United States v. Sandoval

November 7, 1995        [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                         

No. 95-1326 

                        UNITED STATES,

                          Appellee,

                              v.

                        DON SANDOVAL,

                    Defendant, Appellant.

                                         

         APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

           [Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
                                                              

                                         

                            Before

                    Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
                       Circuit Judges.
                                                 

                                         

Don Sandoval on brief pro se.
                        
Sheldon Whitehouse,  United  States Attorney,  Margaret E.  Curran
                                                                              
and Gerard  B. Sullivan, Assistant  United States Attorneys,  on brief
                               
for appellee.

                                         

                                         


          Per Curiam.   Defendant Don  Sandoval appeals  from
                                

the  sentence the district court imposed on him following the

revocation  of  a term  of  supervised  release.   The  court

sentenced defendant to both a term of imprisonment and a term

of supervised release.

          Defendant first argues  that the supervised release

revocation provision, 18 U.S.C.   3583(e)(3), does not permit

the imposition of a  term of supervised release and a term of
                                                               

imprisonment.   We rejected  this precise argument  in United
                                                                         

States   v. O'Neil,  11 F.3d  292  (1st Cir.  1993), and  re-
                              

affirmed our position in United States v. LaPlante, 28 F.3d 1
                                                              

(1st Cir.  1994) (per  curiam), cert.  denied, 115  S.Ct. 910
                                                         

(1995).   Defendant has not presented  any persuasive reasons

why we should change this recent statement of the law.

          Defendant's second argument  on appeal is that  the

district court violated  the prohibition of the ex post facto
                                                                         

clause by applying   3583(h) to him.   This section was added

in  1994.  It specifically provides that when revoking a term

of  supervised release  under subsection  (e)(3),  a district

court may  include a requirement of  supervised release after

imprisonment.

          To fall  within the ex post  facto prohibition, the
                                                        

new  law "must  disadvantage  the offender  affected by  it."

Miller  v.  Florida,  482  U.S.  423,  430  (1987)  (internal
                               

quotations  and  citation omitted).    Assuming the  district

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court used subsection  (h), defendant was not  disadvantaged.

In  O'Neil, we  already  had construed  subsection (e)(3)  to
                      

permit what subsection (h) now  grants expressly.  Cf. United
                                                                         

States  v. Hartman,  57 F.3d  670, 671  (8th Cir.  1995) (per
                              

curiam) (the legislative history of subsection (h) shows that

subsection(e)(3)  permits  both incarceration  and supervised

release).

          Based  on  the  foregoing,  the   judgment  of  the

district court is affirmed.
                                      

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