Hain v. Mullin

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

January 23, 2006
PUBLISH
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court

TENTH CIRCUIT

SCOTT ALLEN HAIN,

Petitioner,
v.

MIKE MULLIN, Warden, Oklahoma
State Penitentiary at McAlester,

Respondent.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee,
No. 05-5039
v.

STEVEN M. PRESSON and
ROBERT W. JACKSON,

Movants - Appellants.

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
WESTERN DISTRICT OF
OKLAHOMA,

Amicus Curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 98-CV-331-TCK)
Submitted on the briefs: *

Steven M. Presson and Robert W. Jackson, Jackson & Presson, P.C., Norman,
Oklahoma, for Movants-Appellants.

David E. O’Meilia, United States Attorney, and Kevin Danielson, Assistant
United States Attorney, Northern District of Oklahoma, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for
Appellee.

Susan M. Otto, Federal Public Defender for the Western District of Oklahoma,
and Scott W. Braden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Death Penalty Federal
Habeas Corpus Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, filed an amicus curiae brief
for the Federal Public Defender for the Western District of Oklahoma in Support
of Petitioner-Appellant.

Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, EBEL, KELLY, HENRY, BRISCOE,
LUCERO, MURPHY, HARTZ, O’BRIEN, McCONNELL, and
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.

LUCERO, Circuit Judge.

We granted initial en banc hearing of this case to consider the reach of 21

U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), which provides federally-funded counsel for indigent state

death row prisoners seeking federal habeas relief. Specifically, § 848(q)(4)(B)

authorizes “the appointment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of such

other services in accordance with” 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(8). Section (q)(8) of the

statute in turn commands that “each attorney so appointed shall represent the

*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

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defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings,

including . . . proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to

the defendant.” Today, we accord these words their plain meaning and hold that

counsel appointed under § 848(q)(4)(B) to represent state death row inmates in 28

U.S.C. § 2254 proceedings are authorized by the statute to represent these clients

in state clemency proceedings and are entitled to compensation for clemency

representation. In so holding, we REVERSE the judgment of the court below.

I

Scott Allen Hain filed a § 2254 petition seeking relief from a sentence of

death imposed by an Oklahoma state court. Hain appealed the denial of habeas

relief, which this court affirmed. Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2002).

Once the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Hain’s attorneys Robert W. Jackson

and Steven M. Presson filed in the district court an “Ex-Parte Request for the

Court to Confirm Continuing Representation Under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(8) and to

Set Immediate Date for Budget Conference.” The district court denied the

attorneys’ request, finding that the statute under which they were appointed – 21

U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) – does not authorize federal funding for attorneys in state

clemency proceedings. Notwithstanding the uncertainty of their funding, counsel

commendably represented Hain in state clemency proceedings. They were

unsuccessful and Hain was executed.

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 While clemency representation was ongoing, this court considered the

appeal from the district court’s order denying counsel’s motion. A divided panel

of this court affirmed the district court’s order. Hain v. Mullin, 324 F.3d 1146

(10th Cir. 2003); id. at 1151 (Lucero, J., dissenting). We then decided to hear

this matter en banc, but Hain was executed before we disposed of the case.

Accordingly, we vacated the panel opinion and vacated the order granting

rehearing en banc, determining that the issue presented was moot. Hain v.

Mullin, 327 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Jackson and Presson subsequently submitted ex parte claim vouchers to the

district court seeking payment for their representation of Hain during the

clemency proceedings. The court denied payment, ruling that § 848(q)(8) does

not authorize federal funding for state clemency representation. Counsel appealed

this ruling and we have again decided to consider this matter en banc.

II

The Supreme Court has “stated time and again that courts must presume

that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it

says . . . .” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). Thus, as

always, we begin with the statutory language and must “give effect, if possible, to

every clause and word.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). We will

not inquire into Congress’s intent if the statutory language is clear. Edwards v.

Valdez, 789 F.2d 1477, 1481 (10th Cir. 1986). Rather, “[w]hen confronted with

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clear and unambiguous statutory language, our duty is simply to enforce the

statute that Congress has drafted.” United States v. Ortiz, 427 F.3d 1278, 1282

(10th Cir. 2005).

Section 848(q) employs clear and precise language, admitting of no

ambiguity and leaving no room for interpretation. Congress has directed that

“[i]n any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 . . . seeking to vacate or

set aside a death sentence . . . any defendant who is or becomes financially unable

to obtain adequate representation . . . shall be entitled to the appointment of one

or more attorneys and the furnishing of such other services in accordance with

[paragraph 8].” 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B). 1 Unambiguously, this provision states

that death row inmates seeking relief under § 2254 – a path exclusive to state

prisoners – are entitled to the appointment of attorneys and the furnishing of

services described in paragraph 8. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (statute applies to

“person[s] in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court”). In turn,

paragraph 8 provides: “each attorney so appointed shall represent the defendant

throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings . . . and shall

1
The full text of 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) reads:

In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of
Title 28, seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any
defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate
representation or investigative, expert, or other reasonably necessary
services shall be entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys
and the furnishing of such other services in accordance with
paragraphs (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9).

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also represent the defendant in such . . . proceedings for executive or other

clemency as may be available to the defendant.” § 848(q)(8). 2

One need look no further than the statute’s plain language to see that

Congress has directed that counsel appointed to represent state death row inmates

during § 2254 proceedings must “represent the defendant throughout every

subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings” including “proceedings for

executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant.” Id. 3 When

Congress required attorneys appointed to represent § 2254 petitioners to pursue

“proceedings for executive or other clemency,” it must have meant state clemency

proceedings given that federal officials have no authority to commute a state

court sentence. See U.S. Const., art. II, § 2 (President has “Power to grant

Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States”). Because the

2
The full text of 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(8) reads:

Unless replaced by similarly qualified counsel upon the attorney’s
own motion or upon motion of the defendant, each attorney so
appointed shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent
stage of available judicial proceedings, including pretrial
proceedings, trial, sentencing, motions for new trial, appeals,
applications for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and all available post-conviction process, together with
applications for stays of execution and other appropriate motions and
procedures, and shall also represent the defendant in such
competency proceedings and proceedings for executive or other
clemency as may be available to the defendant.
3
We do not imply that the statute applies exclusively to state prisoners
proceeding under § 2254. Rather, the statute affords equal access to clemency
representation for § 2254 and § 2255 petitioners.

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President does not have the power acting under the United States Constitution to

pardon defendants convicted in state courts, it would be nonsensical to suggest

that § 848(q)(8) provides for compensation for counsel to state defendants only in

federal clemency proceedings. See Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 66 (1878)

(“if there is no offence against the laws of the United States, there can be no

pardon by the President.”). Acknowledging a circuit split on the issue, we

nonetheless see no other logical way to read the statute. As expressed by the

Eighth Circuit: “The plain language of § 848(q) evidences a congressional intent

to insure that indigent state petitioners receive ‘reasonably necessary’ . . .

clemency services from appointed, compensated counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 992

F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Lowery v. Anderson, 138 F. Supp. 2d

1123, 1125 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (“This court finds the plain language of § 848(q)(8)

to be controlling here, consistent with the straightforward and persuasive

reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in Hill.”); Strickler v. Greene, 57 F. Supp. 2d 313,

316 (E.D. Va. 1999) (same).

Ignoring the statute’s plain meaning, the government urges this court to

follow the Eleventh Circuit in concluding that, because § 848(q) is part of 21

U.S.C. § 848, which focuses primarily on punishments for violations of federal

drug laws, “the language contained in the sections preceding and following

[§ 848(q)(4)(B)] relates more directly to federal criminal trial and appeals, than to

habeas cases seeking relief from state court sentences.” King v. Moore, 312 F.3d

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1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 2002). 4 On that basis, the Eleventh Circuit held that “the

word ‘federal’ is an implied modifier for ‘proceedings,’” as it is used in

§ 848(q)(8), such that “‘proceedings’ = the federal proceedings that are available

to the defendant.” Id. (equals sign in the original). 5 The Eleventh Circuit does

not deny that state death row inmates proceeding under § 2254 are entitled to the

furnishing of services in accordance with paragraph 8. Rather, the court amends

4
In a similar vein, the dissent asserts that the proceedings described in
§ 848(q)(8) are exclusively federal proceedings. Dissent at 4-5. To reach that
conclusion, the dissent relies heavily on the fact that § 848(q)(4)(B) was added to
the bill after § 848(q)(8) was drafted. Initially, § 848(q)(8) detailed the extent of
representation that appointed counsel was to provide to federal capital defendants.
Inexplicably, the dissent concludes that when § 848(q)(4)(B) was added to the bill
to entitle indigent § 2254 capital petitioners to the furnishing of services listed in
§ 848(q)(8), the clemency proceedings listed in § 848(q)(8) necessarily retained
their character as exclusively federal proceedings. Reading the statute in such a
manner would reduce to surplusage the phrase “proceedings for executive and
other clemency” as it applies to § 2254 petitioners. The dissent offers no reason
why the scope of clemency representation remained unaltered despite its
extension to state prisoners, but does argue that it is “unlikely” that Congress
intended to encompass state clemency proceedings because § 848(q)(4)(B) “was
added to the bill very late in session and seemingly without floor debate.”
Dissent at 10 (quoting King, 312 F.3d at 1368). It seems that the dissent is
arguing that, in its haste, Congress did not realize that it was broadening the
scope of clemency representation to include representation at state clemency
proceedings. We refuse to give Congress such little credit. Rather, we recognize
that Congress understands the effect of the language that it employs and “that our
elected representatives . . . know the law.” Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S.
333, 341 (1981) (quotations and citation omitted).
5
The Supreme Court recently cautioned lower courts not to assume that
Congress intended to impose the word “federal” as a modifier for general
statutory terms in the habeas corpus context, given “the fact that the words ‘State’
and ‘Federal’ are likely to be of no small import when Congress drafts a statute
that governs federal collateral review of state court judgments.” Duncan, 533
U.S. at 173-74.

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paragraph 8 to encompass only federal proceedings. Under this amended version

of the statute, although a state prisoner is entitled to federally-funded counsel at

proceedings for executive or other clemency, such state prisoners will receive

representation only at federal clemency proceedings. The analytical complication

with this approach is that, as noted, federal clemency proceedings are unavailable

to prisoners seeking relief from a state sentence. Moreover, such a reading

ignores the plain meaning of the statute, violates the canon of statutory

interpretation requiring us to give effect to every word of a statute, and reads the

statute out of context. 6

6
We do not address whether § 848(q)(8) authorizes federally-funded
representation at state trials and appeals resulting from successful § 2254
petitions. The Sixth Circuit expressed concern that affording the statute its plain
meaning would entitle successful § 2254 petitioners “to have Federal Defender
represent him in any resulting new state trial, state appeal, and state habeas
corpus proceedings if his current sentence is vacated.” House v. Bell, 332 F.3d
997, 999 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Sterling v. Scott, 57 F.3d 451, 457 (5th Cir.
1995). We decide today only the scope of § 848(q)(8) as it relates to state
clemency proceedings, and express no view on the proper construction of the
statute as it relates to prevailing § 2254 petitioners. We doubt, however, that the
parade of horribles presented by the Sixth Circuit has a factual basis. Section
848(q)(4)(B) states that counsel will be appointed when a defendant “is or
becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation.” If the state
becomes obliged to provide counsel, “adequate representation” is available, and
§ 848(q)(4)(B) is no longer implicated. Under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), states are obliged to provide counsel to indigent defendants at
criminal trials. Thus, a defendant granted a new trial as a result of a successful
§ 2254 petition would almost certainly receive constitutionally guaranteed
counsel, and thus would no longer be “unable to obtain adequate representation”
under the statute. By contrast, when a state refuses to pay for counsel at
clemency proceedings, the defendant remains unable to obtain adequate
representation, and such representation is funded under the statute. Moreover, the
result of a request for clemency is binary in nature. Clemency is granted, or it is

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 Adopting the government’s interpretation would fail to “give effect, if

possible, to every clause and word” of the statute. Duncan, 533 U.S. at 174.

Section 848(q)(8) provides that federally-appointed counsel shall “represent the

defendant in such competency proceedings and proceedings for executive or other

clemency as may be available to the defendant.” (Emphasis added). The statute’s

reference to “other clemency” is meaningless unless it refers to state clemency

proceedings, as executive clemency is the only form of clemency in the federal

system. See U.S. Const., art. II, § 2. By contrast, some states have vested

clemency power exclusively in the legislature, have provided for shared

legislative-executive clemency authority, or have permitted the executive and

not. If clemency is denied, that ends the matter. If clemency is granted, the
result of such grant does not generally lead to a new trial and thus the basis
advanced by the Sixth Circuit is not relevant in a clemency context.
In any event, whether § 848(q)(8) authorizes federally-funded
representation at new state trials under any circumstances remains an open
question of statutory interpretation. This statute authorizes representation at two
distinct stages of proceedings. First, it directs that “each attorney so appointed
shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available
judicial proceedings, including pretrial proceedings, trial, sentencing, motions for
new trial, appeals, applications for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States, and all available post-conviction process, together with
applications for stays of execution and other appropriate motions and procedures.
. . .” § 848(q)(8). Second, it provides that appointed counsel “shall also
represent the defendant in such competency proceedings and proceedings for
executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant.” Id. These are
separate clauses. Whether a new state trial resulting from a state’s decision to re-
prosecute a successful § 2254 petitioner is a “subsequent stage of available
judicial proceedings” is unclear, but that issue is neither before us nor implicated
by our decision today.

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judiciary to share clemency power. 7 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Bronson, 537 A.2d

1004, 1006 (Conn. 1988) (“In Connecticut, the pardoning power is vested in the

legislature”); Fla. Const. Art. IV, § 8 (“In cases of treason the governor may grant

reprieves until adjournment of the regular session of the legislature convening

next after the conviction, at which session the legislature may grant a pardon or

further reprieve”); Nev. Const. art. 5, § 14 (“The governor, justices of the

supreme court, and attorney general [may] remit fines and forfeitures, commute

punishments, except as provided in subsection 2, and grant pardons, after

convictions”). 8

7
Because Presidents “have, from time to time, appointed boards to assist
them in exercising their clemency authority,” dissent at 8, and because the dissent
considers it “an open question whether Congress itself has clemency authority
independent from the President,” dissent at 9, the dissent would interpret the
reference in § 848(q)(8) to “other clemency” to mean forms of clemency that
might possibly arise in the federal system at some point in the future. Yet, should
the President appoint a board to assist in the exercise of clemency, any grant of
clemency would remain a form of executive clemency. Moreover, it is well-
established that federal clemency authority “flows from the Constitution alone,
not from any legislative enactments, and that it cannot be modified, abridged, or
diminished by the Congress.” Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974). As
stated above, article II, section 2 of the Constitution vests the pardoning power in
the President. The dissent points to no Constitutional provision, no statute and no
case that authorizes Congress to grant clemency to capital defendants. We do not
think that in drafting § 848(q)(8), Congress somehow meant to refer to a non-
existent form of federal clemency for capital defendants.
8
Many other states divide clemency authority, at least for some crimes,
between the executive branch and a coordinate branch. See Cal. Pen. Code
§ 4852; Idaho Const. art. IV, § 7; Ind. Const. art. V, § 17; Ky. Const. § 77; Neb.
Const. art. IV, § 13; N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 4; Ohio Const. art III, § 11; Or. Const.
art. V, § 14; Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-27-106; Utah Const. art VII, § 12; Wyo.
Const. art. IV, § 5.

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 The government argues that § 848(q)(8) must be considered “in its context

as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.” Appellee Br. at 10. This implies

that because § 848(q) is lodged in a statute generally addressed at federal drug

laws, § 848(q)(8) “does not authorize federally appointed and federally funded

attorneys to represent state prisoners in state clemency proceedings.” Appellee

Br. at 11. There is a problem with this argument: viewing § 848(q)(8) in its

appropriate context, there is no indication that the statute is limited to federal

proceedings. The most informative context is that provided by § 848(q)(4)(B),

which references § 848(q)(8) and establishes that state capital defendants

“proceeding under section 2254” are “entitled to the appointment of one or more

attorneys and the furnishing of such other services in accordance with [paragraph

8].” The provision at issue applies “to habeas cases seeking relief from state

court sentences,” and does not, as the Eleventh Circuit concludes, relate “more

directly to federal criminal trial and appeals.” Moore, 312 F.3d at 1367. It

cannot be disputed that § 848(q) applies to all capital cases, and not just drug-

related cases, even though § 848 is generally addressed at violations of the federal

drug laws. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(A) (applies to “every criminal action in

which a defendant is charged with a crime which may be punishable by death

[and] is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation”)

(emphasis added); 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (applies to “any post conviction

proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of title 28, United States Code, seeking to

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vacate or set aside a death sentence, [where the defendant] becomes financially

unable to obtain adequate representation”) (emphasis added). That § 848(q) is not

limited to drug offenses is recognized by the dissent in its acknowledgment that

representation at the proceedings listed in § 848(q)(8) are available to all indigent

federal capital defendants and not just those charged under § 848. Dissent at 5.

The government’s suggested approach would distort the plain meaning of

§ 848(q).

In a final attempt to avoid the plain meaning of the statute, the government

argues that its unqualified application would lead to absurd results. In particular,

the government argues that it is absurd to think that Congress intended to fund

representation at state clemency proceedings. In order “to justify a departure

from the letter of the law” on the ground of absurdity, “the absurdity must be so

gross as to shock the general moral or common sense.” Crooks v. Harrelson, 282

U.S. 55, 60 (1930); see also Payne v. Fed. Land Bank of Columbia, 916 F.2d 179,

182 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that the absurdity exception applies only when “the

absurdity and injustice of applying the provision [literally] to the case would be

so monstrous that all mankind would without hesitation, unite in rejecting the

application”) (quoting Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202-03

(1819)). The federal government providing representation to indigent death row

inmates at state clemency proceedings is not an absurdity “so gross as to shock

the general moral or common sense.” Id. It is entirely plausible that Congress

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did not want condemned men and women to be abandoned by their counsel at the

last moment and left to navigate the sometimes labyrinthine clemency process

from their jail cells, relying on limited resources and little education in a final

attempt at convincing the government to spare their lives. The government may

not agree with Congress’s decision to authorize such funding, but as Justice

Scalia has noted, “Congress can enact foolish statutes as well as wise ones, and it

is not for the courts to decide which is which and rewrite the former.” Antonin

Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 20 (1997). We

would add only that when Congress has spoken, it is not for us to stand in the

wings like a classic Greek chorus and explain that Congress did not mean what it

said.

III

The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the case is

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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05-5039, Hain v. Mullin
BRISCOE, J., joined by KELLY, J. and MURPHY, J. dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. In my view, 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(8) does not entitle

state prisoners, such as Hain, to federally appointed and funded counsel to

represent them in state clemency proceedings. Thus, I conclude that appellants

Presson and Jackson are not entitled to reimbursement of their fees and expenses

in connection with representing Hain in clemency proceedings before the

Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board.

I.

Appellants Presson and Jackson were appointed by the district court

pursuant to § 848(q)(4)(B) to represent Hain in his federal habeas proceedings.

After those proceedings were completed, Hain’s only remaining avenue of relief

from his death sentence was to seek clemency from the Oklahoma Pardon and

Parole Board and the Governor of the State of Oklahoma. Because the State of

Oklahoma does not provide for appointment of counsel in such proceedings,

Presson and Jackson filed a motion with the district court “‘seeking confirmation

of [their] continuing obligation to represent’” Hain in his state clemency

proceedings, and “‘to receive compensation for [their] time and expenses’” in

doing so. Hain v. Mullin, 324 F.3d 1146, 1148 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting

petitioner Hain’s brief), vacated by Hain v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir.

2003). The district court denied the motion, concluding that § 848(q)(8) does not

encompass representation of a state prisoner in state clemency proceedings. Id.
 Notwithstanding the district court’s order, Presson and Jackson proceeded

to represent Hain in his state clemency proceedings. Hain was ultimately denied

clemency and executed. Thereafter, Presson and Jackson submitted two Criminal

Justice Act (CJA) payment vouchers to the district court seeking reimbursement

of their fees and expenses incurred in representing Hain in his state clemency

proceedings. The district court refused to approve the vouchers for payment. In

the district court’s view, “Congress never intended for the federal government to

pay attorneys for a state court defendant to pursue state remedies sought in state

proceedings.” Aplt. Br., Attachment 1, at 4. Rather, the district court concluded,

“Congress intended § 848(q)(8) to be read in light of § 848(q)(4)(B), which

provides a right to counsel only in connection with federal proceedings brought

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Id. at 5.

II.

Presson and Jackson have now appealed the district court’s order. They

contend § 848(q)(8) encompasses state executive clemency proceedings pursued

by a state capital defendant following the denial of federal habeas relief. Thus,

they assert, they were obligated to represent Hain during his state clemency

proceedings, and in turn are now entitled to reimbursement of the fees and

expenses incurred in connection with that representation. The United States,

whom we invited to participate in this appeal, disputes this interpretation of §

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848(q)(8). The United States argues § 848(q)(8) was never intended by Congress

to encompass state judicial or clemency proceedings.

Because the district court’s interpretation of a federal statute is at issue, we

apply a de novo standard of review. Shawnee Tribe v. United States, 423 F.3d

1204, 1212 (10th Cir. 2005). “As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is

to interpret the words of the [statute] in light of the purposes Congress sought to

serve.” Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 118 (1983). “[O]ur

starting point must be the language employed by Congress, . . . and we assume

that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words

used.” American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

As noted, Presson and Jackson were appointed to represent Hain pursuant

to § 848(q)(4)(B), which provides, in pertinent part:

In any post conviction proceeding under section 2254 or 2255 of
Title 28, seeking to vacate or set aside a death sentence, any
defendant who is or becomes financially unable to obtain adequate
representation . . . . shall be entitled to the appointment of one or
more attorneys . . . in accordance with paragraphs (5), (6), (7), (8)
[of subsection (q)] . . . .

21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B). In turn, the extent to which they were obligated to

represent Hain was outlined in § 848(q)(8):

Unless replaced by similarly qualified counsel upon the attorney’s
own motion or upon motion of the defendant, each attorney so
appointed shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent
stage of available judicial proceedings, including pretrial

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 proceedings, trial, sentencing, motions for new trial, appeals,
applications for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and all available post-conviction process, together with
applications for stays of execution and other appropriate motions and
procedures, and shall also represent the defendant in such
competency proceedings and proceedings for executive or other
clemency as may be available to the defendant.

21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(8). The question posed in this appeal is whether the phrase

“proceedings for executive or other clemency as may be available to the

defendant,” as used in § 848(q)(8), was intended by Congress to encompass state

clemency proceedings. In other words, did Congress, through use of this phrase,

intend to provide federally-funded counsel to represent state capital defendants in

state clemency proceedings?

In answering this question, it is necessary to examine the phrase at issue in

light of the statute as a whole. See Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“It is a fundamental canon

of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context

and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The reason for doing so is clear: “[a] provision that

may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the

statutory scheme–because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context

that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings

produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” Koons

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Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 125 S.Ct. 460, 467 (2004)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Section 848 of Title 21 addresses generally the federal crime of engaging in

a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE). Because the statute provides for the

imposition of the death penalty in certain CCE cases, see 21 U.S.C. § 848(e), it

contains a number of subsections outlining special procedures to be utilized in

such cases, as well as in other federal capital cases. Included among those is a

subsection providing for the appointment of counsel to any “defendant who is or

becomes financially unable to obtain adequate representation . . . at any time

either . . . before judgment . . . or . . . after the entry of a judgment imposing a

sentence of death but before the execution of that judgment . . . .” 21 U.S.C. §

848(q)(4)(A)(I), (ii). Once counsel is appointed in such a case, the extent of their

representation is outlined in § 848(q)(8). Not surprisingly, given § 848’s general

focus on CCE and other federal capital cases, § 848(q)(8) expressly provides for

federally-funded counsel to represent federal capital defendants through all of

their trial proceedings (i.e., from the “pretrial proceedings” through “sentencing”

and “motions for new trial”) and, if they are convicted, through the appellate

process, the post-conviction process and, if necessary, any available clemency

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proceedings. 1 In sum, the intent of Congress is evident: all of the proceedings

listed in § 848(q)(8) are federal proceedings. 2

In my view, the inclusion of § 848(q)(4)(B) in the overall statutory scheme

does nothing to alter the conclusion that Congress intended for § 848(q)(8) to

encompass only federal proceedings. After all, the post-conviction proceedings

listed in § 848(q)(4)(B), i.e., § 2254 and § 2255 proceedings, are necessarily

federal in nature. Further, by the time state capital prisoners are appointed

counsel under § 848(q)(4), they have already completed their state trial and

appellate proceedings and, presumably, exhausted the available state post-

conviction remedies. Thus, absent the granting of federal habeas relief resulting

1
Indeed, the legislative history, which is discussed below, suggests that §
848(q)(8) was drafted exclusively with federal capital defendants in mind, and
was not modified following the last-minute addition of § 848(q)(4).
2
The majority suggests, citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001), that
it is inappropriate to assume that Congress intended for § 848(q)(8) to encompass
only federal proceedings. Maj. Op. at 8, n.4. The majority, however, reads too
much into Duncan. At issue in Duncan was “whether a federal habeas corpus
petition is an ‘application for State post-conviction or other collateral review’
within the meaning of” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 533 U.S. at 169. In concluding
“that an application for federal habeas corpus review is not “an application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review,’” id. at 181, the Court noted “[i]t
would be anomalous, to say the least, for Congress to usher in federal review
under the general rubric of ‘other collateral review’ in a statutory provision that
refers expressly to ‘State’ review, while denominating expressly both ‘State’ and
‘Federal’ proceedings in other parts of the same statute.” Id. at 173. Here, the
statute at issue, § 848, in contrast to § 2244, contains no express references to
“State,” but clearly and expressly refers to federal court proceedings, specifically
federal capital trials and federal habeas proceedings (including both § 2254 and §
2255 proceedings). Thus, the express language of § 848(q)(8) allows for no
assumption other than that Congress intended to refer only to federal proceedings.

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in a new state trial, the majority of the proceedings expressly listed in § 848(q)(8)

have no applicability at all to state capital prisoners. Moreover, it cannot

seriously be suggested that Congress intended, in the event a state capital prisoner

obtains federal habeas relief and is granted a new trial, to provide federally-

funded counsel to represent that prisoner in the ensuing state trial, appellate, and

post-conviction proceedings, even though those proceedings are expressly listed

in § 848(q)(8). 3 Indeed, if that were true, we would have the odd, and potentially

unconstitutional, result of a federal court (i.e., the federal district court that first

3
I fail to see how the majority can reasonably interpret the phrase
“executive or other clemency” to include state clemency proceedings without also
interpreting the remainder of the proceedings listed in § 848(q)(8) to include state
proceedings. Thus, in my view, the majority’s interpretation of § 848(q)(8) opens
the door for federal funding of counsel to represent state defendants in retrials
and subsequent proceedings. Curiously, the majority attempts to downplay the
impact of its ruling by suggesting that, if a state habeas petitioner is granted a
new trial, he or she “would almost certainly receive constitutionally guaranteed
counsel [from the state], and thus would no longer be ‘unable to obtain adequate
representation’ under the statute.” Maj. Op. at 9, n.5. That ignores, however, the
fact that § 848(q)(4)(B) hinges on a state habeas petitioner’s financial ability to
obtain adequate representation, and not upon the availability of adequate
representation through other means. Because the vast majority of state habeas
petitioners are indigent, their financial inability to obtain adequate representation
means that § 848(q)(4)(B) would continue to apply in the event that they obtain
federal habeas relief and are granted a new state trial. Further, § 848(q)(8) would
mandate that federally-appointed counsel continue to represent state habeas
petitioners in state court until they were “replaced by similarly qualified counsel
upon the attorney’s own motion or upon motion of the defendant . . . .”
Therefore, it is entirely foreseeable that a successful state habeas petitioner would
want to continue to be represented in state court by his or her federally-appointed
counsel, and thus would not file any such motion for substitution of counsel.

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appointed counsel pursuant to § 848(q)(4)(B)) effectively overseeing state

proceedings.

Nor am I convinced that § 848(q)(8)’s reference to “executive or other

clemency as may be available to the defendant” does anything to undermine the

notion that Congress intended § 848(q)(8) to include only federal proceedings.

To be sure, the federal government does not currently have in place, as do some

states, a board with clemency authority independent from the executive. See

generally Margaret Colgate Love, Relief from Collateral Consequences of a

Criminal Conviction, Table #1 - Models for Admin. of the Pardon Power in the U.

S. (July 2005), http://www.sentencingproject.org/rights_restoration/table1.html

(noting that six states currently have in place an independent board that exercises

pardon power). Seizing upon that fact, the majority concludes that the phrase “or

other clemency as may be available” must have been intended by Congress to

refer to state clemency proceedings. That conclusion, however, is flawed for at

least three reasons. First, in most of the states that offer clemency proceedings,

the power of clemency is exercised by the governor, either alone or with the

assistance of an advisory board. See id. Thus, most of those proceedings would,

like the federal model, be classified as “executive” clemency proceedings.

Second, Congress, at the time it drafted § 848(q)(8), could reasonably have

anticipated the availability of “other” avenues for federal prisoners to obtain

clemency. For example, history establishes that Presidents have, from time to

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time, appointed boards to assist them in exercising their clemency authority. E.g.,

Paul J. Haase, “Oh My Darling Clemency”: Existing or Possible Limitations on

the Use of the Presidential Pardon Power, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1287, 1302

(2002) (noting that “President Ford created a commission called the Presidential

Clemency Board . . . to review and facilitate clemency for those individuals that

committed crimes related to the Vietnam War.”); Executive Order 9814, 11 Fed.

Reg. 14,645 (1946) (order of President Truman establishing a three-member board

to review convictions of persons under the Selective Training and Service Act of

1940 and to make recommendations for executive clemency). Further, it is an

open question whether Congress itself has clemency authority independent from

the President. 4 E.g., Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power Over Pardon &

4
The majority, citing Article II, § 2, cl. 1, of the Constitution, as well as
the Supreme Court’s decision in Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974), suggests
that Congress lacks authority to grant clemency to capital defendants. Maj. Op. at
11, n.7. It is true that Article II, § 2, cl. 1 confers upon the President the “Power
to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment,” and that such power “cannot be modified, abridged, or
diminished by the Congress.” Schick, 419 U.S. at 266. Significantly, however,
these two sources are silent regarding Congress’s own authority to grant
clemency. Although it can perhaps be argued that Article II, § 2, cl.1’s “express
grant of pardon authority to the President implicitly precludes Congress from
exercising similar authority itself,” “[t]his question has never been definitively
resolved by the courts, and it is still a matter of dispute between the President and
Congress.” Peterson, supra at 1268. Moreover, Congress “has long held the
power to pass private [amnesty] bills,” Hoffstadt, supra at 609, and it is logical to
conclude that the reference to “other clemency” in § 848(q)(8) includes this form
of relief as well. That Congress thought there were other avenues for federal
clemency aside from executive clemency is further bolstered by the fact that §
848(q)(8), and its reference to “other clemency,” was apparently drafted before
the addition of § 848(q)(4)(B), and that subsection’s inclusion of § 2254 habeas

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Amnesty: Legislative Authority in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38

Wake Forest L. Rev. 1225, 1226 (2003) (noting that “no court has ever ruled on

the issue [of] whether Congress has any authority . . to exercise the pardon power

itself”); Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 Tex. L.

Rev. 561, 611-13 (2001) (suggesting that Congress can exercise clemency

authority by passing individual clemency bills). Thus, it is reasonable to

conclude that Congress’s inclusion of the reference in § 848(q)(8) to “other

clemency as may be available to the defendant” was intended to encompass these

other potential forms of federal clemency, rather than state clemency proceedings.

In other words, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress, in fashioning the

language of § 848(q)(8) to encompass the broad range of proceedings that a

federal capital defendant might utilize in order to obtain relief from his or her

death sentence, intended to include not only federal executive clemency

proceedings, but also other forms of federal clemency that might be available to

such a defendant. Lastly, had Congress intended to provide federal funding to

state capital defendants in state clemency proceedings, it could have done so in a

simple and clear manner (e.g., “and proceedings for executive or other clemency,

including state clemency proceedings, as may be available to the defendant”),

rather than through a vague reference to “other clemency as may be available to

the defendant.”

petitioners among those entitled to the appointment of federally-funded counsel.

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 The legislative history, to the extent we need to rely on it, does nothing to

negate the conclusion that Congress intended for § 848(q)(8) to encompass only

federal proceedings. Section 848(q)(4)(B), which as noted provides for the

appointment of federally-funded counsel to state capital prisoners seeking federal

habeas relief, “was added to the bill very late in session and seemingly without

floor debate.” King v. Moore, 312 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 2002). In light of

these circumstances, I agree with the Eleventh Circuit that it was “unlikely” that

“Congress actually intended for section 848(q) to provide counsel, at federal

expense, to state prisoners engaged in state proceedings.” Id. In other words,

absent some type of express indication that Congress intended the addition of §

848(q)(4)(B) to significantly broaden the scope of § 848(q)(8), it is unreasonable

in my view for us to interpret § 848(q)(8) in such a manner.

Finally, it is noteworthy that three of the four circuits that have reviewed

the precise question now before us have concluded that § 848(q)(8) does not

encompass federally-appointed counsel’s representation of a state capital prisoner

in state proceedings. See Clark v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 459, 462-63 (5th Cir. 2002)

(concluding that § 848(q)(8) does not provide for federally-appointed counsel in

state clemency proceedings); House v. Bell, 332 F.3d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 2003)

(reaching same conclusion with respect to state post-conviction proceedings);

King, 312 F.3d at 1368 (reaching same conclusion with respect to state clemency

proceedings); contra Hill v. Lockhart, 992 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1993)

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(concluding that § 848(q)(8) encompasses state clemency proceedings, but

conditioning payment in part upon showing that state provided no avenues for

compensation to counsel). Although the Eighth Circuit (which the majority cites

with approval) reached a contrary result in Hill, its reasoning is not convincing.

Instead of carefully parsing the language of § 848(q)(8), the Eighth Circuit looked

to the language of § 848(q)(10), which allows for attorneys appointed under §

848(q) to receive compensation for “reasonably necessary services,” and simply

concluded that Ҥ 848(q) evidences a congressional intent to insure that indigent

state petitioners receive ‘reasonably necessary’ competency and clemency

services from appointed, compensated counsel.” 992 F.2d at 803. Further,

although the Eighth Circuit attempted to narrow the scope of its decision by

holding that federal compensation was available for counsel only “as part of a

non-frivolous, federal habeas corpus proceeding” and only when “state law

provides no avenue to obtain compensation for these services,” it did so again

without any support in the language of § 848(q)(8). In short, the Eighth Circuit

effectively performed a legislative function by molding § 848(q) to fit what it

believed was a fair and equitable model for providing federally appointed and

compensated counsel to state capital prisoners.

For these reasons, I conclude that Congress did not intend, through its

enactment of § 848(q)(8), to provided federally-funded counsel to represent state

capital defendants in state clemency proceedings. I therefore conclude that

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Presson and Jackson are not entitled to compensation under § 848(q) for the

services they performed in representing Hain in his state clemency proceedings,

and would affirm the district court’s ruling denying compensation.

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