F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
May 19, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 05-4078
(District of Utah)
VICTOR CISN EROS, also known as (D.C. No. 1:04-CR-37-PGC)
M iguel Angel Cisneros, also known as
Victor M anuel Cisneros,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before M U RPH Y, SE YM OU R and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this court has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant-appellant, Victor Cisneros was charged in a one-count
indictment with possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1). The incident that led
to the filing of the charge began when Cisneros w as pulled over for a traffic
violation by Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Ellis A lexander. At Cisneros’ trial,
Alexander testified he was on a routine patrol January 20, 2004, when he noticed
the car in front of him, a Chevrolet Beretta, had two tail lights that were not
functioning. Alexander testified he activated the lights on his patrol car and the
Beretta turned down an alleyway, traveling approximately seventy-five yards
before coming to a stop. Alexander was unable to see inside the vehicle because
the windows were tinted and foggy.
Trooper Alexander exited his vehicle and made contact with defendant
Cisneros w ho was the driver of the Beretta. Cisneros w as unable to produce his
driver’s license, proof of insurance, or registration. Alexander testified he
noticed Cisneros’ eyes were red and his pupils dilated. He also stated Cisneros
exhibited signs of bruxism, 1 which Alexander testified is associated w ith the use
of central nervous system stimulants. W hen Alexander asked who owned the
Beretta, Cisneros gave a male H ispanic name. Cisneros also told Alexander his
1
Bruxism is “the habit of unconsciously gritting or grinding the teeth.”
W ebster’s Third New International D ictionary 287 (1993).
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name w as M iguel Cisneros. After a fingerprint analysis was completed several
weeks later, it was discovered that his real name was Victor Cisneros. 2
Alexander returned to his patrol car and ran the license plate and the name
M iguel Cisneros. He discovered the vehicle was registered to Amber Short and
there was an outstanding warrant for M iguel Cisneros. Alexander decided to
arrest Cisneros on the outstanding warrant and called for Officer Christiansen of
the Ogden City Police Department to back him up. W hen Officer Christiansen
arrived, he and Trooper A lexander instructed Cisneros to exit the vehicle.
Despite being informed of the outstanding warrant, Cisneros did not tell the
officers his real name. Cisneros w as searched and officers found a cigarette
lighter and some loose change.
Cisneros was placed in the back seat of Alexander’s patrol car and
Alexander decided to impound the Beretta. W hen Alexander put his head inside
the vehicle, he smelled marijuana and saw pieces of fresh, green marijuana leaves
on the floor in the back seat. There were two passengers in the vehicle; one was
seated in the front passenger seat and the second was seated in the back seat on
the passenger’s side. A third officer, who was able to speak Spanish, questioned
the two passengers. A fter presenting their identification cards, both consented to
a pat-down search. One passenger had approximately $200 in currency in his
2
The name and birth date Victor Cisneros provided to Trooper Alexander
were that of his brother, M iguel Cisneros.
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pocket; the other passenger had approximately $400. W hen questioned by the
officer, neither knew how much currency was in his pocket and both denied any
knowledge of the marijuana.
Trooper Alexander then requested a drug-sniffing dog and handler from the
Ogden Police Department. The handler, Officer M cGuire, placed the dog inside
the vehicle and it immediately alerted, pulling a dark stocking cap from the floor
underneath the driver’s seat. M cGuire discovered a plastic baggie containing a
white crystalized substance inside the cap. W hen he retrieved the cap from under
the seat, he also noticed a pipe of the type commonly used to smoke
methamphetamine. M cGuire placed the pipe inside the cap and handed the cap to
Trooper Alexander. Alexander performed a field test on the crystalized substance
and it tested positive for methamphetamine. A laboratory test later confirmed the
baggie contained more than forty-one grams of methamphetamine with a purity of
ninety-three percent, yielding a total quantity of 37.4 grams of methamphetamine.
At trial, the government also elicited testimony from Troy Burnett, an
officer with the Ogden City Police Department. Officer Burnett testified that
after the cap was discovered, he and Trooper Alexander commented on the fact
that the two passengers were wearing baseball caps but Cisneros was not wearing
a hat. The officers also observed that Cisneros’ hair was disheveled and Burnett
testified it appeared Cisneros had recently removed a hat from his head. Burnett
then testified that the street value of the methamphetamine found in the Beretta
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was approximately $1,800 to $1,900. If the drugs had been repackaged into
smaller quantities, however, Burnett estimated the street value to be
approximately $8,000 to $10,000. Burnett further testified it would be
“absolutely inconsistent” for an addict to purchase 37.4 grams of
methamphetamine for personal use. Based on Burnett’s experience and training,
he opined that the quantity and purity of the methamphetamine found in the car
indicated it w as “definitely” for distribution and not for personal use.
At the close of the government’s case, Cisneros moved for a judgment of
acquittal. The district court denied the motion. Cisneros then called several
witnesses. The first, Richard Thompson, testified he sold the Chevrolet Beretta
on behalf of Amber Short during the early part of January 2004. He received
$1,500 cash for the car and did not sign the title over. Thompson identified one
of the passengers in the Beretta as the purchaser.
Patricia M artinez testified she had lived with Cisneros for eight years. She
first became aware Cisneros was using drugs in June 2003 when Cisneros told her
he was using crystal methamphetamine. According to M artinez, Cisneros was
still using drugs in January 2004. M artinez testified two men came to the house
looking for Cisneros at approximately 11:30 p.m. on January 19, 2004.
According to M artinez, one of the men was wearing a dark, beanie-style knit cap.
Cisneros told M artinez the two men w ere from Arizona and needed a ride because
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they were unfamiliar with the area. Cisneros then left with the men. M artinez
was Cisneros’ final witness.
The jury convicted Cisneros of possession with intent to distribute 37.4
grams of methamphetamine. He was sentenced to a term of eighty-seven months’
incarceration. In this appeal, Cisneros attacks his conviction, arguing the
Government presented insufficient evidence at trial demonstrating he
constructively possessed the methamphetamine or had the intent to distribute it.
This court reviews de novo the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial.
See Unites States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1997). Evidence is
sufficient to support a conviction if the direct and circumstantial evidence and the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, collectively viewed in the light most
favorable to the Government, would permit any reasonable juror to find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. W hen conducting our
review, “we accept the jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence without weighing
the credibility of witnesses.” United States v. M uessig, 427 F.3d 856, 861 (10th
Cir. 2005).
To sustain a conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent to
distribute, the Government was required to prove Cisneros (1) knowingly
possessed the methamphetamine and (2) intended to distribute it. See United
States v. Reece, 86 F.3d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1996). Possession under § 841(a)(1)
may be actual or constructive and the Government may rely on either direct or
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circumstantial evidence. United States v. Jenkins, 175 F.3d 1208, 1216 (10th Cir.
1999). In this case, the G overnment relied on circumstantial evidence to establish
Cisneros constructively possessed the methamphetamine. “In cases involving
joint occupancy of a vehicle where a controlled substance is found, some
evidence supporting at least a plausible inference the defendant had knowledge of
and access to the controlled substance must be introduced.” United States v.
Delgado-Uribe, 363 F.3d 1077, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004). This court has also held
“it is permissible to infer that the driver of a vehicle has knowledge of the
contraband within it.” United States v. Pulido-Jacobo, 377 F.3d 1124, 1130 (10th
Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).
W e conclude the Government presented ample evidence from which a jury
could conclude Cisneros had both knowledge of and access to the
methamphetamine. See United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1179 (10th Cir.
2004). Officer M cGuire testified he found the drugs under the driver’s seat of the
Beretta and it w as uncontested at trial that Cisneros was the driver. See Pulido-
Jacobo, 377 F.3d at 1130. The Government also presented evidence Cisneros
failed to stop immediately once Trooper Alexander activated his emergency
lights. Alexander testified drivers typically pull over immediately when
requested to do so by an officer. Further, Cisneros was unable to provide any
identification, registration, or proof of insurance. W hen asked to identify himself,
he gave Trooper Alexander his brother’s name and birth date and did not disclose
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his real name even when informed there was an outstanding warrant for M iguel
Cisneros. The circumstances surrounding the traffic stop support a reasonable
inference Cisneros knew he was transporting an illegal substance. See United
States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1532 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding a jury may infer a
defendant’s “guilty knowledge from the undisputed testimony that [defendant]
gave the police a false name”).
The Government also presented evidence linking the hat in which the drugs
were found to Cisneros. Trooper Alexander and Officer Burnett both testified
that the two passengers in the Beretta were wearing baseball caps but Cisneros
was not wearing a hat. After the hat and the drugs were discovered in the car,
Alexander and Burnett noticed Cisneros’ hair was messy and disheveled and
discussed this between themselves. Burnett testified “it appeared that [Cisneros]
recently had worn that beanie cap.”
Cisneros argues the fact the methamphetamine w as found under the driver’s
seat should not be given any weight because the two passengers were alone in the
Beretta for nearly five minutes and their actions were not observed during that
time because the dark tint of the windows obscured Trooper A lexander’s view.
Thus, according to Cisneros, the passengers had time to place the drugs under the
driver’s seat after the vehicle was stopped. This argument does not undermine the
Government’s evidence indicating Cisneros had knowledge of and access to the
drugs discovered under his seat. It is settled that “[t]he evidence necessary to
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support a verdict need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis
and need not negate all possibilities except guilt.” Pulido-Jacobo, 377 F.3d at
1129.
Cisneros also argues M artinez’s testimony was the only direct evidence on
the ownership of the beanie cap and her testimony linked the cap to one of the
passengers, not to him. Further, Trooper Alexander did not reference Cisneros’
disheveled hair or the possibility that the beanie cap belonged to Cisneros in his
police report. Cisneros’ arguments, however, go to the weight of conflicting
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, matters for the jury and not this
court. See Delgado-Uribe, 363 F.3d at 1081. Obviously, the jury disbelieved
M artinez and accepted Trooper Alexander’s testimony. After reviewing the
record, we conclude the Government’s evidence and the plausible inferences to be
drawn therefrom, considered as a whole and in the light most favorable to the
Government, are sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that Cisneros knowingly
possessed the methamphetamine found in the Beretta.
Cisneros next argues the G overnment’s evidence was insufficient to support
the jury’s finding he had the intent to distribute the methamphetamine. Proof of
intent to distribute drugs is frequently established through circumstantial evidence
and “may be inferred from the possession of a large quantity of the substance.”
United States v. Powell, 982 F.2d 1422, 1430 (10th Cir. 1992). The Government
introduced evidence the methamphetamine recovered from the Beretta weighed
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more than forty-one grams and had a purity of ninety-three percent. Officer
Burnett testified that a typical addict uses only one-third to one-half gram of
methamphetamine a day. Burnett also testified that the average purity of
methamphetamine possessed by the average user is approximately seventy-five
percent. The purity of methamphetamine found in the Beretta indicated to
Burnett that it was obtained from a top-level source and had not yet been cut or
diluted to increase the bulk. 3 From the Government’s evidence, the jury could
reasonably infer that Cisneros had an intent to distribute the drugs.
Upon review of the entire record, this court concludes the Government
presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude
Cisneros possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is hereby affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
M ichael R. M urphy
Circuit Judge
3
Burnett testified that dealers add methylsulfonylmethane (M SM ) to
methamphetamine to increase its volume which, in turn, increases the dealers’
profits.
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