FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 9, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 09-6023
v. (D.C. Nos. 5:08-CV-00796-R and
5:06-CR-00009-R-1)
JAMES L. HILL, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant James Hill, a federal inmate appearing pro se, seeks to
appeal from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate,
set aside or correct his sentence. 2 R. Doc. 110. Because Mr. Hill has not made
“a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2), we deny his request for a certificate of appealability (“COA”) and
dismiss the appeal. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Mr. Hill was convicted by a jury of one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 1 R. Doc. 1, 26.
He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment followed by two years of
supervised release. 1 R. Doc. 41 at 2-3. On direct appeal, we affirmed his
conviction and sentence. United States v. Hill, 224 Fed. App’x. 825, 832 (10th
Cir. 2007) (unpublished). He then sought leave to correct the appellate record, a
matter we deemed moot, United States v. Hill, 272 Fed. App’x 707, 708 (10th Cir.
2008), given that the the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Hill v. United States,
128 S. Ct. 327 (2007).
On July 31, 2008, Mr. Hill then sought relief pursuant to § 2255, raising a
total of eleven grounds for relief and requesting an evidentiary hearing. 3 R. Doc.
75, App. at 23-79, 80-81; 1 R. Doc. 97. After the government filed its initial
response, 1 R. Doc. 92, Mr. Hill responded, 1 R. Doc. 100. The district court
then ordered the government to supplement its response with an affidavit from
Mr. Hill’s trial counsel. 1 R. Doc. 102. The affidavit was to address defense
counsel’s interview with a potential witness and why trial counsel did not call her
as a defense witness or on rebuttal. 1 R. Doc. 102. The government then filed its
surreply along with the affidavit of defense counsel and a forensic lab report that
had been previously provided in discovery. 1 R. Doc. 106 at 8 & Att. 1, 2. After
Mr. Hill requested a twenty-day extension to respond to the government’s
surreply, 2 R. Doc. 108, the district court denied the request, noting that the
§ 2255 motion “has been fully briefed.” 2 R. Doc. 109. On December 1, 2008,
the district court denied the § 2255 motion. 2 R. Doc. 110. On December 4,
2008, Mr. Hill filed his response to the surreply, which the district court struck. 2
R. Docs. 111, 112.
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On appeal, Mr. Hill raises seven issues which can be distilled into whether
the district court erred (1) in allowing impeachment by prior convictions
notwithstanding that Mr. Hill stipulated to a prior conviction; (2) in sentencing
Mr. Hill based upon disputed information not found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, (3) in not allowing Mr. Hill to file a responsive pleading to prove his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, (4) in not sustaining his Brady claim
concerning various items of evidence, and (5) in committing cumulative error.
Aplt. Br. 14-33.
In order to obtain a COA, Mr. Hill must make a “substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), such that “reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484; see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 338 (2003). We note that the district court allowed limited discovery and
exhaustively addressed Mr. Hill’s claims on the merits. We do not find its
resolution of those claims reasonably debatable. One issue raised by Mr. Hill,
however, warrants brief discussion.
Mr. Hill contends that the district court’s denial of his request to file a
reply in response to the government’s surreply (which contained defense
counsel’s affidavit) was error. He suggests that such a response would have
supported his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. As he correctly notes,
Rule 7(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings requires a court to
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allow a party to respond to the introduction of additional materials. The rule
provides that “[t]he judge must give the party against whom the additional
materials are offered an opportunity to admit or deny their correctness.” Rule
7(c), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District
Courts. Although the district court did not allow Mr. Hill to respond, any error
was harmless. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2111. First, no one contests the genuineness of
the affidavit. Moreover, the affidavit is consistent with Mr. Hill’s rendition of the
facts. Both accounts indicate that defense counsel did not want to call the witness
because the witness was not present when the offense occurred, raising relevancy
and hearsay concerns. See 1 R. Doc. 100 (Hill aff.); 1 R. Doc. 106, Att. 1.
Second, even assuming that the witness would have testified that Mr. Hill did not
have a gun on a prior occasion, trial counsel could make a reasonable and tactical
decision that any potential benefit was outweighed by other matters her testimony
would surely highlight. Finally, though his response to the government’s surreply
was later stricken, Mr. Hill referenced the affidavit but once when arguing that
defense counsel operated under a conflict of interest by inferring joint possession
of the firearm. 2 R. Doc. 111 at 7. This inference was certainly reasonable given
the facts. Thus, the ultimate effect of the district court’s decision not to allow a
further response was harmless. With or without the response, Mr. Hill could not
demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice as is required to succeed on
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
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U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
We deny a COA, deny IFP, and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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