F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
January 31, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 06-5152
v.
(D.C. No. 04-CR-66-01-HDC)
(N.D. Okla.)
REM OND ANDRE M EA DOW S,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR DER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before BR ISC OE, EBEL, and M CCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Remond A ndre M eadows appeals from a twelve-month prison
sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Northern District of
O klahom a after M r. M eadow s violated the terms of his supervised release. He
contends that this is an unreasonable sentence in light of the sentencing factors a
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
trial court is required to consider. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553. W e affirm the sentence,
finding it to be reasonable.
On July 8, 2004, M r. M eadows was charged with possession of cocaine
base and marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm during and in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm and
ammunition after former conviction of a felony. M r. M eadows was tried by jury,
which convicted him on August 5, 2004, of only possession of cocaine base and
marijuana. He was acquitted of the remaining charges. The U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines range for the conviction provided for a sentence of nine- to fifteen-
months of custody. The court sentenced him to fifteen-months’ imprisonment and
twelve-months’ supervised release. M r. M eadows did not appeal the conviction
or the sentence.
During his period of supervised release, M r. M eadows w as required to
attend an in-patient substance abuse program, abide by all the requirements of
that program, remain drug-free, maintain employment, and file periodic reports
with his probation officer. His term of supervised release was set to expire on
June 9, 2006. On June 8, 2006, the probation office petitioned the court to revoke
M r. M eadows’s supervised release. The probation office alleged that M r.
M eadows had violated the terms of his release because: (1) he failed to report to
his probation officer as directed; (2) he failed to maintain employment; (3) his
urine sample tested positive for marijuana, and (4) he failed to submit to
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urinalysis and did not attend all the required substance abuse counseling sessions.
The government also submitted evidence indicating that he had been generally
non-compliant with the requirements of his treatment program. The evidence
included documentation from program staff that M r. M eadows had been
belligerent toward staff, violated curfew, damaged a smoke alarm, did not abide
by requirements to check in and out of the facility, and missed counseling
sessions. The documentation observed that M r. M eadows did not take the
violations seriously. At a hearing on June 19, 2006, M r. M eadows admitted to
violating the terms of his supervised release.
The district court held a sentencing hearing on July 31, 2006, in w hich M r.
M eadows disputed the finding that he had “absconded” from supervision.
However, he did not dispute the remaining allegations. The court sentenced M r.
M eadows to twelve-months’ imprisonment, to be follow ed by twelve-months’
supervisory release. The court told M r. M eadows that “efforts have been made
to give you assistance in this matter.” In announcing the sentence, the court said
it took into consideration “the serious nature of the violations while under the
term of supervised release, the defendant’s pattern of criminal activity, [and] his
flight from supervision.” The court also referred to the factors enumerated at 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), including “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics that the defendant has displayed, the need for the
sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, [and] to promote
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respect for the law and provide just punishment.” The sentence imposed was
within the suggested Sentencing Guidelines range of seven to thirteen months of
imprisonment under policies that apply to terms imposed after violations of the
conditions of supervised release. 1
On appeal, M r. M eadows argues that the crime he was convicted of – drug
possession – “is not a serious offense,” and contends that “[d]rug addiction is a
victimless-crime” that can be treated successfully. As such, he argues that it
would have been more reasonable and cost-effective for the court to sentence him
to an in-patient drug treatment program.
“Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), when a person violates a condition of his or
her supervised release, the district court may revoke the term of supervised
release and impose prison time.” United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1304
(10th Cir. 2004). 2 Because the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide only non-
1
The maximum custody term that can be imposed for violation of a
condition of supervised release is one year for each count of the underlying class
E felony. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3584, a court can
order the sentences to run concurrently or consecutively. M r. M eadows was
convicted of tw o counts of a class E felony, which would total a maximum of tw o
years if the sentences ran consecutively.
2
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) provides that:
[t]he court may, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553 . . .
revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in
prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for
the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit
for time previously served on postrelease supervision, if the court, pursuant
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of
(continued...)
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binding policy statements that apply to the sentence to be imposed after a
violation of the conditions of supervised release, the standard for review for a
district court’s decision to impose such a sentence is “plainly unreasonable” under
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4). United States v. W hite, 244 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir.
2001) (citing to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines M anual, ch. 7). “In reviewing the
sentence and the court’s explanation of it, ‘we will not reverse if it can be
determined from the record to have been reasoned and reasonable.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 774 (10th Cir. 1992)). “In conducting this
analysis, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal
interpretations of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo.” Kelley, 359 F.3d at 1304.
W e conclude that the district court, in considering the probation office’s
sentencing memorandum, M r. M eadows’s own memorandum and admissions, and
the additional statements from M r. M eadows at the sentencing hearing, properly
found that M r. M eadows violated the terms of his supervisory release by a
preponderance of the evidence. M oreover, the district court’s explanation in the
record is “reasoned and reasonable,” referring to treatment assistance that had
already been provided to M r. M eadows, his pattern of illegal drug use, and his
2
(...continued)
probation or supervised release, finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release, except that a
defendant whose term is revoked under this paragraph may not be required
to serve on any such revocation . . . more than one year [in prison if the
felony is a class E felony].
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“flight from supervision,” reflected in both the failure to report to his probation
officer and his failure to abide by the rules of the inpatient treatment program.
The prison term of twelve months did not exceed the statutory maximum that
could be imposed. Finally, the court was not obligated to impose another term of
supervisory release to include additional substance abuse treatment, regardless of
the general policy arguments that M r. M eadows makes in this appeal. 3
For those reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M . Ebel
Circuit Judge
3
The court did recommend that the Bureau of Prisons place M r. M eadow s
in a facility in which substance abuse treatment is available.
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