Denis v. Attorney General of the United States

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________

Nos. 09-2113, 09-3520,
10-1390 and 10-1391
_____________

JEAN ANTOINE DENIS,
Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
_____________

Petitions for Review of an Order of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA No. A091-357-312)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Walter A. Durling
_____________

Argued October 26, 2010

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SLOVITER and
RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 26, 2011)
_____________
 Jonathan J. Li, Esq.
Joseph R. Wallin, Esq. [ARGUED]
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
200 Park Avenue, 47th Floor
New York, NY 10166
Counsel for Petitioner

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Esq.
Thomas W. Hussey, Esq.
Ann C. Varnon, Esq.
Kelly J. Walls, Esq. [ARGUED]
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
Counsel for Respondent
_____________

OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Jean Antoine Denis petitions for review of the
determination of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
that his conviction for tampering with physical evidence
under New York law constituted an aggravated felony and a
particularly serious crime, subjecting him to removal pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and rendering him ineligible
for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
Denis also contends that he received ineffective assistance of

2
counsel and should have been found eligible for deferral of
removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. § 208.17. 1

We conclude that the BIA correctly determined that
Denis’s conviction constituted an aggravated felony and a
particularly serious crime, and that Denis is ineligible for
deferral of removal.

Background & Procedural History

Denis, a native and citizen of Haiti, entered the United
States unlawfully in 1985, and adjusted his status to lawful
permanent resident in 1992. Prior to emigrating from Haiti,
Denis was a police officer under Francois Duvalier’s regime,
and served on the security detail for Duvalier’s motorcades,
which were widely televised and photographed in Haiti.
Denis asserts that after he objected to the human rights abuses
perpetrated by others in Duvalier’s police force, he was
forced to flee Haiti due to concerns for his safety. After

1
Denis petitions for review of four orders issued by the
BIA: (1) a September 17, 2007 decision reissuing the BIA’s
August 8, 2005 summary affirmance of the IJ’s denial of
deferral of removal under the CAT and order of removal; (2)
a November 13, 2007 decision upholding the IJ’s finding of
removability and denial of CAT protection, but granting and
remanding for adjudication Denis’s withholding of removal
application; (3) a March 18, 2009 decision affirming the
BIA’s November 13, 2007 aggravated felony finding and
upholding the denial of withholding of removal and CAT
protection; and (4) a July 29, 2009 decision denying Denis’s
motion to reconsider the BIA’s March 18, 2009 decision.

3
arriving in the United States, Denis continued to support the
democratic movement in Haiti associated with Jean-Bertrand
Aristide.

In the United States, Denis eventually started
and owned a business that provided a variety of services,
including selling insurance, notarizing documents, and
preparing income tax returns. On November 9, 1998, Denis
had an altercation with a female client regarding an allegedly
outstanding debt of $300 owed by Denis to the client. The
client visited Denis at his office, bit him and placed him in a
chokehold; when Denis resisted, the client slipped, landed on
her head, and died instantly. Denis panicked and hid the body
with the assistance of an associate.

Because the victim’s body was stiff and her legs did
not fit in the bag Denis intended to use to carry the victim to
his car, Denis dismembered her legs and one of her arms with
a machete from his office. After transporting the body in the
trunk of his car to his house, Denis took the body to the
basement and left the victim there for approximately two
days. He then returned to his office and cleaned up the
victim’s blood. Subsequently, Denis and his associate dug
through the cement floor of Denis’s garage, placed the body
in a suitcase in the hole, covered the suitcase with dirt, and
poured cement over the buried corpse.

Denis’s associate eventually revealed the
occurrence of the crime, and the police arrested Denis on
December 15, 1998, charging him with second degree murder
and tampering with physical evidence. On June 29, 1999, a
jury found Denis guilty of second degree manslaughter, in

4
violation of New York Penal Law (“NYPL”) § 125.15(1), 2
and of tampering with physical evidence, in violation of
NYPL § 215.40(2).3 Due to the significant aggravating facts
associated with the aftermath of the fatal attack, the judge
sentenced Denis to the “absolute maximum sentence for his
conduct.” (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 1170.) Denis
received an indeterminate sentence of two-and-two-thirds
years to eight years for manslaughter, and an indeterminate
sentence of one-and-one-third years to four years for the
tampering with physical evidence conviction. Denis served a
total of seven years in prison and was released in December
2006. He was then placed in federal immigration detention
and placed on supervised released in April 2010.

In June 2004, while Denis was incarcerated for the
state convictions, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) issued a Notice to Appear to Denis,
charging him with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) based on his conviction for an aggravated

2
Section 125.15(1) provides in pertinent part that “[a]
person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when . .
. [h]e recklessly causes the death of another person . . . .”
N.Y. Penal Law §125.15 (McKinney 2009).
3
Section 215.40(2) provides: “Believing that certain
physical evidence is about to be produced or used in an
official proceeding or a prospective official proceeding, and
intending to prevent such production or use, he suppresses it
by any act of concealment, alteration or destruction, or by
employing force, intimidation or deception against any
person.” N.Y. Penal Law § 215.40(2) (McKinney 2009).

5
felony, 4 as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), namely, an
offense relating to obstruction of justice for which the term of
imprisonment is at least one year. 5 Denis appeared with his
accredited representative before the immigration judge (“IJ”)
on November 30, 2004, admitted the truth of the factual
allegations, but denied removability. He offered testimony as
to the circumstances of the crime, explaining that he could not
“just throw [the victim’s] body in the water or somewhere”
because his fingerprints were on the body. (A.R. at 782-84.)
Specifically, Denis worried that he “might have a problem
with the police if they found [the body],” and decided to
transport it from his office in Brooklyn, New York to his
house in Queens, New York. At a continued hearing on
February 23, 2005, Denis moved for withholding of removal
and CAT protection, arguing that he would face persecution if
he returned to Haiti due to his previous role as a bodyguard to
the Duvalier regime. The IJ sustained the aggravated felony
ground of removability and denied Denis’s request for CAT
withholding of removal on April 26, 2005. After a timely
appeal, the BIA affirmed without opinion the IJ’s decision on
August 8, 2005. Denis timely petitioned for review before
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on

4
Denis was not charged with removability for his
manslaughter conviction, and we do not consider that
conviction in this appeal.
5
ICE further charged Denis with removability pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), as an alien convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years
after admission for which a sentence of one year or longer
may be imposed. ICE subsequently withdrew this charge, and
it does not factor in our analysis.

6
October 17, 2007, which petition was transferred to this Court
on February 18, 2010.6

In extensive subsequent proceedings, Denis challenged
the IJ’s and BIA’s rulings holding that Denis’s crime of
conviction constituted an aggravated felony and a particularly
serious crime; he further disputed the decision as to his
ineligibility for CAT relief. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s
decision that Denis committed an aggravated felony and the
IJ’s subsequent decision finding that Denis’s felony
constituted a particularly serious crime. The BIA also
affirmed the IJ’s determination that in spite of receiving
ineffective assistance of counsel, the deficiency did not
prejudice Denis as he failed to demonstrate eligibility for
CAT relief. 7 Denis petitioned this Court for review of both of

6
Denis’s proceedings were originally held in Batavia,
New York in light of his incarceration in Fishkill, New York.
Upon completion of his criminal sentence, his proceedings
were transferred to the immigration court in York,
Pennsylvania subsequent to his custodial transfer to York
County Prison.
7
After the BIA remanded his case to the IJ, Denis filed
a motion on December 17, 2007 with the BIA to reopen
proceedings based on the allegedly ineffective assistance of
counsel in failing to object to the initial IJ’s misapplication of
an incorrect legal standard to Denis’s application for relief
under the CAT. The BIA forwarded the motion to reopen to
the IJ to be considered in tandem with its November 13, 2007
remand order. The IJ agreed with Denis that his counsel had
been ineffective, and permitted Denis to augment the record
as to his CAT claim and granted a new hearing as to whether

7
the BIA’s latter decisions, and the Court consolidated the
petitions for review.

In this petition for review, Denis contends that
his crime of conviction is not an aggravated felony and
should not constitute a particularly serious crime; he further
alleges that based on his counsel’s ineffective assistance, he
was found ineligible for CAT relief without due process.
Each assertion implicates “constitutional claims or questions
of law,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we review the BIA’s
legal determinations de novo, subject to Chevron principles of
deference. Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.
2008) (citing Chevron, 567 U.S. at 844); Kang v. Att’y Gen.,
611 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2010). We will address each
argument in turn. 8

Denis’s present medical condition would likely lead to his
torture as a deportee. Denis contended that upon deportation,
he would lose access to his medicine and become
symptomatic for hyperthyroidism and hypertension, which
would render him mentally ill and more likely to be
intentionally mistreated. Following the merits hearing on
October 9, 2008, the IJ denied Denis’s CAT application as
insufficient. Denis appealed the decision to the BIA, which
affirmed the decision on March 18, 2009, and denied Denis’s
subsequent motion to reconsider. Denis subsequently
petitioned this Court for review.
8
The BIA exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15, and had jurisdiction over
Denis’s motion to reconsider under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b). We
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).

8
 Discussion

I. “Aggravated Felony” Determination Pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S)

Denis contends that his conviction for
tampering with physical evidence under NYPL § 215.40(2)
does not constitute an aggravated felony for purposes of 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The Attorney General counters that
Denis’s state conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony
because it was an offense relating to obstruction of justice,
warranting his removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), an aggravated felony is defined to include “an
offense relating to obstruction of justice . . . for which the
term of imprisonment is at least one year.” § 1101(a)(43)(S).
Because Denis’s minimum term of imprisonment exceeded
one year, his violation of NYPL § 215.40(2) qualifies as an
aggravated felony and renders him removable if his crime of
conviction “relat[es] to obstruction of justice.”

Our analysis as to whether a particular state conviction
constitutes an aggravated felony under the INA usually
follows the “formal categorical approach” set forth in Taylor
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); that is, we “look to the
elements of the statutory state offense, not to the specific
facts, reading the applicable statute to ascertain the least
culpable conduct necessary to sustain conviction under the
statute.” Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 466 (3d Cir.
2009) (citing Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir.
2004)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Restrepo v.
Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 791 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he
categorical approach prohibits consideration of evidence

9
other than the statutory definition of the offense, thus
precluding review of the particular facts underlying a
conviction.”). If the elements of the aggravated felony
generic crimes enumerated in the federal statute are the same
as or broader than the elements of the specific criminal statute
of conviction, then the specific crime of conviction
categorically qualifies as an aggravated felony. See, e.g.,
Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2006).

Where, however, “‘a statute criminalizes different
kinds of conduct, some of which would constitute [aggravated
felonies] while others would not, the court must apply a
modified categorical approach by which a court may look
beyond the statutory elements to determine the particular part
of the statute under which the defendant was actually
convicted.’” Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 791 (quoting United
States v. Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 2010)). In such
instances, “we have conducted a limited factual inquiry,
examining the record of conviction for the narrow purpose of
determining the specific [elements] under which the
defendant was convicted.” Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 466
(referencing Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 162 (3d Cir.
2004)).

Here, we will employ the categorical approach
in order to determine whether Denis’s crime of conviction
qualifies as an aggravated felony under the INA. The
elements of the state and federal offenses – and not the
individual facts or circumstances – are determinative to our
analysis. Denis argues that, in applying the categorical
approach, the elements that need to be proven for his
conviction under NYPL § 215.40(2) do not “match” those of
the comparable federal crime because the latter is limited to

10
interference with judicial proceedings, while one can be
convicted under the New York statute for interfering or
believing to interfere with a broader range of “official”
proceedings. However, unlike other subsections of
§ 1101(a)(43) that define “aggravated felony” by equating a
crime of conviction with a particular federal generic crime
element by element – such as 26 U.S.C. § 5861(firearms
offenses), 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (child pornography), or 26 U.S.C.
§ 7201 (tax evasion) – subsection (S) of § 1101(a)(43) is
more descriptive in nature and, thus, slightly more expansive.
The statutory text states that aggravated felonies include any
offense “relating to obstruction of justice.” As such, rather
than ascertaining whether the elements of a state crime of
conviction match the elements of a generic federal offense
with precision, we must only decide that the state conviction
“relates to” the offense criminalized by § 1101(a)(43)(S),
namely, obstruction of justice. Thus, the fact that the
elements do not precisely “match” each other is not
determinative.

The meaning of the phrase “relating to
obstruction of justice” and its application here present issues
of first impression in our Court. The BIA, however, has
issued a precedential decision analyzing this phrase, In re
Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889 (BIA 1999). There,
the Board determined that the federal crime of misprision of
felony, 18 U.S.C. § 4, did not constitute an aggravated felony,
as it did not sufficiently “relate to” 9 obstruction of justice. Id.
at 894. The BIA set forth a specific analytic path to be used
in determining whether an offense relates to obstruction of

9
We use the terms “relating to” and “relate to”
interchangeably throughout this Opinion.

11
justice; namely, the crime of conviction must contain a
“critical element” – “an affirmative and intentional attempt,
motivated by a specific intent, to interfere with the process of
justice.” Id.

The threshold issue we must address is the
appropriate level of deference we should give to the BIA’s
interpretation of the phrase “relating to obstruction of
justice,” which requires the presence of this critical element
in the crime of conviction. The general question of the
deference we owe to an agency’s – and specifically to the
BIA’s – statutory construction of the relevant provision is a
matter of some confusion. See, e.g., Patel v. Ashcroft, 294
F.3d 465, 467 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that Chevron deference
to administrative interpretation of statute yields to de novo
review of “legal issues that turn on a pure question of law not
implicating the agency’s expertise,” but declining to state
whether deference should be afforded to BIA’s interpretation
of “aggravated felon”); Drakes v. Zmiski, 240 F.3d 246, 250-
51 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding that BIA’s definition of “relating to
. . . forgery” under § 1101(a)(43)(R) constituted a question of
law, and fell “somewhere between” the deference owed under
Chevron and “a pure question of statutory construction for the
courts to decide”) (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S.
415, 424 (1999), and Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir.
1999)). See also Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322,
1326-27 (9th Cir. 1997) (Farris, J., dissenting) (highlighting
disagreement as to appropriate level of deference owed to
BIA’s interpretation of “relating to” in INA).

On the one hand, support is easily found for the
proposition that we are to engage in de novo review of
aggravated felony determinations. See, e.g., Henry v. Bureau

12
of Immig. & Customs Enforcement, 493 F.3d 303, 306 (3d
Cir. 2007) (exercising plenary review and noting that “[w]e
do not defer to the BIA’s determination of whether a crime
constitutes an aggravated felony”); Bobb v. Att’y Gen., 458
F.3d 213, 217 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Although we give Chevron
deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the aggravated felony
provisions of the INA if we determine that the statute is
ambiguous, the BIA is not entitled to Chevron deference as to
whether a particular federal criminal offense is an aggravated
felony.”) (internal citation omitted); Yong Wong Park v. Att’y
Gen., 472 F.3d 66, 71 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[N]either the Attorney
General nor the BIA . . . ‘is entitled to Chevron deference as
to whether a particular federal offense is an aggravated
felony.’”) (citation omitted). De novo review is customary
where the issue is one that dictates our subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(c), and is a
legal issue as to removability. See Patel, 294 F.3d at 467; Lee
v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 218, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We apply
de novo review to this purely legal question of statutory
interpretation [of aggravated felony under §
1101(a)(43)(M)(i)] that governs our own jurisdiction.”);
Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“Because we are determining a purely legal question, and
one that governs our own jurisdiction, we review de novo
whether the petitioner’s conviction qualifies as an aggravated
felony.”); Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 872 (7th
Cir. 2000) (“[B]oth our jurisdiction . . . and the merits of the
appeal turn on the question of whether [the petitioner] is an
aggravated felon, a decision we review de novo.”).

Furthermore, if the issue turns on the meaning of a
federal statute other than the INA, we possess the requisite
expertise to interpret a federal criminal statute such that no

13
deference is due. See Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464, 467
(3d Cir. 2005) (“The interpretation of criminal statutes is a
task outside the BIA’s special competence and congressional
delegation, while it is very much a part of this Court’s
competence.”) (citation omitted); Yong Wong Park, 472 F.3d
at 71 (“[T]he Attorney General has no particular expertise in
defining a term under federal law, yet it is ‘what federal
courts do all the time.’”) (quoting Drakes, 240 F.3d at 251).

On the other hand, we have also recognized that in
certain instances some deference to the agency’s view as to
what constitutes an aggravated felony is warranted. We have
stated that if we cannot ascertain on our own the meaning of a
statutory phrase by its plain terms, statutory context, or by
resort to legislative history, we will defer to the agency’s
view. See, e.g., Restrepo v. Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 794-95
(3d Cir. 2010) (observing that the phrase “sexual abuse of a
minor” in § 1101(a)(43)(A) “is most assuredly not clear and
unambiguous,” and “leaves us in a state of interpretative
uncertainty,” warranting deference to the BIA’s reasonable
interpretation of the phrase); Valansi, 278 F.3d at 208
(“Despite our exercise of de novo review, we will give
deference to the agency’s interpretation of the aggravated
felony definition if Congress’s intent is unclear.”). This will
occur if there is a lack of clarity, or outright ambiguity, or if
the agency has “filled a gap” in the statute. See Augustin v.
Att’y Gen., 520 F.3d 264, 268 (3d Cir. 2008) (“When
Congress has left a gap in a statute, implicitly leaving the
administering agency responsible for filling that gap, ‘a court
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.’”) (citation omitted). Moreover,
where the statutory provision implicates the agency’s concern

14
with foreign relations and diplomatic repercussions, the
Supreme Court has instructed that the BIA, and not the
courts, should resolve any ambiguity. Aguirre, 526 U.S. at
422; Patel, 294 F.3d at 467-68 (“[J]udicial deference to the
Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration
context where officials exercise especially sensitive political
functions.”).

The instant petition for review does not present an
obscure ambiguity or a matter committed to agency
discretion. Rather, the phrase “relating to obstruction of
justice” in Section 1101(a)(43)(S) includes two discrete
phrases – “relating to” and “obstruction of justice” – both of
which are capable of definition. As to the latter, Title 18 of
the U.S. Code contains a listing of crimes entitled
“obstruction of justice,” permitting us to easily determine the
types of conduct Congress intended the phrase to encompass.
We noted in Tran that construction of the criminal provisions
in Title 18 “is a task outside the BIA’s special competence
and congressional delegation, while it is very much a part of
this Court’s competence.” 414 F.3d at 467 (citing Francis v.
Reno, 269 F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 2001)). Similarly, we have
often discussed the meaning of the phrase “relating to” in
Section 1101(a)(43), observing that the phrase is to be read
expansively and “must not be strictly confined to its
narrowest meaning.” Drakes, 240 F.3d at 249; see also Yong
Wong Park, 472 F.3d at 72 (finding Congress’s use of
“relating to” “critical,” “evidenc[ing] an intent to define [the
listed offenses] in [their] broadest sense”). 10 Indeed, unless

10
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals likewise
explained that Congress’s use of “relating to” in subsection
(R) “necessarily” signaled an intent to cover “a range of

15
the words “relating to” are of no effect, they must be
construed to encompass crimes other than those specifically
listed in the federal statutes. See Kamagate v. Ashcroft, 385
F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir. 2004) (observing that the Supreme
Court previously rejected a narrow construction of the phrase,
and defined “relating to” as follows: “to stand in some
relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring
into association with or connection with”) (quoting Morales
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)); see
generally United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 62-63 (3d Cir.
2008) (“[L]egislative enactments should not be construed to
render their provisions mere surplusage.”). Accordingly, we
conclude that our review here is de novo and we owe no
deference to the BIA’s reasoning or definition. 11

activities beyond those of counterfeiting or forgery itself.”
Albillo-Figueroa v. INS, 221 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000).
11
Notably, the Ninth and Fifth Circuit Courts of
Appeals followed a deferential approach in applying the
statutory provision before us, examining whether the Board’s
reasoning – as set forth in Espinoza – resulted in a
permissible construction of the language of the INA under
Chevron. See Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076,
1086 (9th Cir. 2008); Salazar-Luviano v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d
857, 861 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gamboa-Garcia,
620 F.3d 546, 549-50 (5th Cir. 2010); Alwan v. Ashcroft, 388
F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 2004). Relying on Aguirre, both
courts concluded that the phrase “offense relating to
obstruction of justice” lacked a clear meaning, and therefore
deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of subsection (S). In
Aguirre, however, the phrase at issue – “serious nonpolitical
crime” – was viewed by the Supreme Court as pertaining to

16
 Although we do not defer to the BIA here, we will
discuss its approach to resolving the instant matter, as it bears
some similarities to our own. Relying on its previous
precedential decision in Espinoza, the BIA concluded that the
elements of Denis’s offense of conviction required “an
affirmative and intentional attempt, motivated by a specific
intent to, interfere with the process of justice.” (J.A.-12.) As
this element was present in the New York crime, Denis was
found to be an aggravated felon, and removable by virtue of
Section 1227(a)(2).

In Espinoza, the BIA decided that misprision of felony
did not constitute a crime “relating to” obstruction of justice.
22 I. & N. Dec. at 892. The Board explored the elements of
misprision and compared them to the elements of the federal
offenses included in the list of crimes labeled “obstruction of
justice” in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1518. 22 I. & N. Dec. at 892.
The BIA found Section 1503 inapplicable to misprision of a
felony since it does not “require as an element either active

the Executive Branch’s exercise of “especially sensitive
political functions that implicate questions of foreign
relations.” 526 U.S. at 422. In contrast, here, the phrase
“relating to obstruction of justice” bears none of the same
implications. See Yong Wong Park, 472 F.3d at 70
(observing that Aguirre’s foreign policy considerations
“motivating that deference are largely absent” in the §
1101(a)(43) context). More importantly, the instant phrase is
readily definable, unlike “serious nonpolitical crime.” As we
already noted, we are well-equipped to interpret and apply the
statutory language of Title 18 on our own, and will not defer
to the Board’s view.

17
interference with proceedings of a tribunal or investigation, or
action or threat of action against those who would cooperate
in the process of justice.” Id. The BIA reasoned that
“Congress did not adopt a generic descriptive phrase such as
‘obstructing justice’ or ‘obstruct justice,’ but chose instead a
term of art utilized in the United States Code to designate a
specific list of crimes.” Id. at 893. Noting that the United
States Code “delineates a circumscribed set of offenses that
constitute ‘obstruction of justice,’” the agency articulated its
belief that not “every offense that, by its nature, would tend to
‘obstruct justice’ is an offense that should properly be
classified as ‘obstruction of justice.’” Id. at 893-94. “To
include all offenses that have a tendency to, or by their nature
do, obstruct justice would cast the net too widely.” Id.

The BIA focused on “the nature of the underlying
offense,” namely, misprision of felony, and concluded that
the conviction for misprision did not relate to obstruction of
justice because it was “separate and distinct from the crimes
[actually] categorized as ‘obstruction of justice.’” Id. at 896.
Indeed, misprision of felony and obstruction of justice are
treated as separate offenses under federal law. Id. at 894.
Importantly, the Board also noted that misprision lacked the
“critical element” of an obstruction of justice offense – “an
affirmative and intentional attempt, motivated by a specific
intent, to interfere with the process of justice.” Id. at 894.

While we do consider the elements of a crime in
deciding whether a conviction is “related to” another offense,
see, e.g., Drakes, 240 F.3d at 250 (examining distinct
elements of forgery crimes in several jurisdictions for
purposes of Section 1101(a)(43)(R) determination), we have
also held that the crimes of conviction can be “related to” a

18
listed offense without containing what might be viewed as an
essential element. In Bobb, we addressed whether a
conviction for forging a check in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 510(a)(2) constituted an offense “related to” forgery under
Section 1101(a)(43)(R). 458 F.3d at 219-20. We stated that
Congress intended to define forgery in its broadest sense by
using the language “relating to”:

The term “relate” means “to show or
establish a logical or causal connection
between.” Subsection (R) thus encompasses
conduct beyond the traditional definition of
forgery, and includes criminal conduct that is
causally connected to forgery, but may lack as
an essential element an intent to defraud or
deceive.
458 F.3d at 219. We remarked that the example of
Section 510(b), which criminalizes the knowing exchange of
stolen or forged Treasury instruments, represented a good
example of an offense “related to” forgery, even though it
lacked as an element an intent to defraud or deceive. Id.
(“[I]f [Congress] had used the language ‘forgery offense’
instead of ‘related to . . . forgery’ – then [the narrow
interpretation] would have merit.”); see also Drakes, 240 F.3d
at 250 (holding that forgery lacking an intent to defraud still
“related to . . . forgery” under subsection (R)).

Similarly, in Yong Wong Park, we considered whether
a conviction for trafficking in counterfeit items constituted an
aggravated felony “relating to . . . counterfeiting” pursuant to
subsection (R). 472 F.3d at 72. Finding the distinction
between “counterfeiting” and “relating to . . . counterfeiting”

19
“critical,” we opined that “considering the broad reach of the
term ‘relating to,’ certainly a statute which prohibits the
knowing use of a counterfeit mark is a statute which codifies
an offense relating to counterfeiting.” Id. (“Indeed, it is
common for a federal criminal statute pertaining to
counterfeiting to include as an element of the crime either the
act of counterfeiting or the knowing use of the end product of
an act of counterfeiting.”). We concluded that the specific
statute of conviction “was simply one of several federal
criminal statutes which ‘seeks to discourage [the act of]
counterfeiting through the criminalization of the use of its end
product.’” Id. (quoting Albillo-Figueroa, 221 F.3d at 1073).

Accordingly, our caselaw would seem to embrace a
broader reading of “related to” obstruction of justice than that
adopted by the BIA, which required the presence of a “critical
element.” To give effect to Congress’s choice of language, a
categorical matching of the elements of the offense of
conviction with the elements of a federal law cannot be the
sole test for determining whether a crime of conviction
“relates to” a generic federal offense. 12 Indeed, we

12
In this regard, we again depart from the view adopted
by the Ninth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals, which have
read Espinoza to suggest that “the question whether a specific
offense of conviction counts as an aggravated felony under
§ 1101(a)(43)(S) depends exclusively on whether ‘the
elements of the offense . . . constitute the crime of obstruction
of justice as that term is defined’ in” §§ 1501-1521. Salazar-
Luviano , 551 F.3d at 861 (quoting Espinoza, 22 I. & N. Dec.
at 893) (emphasis added); see also Alwan, 388 F.3d at 514
(finding that substantive offense of conviction categorically
matched the elements of obstruction of justice under § 1503,

20
previously found that a “causal connection” may suffice to
make the separate crimes related; the connection between a
crime of forgery and the exchange of forged documents is a
prime example. See Bobb, 458 F.3d at 219-220 (“Congress’
choice of the word ‘related to’ was intended to capture certain
criminal conduct . . . which does not contain any intent to
deceive or defraud”).

The parties to this petition focused extensively
upon the elements of Denis’s crime when compared to the
crimes enumerated in the obstruction of justice section of
Title 18. Each side proposed that deference is due, assuming
that we would defer to the BIA’s “critical element” approach
in Espinoza. We conclude that their reasoning and focus is
misguided. We need not determine the precise degree of
similarity between the elements of Denis’s offense and a

where “the defendant [was] convicted of a crime not
expressly designated as obstruction”). Rather than treating
the provisions in title 18 as merely guiding the analysis of
whether a crime of conviction relates to obstruction of justice
under § 1101(a)(43)(S), these decisions instead require that
the elements of the crime categorically match the elements of
the individual offenses listed in Section 1501 et seq. This
interpretation effectively disregards Congress’s decision to
employ the expansive term “relating to” in subsection (S) and
is unsupported by the plain language of the statute. “Unless
the words ‘relating to’ have no effect, the enumerated crime .
. . must not be strictly confined to its narrowest meaning.”
Drakes, 240 F.3d at 249 (citing Ruiz-Romero v. Reno, 205
F.3d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that “related to”
describes a class of crimes and does not constitute a
restriction)).

21
listed federal crime. Rather, under our precedent, we will
“survey the interrelationship between [the] two statutory
provisions,” Bobb, 458 F.3d at 214, and apply the phrase
“relating to” broadly, seeking a logical or causal
connection.13 Here, that task is straightforward and the test is
easily met.

Examining Denis’s crime of conviction in
relation to the federal obstruction of justice offenses codified
in Section 1501 et seq., we are convinced that Denis’s
conviction represented a crime relating to obstruction of
justice. The two provisions most relevant to Denis’s conduct
are Sections 1503 and 1512(c). (J.A.-12.) Section 1503
contains a catchall provision prohibiting a person from
“corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter
or communication, influenc[ing], obstruct[ing], or
imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct or impede,
the due administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 1503. Both

13
Although we need not defer to the BIA’s decision in
Espinoza, even if we were to find § 1101(a)(43)(S)
ambiguous and accorded Chevron deference, we would
nevertheless find the Board’s requirement of the “critical
element” as the sine qua non of an aggravated felony an
impermissibly narrow interpretation. As we stated in Yong
Wong Park with respect to Section 1101(a)(43)(R), “there
exist offenses ‘related to’ forgery which do not contain as an
essential element an intent to defraud or deceive.” 458 F.3d
at 220. Similarly here, there may exist offenses causally
related to obstruction of justice that do not necessarily contain
“the critical element of an affirmative and intentional attempt,
motivated by a specific intent, to interfere with the process of
justice.” Espinoza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 893.

22
Denis’s crime of conviction and this federal obstruction of
justice provision, by their terms, proscribe any behavior that
entails the use of force in an effort to impede or obstruct an
official proceeding,14 such as through evidence tampering.
See United States v. Jahedi, 681 F. Supp. 2d 430, 439
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that courts consistently construe §
1503 to cover evidence tampering); see also United States v.
Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 952 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that
concealment and destruction of documents satisfies § 1503).
Thus, Denis’s conviction for tampering bears a close
resemblance to the federal obstruction of justice offense
defined in Section 1503.15

14
Title 18 defines official proceeding as “a proceeding
before a judge or court of the United States . . . or a Federal
grand jury . . . or a proceeding before a Federal Government
agency which is authorized by law.” 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1).
15
As noted above, while Section 215.40(2) has been
interpreted by New York courts to apply regardless of
whether the conduct interfered with a judicial proceeding or a
police investigation, see, e.g. People v. Berdini, 845 N.Y.S.2d
717, 721 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2007), and Section 1503 only
pertains to obstruction of judicial proceedings, United States
v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995), this distinction does not
defeat our “relating to” analysis, even if it could defeat a
traditional categorical matching of the crime of conviction
with a generic federal offense, see Garcia, 462 F.3d at 291.
As discussed, our approach does not depend upon matching
the elements of the state crime of conviction with the
elements of Section 1503, and, instead, we only consider the
provision to identify the nature of offenses classified as

23
 Section 1512 provides similar reinforcement. This
obstruction of justice provision prohibits in pertinent part
alteration, destruction, mutilation, or concealment of any
object that would “impair the object’s integrity or availability
for use in an official proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c). 16
This subsection’s focus on destroying or mutilating
evidentiary items in anticipation of their potential production
in a prospective proceeding is directly analogous, and thus,
logically connected to Denis’s state crime of conviction.17 As
such, Denis’s offense “relat[es] to obstruction of justice” as

obstruction of justice under federal law for purposes of
conducting the “relating to” examination.
16
In contrast with Section 1503 and its limited
application to judicial proceedings under Aguilar, Section
1512(f)(1) specifically notes that “an official proceeding need
not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the
offense” for subsection (c) to govern a tampering offense.
17
We need not resolve Denis’s assertion that the
current iteration of Section 1512(c) – which added the
subsection on tampering with physical evidence – constitutes
an impermissible retroactive application of an amended
statute under Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244
(1994). As with our review of Section 1503, we consider the
amended Section 1512(c) solely to gauge Congress’s
conception of the scope of offenses that constitute obstruction
of justice for purposes of deciding which offenses relate to
the topic under Section 1101(a)(43)(S). As such, we do not
actually rely upon 1512(c) to find that Denis’s crime of
conviction categorically matched the elements of the
amended section.

24
that offense is defined in both federal statutes – Sections
1512(c) and 1503.

Because Denis’s violation of NYPL § 215.40(2)
relates to obstruction of justice and mandated a term of
imprisonment of at least one year, it qualifies as an
aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(S). Accordingly,
Denis’s petition for review on this basis will be denied as we
lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal
pursuant to Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(C).

II. “Particularly Serious Crime” Determination
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)

Denis next contests the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s
ruling that Denis committed a “particularly serious crime,” as
codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and is thus ineligible for
withholding of removal. Denis argues that the elements of his
crime of conviction – as well as the actual underlying conduct
– did not entail a crime against a person, and should not be
deemed particularly serious. Denis also contends that in
ruling on this issue, the IJ improperly considered evidence of
alleged offenses of which Denis was acquitted. Finally,
Denis argues that the IJ improperly placed the burden upon
him to disprove that his offense was particularly serious. We
reject each of Denis’s contentions.

Section 1231 provides that while the Attorney General
“may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General
decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in
that country,” § 1231(b)(3)(A), such withholding is
unavailable “if the Attorney General decides that . . . the

25
alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of the
United States,” § 1231(b)(3)(B). The Section further explains
that “an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony
. . . for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate
term of imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be considered to
have committed a particularly serious crime.” Id.; see also 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). Here, Denis’s sentence for an
aggravated felony did not entail a minimum imprisonment of
at least five years, rendering the conviction not particularly
serious per se.

Unlike the commonly understood terms discussed
above concerning the definition of an aggravated felony
relating to obstruction of justice, there are no textual or
contextual indicators in the INA as to “how the Board should
determine whether an alien has committed a ‘particularly
serious crime’ when a court has convicted the alien of an
aggravated felony for which the court sentenced the alien to
less than five years imprisonment.” Chong v. INS, 264 F.3d
378, 387 (3d Cir. 2001). The statute itself expressly grants
the Attorney General discretion to decide whether an alien
committed a particularly serious crime; the Attorney General
may “determin[e] that, notwithstanding the length of sentence
imposed, an alien has been convicted of a particularly serious
crime.” Id. (citing § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv)); see also Lapaix v.
Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 2010) (“When the
offense in question is not a per se particularly serious crime,
the Attorney General retains discretion to determine on a
case-by-case basis whether the offense constituted a
particularly serious crime.”); Singh v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 435,
439 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Attorney General may determine
that any aggravated felony, even one that results in a sentence

26
of less than five years, qualifies as particularly serious.”)
(emphasis in original). The statutory language “contains no
limiting language restricting the Attorney General’s
discretion to label [ ] crimes as ‘particularly serious’ . . . [and]
the long history of case-by-case determination of ‘particularly
serious crimes’ counsels against [attempts] to craft a bright-
line rule.” N-A-M v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1052, 1076 (10th Cir.
2009). As in Aguirre, the provision of the INA here
anticipates reliance on the expertise of the agency for a
judgment as to “seriousness,” as given meaning “through a
process of case-by-case adjudication,” 526 U.S. at 425; the
application of this phrase is committed to the agency’s
reasoning and exercise of discretion. Accordingly, we will
defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the statutory text if it “is
based on a permissible construction of § 1231(b)(3)(B).” 18
Chong, 264 F.3d at 387 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43);
see also Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 648 (3d Cir.
2006) (“We . . . will afford Chevron deference to the BIA’s
reasonable interpretations of statutes which it is charged with
administering.”).

18
In reviewing the BIA’s determination of particularly
serious crime, we reiterate our previous conclusion that the
statutory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which limits judicial
review of the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions, is
“insufficient to pull the ‘particularly serious crime’
determination out from the broad class of reviewable
decisions that require the application of law to fact into the
narrower class of decisions where judicial review is precluded
by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).” Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88,
101-02 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)).

27
 The BIA has taken a notably expansive view as to
what can be considered in determining whether a crime
qualifies as particularly serious. In Chong, we commented on
that approach with approval:

[C]onsideration of the individual facts and
circumstances is appropriate . . . This inquiry
does not involve an examination of the
respondents’ family or community ties, or the risk
of persecution in the alien’s native country. To
make this determination, we look to the
conviction records and sentencing information.

Further, we do not engage in a retrial of
the alien’s criminal case or go behind the record
of conviction to redetermine the alien’s innocence
or guilt.

264 F.3d at 388 (quoting In re L-S, 22 I. & N. Dec.
645, 651 (BIA 1999)). After our decision in Chong, the BIA
provided more clarity as to the evidence that may be
considered in deciding whether an offense is particularly
serious. In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (BIA 2007).
Further distancing the analysis from a categorical or
structured approach, the BIA explained:

If the elements of the offense do not
potentially bring the crime into a category of
particularly serious crimes, the individual facts
and circumstances of the offense are of no
consequence, and the alien would not be barred
from a grant of withholding of removal. On the
other hand, once the elements of the offense are

28
 examined and found to potentially bring the
offense within the ambit of a particularly serious
crime, all reliable information may be considered
in making a particularly serious crime
determination, including the conviction records
and sentencing information, as well as other
information outside the confines of a record of
conviction.

Id. (citing L-S, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 654-56). In other
words, where the elements of the crime of conviction suggest
that the crime could potentially qualify as particularly serious,
the BIA “[does] not prohibit the examination of other
evidence or indicate that only conviction records and
sentencing information could be used.” Id. at 344. In fact,
the BIA emphasized that no decision “has ever suggested that
the categorical approach, used primarily in determining
removability, is applicable to the inherently discretionary
determination of whether a conviction is for a particularly
serious crime.” Id.

Although the BIA will sometimes rely “exclusively on
the elements of an offense” in exercising its discretion, it
“generally examine[s] a variety of factors” and “see[s] no
reason to exclude otherwise reliable information from
consideration . . . once the nature of the crime, as measured
by its elements, brings it within the range of a ‘particularly
serious’ offense.” Id. (citing In re Babaisakov, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 306 (BIA 2007)); In re Q-T-M-T-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 639,
650-51 (BIA 1996) (applying categorical approach for case-
by-case analysis based solely on the statutory elements of the
offense). In such instances, IJs and the BIA “look ‘to such
factors as the nature of the conviction, the circumstances of

29
the underlying facts of the conviction, [and] the type of
sentence imposed.’” 19 Lapaix, 605 F.3d at 1143-44 (quoting
In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247 (BIA 1982)); see
also Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 677-78 (9th Cir.
2010) (same); Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890, 897 (8th Cir.
2009) (same).

Pursuant to the above approach, before examining the
individual facts and circumstances of a case, the BIA will first
decide whether the elements of an offense “potentially bring
the offense within the ambit of a particularly serious crime.”
N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342. The BIA has consistently
stated that crimes entailing or threatening to use physical
force or violence against another person “are more likely to
be categorized as particularly serious.” Id.; L-S-, 22 I. & N.

19
The BIA previously considered “whether the type
and circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be
a danger to the community” as the “most important[ ]” factor
in the instant analysis. In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at
247. In N-A-M-, however, the BIA emphasized that its
“approach to determining whether a crime is particularly
serious has evolved since the issuance of [its] decision in [ ]
Frentescu.” 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342. “Once an alien is found
to have committed a particularly serious crime, [the BIA] no
longer engage[s] in a separate determination to address
whether the alien is a danger to the community.” Id. Instead,
“the proper focus for determining whether a crime is
particularly serious is on the nature of the crime and not the
likelihood of future serious misconduct.” Id. (citations
omitted); see generally Tian, 576 F.3d at 897 (same).
Therefore, neither the IJ nor the BIA, nor we, need opine as to
Denis’s potential danger to the community.

30
Dec. at 649; In re LSJ, 21 I. & N. Dec. 973, 974-75 (BIA
1997) (finding armed robbery with the threat of violence
against several people particularly serious). 20 Here, Denis
employs this line of reasoning to urge that because the victim
was deceased when the tampering occurred, his crime cannot
constitute a particularly serious crime because it was not
committed against a person. This argument is unavailing.

The fact that crimes against persons are considered
particularly serious does not suggest that other offenses –
such as the crime of conviction here – cannot also be viewed
as particularly serious. To decide, we look, as did the BIA, to
all reliable evidence “in making a particularly serious crime
determination.” N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342; see J.A.-22
(noting that the IJ properly reviewed “the respondent’s
testimony and other information outside the record of
conviction”).

20
Analogously, our fellow Courts of Appeals regularly
focus upon the use of force or violence against other persons
in reviewing BIA decisions defining particularly serious
crimes. See, e.g., Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 946, 951 (7th
Cir. 2008) (observing that plaintiff can rebut presumption of
particularly serious crime by establishing “the absence of any
violence or threat of violence”); Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey,
516 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that conviction for
crime demonstrating propensity for violence is indicative of a
particularly serious crime); Yousefi v. INS, 260 F.3d 318, 328
(4th Cir. 2001) (“When the crime is a against a person, the
likelihood that the offense will be classified as a ‘particularly
serious crime’ is increased.”); Ikharo v. Holder, 614 F.3d
622, 633 (6th Cir. 2010) (same).

31
 Here, the Board concluded that “in view of the
gruesome brutality of the respondent’s actions underlying the
conviction (as graphically reflected in the respondent’s
testimony), we expressly reject the respondent’s contention
that the record of proceeding fails to establish” the
particularly serious nature of his crime. (J.A.-22.) We find
this a permissible reading and application of the phrase.
Consideration of the “individual facts and circumstances”
reveals that Denis tampered with physical evidence by
violently dismembering and concealing his victim. 21
Moreover, the record confirms that Denis perpetrated the
offense through the use of physical force. The BIA properly
considered the nature of his acts and we will not disturb its
determination that Denis’s offense constituted a particularly
serious crime. 22

21
See In re Denis, Decision and Order, J.A.-152
(“[R]espondent, in a grisly and wanton act, grossly disfigured
his victim’s body by hacking her legs off with a machete,
took the body to his house when his wife and child were at
home, and returned to clean up the crime scene.”)
22
Denis separately avers that the IJ improperly
considered evidence of alleged offenses of which Denis was
acquitted in deciding upon the particularly serious question.
Citing our decision in Alaka, Denis claims that evidence of
other bad acts or other convictions may not be considered in
this analysis, and only evidence of the conviction’s elements
is appropriate. In so arguing, Denis mischaracterizes Alaka,
which only provided that dismissed charges may not be
considered in determining whether an offense was
particularly serious. 456 F.3d at 108-09 (“[W]e can find no
authority for the proposition that dismissed counts or crimes .

32
 Denis’s final argument as to the IJ’s and BIA’s
purportedly improper placement of the burden of proof is
similarly incorrect. The BIA stated in N-A-M- that “[i]t has
been our practice to allow both parties to explain and
introduce evidence as to why a crime is particularly serious or
not.” 24 I. & N. Dec. at 344. In this vein, the government
advanced Denis’s testimony and the record of conviction to
demonstrate the particularly serious nature of the offense,
while Denis provided no explanation to rebut this
conclusion. 23 See generally Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d
645, 951 (7th Cir. 2008) (observing that plaintiff can rebut
presumption of particularly serious crime by establishing “the
absence of any violence or threat of violence”). On appeal,
Denis merely stands upon the already rejected assertion that
his crime did not involve an act “against a person” and thus
did not bring it within the ambit of a particularly serious
crime. We find no fault in this regard and no prejudice to

. . may be considered in determining whether a specific crime
is a particularly serious crime”) (quoting Yousefi, 260 F.3d at
329-30). Our review of the record does not support Denis’s
allegation that the IJ or the BIA relied on such dismissed
charges in reaching its decision, and Denis advanced no
evidence to substantiate this claim. Furthermore, as more
thoroughly demonstrated in this section, the BIA may
consider more than the mere elements of an offense in finding
a conviction particularly serious.
23
See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (“If the evidence
indicates the applicability of one or more of the grounds for
denial of withholding enumerated in the Act, the applicant
shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that such grounds do not apply.”).

33
Denis in the IJ’s proper review and consideration of all
pertinent evidence as permitted by the BIA’s controlling
precedents.

As such, we are left with no doubt that the IJ and the
BIA properly exercised their discretion in applying the legal
standard to the instant facts in finding Denis’s crime
particularly serious. It follows that Denis’s crime of
conviction constitutes a particularly serious crime, and he is
therefore ineligible for withholding of removal pursuant to
Section 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).

III. Deferral of Removal Pursuant to the
Convention Against Torture Determination

34
 The final issues on appeal pertain to Denis’s claim of
entitlement to deferral of removal pursuant to the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”), 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note and 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16. Denis contends that the BIA and the IJ failed to
provide a full and fair rehearing of his CAT claim after the IJ
determined that Denis was denied due process as a result of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The IJ afforded Denis an
opportunity to augment the record with further evidence, but
limited the subsequent merits hearing to evidence of Denis’s
present medical condition. Denis also avers that he
demonstrated eligibility for CAT relief because he will be
singled out for torture due to his status as a former Duvalier
regime officer and also due to his dependence upon
hyperthyroid and hypertension medication, the absence of
which may render him mentally ill and seemingly
noncompliant with the prison guards. We will address these
arguments in reverse order.

Our resolution of Denis’s claims regarding the
likelihood of torture is informed by our discussion in Pierre v.
Attorney General, 528 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2008). Pierre
addressed the petition of a Haitian alien for deferral of
removal pursuant to the CAT on the basis that the alien would
experience torture, extreme pain, and suffering if deported to
a Haitian prison. Id. at 183-84. There we discussed the
origins and policy underlying the CAT, namely a
commitment “not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the
involuntary return of any person to a country in which there
are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in
danger of being subjected to torture.” Id. at 186 (quoting §
1231 note)). Consequently, deferral of removal is mandatory
if a petitioner is able to show that he is more “likely than not”
to be tortured. Id. at 186 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a)).

35
Pursuant to the Attorney General’s promulgated regulations
setting forth the procedures by which individuals could seek
relief under the CAT, an act constitutes torture solely if it is:

intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a
third person information or a confession,
punishing him or her for an act he or she or a
third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating or coercing
him or her on a third person, or for any reason
based on discrimination of any kind, when such
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.

Id. at 189 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)). In light
of this definition, we concluded in Pierre that “a petitioner
cannot obtain relief under the CAT unless he can show that
his prospective torturer will have the goal or purpose of
inflicting severe pain or suffering.” Id. at 190.

On the facts, we determined that Pierre would be
imprisoned “because the Haitian government has a blanket
policy of imprisoning ex-convicts who are deported to Haiti
in order to reduce crime.” Id. at 189; see also Auguste v.
Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 152 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing indefinite
detention of ex-convicts returned to Haiti). We further
observed that “the lack of medical care and likely pain that
Pierre will experience is an unfortunate but unintended
consequence of the poor conditions in the Haitian prisons,
which exist because of Haiti’s extreme poverty.” Pierre, 528

36
F.3d at 189; see also Auguste, 395 F.3d at 153 (same).
Because Pierre “failed to show that Haitian officials will have
the purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering by placing
him in detention upon his removal from the United States,”
“this unintended consequence is not the type of proscribed
purpose contemplated by the CAT.” Id. at 189, 190; see also
Gourdet v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he
substandard prison conditions in Haiti did not constitute
torture under the CAT.”).

Similarly here, Denis failed to demonstrate that the
Haitian prison officials will more likely than not specifically
target him or intend to inflict pain on him because of potential
symptoms resulting from his hyperthyroid and hypertension
medical conditions. His unsupported speculation as to how
he may appear or act, how the prison officials may potentially
react, and the purported state of mind of the prison officials
that may hypothetically inflict pain upon him, does not rise to
the level of proof necessary to demonstrate that he will more
likely than not be singled out for torture. Furthermore, Denis
failed to substantiate his assertion that he would be singled
out for torture by Haitian prison officials because of his
unspecified role as a bodyguard for the Duvalier regime in the
previous century. Indeed, Denis’s assertions are “based on a
chain of assumptions and a fear of what might happen, rather
than evidence that meets [his] burden of demonstrating that it
is more likely than not that [he] will be subjected to torture
by, or with the acquiescence of, a public official . . . .” In re
M-B-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 474, 479-80 (BIA 2002) (en banc)
(emphasis in original). Accordingly, the BIA properly
applied the standard for CAT and denied Denis’s request for
deferral of removal.

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 Our conclusion that Denis is ineligible for CAT relief
informs our resolution of his due process claim. Although the
IJ found that Denis’s counsel provided ineffective assistance,
we previously stated that “an alien claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel in removal proceedings must, in
addition to showing that his lawyer committed unprofessional
errors, show that there was a ‘reasonable likelihood that the
result would have been different if the error[s] . . . had not
occurred.’” Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 159 (3d Cir.
2007) (quoting United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347,
362 (2006)). In this vein, “to prevail on a procedural due
process challenge to a decision by the BIA, an alien must
make an initial showing of substantial prejudice.”
Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 448 (3d Cir. 2005)
(citing De Zavala v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 879, 883 (5th Cir.
2004)). Mindful of our focus on substantial prejudice, we
reasoned that where an alien “cannot demonstrate that he was
eligible for relief . . . under the CAT, no procedural due
process claim can lie.” Id.

Dennis cannot satisfy this standard. As we already
decided, he failed to adduce evidence establishing that he
would more likely than not be singled out for torture. His
ineligibility for CAT relief wholly undermines Denis’s
assertion that the ineffective assistance of counsel caused
substantial prejudice to his otherwise compelling claim. On
this ground alone, his due process claim must fail.

Moreover, the BIA correctly rejected Denis’s assertion
that “deficient performance of the prior representative
prevented him from introducing evidence that competent
counsel would have otherwise discovered and marshaled in
support of the respondent’s claim.” (J.A. 23.) Denis did not

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identify “any specific evidence . . . that his prior
representative failed to submit in support of the claim that
would have ‘likely changed the outcome of his initial removal
proceedings.’” (J.A. 23.) Indeed, “the only evidence
particular to [Denis that he] sought to submit in support . . .
was evidence relevant to his medical conditions, and the [IJ]
imposed no unreasonable limitation on [Denis’s] opportunity
to submit and develop such evidence.” (Id.) Even in the
absence of an entirely new hearing, Denis was given ample
opportunity to supplement the record with additional
allegations pertaining to his claims. Considering Denis’s
failure to adduce persuasive particularized evidence and to
make an initial showing of substantial prejudice from the IJ’s
decision, the BIA’s reasoning and decision are proper.

As a result, Denis’s claim for relief under the CAT and
his procedural due process claim for a new hearing fail.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we find no constitutional
violation or legal error in the BIA’s resolution of Denis’s
arguments. Accordingly, we will deny the petitions for
review.

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