United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued March 9, 2007 Decided April 6, 2007
No. 06-5030
FRANCES L. GREENHILL,
APPELLANT
V.
MARGARET SPELLINGS,
SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 05cv01100)
Daniel Moar, Student Counsel, argued the cause for
amicus curiae in support of appellant. With him on the briefs
were Stephen H. Goldblatt, Director, and Michael Huang,
Student Counsel.
Frances L. Greenhill, pro se, was on the briefs for
appellant.
Megan L. Rose, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause
for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor,
U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.
2
Attorney. Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered
an appearance.
Before: GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
WILLIAMS.
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: In 2002 Frances
Greenhill received a letter from the Department of Justice
rescinding an offer of employment. This rescission was the
result of a negative reference, which Greenhill claims came
from her former supervisor at the Department of Education in
contravention of a settlement agreement. Plaintiff brought
suit in district court, seeking $210,000 in damages and some
equitable remedies. The district court concluded that the
cause of action was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Federal Claims. We agree. We remand the case to
the district court with instructions to transfer the case to that
court.
* * *
Greenhill, an employee of the Department of Education
(“DOE”), executed a settlement agreement with the
Department in 1999 to resolve complaints of age and race
discrimination that she had filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). According to the
agreement, DOE was to remove certain documents from
Greenhill’s record and to direct to a specified person all
requests for employment references on Greenhill. In February
2002, Greenhill received an offer of employment from the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), pending a background
investigation. But on June 21, 2002 DOJ wrote to Greenhill
rescinding the offer, citing a negative reference from DOE.
3
Because Greenhill believed that DOE had breached the
1999 settlement, she consulted with Equal Employment
Specialist Cathy Hawkins during the summer of 2002. The
1999 agreement required that any complaint alleging breach
must be filed “in writing within thirty (30) calendar days of
the date [Greenhill] knew or should have known of the alleged
noncompliance.” Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 41. Plaintiff in fact
didn’t submit a written complaint until July 30, 2003, more
than a year after she learned of the bad reference. The Equal
Employment Opportunity office at DOE initially accepted
Greenhill’s complaint for formal processing but on August 17,
2004 dismissed it for lack of timeliness. The EEOC affirmed
the dismissal and sent Greenhill a right-to-sue letter. Plaintiff
then filed a timely pro se complaint in district court seeking
$210,000 in damages and various forms of equitable relief,
including reinstatement to her position at DOE, restoration of
leave, and reinstatement into retirement and savings plans.
Noting that the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive
jurisdiction over all contract claims against the federal
government in excess of $10,000, the court dismissed the
cause of action without prejudice for want of jurisdiction.
* * *
The Tucker Act provides that “[t]he United States Court
of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment
upon any claim against the United States founded . . . upon
any express or implied contract with the United States, or for
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Although the Little Tucker Act
gives district courts jurisdiction over certain similar claims
against the federal government, the jurisdiction of the Court of
Federal Claims is exclusive when a plaintiff seeks more than
$10,000 in damages. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a); Sharp v.
Weinberger, 798 F.2d 1521, 1523 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
4
As we said, Greenhill’s complaint requested $210,000 as
well as equitable relief. Although the complaint did not
explicitly denominate the $210,000 claim as one for contract
damages (as opposed, for example, to back pay under Title
VII, see Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1216 (D.C. Cir.
2006)), neither Greenhill nor amicus argues that the amount
sought is anything other than contract damages. Thus the
complaint on its face appears to be one over which the Court
of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction.
On appeal, Greenhill has benefited from the able
advocacy of amicus, who offers several theories to avoid the
jurisdictional limitation. Close inspection, though, reveals
none of them to be availing. First, amicus argues that the
district court failed to recognize a Title VII retaliation claim in
Greenhill’s complaint or, alternatively, in her motion for the
court to reconsider its dismissal of the complaint. The district
court would have had jurisdiction over a retaliation claim and,
according to amicus’s theory, could then have exercised
supplemental jurisdiction over the contract claim. See
Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1215.
The Supreme Court has stated that pro se complaints,
“however inartfully pleaded,” are to be held “to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). We have also permitted
courts to consider supplemental material filed by a pro se
litigant in order to clarify the precise claims being urged. See
Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1054 (D.C. Cir.
1998). But even under these liberal pleading standards
Greenhill has not shown that a Title VII retaliation claim was
before the district court.
Essentially, Greenhill argues that the negative evaluation
supplied to DOJ by her former supervisor, Mary Brayboy, is
indicative of animus toward Greenhill and thus “supports an
5
inference of retaliation.” Amicus’s Br. at 28. Although
providing a negative employment reference may be consistent
with retaliatory behavior, the district court here could not
reasonably be expected to discern a separate retaliation claim.
The complaint makes no reference to retaliation, and the
negative statements by Greenhill’s former supervisor, without
more, are not self-evidently retaliatory.
Amicus also points to two statements in the record that
supposedly should have placed the district court on notice that
Greenhill sought to pursue a retaliation claim. In an August
24, 2004 letter to the EEOC, Greenhill wrote that “Ms.
Brayboy retaliated as well as discriminated as stated in the
first complaint claimed.” J.A. 77. Also, in a declaration
before the EEOC, Greenhill asserted, “I am a victim of race
and disability discrimination.” J.A. 11. These are, at best,
two isolated statements in over 100 pages of documents—a
potpourri of letters, declarations, e-mail exchanges, and the
like—that plaintiff attached to the complaint. Although
accompanying documents might clarify an otherwise
ambiguous complaint, see Stewart v. National Education
Association, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2006), nothing in
our case law requires a district court to go on a fishing
expedition for new claims.
Alternatively, amicus asserts that Greenhill’s motion for
reconsideration of the district court’s dismissal of her
complaint effectively amended the original complaint. In that
motion, amidst numerous charges of malice, recklessness, and
evil intent on the part of Ms. Brayboy, Greenhill asserted that
she was the victim of “intentional discrimination.” J.A. 212–
14. Although Greenhill included numerous allegations and
declarations in her pro se motion, the essence of the motion
was: “Ms. Mary Brayboy in fact did breach our 1999 . . .
settlement . . . .” J.A. 212. The other statements did nothing
to clarify or amend the original complaint; rather, by all
6
appearances, they simply sought to bolster the argument that
there was a breach.
Consequently, we reject amicus’s suggestion that
Greenhill brought a Title VII claim within the district court’s
jurisdiction. We thus have no occasion to consider the
possible application of Rochon, i.e., whether, or under what
circumstances, a district court might exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over contract claims that otherwise fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.
Amicus’s second theory for avoiding the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims relies on the fact
that the settlement agreement explicitly precludes Greenhill
from recovering damages. Because of this bar, amicus says,
Greenhill can in fact obtain only equitable relief; and because
the Court of Federal Claims can award only money damages
(a much oversimplified proposition, as we note below), that
court lacks jurisdiction to award Greenhill any relief. Amicus
anticipates that if the present case were brought in the Court
of Federal Claims, the government would argue that the court
lacks jurisdiction on precisely these grounds. To be sure, it
would be unseemly for a party to engage in a “paper charade,”
arguing to a district court that the Court of Federal Claims has
exclusive jurisdiction over a case, only to make a
contradictory jurisdictional argument once the case is
transferred. See Stovall v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 696,
697–98 (2006). But there is no reason to believe that the
government has behaved or will behave with such duplicity
here. More to the point, the possibility of shenanigans by a
party doesn’t permit a court to ignore jurisdictional defects.
Jurisdiction is determined by looking to the complaint.
See Tootle v. Secretary of the Navy, 446 F.3d 167, 174 (D.C.
Cir. 2006). If Greenhill explicitly or in essence seeks money
damages in excess of $10,000, jurisdiction rests exclusively
7
with the Court of Federal Claims. See Kidwell v. Department
of the Army, Board for Correction of Military Records, 56
F.3d 279, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Amicus’s proposed approach
would invert the usual order of operations—it would basically
resolve the merits question of whether Greenhill is entitled to
money damages and then use that result to answer the
jurisdictional question. Jurisdiction, however, is an
independent, preliminary issue. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). Here,
Greenhill explicitly requested $210,000 in damages. This is
enough for the Court of Federal Claims to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. The disposition on the merits is a
separate question and one that only the Court of Federal
Claims can resolve.
Amicus’s third theory is a more sophisticated variation of
the second. Here amicus argues that in defending against the
contract damages claim the government will point to the
settlement’s provision against damages; whereupon the
plaintiff will respond that any such ban is invalid under Title
VII. Pointing to cases of the Court of Federal Claims
suggesting that it has jurisdiction only over straightforward
contract issues, but not over claims requiring an interpretation
of federal statutes such as Title VII, amicus says that in reality
there is no claim within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Federal Claims. While the question before us is the district
court’s jurisdiction, it is counterintuitive that the jurisdictional
statutes would be so ill-coordinated as to leave perfectly
sound claims orphaned. Accordingly, as we have in prior
decisions, we consider the alleged deficit in the jurisdiction of
the Court of Federal Claims.
It is quite true that the Court of Federal Claims has no
jurisdiction over Title VII claims. According to its
predecessor, the U.S. Claims Court, “Title VII . . . is the
comprehensive, exclusive, and preemptive remedy for federal
8
employees alleging discrimination.” Fausto v. United States,
16 Cl. Ct. 750, 752–53 (1989). The point is not in dispute—
regarding actual Title VII claims. See, e.g., Kizas v. Webster,
707 F.2d 524, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Title VII constitutes the
exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by
federal employees subject to its protection . . . .” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
And there have been decisions of the Court of Federal
Claims and its predecessor treating a claim based on a
settlement agreement that extinguished a Title VII complaint
as itself an action under Title VII rather than a contract
dispute covered by the Tucker Act. See Griswold v. United
States, 61 Fed. Cl. 458, 464–65 (2004); Mitchell v. United
States, 44 Fed. Cl. 437, 439 (1999); Lee v. United States, 33
Fed. Cl. 374, 378–80 (1995); Fausto, 16 Cl. Ct. at 753. Last
year, however, the Court of Federal Claims repudiated the
logic of these opinions and drew a critical distinction between
actual discrimination claims for which Title VII provides the
exclusive remedy and breach-of-settlement claims that “fall[]
outside the comprehensive scheme” of Title VII. Westover v.
United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 635, 639 (2006). There the court
relied on the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedents
discussed below to conclude that settlement agreements are
indeed straightforward contract claims within the purview of
the Tucker Act and the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims.
In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America,
511 U.S. 375 (1994), the Supreme Court drew a sharp line
between an action on a settlement agreement and one under a
law whose alleged violation gave rise to the settlement. “The
[instant] suit involves a claim for breach of a contract, part of
the consideration for which was dismissal of an earlier federal
suit. No federal statute makes that connection . . . the basis
9
for federal-court jurisdiction over the contract dispute.” Id. at
381.
Recent Federal Circuit cases have applied the distinction,
making clear that a contract dispute with the government,
arising out of a matrix of statutes, does not become a suit to
enforce the statutes themselves merely because its resolution
may require their construction. In Del-Rio Drilling Programs,
Inc. v. United States, 146 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the
Court of Federal Claims had dismissed for want of jurisdiction
a claim against the government for breach of a lease from the
Bureau of Land Management to plaintiff. The government
claimed the case was one for enforcement of several statutes,
pointing to various issues the court would have to resolve to
dispose of the lease claim. Given the confusion over this
issue, the Federal Circuit’s rejection of this idea deserves
extensive quotation:
[T]he fact that the court may have to interpret the Tribal
Consent Act or make other determinations regarding
principles of state and federal law in order to resolve the
contract claim does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to
decide that claim. It is often necessary to interpret or
apply statutory or common law principles in order to
resolve contract claims, but the fact that the resolution of
a contract claim may turn on the interpretation of a statute
does not deprive the Court of Federal Claims of
jurisdiction over that claim.
The Tucker Act gives the Court of Federal Claims
“jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against
the United States founded . . . upon any express or
implied contract with the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1). That broad jurisdictional grant does not
exempt contract claims that turn on the construction of
statutes.
10
....
. . . It is true, of course, that the respective rights of
the parties conferred by the leases must be analyzed in
light of the statutes and regulations governing the subject
matter of mining on trust lands. Nonetheless, the leases
are contractual undertakings by the government upon
which citizens are entitled to sue in the Court of Federal
Claims.
Id. at 1367. See also Massie v. United States, 166 F.3d 1184,
1189 (Fed. Cir. 1999), in which the court found that a claim to
enforce a contract resolving a dispute between the plaintiff
and an agency fell within the Court of Federal Claims’
jurisdiction even though the agency decision, out of which the
contract arose, was not subject to any kind of judicial review.
Del Rio’s holding that the anticipation of statutory issues
cannot strip a contract case of its character of course fits the
standard approach to jurisdiction over claims founded on a
specified legal basis, such as that stated in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1). Under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, for
example, jurisdiction of “actions arising under” federal law,
28 U.S.C. § 1331, is resolved by looking to the legal basis of
plaintiff’s claim and emphatically not to anticipations of
issues that might arise by way of defense. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152–53
(1908). Amicus’s theory of course goes further, trying to
defeat jurisdiction not on the basis of a hypothesized defense
but on a hypothesized response to a hypothesized defense.
Our own recent cases have been equally clear on the
distinction between contract claims and their statutory
context. We have held that even though Title VII might have
been the basis of a settlement agreement, a breach claim is a
straightforward contract dispute. Hansson v. Norton, 411
11
F.3d 231, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“This court generally treats
settlement agreements as contracts subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims . . . .”); Brown v.
United States, 389 F.3d 1296, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding
that a breach of settlement claim should have been brought in
the Court of Federal Claims pursuant to the Tucker Act).
Consequently, we find that Greenhill’s claim is a
straightforward contract dispute under the Tucker Act and that
jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims is proper.
Finally, amicus argues that we should remand the case to
the district court to give Greenhill an opportunity to amend
her complaint and seek damages below the Little Tucker Act’s
$10,000 ceiling; see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). But in support of
the proposal amicus cites only a case where the plaintiff had,
in district court, made an effort (albeit a defective one) to
waive the excess over $10,000, Goble v. Marsh, 684 F.2d 12,
17 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and another case in which we found that
plaintiff’s trial-court waiver was adequate, Stone v. United
States, 683 F.2d 449, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Greenhill made
no trial-court effort to waive. We note in this connection that
when asked at oral argument whether Greenhill was ready to
drop her damages claim, amicus answered unequivocally no.
Oral Arg. at 2:21 (“Q: Does this mean that Ms. Greenhill is
withdrawing her claim for money damages? A: No, Your
Honor, it does not mean that she is withdrawing her claim for
money damages . . . .”).
Insofar as Greenhill believes that jurisdiction in district
court would open up to her a broader array of non-monetary
remedies than would be available in the Court of Federal
Claims, we observe only that the validity of that belief is not
so clear. The Tucker Act explicitly provides for equitable
relief:
12
To provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief
afforded by the judgment, the court may, as an incident of
and collateral to any such judgment, issue orders
directing restoration to office or position, placement in
appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of
applicable records, and such orders may be issued to any
appropriate official of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2).
This has, to be sure, been somewhat narrowly construed.
See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 195, 201 (2005)
(noting the court’s power to grant “incidental” reinstatement
to service); French v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 49, 52 (1998)
(noting the court’s power to correct official records if plaintiff
would be entitled to damages “if the record is corrected”).
Similarly, our own cases have found very sharp constraints on
district court jurisdiction to grant equitable relief on contract
claims against the government. See Transohio Savings Bank
v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 607–
13 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Sharp v. Weinberger, 798 F.2d 1521,
1523 (D.C. Cir. 1986). But compare Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S.
731 (1947) (finding, where plaintiffs sued agents of the
United States, who had allegedly acted in excess of their
public authority, to recover property that was allegedly due
them under their contract with the United States, the claim
sounded in tort and was within the jurisdiction of the district
court). We take no position on which system is in practice
less forthcoming.
* * *
Because we conclude that Greenhill has sought over
$10,000 in damages and that the cause of action constitutes a
“claim against the United States founded . . . upon an[]
13
express or implied contract with the United States,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1), the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive
jurisdiction. We remand the case to the district court with
instructions to transfer the case to the Court of Federal Claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
So ordered.