F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
January 2, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
PA UL HUGGINS, JR., Prophet
Evangelist Doctor Reverend/Kids
Against Alcohol Drugs and Crime
as KAADAC the First Black
M inistry Nations of Isrum,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 06-1423
v. (D. Colorado)
(D.C. No. 06-cv-01095-ZLW )
SA FEW AY, INC., actually named
as Safeway et al./John Do female
employer,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, BR ISC OE, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. **
Paul Huggins, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of his complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 (eff. Dec.
1, 2006) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007).
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(f); 10 TH C IR . R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. W e review the
district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. See Kuehl v. FD IC, 8 F.3d
905, 908 (1st Cir. 1993); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).
Because M r. Huggins is proceeding pro se, we construe his complaint liberally.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
Upon review of M r. Huggins’s complaint, we discern no abuse of discretion
in the district court’s decision to dismiss it without prejudice. Rule 8 requires
“(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction
depends . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader
seeks.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 8( A ). These requirements ensure that the complaint
“‘give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.’” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N .A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
Here, M r. Huggins’s complaint alleges that, while he was paying for gas at
a Safeway store, a Safeway employee allowed other customers to have access to
personal information on his credit card. According to M r. Huggins, the employee
“stated directly to me that I, am Penetration against you and I, am Penetration
against all Black People” and told him that he was not allowed to come back into
the store. Rec. doc. 3, at 2. M r. Huggins asserts that this conduct violated his
First and Second Amendment rights and his right to equal protection.
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The constitutional provisions invoked by M r. Huggins concern acts
comm itted by the government or by persons acting under color of state law. See
Smith v. Kitchen, 156 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1997) (“A private individual
falls within the scope of our Constitution’s . . . guarantees only when the private
actor may ‘be fairly said to be a state actor.’”) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). From the allegations of M r. Huggins’s
complaint, we see no indication that the government was involved in the alleged
wrongdoing. M oreover, from M r. Huggins’s allegations, we can discern no other
ground for the district court’s jurisdiction or a claim for relief.
Accordingly, we A FFIRM the district court’s dismissal of M r. Huggins’s
complaint without prejudice. Appellant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is
denied.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
United States Circuit Judge
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