[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 13, 2010
No. 09-12483
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-00107-CV-5-RS-MD
JOSEPH CHESTER PARZYCK, III,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES INC., et al.,
Defendants,
DANIEL P. CHERRY,
DR,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(December 13, 2010)
Before BARKETT and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and HUNT,* District Judge.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
Joseph Parzyck, III, a Florida prisoner, appeals the dismissal without
prejudice of his third amended complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), which was enacted as part of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Parzyck filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint alleging that prison medical personnel were deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.1 Ultimately, he
filed the third amended complaint at issue in this case, leaving Dr. Daniel Cherry,
the Chief Health Officer at the Apalachee Correctional Institution (“ACI”), as the
sole defendant. Parzyck alleged that Dr. Cherry, as Chief Health Officer, violated
his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him consultations with an orthopedic
specialist recommended by prison medical personnel for his severe back pain. The
only issue before us in this appeal is whether Parzyck exhausted his administrative
remedies prior to filing suit.2
*
Honorable Willis B. Hunt, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Georgia, sitting by designation.
1
Although Parzyck initially appealed pro se, this Court appointed counsel and ordered
supplemental briefing.
2
We review de novo the dismissal of a lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies under § 1997e(a). Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2000).
2
Section 1997e(a), enacted as part of the PLRA, provides that a prisoner must
exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing a federal action
challenging prison conditions. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 (2001).
The PLRA seeks to eliminate unwarranted interference with the administration of
prisons in order to “afford corrections officials time and opportunity to address
complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) (alteration and quotation marks omitted).
“Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by
the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).
The grievance procedures promulgated by the Florida Department of
Corrections (“FDOC”) require an inmate to (1) file an informal grievance to the
staff member responsible for the particular area of the problem, Fla. Admin. Code
Ann. r. 33-103.005(1)(a); (2) file a formal grievance with the warden’s office, id. at
r. 33-103.006(1); and (3) submit an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of the
FDOC, id. at r. 33-103.007(1). However, if an inmate is filing a medical
grievance, as was the case here, the initial informal grievance step may be omitted.
Id. at r. 33-103.006(3)(e).
In November 2006, Parzyck filed an informal grievance complaining that he
had been waiting three months for a promised orthopedic consultation for his
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continual and severe back pain and asking to be seen by an orthopedist
immediately. The grievance was returned with instructions to file a formal
grievance, as an informal grievance was unnecessary for a medical complaint.
Parzyck did so and received a response stating that his medical chart would be
reviewed. When he was still not granted a referral, Parzyck submitted an appeal to
the Office of the Secretary. In January 2007, while the appeal was pending, Dr.
Cherry was appointed as Chief Health Officer and Parzyck again requested an
orthopedic consultation, which was denied by Dr. Cherry. On March 13, 2007, the
Office of the Secretary denied Parzyck’s appeal on the ground that it was “the
responsibility of [the] Chief Health Officer to determine the appropriate treatment
regimen for the condition [he was] experiencing.” On May 17, 2007 – two months
after having completely exhausted the FDOC’s administrative grievance
procedures – Parzyck filed his original complaint in federal court.
While his lawsuit was pending, Parzyck again filed a grievance regarding
the failure to provide promised referrals to specialists for his severe back pain. Dr.
Cherry denied this grievance, and Parzyck appealed to the Office of the Secretary,
specifically referencing Dr. Cherry’s earlier denial of his request for an orthopedic
consultation. This appeal was denied on July 22, 2008. Three months after fully
exhausting this second round of the FDOC’s administrative grievance procedures –
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on October 28, 2008 – Parzyck filed his third amended complaint.
The district court determined that because Parzyck’s first grievance only
addressed acts and omissions that occurred before Dr. Cherry’s appointment as
Chief Health Officer, Dr. Cherry could not be held liable and therefore, Parzyck’s
first grievance did not exhaust administrative remedies as to any claim against him.
As to the second grievance, the district court held that it did not exhaust
administrative remedies because Parzyck did not complete the administrative
review process before he filed his original complaint, even though it had been
completed before his third amended complaint was filed.
We find that under the facts of this case, the district court erred in
concluding that Parzyck had not exhausted all available administrative remedies
before filing the original complaint. In holding that Parzyck had not exhausted his
first grievance against Dr. Cherry because it referenced acts that occurred before he
became Chief Health Officer, the district court confused the question of Dr.
Cherry’s liability on the merits of the claim with the separate and distinct question
of whether Parzyck exhausted his administrative remedies. A prisoner need not
name any particular defendant in a grievance in order to properly exhaust his
claim. Jones, 549 U.S. at 219; see also Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th
Cir. 2000) (“[W]hile § 1997e(a) requires that a prisoner provide as much relevant
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information as he reasonably can in the administrative grievance process, it does
not require that he do more than that.”). Section 1997e(a)’s exhaustion
requirement is designed “to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide
personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued . . . .” Jones, 549 U.S. at
219 (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004)). The statute
merely requires inmates to complete the administrative review process in
compliance with the prison’s grievance procedures, so that there is “time and
opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a
federal case.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93 (alteration and quotation marks omitted).
Although Parzyck’s first grievance did not name Dr. Cherry, it accomplished
§ 1997e(a)’s purpose by alerting prison officials to the problem and giving them
the opportunity to resolve it before being sued. Parzyck was not required to initiate
another round of the administrative grievance process on the exact same issue each
time another request for an orthopedic consultation was denied. See Howard v.
Waide, 534 F.3d 1227, 1244 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Howard was not required to begin
the grievance process anew . . . [because] further grievances complaining of the
same living situation would have been redundant.”); Johnson, 385 F.3d at 521 (“As
a practical matter, Johnson could not have been expected to file a new grievance . .
. each time he was assaulted . . . . Johnson’s grievances were sufficient to exhaust
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claims that arose from the same continuing failure to protect him from sexual
assault.”).
Nothing in the FDOC’s grievance procedures requires inmates to file new
grievances addressing every subsequent act by a prison official that contributes to
the continuation of a problem already raised in an earlier grievance. The only
FDOC requirements regarding the contents of grievances are that they must
accurately state the facts and “address only one issue or complaint.” Fla. Admin.
Code Ann. rr. 33-103.006(2)(e) and (2)(f). Parzyck properly exhausted his
administrative remedies by complying with these requirements and completing the
administrative review process before filing his original complaint.
Parzyck demonstrated meticulous respect for the FDOC’s administrative
grievance procedures and gave prison officials ample opportunity to respond
internally before Dr. Cherry was brought into court. Because he complied with the
letter and purpose of § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement, we reverse the dismissal
of his third amended complaint and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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