedings, to dismiss the Utah divorce decree, and restore to him full custodial
and visitation rights to his two minor children. In his initial complaint, as
amended once pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), Mr. Kanth named as defendants
numerous Utah state trial judges, commissioners, and appellate court judges, as
well as three attorneys in the Utah Office of Guardian Ad Litem, the Attorney
General of the State of Utah, and the Director of the Utah Department of Human
Services. 2
He attempted to file five additional amended complaints additionally
naming his ex-wife, her parents, and her attorney as defendants. The district
court denied these proposed amendments as both improperly filed and futile, and
we find no abuse of the court’s discretion in this regard. Jefferson County Sch.
Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor's Servs., Inc. , 175 F.3d 848, 859
(10th Cir. 1999) (“district court may deny leave to amend where amendment
would be futile.”).
The district court dismissed Mr. Kanth’s complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars him from challenging the orders and judgments
entered in the state-court proceedings. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a
2
He also named, but never served, Susan Callister, the principal of
Cottonwood Heights Elementary School.
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jurisdictional prohibition based on 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which holds that, with the
exception of habeas corpus, federal review of state court judgments can be
obtained only in the United States Supreme Court. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co. ,
263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S.
462 (1983). As additional grounds for dismissing the complaint, the district
court also noted that (1) it lacked jurisdiction over the claims under the Younger
doctrine, which bars federal court from interfering with ongoing state court
proceedings, see Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37 (1971); (2) all of the Utah state
defendants in their official capacities were immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which bars suits by private citizens
against the states in federal court absent waiver; and (3) all of the judicial
defendants were absolutely immune from suit because all of Mr. Kanth’s
allegations against them arose out of actions they took or failed to take in their
judicial capacities.
Mr. Kanth contends the district court erred in denying his motion for
appointment of counsel; refusing to offer him guidance because of his pro se
status; denying his motion for preliminary injunction requesting the federal court
to assume immediate jurisdiction of the Utah divorce proceedings; failing to
replace the magistrate judge for failure to timely rule on his stay motion; failing
to allow his complaint to proceed against the defendants in their personal, rather
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than official, capacities; failing to hold a hearing; dismissing his complaint and
refusing to assume jurisdiction over his complaint. We review de novo the
district court’s decision to dismiss the case under Rules 12(b)(1) and (6). Colo.
Envtl. Coalition v. Wenker , 353 F.3d 1221, 1227 (10th Cir. 2004). Contrary to
Mr. Kanth’s arguments and claim of error, neither this court nor the district court
may assume the role of advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall v. Bellmon ,
935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a lower federal court from
considering claims actually decided by a state court, and claims inextricably
intertwined with a prior state-court judgment.” Kenmen Eng'g v. City of Union ,
314 F.3d 468, 473 (10th Cir. 2002) (citations and quotations omitted). It
“precludes a party losing in state court . . . from seeking what in substance would
be appellate review of [a] state judgment in a United States district court. . . .”
Id. (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Mr. Kanth contends that he is not
seeking appellate review of the state court rulings, but restitution of his civil
rights. To determine if Rooker-Feldman applies , we look to the relief Mr. Kanth
seeks, and determine if “the state court judgment caused , actually and
proximately, the injury for which the federal court plaintiff seeks redress .” Id. at
476 (footnote omitted). “If it did, Rooker-Feldman deprives the federal court of
jurisdiction.” Id. Despite his attempt to characterize his federal complaint as one
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seeking to vindicate his federal constitutional rights, the relief Mr. Kanth seeks is
a reversal of the Utah state courts’ rulings against him and an award of custodial
and visitation rights to his children. Any federal claims are inextricably
intertwined with those orders. See id . at 476-77.
Mr. Kanth further argues the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable
because, he contends, the Utah courts lacked any jurisdiction over the divorce and
custody proceedings since the Utah divorce decree was entered before the United
States Supreme Court ruled on his International Child Abduction Remedies Act
(ICARA) petition alleging that his children were wrongfully removed from
Australia to the United States. This argument is factually and legally without
merit. This court affirmed the district court’s denial of his ICARA petition in
2000, well before the Utah court entered the divorce decree in 2001. See Kanth v.
Kanth , No. 99-4246, 2000 WL 1644099 (10th Cir. Nov. 2, 2000), affirming Kanth
v. Kanth , 79 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1318-20 (D. Utah 1999). Mr. Kanth did not seek a
stay of this court’s judgment, and the Supreme Court denied review on June 25,
2001, Kanth v. Kanth , 533 U.S. 929 (2001), prior to the August 1, 2001 date that
the Utah divorce decree was entered. See Kanth v. Kanth , No. 20010718-CA,
2002 WL 31770985, at *1 (Utah App. Dec. 12, 2002) (rejecting same argument,
and noting that formal divorce decree not entered until August 1, 2001); see also
Aplee. Supp. App., at 25.
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In short, we agree with the district court, for substantially the same reasons
stated in its order filed February 26, 2004, that Mr. Kanth’s complaint was
properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. Because the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
over Mr. Kanth’s complaint, we do not consider the district court’s alternative
and additional reasons for dismissal. See United States ex rel. Grynberg v.
Praxair, Inc ., 389 F.3d 1038, 1042 (10th Cir. 2004).
The order of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
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