United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 10-1200
CHICO SERVICE STATION, INC. and JOSÉ CHICO,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
SOL PUERTO RICO LIMITED,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lipez, Leval,* and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Orlando Cabrera-Rodriguez for appellants.
Alejandro J. Cepeda-Díaz, with whom José R. González-Irizarry,
Mariana S. Pérez-Cordero, and McConnell Valdés LLC were on brief,
for appellee.
January 26, 2011
*
Of the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. This appeal requires us to assess
the propriety of Burford abstention in a citizen suit under the
federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA").
Appellants Chico Service Station, Inc. and José Chico brought the
suit in an effort to force the cleanup of contamination caused by
leaking underground storage tanks ("USTs") at a former gasoline
filling station. Their citizen suit represents the latest in a
long-running series of proceedings aimed at addressing
contamination at the site. In addition to an investigatory
proceeding at the Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board ("EQB")
that has been ongoing since leaks were discovered in the early
1990s, appellants have filed two lawsuits in commonwealth courts
over the past decade related to the contamination of the site.
The pendency of these parallel state administrative
proceedings led the district court to abstain from hearing the
appellants' federal citizen suit, ordering dismissal on the
authority of Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
Application of the Burford abstention doctrine to RCRA citizen
suits is an issue of first impression in this circuit. On careful
consideration, we find abstention to be inappropriate, and we
therefore vacate the district court's judgment.
-2-
I.
A. Factual Background1
The history of the filling station at the center of this
citizen suit stretches back more than four decades. Located on a
parcel of land in Río Grande, Puerto Rico, the filling station and
associated USTs were in operation between the 1960s and 2001. The
site, which is situated on a major road and abuts a small stream,
contained five USTs: two 8,000-gallon tanks, two 5,000-gallon
tanks, and a fifth tank with a capacity of 550 gallons. Until
1987, the facility was owned and operated by The Shell Company
(Puerto Rico) Limited ("Shell"), predecessor to appellee Sol Puerto
Rico ("Sol").2 Shell sold the filling station in April 1987 to
appellants Chico Service Station, Inc. and José Chico
(collectively, "Chico").3
The UST leak at the filling station first came to light
two years after the sale, in 1989, when an environmental consultant
1
Our recitation of facts draws from the district court's
opinion as well as various documents submitted below in support of
the defendant's motion to dismiss.
2
In 2006, Sol acquired Shell in a stock purchase. The
company now operates under Sol's name, though it continues to use
Shell's trademarks pursuant to a license agreement.
3
It is not entirely clear what interests were transferred in
the sale. Chico represents that the purchase agreement did not
include the USTs and associated pipelines, nor the station's grease
trap and septic tanks, but this is neither established nor
contradicted by the record. In any event, the ownership of the
USTs does not bear on our decision here.
-3-
for Shell found evidence of gasoline-associated contaminants such
as benzene in the soil as well as "free product" (gasoline and
related petroleum constituents) floating on top of the groundwater.
This discovery led Shell to conduct several environmental studies
of the site over the following three years, which further confirmed
the soil and groundwater contamination. Shell also installed a
skimming device to aid in recovering free product from the surface
of the groundwater.
In April 1993, Shell informed the EQB that free product
had been found in the groundwater at the filling station.4 The EQB
added the filling station to its "Leaking Underground Storage Tank
List," marking the beginning of a lengthy investigatory proceeding
that continues to this date.
B. EQB Investigation
Over the past seventeen years, there have been no formal
enforcement proceedings before the EQB concerning the contamination
at the filling station, nor has the EQB held any hearings, issued
a final order, or approved a remediation plan for the site. The
record discloses no substantive action at all by the EQB for the
first eight years after it was notified of the leak. Since then,
the EQB's investigation of the contaminated filling station has
4
Over the course of the initial investigation, Shell's
environmental consultants had twice recommended, in 1990 and 1992,
that Shell disclose the suspected release to regulators; Shell
apparently ignored these recommendations.
-4-
been conducted primarily by intermittent correspondence between the
EQB and Shell, the highlights of which we summarize here.
In February 2001, Shell wrote to the EQB to request that
the filling station be removed from the Leaking Underground Storage
Tank List, in light of the fact that no free product had been
detected in the groundwater for three years prior. The EQB denied
the request and directed Shell to conduct additional testing. When
Chico ceased active operation of the filling station in July 2001,
Shell again wrote to the EQB and requested authorization to remove
the idle USTs from the site. The EQB approved the removal, though
the five tanks were not actually removed until March 2004 due to a
dispute between Chico and Shell over access to the property.
Soil sampling results conducted in conjunction with the
removal of the tanks revealed contaminant levels in excess of the
applicable limits under the EQB's regulations. In response, the
EQB asked Shell to prepare a site characterization plan5 to define
the plume of contamination at the site and submit a remediation
plan for approval. Shell prepared a characterization plan, which
the EQB approved on the condition that Shell conduct additional
analysis to determine the direction of water flow at the site.
Shell's testing pursuant to the characterization plan
stretched over the following several years, with results reported
5
Generally speaking, a site characterization plan is a road
map for gathering information about the extent and nature of
contamination at a site.
-5-
to the EQB in two installments. In January 2007, defendant Sol --
having purchased Shell in the interim -- submitted the first and
primary report, which provided details on the extent and migration
of contamination in soil and groundwater at the site.6 Sol
submitted a supplemental report in May 2008 disclosing the results
of additional testing, which purportedly showed a decrease in soil
contaminant levels. Based on these results, Sol contended that no
soil remediation would be necessary, and it proposed that the
lingering groundwater contamination be addressed through aerobic
bioremediation (a technique to accelerate contaminant breakdown by
natural processes).
The submission of these results did not, however, signal
an end to the investigation. Chico wrote the EQB in May 2008,
taking issue with, inter alia, Sol's failure to take samples in the
vicinity of the stream abutting the property and the absence of
approved guidelines for risk assessment in cases involving USTs.
The EQB apparently agreed with the latter point. It wrote to Sol
in November 2008 and explained that the EQB was working with the
federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to develop
guidelines for evaluating UST risk assessment studies, and that
until those guidelines were finalized -- which would necessitate
6
The report itself is not in the record. Chico describes the
report as concluding that the plume of contamination appears to
have migrated outside the property limits to the north; Sol has not
disputed this characterization.
-6-
approval by both agencies and a public hearing process -- the EQB
could not accept Sol's original report. The EQB also identified
certain quality control issues with Sol's sampling process that
required rejection of the report.
The EQB sent a follow-up letter in January 2009 calling
for Sol to prepare a new characterization plan to outline
additional testing. Sol met with the EQB in February to discuss
the EQB's requests. In April 2009, Sol submitted to the EQB new
testing plans, a compiled report summarizing the testing conducted
at the filling station to date, and a proposed remediation plan.
In the accompanying letter, Sol argued that a plan for additional
sampling was unnecessary. There is no indication of further action
taken by Sol or the EQB between April 2009 and the present.
C. Commonwealth Legal Proceedings
In August 2003, Chico filed in a commonwealth court the
first of three lawsuits relating to the filling station. Primarily
a contract action, the suit sought declaratory relief and damages
related to Shell's alleged breach of its site improvement
obligations under a lease agreement with Chico. Among the remedies
requested in the action, however, was an injunction requiring Shell
to conduct an environmental site assessment, carry out any
necessary remediation, and reimburse Chico for costs attributable
to environmental degradation at the site. After Shell moved to
dismiss, the parties settled and stipulated to dismissal of the
-7-
portion of the suit requesting injunctive relief related to the
environmental condition of the site. Pursuant to the settlement
agreement, Chico agreed to allow Shell access to the filling
station to remove the USTs and conduct sampling activities.
Chico amended the complaint in May 2005 to allege the
discovery of contamination during removal of the USTs at the
filling station, and to request damages for environmental harm and
operational losses stemming from the contamination. In 2010,
recognizing that the question of the environmental condition of the
filling station was before the EQB, the commonwealth court stayed
the action pending final EQB action. The stay was subsequently
upheld on interlocutory appeal to a commonwealth appeals court.
Chico filed its second action, a mandamus petition
directed to the EQB, in a commonwealth court in October 2008. The
petition sought an order directing the EQB to require testing for
lead at the filling station, in light of evidence that Shell had
sold leaded gasoline on the premises up until the 1980s.7 Chico
and the EQB quickly reached a settlement in January 2009, under
which the EQB agreed to hear Chico's evidence of lead
contamination, conduct the "necessary administrative hearings," and
7
Chico had sent a letter to the EQB containing an identical
request in September 2008, shortly before the mandamus petition was
filed, but the record discloses no response.
-8-
"issue the final resolution" in the case within sixty days.8 In
turn, Chico agreed to have its concerns heard by the EQB rather
than the commonwealth courts. Pursuant to the parties' agreement,
the mandamus petition was dismissed as moot.
D. Federal Legal Proceedings
Chico filed the present suit, its third, in the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico in April
2009. Brought under RCRA's citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. §
6972, the suit rests on three core allegations. First, Chico
alleges that Sol is in ongoing violation of a number of Puerto
Rico's UST regulations, including those that mandate reporting of
a suspected release of contaminants, require investigation and
remediation following such a release, and prohibit the
contamination of underground sources of drinking water. Second,
Chico alleges that conditions at the filling station may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the environment or public
health actionable under RCRA. Third, Chico alleges that Sol has
disposed of or abandoned gasoline, diesel, and their constituents
at the filling station in violation of RCRA's solid waste disposal
requirements. The suit seeks civil penalties under RCRA, in
addition to an order enjoining further releases at the site and
8
The record does not confirm whether any hearings were held
or evidence presented within the prescribed time period, but it is
clear that the EQB did not issue the "final resolution" within that
time, nor has it done so to date.
-9-
requiring Sol to conduct whatever corrective or remedial actions
are necessary.
In accordance with RCRA's requirements, Chico provided
pre-filing notice of its intent to file a citizen suit to Sol, the
EQB, the regional and national EPA administrators, and the
commonwealth and federal attorneys general via letter in October
2008. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b). RCRA requires such notice
primarily to afford regulators a chance to initiate an enforcement
suit or take other formal action to address the conditions targeted
by the intended citizen suit; here, no such action was taken
between October 2008 and the filing of suit the next April.
Sol moved to dismiss within a month of the complaint's
filing, proffering three alternative grounds for dismissal. Sol's
leading argument was that RCRA's diligent prosecution bar, which
precludes citizen suits where federal or state regulators are
taking certain enumerated enforcement actions (see 42 U.S.C. §
6972(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B), (b)(2)(C)), divested the court of subject
matter jurisdiction over Chico's claims. Alternatively, Sol
contended that Chico's claims were moot, and separately asked the
-10-
court to abstain from hearing the suit under the Burford9 and
Colorado River10 doctrines.
In a December 2009 opinion and order, the district court
granted dismissal under Burford. Among several "compelling reasons
to abstain" cited by the district court were Puerto Rico's interest
in uniform and coherent regulation of USTs and the availability of
adequate judicial review of a final administrative decision under
Puerto Rico law. Chico immediately moved for reconsideration,
which the court denied. This timely appeal followed.
II.
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
We have previously described RCRA as "a cradle-to-grave
statute providing a full range of remedies designed to protect both
health and the environment." United States v. Borowski, 977 F.2d
27, 31 (1st Cir. 1992). More particularly, the Act regulates the
9
As discussed in full below, the Burford doctrine counsels
abstention in situations where a federal suit will interfere with
a state administrative agency's resolution of difficult and
consequential questions of state law or policy. See New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361
(1989).
10
This doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court's opinion in
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424
U.S. 800 (1976), addresses situations in which there are parallel
state and federal proceedings and "'considerations of wise judicial
administration' . . . counsel against duplicative lawsuits."
Jiménez v. Rodríguez-Pagán, 597 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted). Because the district court based its decision
solely on the Burford strain of abstention and Sol has not argued
for abstention under Colorado River in this appeal, we do not
address the applicability of the Colorado River doctrine here.
-11-
"handling, treatment and storage of hazardous substances" and solid
waste. Id. In enacting RCRA, Congress acknowledged these
activities to be "primarily the function of State, regional, and
local agencies," but found that, due to technological progress,
increases in industrial production, and population growth, "the
problems of waste disposal . . . have become a matter national in
scope and in concern and necessitate Federal action." 42 U.S.C. §
6901(a)(4).
RCRA's approach to regulating solid and hazardous waste
is one of cooperative federalism, of which the UST program is a
paradigmatic example. Subchapter IX of RCRA creates a
comprehensive federal regulatory framework for USTs, see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6991-6991m, pursuant to which the EPA has promulgated numerous
specific regulations governing UST registration, leak detection,
notification, and cleanup requirements. See 40 C.F.R. Pt. 280
(2010); see also Francisco Sánchez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 572
F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2009). However, a state may, with federal
approval, implement its own regulatory program for USTs. Congress
expressly authorized the EPA to approve state UST regulations for
operation "in lieu of the Federal program" where the state program
sets requirements "no less stringent" than those established by the
EPA and "provides for adequate enforcement of compliance." 42
U.S.C. § 6991c. EPA approval of a state UST program transfers
primary enforcement responsibility for the program to state
-12-
regulators, id. § 6991c(d)(2), though the EPA retains parallel
enforcement authority, see id. § 6991e.
Such is the case in Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico's
Underground Storage Tank Control Regulations, adopted in 1990, have
been approved by the EPA to operate in lieu of the federal
regulations, and Puerto Rico's EQB has been delegated primary
enforcement responsibility. See 40 C.F.R. § 282.102(a); Francisco
Sánchez, 572 F.3d at 6-7. Puerto Rico's program appears to closely
mirror the EPA's program. In fact, the provisions of Puerto Rico's
regulations that Chico alleges have been violated by Sol are
materially identical to the EPA's UST regulations, with a single
exception.11 Compare Puerto Rico Underground Storage Tank Control
Regulations, Rules 501, 503, 601, 602, 603, 604, and 606 with 40
C.F.R. §§ 280.50, 280.52, 280.60, 280.61, 280.62, 280.63, and
280.65.
B. Citizen Suits Under RCRA
Congress provided for broad enforcement of RCRA by
federal and state regulators as well as through "citizen suits," a
mechanism RCRA shares with numerous other federal environmental
statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972; see also, e.g., id. § 7604 (Clean
Air Act); id. § 300j-8 (Safe Drinking Water Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1365
11
Rule 1102(B) of Puerto Rico's Underground Storage Tank
Control Regulations, setting forth a generalized prohibition on the
"contamination of an existing or potential underground source of
drinking water," has no direct analog in the EPA's UST regulations.
-13-
(Clean Water Act). Citizen suits "function as a form of statutory
enforcement in addition to, or in conjunction with, enforcement by
an administrative agency or other governmental entity." Esso
Standard Oil Co. (P.R.) v. Rodríguez-Pérez, 455 F.3d 1, 5 n.2 (1st
Cir. 2006). As Congress noted in the course of amending RCRA to
broaden its citizen suit authority, citizen suits "complement,
rather than conflict with" agency enforcement of the law. H.R.
Rep. No. 98-198, pt. I, at 53 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612.
The present suit was brought under subsections
6972(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) of RCRA's citizen suit provision, which
authorize "any person" to commence a civil action on his or her own
behalf:
(1)(A) against any person . . . who is alleged
to be in violation of any permit, standard,
regulation, condition, requirement,
prohibition, or order which has become
effective pursuant to this chapter; or
(B) against any person . . . who has
contributed or who is contributing to the past
or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or
hazardous waste which may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment[.]
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). The statute specifies that citizen suits
under either of these subsections "shall be brought in the district
court for the district in which the alleged violation occurred or
the alleged endangerment may occur." Id. In hearing suits under
-14-
these provisions, district courts have statutory authority to grant
various types of equitable relief necessary to address the
violation or endangerment, as well as to impose civil penalties.
Id.
Despite the broad ambit of the statute, RCRA citizen
suits are subject to a handful of clearly delineated limitations.
These limitations fall into two categories, both intended to avert
citizen suit interference with state and federal enforcement
activities. The first category requires written notice to state
and federal regulators (as well as to the alleged offender) prior
to filing suit, giving the responsible agencies the opportunity to
address the purported violation or endangerment. See 42 U.S.C. §
6972(b)(1)(A) (requiring notice sixty days prior to filing a
citizen suit based on ongoing violations of RCRA), (b)(2)(A)
(requiring notice ninety days before filing a citizen suit based on
an imminent endangerment). The second and related category of
limitations bars suit where a responsible state or federal agency
is diligently pursuing one of several enumerated judicial or
administrative enforcement actions under RCRA or the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA").
See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B), (b)(2)(C). This so-
called "diligent prosecution bar" is invoked by appellees as an
alternate ground to justify the dismissal of appellants' lawsuit.
-15-
III.
The sole issue raised by Chico on appeal is whether the
district court erred when it abstained from hearing this citizen
suit on Burford grounds. Chico argues that the circumstances of
this case, in which the commonwealth agency responsible for UST
enforcement has taken negligible action during a seventeen-year
period of oversight, cannot support the district court's deference
to local administrative processes. Defendant Sol counters that
abstention is proper because the "EQB is actively enforcing its UST
regulations" in the investigative proceeding concerning the filling
station. Additionally, noting our authority to affirm a dismissal
on any ground supported by the record, see Román-Cancel v. United
States, 613 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2010), Sol revives the diligent
prosecution bar and mootness arguments it pressed below. We
address each in turn.
A. Burford Abstention
1. General Principles
Abstention occupies an uneasy position in the
jurisprudence of federal court jurisdiction. As the common refrain
goes, "federal courts have a 'virtually unflagging obligation . .
. to exercise the jurisdiction given them.'" Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (quoting Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976));
United States v. Fairway Capital Corp., 483 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir.
-16-
2007) (same). This all but unyielding duty to exercise
jurisdiction rests on "the undisputed constitutional principle that
Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal
jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds." New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491
U.S. 350, 359 (1989); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404
(1821) (federal courts "have no more right to decline the exercise
of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not").
Against the backdrop of this duty to exercise
jurisdiction, Supreme Court precedent has carved out a discrete set
of "exceptional circumstances" in which the exercise of
jurisdiction may be declined. As a general proposition, these
"exceptional circumstances" lie "where denying a federal forum
would clearly serve an important countervailing interest," such as
"regard for federal-state relations" or "wise judicial
administration." Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706,
716 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). The circumstances
that fit this mold are rare. Indeed, because abstention runs so
firmly against the jurisprudential grain, we have repeatedly
emphasized that abstention must always be "the exception, not the
rule." Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F.2d 878, 882 (1st Cir. 1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The particular species of abstention at issue here grew
out of the Supreme Court's decision in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
-17-
U.S. 315 (1943).12 As we have observed on past occasions, the
"fundamental concern in Burford is to prevent federal courts from
bypassing a state administrative scheme and resolving issues of
state law and policy that are committed in the first instance to
expert administrative resolution." Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v.
Patch, 167 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing NOPSI, 491 U.S. at
361-64, and Bath Mem'l Hosp. v. Me. Health Care Fin. Comm'n, 853
F.2d 1007, 1014-15 (1st Cir. 1988)). The Supreme Court has
articulated a two-pronged analytical framework for identifying
situations that implicate this concern:
Where timely and adequate state-court review
is available, a federal court sitting in
equity must decline to interfere with the
proceedings or orders of state administrative
agencies: (1) when there are "difficult
questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose
importance transcends the result in the case
then at bar"; or (2) where the "exercise of
federal review of the question in a case and
in similar cases would be disruptive of state
efforts to establish a coherent policy with
respect to a matter of substantial public
concern."
NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 361 (quoting Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 814).
While Burford's principle of deference to state
administrative bodies could be interpreted expansively, requiring
that federal courts "abstain from hearing any case involving
12
We provided a detailed summary of the factual background and
holding of Burford in Bath Memorial Hospital v. Maine Health Care
Finance Commission, 853 F.2d 1007, 1013-14 (1st Cir. 1988).
-18-
important state regulatory policies," Vaquería Tres Monjitas, Inc.
v. Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464, 473 (1st Cir. 2009), we have declined to
give it so broad a reading. Id. In light of the strong
presumption in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction, we have held
that "Burford abstention must only apply in 'unusual
circumstances,' when federal review risks having the district court
become the 'regulatory decision-making center.'" Id. (quoting Bath
Mem'l Hosp., 853 F.2d at 1012-13); see also Fragoso, 991 F.2d at
882 (noting that, under the formulation in NOPSI, Burford
abstention is limited to "narrowly circumscribed situations where
deference to a state's administrative processes for the
determination of complex, policy-laden, state-law issues would
serve a significant local interest and would render federal-court
review inappropriate"). Similarly, we have cautioned that the
Burford doctrine does not require abstention merely because the
federal action may impair operation of a state administrative
scheme or overturn state policy. See Patch, 167 F.3d at 24 (citing
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 379 n.5 (1978)); see also
Vaquería Tres Monjitas, 587 F.3d at 473-74.
2. Applicability of Burford
With these principles in mind, we turn to the question of
Burford's application to the present suit. We review de novo the
"essentially legal determination of whether the requirements for
abstention have been met," but employ a "more deferential standard"
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in reviewing the district court's findings of fact and applications
of law. Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gómez, 585 F.3d 508, 517
(1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Though the
propriety of abstention from a RCRA citizen suit is a matter of
first impression in this circuit, we are far from the first court
to take up the issue. The majority of courts to have considered it
have found abstention, whether under Burford or related doctrines
such as primary jurisdiction,13 to be improper. See DMJ Assocs.,
L.L.C. v. Capasso, 228 F. Supp. 2d 223, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing
cases).14
13
The primary jurisdiction doctrine counsels abstention
"whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within
the special competence of an administrative body." United States
v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956); see also U.S. Pub.
Interest Research Grp. v. Atl. Salmon of Me., 339 F.3d 23, 34 (1st
Cir. 2003) ("[T]he primary jurisdiction doctrine permits and
occasionally requires a court to stay its hand while allowing an
agency to address issues within its ken.").
14
See, e.g., PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610,
619 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting Burford abstention and primary
jurisdiction); Interfaith Cmty. Org. Inc. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 702
F. Supp. 2d 295, 307-10 (D.N.J. 2010) (rejecting Burford and
Colorado River abstention); Remington v. Mathson, No. CV 09-4547,
2010 WL 1233803, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2010) (rejecting
Younger and Colorado River abstention); K-7 Enters., L.P. v.
Jester, 562 F. Supp. 2d 819, 826-28 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (rejecting
Burford abstention); Coll. Park Holdings, LLC v. RaceTrac
Petroleum, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1326-29 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(rejecting abstention under Burford and primary jurisdiction
doctrine); Me. People's Alliance v. Holtrachem Mfg. Co., No.
00-CV-69, 2001 WL 1704911, at *5-9 (D. Me. Jan. 8, 2001) (rejecting
application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine); Williams v. Ala.
Dep't of Transp., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1257-58 (M.D. Ala. 2000)
(rejecting application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine);
Wilson v. Amoco Corp., 989 F. Supp. 1159, 1170 (D. Wyo. 1998)
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Before we reach the doctrinal considerations specific to
Burford, we note that the careful structure of federal court
jurisdiction under RCRA makes us distinctly reluctant to
countenance abstention here. Abstention is, at its core, a
prudential mechanism that allows federal courts to take note of and
weigh significant and potentially conflicting interests that were
not -- or could not have been -- foreseen by Congress at the time
that it granted jurisdiction for a given class of cases to the
courts. When it enacted RCRA, however, Congress recognized and
addressed the specific clash of interests at issue here, by
carefully delineating (via the diligent prosecution bar) the
situations in which a state or federal agency's enforcement efforts
will foreclose review of a citizen suit in federal court.15 To
abstain in situations other than those identified in the statute
thus threatens an "end run around RCRA," PMC, Inc. v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 1998), and would
(same); White & Brewer Trucking, Inc. v. Donley, 952 F. Supp. 1306,
1311-14 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (rejecting Burford abstention); Craig Lyle
Ltd. P'ship v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 476, 483-84 (D.
Minn. 1995) (rejecting abstention under Burford and the primary
jurisdiction doctrine). But see Coal. for Health Concern v. LWD,
Inc., 60 F.3d 1188, 1193-95 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying Burford
abstention to RCRA citizen suit); Friends of Santa Fe Cnty. v. LAC
Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1347-49 (D.N.M. 1995) (same).
15
As discussed below, the statutory bar to citizen suits
applies only where a regulatory agency has filed a formal action in
state or federal court or is pursuing one of a handful of remedial
actions under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B),
(b)(2)(C).
-21-
substitute our judgment for that of Congress about the correct
balance between respect for state administrative processes and the
need for consistent and timely enforcement of RCRA. Cf. Charlotte
Gibson, Note, Citizen Suits Under the Resource Conservation &
Recovery Act: Plotting Abstention on a Map of Federalism, 98 Mich.
L. Rev. 269, 281 (1999) (arguing that federal courts "may not
create a separate standard as to what level of administrative
investigation is sufficient to dismiss a citizen suit").
Moreover, we are leery of abstaining where litigants may
be unable to press their federal claims in a state forum. Section
6972(a) -- which states both that citizen suits "shall be brought
in the district court for the district in which the alleged
violation occurred or the alleged endangerment may occur" and that
"[t]he district court shall have jurisdiction" to grant relief in
such suits -- arguably locates exclusive jurisdiction over RCRA
citizen suits in the federal courts. The majority of courts that
have examined the issue have reached that conclusion. See Blue
Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th
Cir. 1989) (stating that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over RCRA citizen suits); Interfaith Cmty. Org. Inc. v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 295, 307 (D.N.J. 2010) (same);
Remington v. Mathson, No. CV 09-4547, 2010 WL 1233803, at *8-9
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2010) (same); K-7 Enters., L.P. v. Jester, 562
F. Supp. 2d 819, 827 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (same); White & Brewer
-22-
Trucking, Inc. v. Donley, 952 F. Supp. 1306, 1312 (C.D. Ill. 1997)
(same). But see Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606, 611-12 (6th
Cir. 1998) (holding that federal courts do not have exclusive
jurisdiction over RCRA citizen suits).
Regardless of whether the jurisdiction conferred by
Congress is exclusive, the statute plainly reflects an emphasis by
Congress on the availability of a federal forum for consistent and
timely review of RCRA claims. Taken together with Congress's
careful delineation of the limited situations in which federal
courts must refrain from hearing citizen suits, it counsels federal
courts to exercise great caution in considering abstention. While
we are not prepared to rule out categorically the possibility of
abstention in a RCRA citizen suit, we believe that the
circumstances justifying abstention will be exceedingly rare. As
we explain, the case before us offers no such justification for
second-guessing the balance struck by Congress.
In finding abstention to be improper here, we consider
three factors: (1) the availability of timely and adequate state-
court review, (2) the potential that federal court jurisdiction
over the suit will interfere with state administrative
policymaking, and (3) whether conflict with state proceedings can
be avoided by careful management of the federal case.
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i. Availability of State-Court Review
Under the modern formulation of the Burford doctrine, a
court weighing abstention must first determine whether "timely and
adequate state-court review is available." NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 361.
In making this assessment here, the district court found that "the
record abounds with evidence of adequate judicial review," citing
the two lawsuits filed by Chico in the commonwealth courts as well
as the availability under Puerto Rico law of judicial review for
final agency decisions. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, §§ 2171-77. As
a formal matter, the district court is correct that Puerto Rico law
provides for review of administrative decisions, and the record
provides no basis to doubt the adequacy of that review.
We have significant concerns, however, about the
timeliness of the review offered by commonwealth courts in the
present case. The availability of judicial review for "final
orders" by commonwealth agencies, id. § 2171, can hardly qualify as
"timely and adequate" if, as here, the agency may take decades to
issue a reviewable final order. Perhaps Chico could seek mandamus
relief in a commonwealth court to force more prompt action by the
EQB. Because Chico dismissed its mandamus petition upon settling
with the EQB, though, the record does not reflect whether mandamus
relief is available and effective, nor was the issue briefed by the
parties. The experience of Chico's other commonwealth lawsuit,
which was stayed in deference to the EQB, gives us little comfort
-24-
that Chico could in fact obtain "timely and adequate" review of the
EQB's actions in the commonwealth courts.16
ii. Interference with State Policymaking
Even if we were to find adequate review available in the
commonwealth courts, we nonetheless would consider this case to be
an improper candidate for Burford abstention. As we have said, the
animating concern under Burford is the threat that federal courts
will usurp the role of state administrative agencies in deciding
"issues of state law and policy that are committed in the first
instance to expert administrative resolution." Patch, 167 F.3d at
24. In light of the intertwined state and federal interests
implicated by RCRA, that concern does not obtain here.
The Supreme Court's articulation of the Burford doctrine
in NOPSI provides a convenient analytical framework for evaluating
this interplay of interests. Accordingly, we first examine whether
"there are 'difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends
16
In fairness, we note that the history of the stay is not
entirely clear. Sol initially moved for and obtained a stay of the
commonwealth court action pending completion of the EQB
proceedings. However, that stay was set aside upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by Chico. Some time later, Chico filed an
"information motion" (the content of which is not disclosed by the
record), which prompted the commonwealth court to reinstate the
stay, apparently sua sponte. For reasons that cannot be divined
from the record, Sol then moved for reconsideration of the
reinstated stay. The court denied Sol's motion for
reconsideration, and a commonwealth appeals court affirmed the stay
on appeal.
-25-
the result in the case . . . at bar.'" NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 361
(quoting Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 814).
The substantive laws at issue in Chico's citizen suit are
indeed commonwealth regulations, but they rest heavily on a
framework of federal law. To a large extent, RCRA dictates the
content and standards of Puerto Rico's UST program, leaving the
Commonwealth only the discretion to enact regulations that are no
less stringent than those developed by the EPA. See 42 U.S.C. §
6991c. The questions of law at issue in this suit are therefore
only marginally questions of commonwealth law, with a strong
federal cast. Moreover, they are of no particular difficulty.
Federal courts regularly interpret EPA regulations substantively
identical to those here,17 see, e.g., Albany Bank & Trust Co. v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 310 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2002), and have an
affirmative interest in ensuring that corresponding state
regulations are interpreted in a consistent manner.
Nor are we concerned, turning to the second category of
cases identified by NOPSI to warrant abstention, that the exercise
of federal review of the enforcement of state regulations in this
case or similar cases "'would be disruptive of state efforts to
establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial
public concern.'" NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 361 (quoting Colo. River, 424
17
As we previously noted, all but one of the Puerto Rico UST
regulations cited in Chico's complaint are substantively identical
to EPA regulations.
-26-
U.S. at 814). In enacting RCRA, Congress made an express
determination that a coherent national policy was necessary to
address the serious, jurisdiction-spanning problems of solid and
hazardous waste, thereby inherently privileging the consistency of
federal regulation over local control. See 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4).
By design, RCRA interferes with a state's efforts to establish its
own policy with respect to hazardous waste, both in subjecting
state regulations to federal review and in mandating that they
adhere to a federal framework. It would fly in the face of
Congress's unmistakable attention to the coherency of national
policy for a federal court to defer to a local agency. As one of
our sister circuits has observed in similar circumstances, such
ill-advised deference "might well result in review by fifty
different state agencies with fifty different charters," which
would all but "ensure non-uniformity" in interpretation and
enforcement. Cnty. of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907
F.2d 1295, 1310 (2d Cir. 1990).
iii. Likelihood of Conflict with State Proceeding
There is one additional reason why abstention is
inappropriate in this case. As we have cautioned before, a federal
court may abstain only where conflict with state administrative
processes cannot be avoided through careful conduct of the federal
case:
The abstention issue posed here is whether the
litigation necessarily implies an involvement
-27-
in the administration of the internal affairs
of the [state regulatory body] so unseemly for
a federal court as to encroach on principles
of comity and federalism. As we see the
issue, the word "necessarily" is of critical
importance. . . . This means to us that a
federal judge, while being . . . sensitive to
important state interests and . . . wary of
intruding in internal state affairs . . .,
will also endeavor to see if the legitimate
objectives of the litigation can be pursued
without treading on those state interests and
internal affairs. If they cannot be so
pursued, abstention should be invoked; but if
the case can so be managed that fears of
unseemly intrusion can be dispelled,
abstention should be refused.
Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 868 F.2d 459, 464
(1st Cir. 1989).
Intrusion on state affairs is by no means inevitable
here. This is not a case where review is, in effect, sought for a
final state administrative decision in federal rather than state
court, "effectively creat[ing] a dual review structure for
adjudicating a state's specific regulatory actions." Vaquería Tres
Monjitas, 587 F.3d at 474; see also Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v.
Montgomery Cnty, Md., 33 F.3d 52 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table
decision) (applying Burford abstention to RCRA citizen suit where
it was "merely . . . a collateral attack" on state agency's
permitting decisions).
Instead, Chico's suit seeks an order enjoining further
releases of contaminants at the filling station and requiring
defendant Sol to take remedial action, as well as the imposition of
-28-
civil penalties. None of these steps requires that the court
directly review actions taken by the Puerto Rico EQB, which, in any
event, has issued no final order. Indeed, the fact that the EQB
has taken so little action over the past seventeen years suggests
that conflict with the EQB's proceedings is unlikely. We might be
more concerned if we were faced with an aggressive and
comprehensive state enforcement proceeding on the verge of a final
order, but that simply is not the case here. Regardless, should
the threat of conflict arise, we see no reason why federal court
relief could not be structured so as to avoid interference with the
EQB proceeding. See Coll. Park Holdings, LLC v. RaceTrac
Petroleum, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1328 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (noting
that documentation of agency's "institutional attitudes and
remediation expectations" produced in the course of an
administrative proceeding would permit the federal court "to
fashion appropriate non-conflicting relief"); cf. Francisco
Sánchez, 572 F.3d at 13 (concluding that threat of duplicative or
conflicting remedies in parallel RCRA enforcement suits could not
justify "short circuit[ing]" the federal suit on jurisdictional
grounds at an early stage).
B. Diligent Prosecution Bar
We next examine whether the investigative proceeding of
the Puerto Rico EQB falls within the discrete, statutorily
-29-
enumerated list of enforcement actions that will bar a citizen suit
under RCRA. We conclude that it does not.
There are three basic circumstances in which state action
will bar a RCRA citizen suit: (1) where the state "has commenced
and is diligently prosecuting" an enforcement action; (2) where the
state is engaged in a removal action under CERCLA that addresses an
imminent endangerment alleged by the citizen suit; and (3) where
the state has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation
and Feasibility Study under CERCLA and is diligently proceeding
with a remedial action that addresses the alleged imminent
endangerment. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(C). The first of
these bars applies equally to RCRA suits brought under the "ongoing
violations" prong of RCRA's citizen suit provision, §
6972(a)(1)(A), and suits based on the "imminent endangerment"
prong, § 6972(a)(1)(B). The latter two bars apply solely to
imminent endangerment suits. Here, Chico filed suit under both
prongs, and thus we consider the application of all three bars.
The latter two we can discount out of hand, as the EQB
has taken no action under CERCLA. The only colorable issue is
whether the EQB, through its investigative proceedings, "has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting" an enforcement action that
addresses the substance of Chico's citizen suit claims. Id. §
6972(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(C)(i). Most courts that have examined this
aspect of the diligent prosecution bar have concluded that the
-30-
language of the statute requires a formal action in court.18 We
agree.
Though the statute uses different language to describe
the bar as it applies to "ongoing violation" suits versus "imminent
endangerment" suits, both plainly necessitate an action in court.
For ongoing violation citizen suits, the statute is explicit: such
suits will be barred only where the "State has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the
United States or a State to require compliance with such permit,
standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or
order." Id. § 6972(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). In the case of
imminent endangerment suits, the statute is less direct, providing
that suit will be barred where the state "has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting an action under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this
section" (i.e., the imminent endangerment provision of RCRA's
citizen suit statute). Id. § 6972(b)(2)(C)(i). While there is no
express reference in this latter provision to an action "in a
court," such limitation is implicit. Section 6972 provides that
"any person may commence a civil action" to address circumstances
which may present an imminent endangerment, and states that any
18
See, e.g., Marrero Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 597
F. Supp. 2d 272, 280 (D.P.R. 2009); Kara Holding Corp. v. Getty
Petroleum Mktg., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 302, 306-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
Gilroy Canning Co. v. Cal. Canners & Growers, 15 F. Supp. 2d 943,
946-47 (N.D. Cal. 1998); see also Gibson, supra, at 276 ("Courts
have unanimously understood [RCRA's] statutory bar to require court
action, not simply administrative inquiry.").
-31-
such action "shall be brought in the district court for the
district in which . . . the alleged endangerment may occur." Id.
§ 6972(a) (emphasis added). Thus, this provision also refers to a
formal action in court.
Because the EQB has not filed an enforcement action in
state or federal court, we hold that Chico's citizen suit is not
subject to dismissal pursuant to the diligent prosecution bar.
C. Mootness
We last address defendant Sol's argument that the
district court's dismissal of Chico's citizen suit may be upheld on
mootness grounds. "Article III of the Constitution restricts
federal courts to the resolution of actual cases and
controversies." Overseas Military Sales Corp. v. Giralt-Armada,
503 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2,
cl. 1). In so limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
Article III "ensures that courts do not render advisory opinions."
Id. at 17. "When a case is moot -- that is, when the issues
presented are no longer live or when the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome -- a case or controversy ceases
to exist, and dismissal of the action is compulsory." Cruz v.
Farquharson, 252 F.3d 530, 533 (1st Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
Sol's mootness argument rests on two subsidiary contentions: first,
that Sol has complied with each of the UST regulations that Chico
seeks to enforce under § 6972(a)(1)(A), and second, that "there is
-32-
no further remedy that the Court could issue to address Chico's
claims."
1. Sol's Compliance with Applicable UST Regulations
On the record before us, we cannot conclude that Chico's
claim under § 6972(a)(1)(A) is moot on the ground that Sol has
complied with the UST regulations Chico seeks to enforce. At a
minimum, there appear to be unresolved disputes as to whether Sol
has met its initial abatement obligations under Rule 603 of Puerto
Rico's UST regulations; whether Sol has adequately investigated the
"full extent and location of soils contaminated by the release and
the presence and concentrations of dissolved product contamination
in the groundwater" under Rule 606; and whether Sol is in violation
of Rule 1102, which proscribes the "contamination of an existing or
potential underground source of drinking water." We thus are
unable to say that there is no live controversy to be decided with
respect to Chico's claim under § 6972(a)(1)(A).19
2. Availability of Further Relief
There is no question that an action becomes moot when the
court "cannot grant 'any effectual relief whatever'" in favor of
the plaintiff. Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996)
19
Because the district court never reached the mootness
arguments that Sol advances here, the record is thin and our
assessment is not conclusive. The district court may wish to more
fully explore the question of mootness on remand. See Calderon v.
Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) ("[M]ootness can arise at any stage
of litigation.").
-33-
(quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). To avoid
mootness, though, the plaintiff need not establish that the full
relief sought is available; "even the availability of a 'partial
remedy' is 'sufficient to prevent [a] case from being moot.'" Id.
(quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S.
9, 13 (1992)) (alteration in original); see also Weaver's Cove
Energy, LLC v. R.I. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 589 F.3d 458, 468
(1st Cir. 2009) ("We will only find a case moot if an intervening
event 'makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual
relief.'" (quoting Gulf of Me. Fisherman's Alliance v. Daley, 292
F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 2002))).
It is undisputed that some -- or all -- of the relief
requested by Chico remains outstanding and could be granted by a
federal court. Most significantly, no order requiring remediation
of the filling station site has been issued by any commonwealth or
federal tribunal. Nonetheless, Sol argues that, because the EQB
has a proposed remediation plan before it as well as the power to
grant the civil penalties Chico has requested, any relief the
district court could order would be duplicative and unnecessary.
This is nothing more than a repackaged version of the meritless
abstention argument. The fact that the EQB proceeding might
eventually yield an order providing the same relief sought in the
district court action in no way renders the plaintiffs' suit moot.
See ConnectU LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 89 (1st Cir. 2008)
-34-
(holding that the pendency of parallel actions seeking same relief
does not render either action moot).
IV.
The circumstances that can sustain a federal court's
abstention from the duty to exercise jurisdiction are rare. This
is particularly true for citizen suits brought under RCRA. In
light of the important federal interests at stake and the care with
which Congress delineated the situations in which RCRA citizen
suits will be barred, only exceptional circumstances could justify
abstention. Because such circumstances are not present here, the
district court erred in abstaining. Moreover, we conclude that
neither the diligent prosecution bar nor mootness can independently
support the district court's dismissal of Chico's suit. We must
therefore vacate the judgment of the district court. Costs shall
be awarded to the appellants.
So ordered.
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