F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 28, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SHARON MULLER and JEFF
MULLER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. No. 03-8072
JACKSON HOLE MOUNTAIN (D.C. No. 01-CV-168-D)
RESORT CORPORATION, (D. Wyoming)
Defendant-Appellee.
STATE OF WYOMING,
Intervenor.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges, and HERRERA, District Judge **
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is, therefore,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (eff. Dec. 1, 2006) and 10th Cir. R.
32.1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007).
**
The Honorable Judith C. Herrera, United States District Judge for the District of
New Mexico, sitting by designation.
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiffs Sharon Muller and Jeff Muller appeal from the judgment entered in favor
of defendant Jackson Hole Mountain Resort Corporation (“the Resort”) on the Mullers’
negligence claim. After a three-day trial before a magistrate judge, a jury determined that
the injuries that Sharon suffered while attempting to board a gondola were an inherent
risk of skiing under the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act (“RSA”). Therefore, the RSA
precluded any recovery for the Mullers under their negligence claim.
On appeal, the Mullers challenge that judgment, asserting that the RSA is
unconstitutional, that the RSA does not apply to this case, that Sharon’s injuries did not
result from an inherent risk of skiing, and that the Resort is a common carrier under the
Wyoming Constitution. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I.
The Mullers, a married couple from Hawaii, traveled to the Resort for a skiing
vacation. Aplt. App. at 59. On February 3, 2001, Sharon attempted to board a gondola at
the Resort to ride to the top of a hill. Id. at 32. Sharon alleges that her foot became
caught in a space between the lift and a bunched up mat. Id. at 79. The gondola pulled
her forward for approximately fifteen feet until she managed to escape. Id. at 72. As a
result, she suffered permanent injuries to her leg. Id. at 67, 83.
Contending that the Resort’s negligent operation of the gondola led to Sharon’s
injuries, the Mullers sued the ski resort in federal court under diversity jurisdiction.
Issues now raised on appeal involve the RSA, which provides:
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(a) Any person who takes part in any sport or recreational opportunity
assumes the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity, whether
those risks are known or unknown, and is legally responsible for any and all
damage, injury or death to himself or other persons or property that results
from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity.
(b) A provider of any sport or recreational opportunity is not required to
eliminate, alter or control the inherent risks within the particular sport or
recreational opportunity.
(c) Actions based upon negligence of the provider wherein the damage, injury
or death is not the result of an inherent risk of the sport or recreational
opportunity shall be preserved pursuant to W.S. 1-1-109.
W YO. S TAT. A NN. § 1-1-123(a), (b), (c) (emphasis added). The Act defines “inherent
risk” as “those dangers or conditions which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an
integral part of any sport or recreational opportunity.” Id. § 1-1-122(a)(i). The RSA’s
exclusion clause preserves the right to sue on “a cause of action based upon the design or
manufacture of sport or recreational equipment or products or safety equipment used
incidental to or required by the sport or recreational opportunity.” Id. § 1-1-122(a)(ii).
At trial, the magistrate judge ruled that § 1-1-123’s inherent risk standard applied,
because the facts of the case did not trigger the RSA’s exclusion clause. Aplt. App. at 45-
47. As a consequence, the court instructed the jury that the Resort would not be liable if
Muller’s injury “resulted from an inherent risk of the recreational opportunity in which
she was taking part.” Id. at 42, 45-47. The court also denied the Mullers’ motion to
include a jury instruction that the Resort is a common carrier under Section 7 of Article
10 to the Wyoming Constitution, which would have subjected the Resort to a higher
standard of care. Id. at 53-54.
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The jury ultimately found for the Resort, concluding that Sharon’s injuries resulted
from an inherent risk of a recreational opportunity under the RSA. After the magistrate
judge entered judgment in favor of the Resort, the Mullers filed this appeal. Initially, the
Mullers raised four issues: (1) whether the RSA is unconstitutional, because it violates
equal protection principles and is void for vagueness; (2) whether the RSA’s exclusion
clause bars application of the RSA’s inherent risk standard to this case; (3) whether an
injury from loading onto a gondola is an inherent risk of alpine skiing; and (4) whether
the court improperly failed to instruct on the Resort’s status as a common carrier under
the Wyoming Constitution. Aplt. Opening Br. at 1-2.
II.
We begin by identifying those issues that have been addressed by the Wyoming
Supreme Court as a result of our certifying questions to that court. Pursuant to 10th Cir.
R. 27.1 and Wyo. R. App. P. 11.01, this court certified the second, third, and fourth issues
identified above to the Wyoming Supreme Court. On August 11, 2006, the Wyoming
Supreme Court issued an opinion answering our certified questions. Based on those
answers, we conclude the magistrate judge correctly instructed the jury on inherent risk
because the exclusion clause does not apply to “a ski lift operated by a recreational
provider.” Muller v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, 139 P.3d 1162, 1166 (Wyo. 2006).
Also, we conclude the inherent risks of alpine skiing include injuries that occur “while
boarding a ski lift.” Id. at 1168. These conclusions render the common carrier issue
moot. Id. at 1164. In supplemental briefing, the Mullers did not contend that the
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Wyoming Supreme Court’s answers failed to dispose of the second, third, and fourth
issues, characterizing the first issue as the “remaining issue” before us. See Aplt. Supp.
Br. at 1.
III.
The sole issue remaining in this case is whether the RSA is unconstitutional. The
Mullers argue that the RSA violates their right to equal protection, because the RSA
benefits one class (recreational providers) at the expense of another class (those injured
while taking part in recreational activities). Aplt. Opening Br. at 14-15. The Mullers also
assert that the RSA is unconstitutionally vague, because the phrase “inherent risk” is too
ambiguous to give notice to skiers that their injuries on the slopes may not be
compensable. Id. at 16. Although the Mullers fail to make clear whether they are
contending that the RSA runs afoul of state or federal constitutional guarantees, we
conclude that the Mullers’ argument focuses on the Wyoming Constitution because the
authorities the Mullers cite in support of their constitutional arguments are, for the most
part, Wyoming state cases.1
1
The only exceptions include a Montana case dealing with a similar statute in that
state and a case from the District of Wyoming, Westbrook v. Teton County Sch. Dist. No.
1, 918 F. Supp. 1475 (D. Wyo. 1996). The Mullers appear to cite to Westbrook to
establish the general proposition that due process requires prohibitions to be clearly
defined. The Mullers also cite to Walters v. Grand Teton Crest Outfitters, Inc., 804 F.
Supp. 1442 (D. Wyo. 1992), as an example of a court trying to apply the RSA’s inherent
risk standard. Finally, the Mullers highlight Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566
(10th Cir. 1995) for the general proposition that courts may address the constitutionality
of statutes even when those statutes involve a legislature’s public policy judgments.
Viewed individually or as a whole, these citations do not cause us to conclude that the
Mullers have alleged a federal constitutional claim.
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Before reaching the merits of the Mullers’ arguments, we must ascertain whether
these constitutional issues are properly before us. Generally, we will only consider
arguments on appeal that the parties have first raised before the district court. In re
Walker, 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992). The State of Wyoming, an intervenor in this
case, contends that the Mullers never raised their equal protection or vagueness
arguments prior to their assertion of these arguments on appeal. Intervenor Br. at 19-20.
After reviewing the record, we agree that the Mullers did not preserve these arguments by
raising them below.
The Mullers contend that they raised “the issue of the [RSA’s] constitutionality”
before the magistrate judge and that the magistrate judge ruled that the RSA was
constitutional, thus preserving their equal protection and vagueness arguments for our
review on appeal. Aplt. Reply Br. at 2. The magistrate judge’s constitutional analysis,
however, was limited to whether he should instruct the jury that the Resort was a common
carrier under the Wyoming state constitution, thereby entitling the Mullers to a higher
standard of care. The magistrate judge refused to give the instruction after concluding
that the common carrier issue had been raised too late in the proceedings and because
operators of ski gondolas are not common carriers. Aplt. App. at 34-35, 53-54. While
the Mullers are correct that their common carrier arguments placed the RSA’s
constitutionality at issue, those arguments questioned the RSA’s constitutionality only
with regard to the common carrier provision.
Our waiver rule is not “absolute,” because we may still consider, in our discretion,
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an argument not raised below when it presents “‘a strictly legal question, the proper
resolution of which is beyond doubt or when manifest injustice would otherwise result.’”
Sussman v. Patterson, 108 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Daigle v. Shell Oil
Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1539 (10th Cir. 1992)). While the Mullers’ constitutional issues
present strictly legal questions, we cannot conclude that the proper resolution of these
issues is beyond doubt or that a manifest injustice would result if we do not now consider
these issues. Although the Mullers were aware that the RSA could implicate the
Wyoming Constitution, as evidenced by their arguments regarding the common carrier
provision, they did not pursue the equal protection and due process challenges now
alleged. We decline the invitation to address these equal protection and other due process
issues which are raised for the first time on appeal.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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