United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-1983
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
CHERYL B. STEIN,
Defendant, Appellant.
No. 99-1985
UNITED STATES
Appellee,
v.
WENDY B. GOLENBOCK,
Defendant, Appellant.
No. 99-1987
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
SUSAN OTIS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Kevin S. Nixon for appellant Cheryl B. Stein.
John J.E. Markham, II with whom Markham & Read was on brief
for appellant Wendy B. Golenbock.
Richard D. Biggs with whom Marcia G. Shein and the Law
Office of Shein & Biggs were on brief for appellant Susan Otis.
Mark J. Balthazard, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom
Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for
appellee.
November 28, 2000
CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellants
Wendy B. Golenbock, Cheryl B. Stein and Susan B. Otis were each
charged in an indictment with one count of bankruptcy fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152 and one count of conspiracy to
commit bankruptcy fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The
charges arose from their alleged concealment of Golenbock’s and
Stein’s ownership interest in a summer home in Wellfleet,
Massachusetts, which they placed in Otis’s name in trust during
bankruptcy proceedings. After a jury trial in the district
court, Golenbock and Stein were convicted on both counts, and
Otis was convicted on the conspiracy count. We affirm the
convictions and sentences.
I.
At the time of the bankruptcy proceedings, Golenbock
and Otis were lawyers.1 Golenbock and Stein worked and lived
together in Weston, and were, at times, in the business of real
estate development and management. Otis was a close personal
friend of both.
A. The Wellfleet property
On October 5, 1982, Golenbock and a friend named Ellen
Ratner purchased a parcel of land on Bond Street in South
1Stein is now also a lawyer.
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Wellfleet, Massachusetts (“the Wellfleet property”) for $18,000.2
To build a house on the property, they borrowed $56,700 from the
Cape Cod Five Cent Savings Bank (“Cape Cod Five”), secured by a
mortgage on the property. In 1986, Ratner sold her interest in
the Wellfleet property to Golenbock and Stein for $34,050. The
Cape Cod Five was notified of the transfer, and released Ratner
from the mortgage. Shortly thereafter, Golenbock and Stein
obtained an additional $50,000 line of credit from the Cape Cod
Five, secured by a second mortgage on the Wellfleet property.
Golenbock and Stein used the newly-built house on the Wellfleet
property as a vacation home, and sometimes rented it out.
B. The transfer of the Wellfleet property to Otis
On September 25, 1990, Golenbock and Stein filed
separate Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions. They did not list the
Wellfleet property as an asset in their bankruptcy schedules or
in their statement of financial affairs. Neither did Golenbock
and Stein list the Cape Cod Five as a creditor of theirs, state
that they had conveyed the Wellfleet property to anyone else in
the year before bankruptcy, nor identify the Wellfleet property
as being held or managed for someone else. Stein did not
disclose an ongoing civil action she had brought relating to a
2Ratner was not involved in this case.
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hot tub she and Golenbock had had installed at the Wellfleet
property.
Two days after Golenbock and Stein filed their
bankruptcy petitions, Golenbock gave Otis a $15,000 check. On
October 4, 1990, a deed was filed with the Barnstable Country
Registry of Deeds conveying the Wellfleet property from
Golenbock and Stein to Otis (under the name of Alekman) as sole
trustee of the B.Z. Realty Trust, for a stated consideration of
$108,000. The deed on its face was dated and notarized December
31, 1989. Stein testified at trial that the deed was signed in
Andover, Massachusetts -- in Essex County -- on December 31,
1989, but the deed reflects that the signatures were notarized
in Middlesex County, where Golenbock and Stein both lived.
At the same time as the deed was recorded, a
Declaration of Trust for the B.Z. Realty Trust was also
recorded. Two dates appeared on the Declaration as indicating
when it was executed: August 1, 1989, and August 1, 1990.
Despite the stated consideration of $108,000, Otis did
not pay any such sum to Golenbock and Stein. The mortgagor,
Cape Cod Five, was not notified of the transaction. Golenbock
and Stein continued to make regular mortgage and line of credit
payments, often by postal money orders, bank checks or cash.
The postal money orders and bank checks were obtained by
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employees of Golenbock and Stein, at their instruction and using
cash provided by them. Later payments were made using accounts
controlled by Golenbock and Stein. They made all the payments
until the property was sold in June 1996.
In addition to paying the mortgage, Golenbock and Stein
also paid the telephone, electric, and trash pickup bills for
the Wellfleet property while it was in Otis’s name in trust.
The accounts for those bills were changed to Otis’s name
beginning in 1991. However, the mailing address for the bills
always remained Golenbock and Stein’s post office box, which
Otis did not use. Mail sent to the Wellfleet address was routed
to Golenbock’s and Stein’s offices.
Golenbock and Stein also handled and paid for the
insurance on the property after the title was transferred. In
June, 1991, a year and a half after the date on the deed to
Otis, and nine months after the deed was recorded, Golenbock and
Stein applied for new homeowner’s insurance for the property in
their names only, with no reference to Otis or the Trust. The
insurance for the Wellfleet property was designated for personal
use, not commercial use. In July, 1991, they had Otis and the
Trust added to the policy as additional insureds. Only
Golenbock and Stein, however, were insured for the contents of
the Wellfleet property and for the loss of use. All the
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payments made for the Wellfleet property expenses were paid for
or directed to be paid by Golenbock and Stein and their
handwriting appears on checks and bills relating to those
expenses.
Only Golenbock and Stein dealt with the real estate
broker for the rental of the property. The income tax forms for
the rental were mailed only to Golenbock and Stein’s post office
box. The tax form for the rent for the year 1990 was issued to
Golenbock. The name was changed to Otis in 1991, at Golenbock’s
direction. Rental income checks from the real estate broker
were payable to Otis in 1991, but were endorsed by Golenbock.
C. Golenbock and Stein’s bankruptcy proceedings
In November, 1990, several weeks after filing their
bankruptcy petitions, Golenbock testified under oath at a
bankruptcy meeting of creditors (“341 meeting”) that she had not
conveyed any property within the prior year to an insider or
“good friend.” She did not include the Cape Cod Five when
listing the banks to which she owed money. Stein attended a 341
meeting in 1990, and both Golenbock and Stein attended another
341 meeting in June, 1992. At none of those meetings did either
disclose to the representative of the U.S. Trustee’s Office, who
was conducting their examinations, an ownership interest in the
Wellfleet property, its transfer in the year before the
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bankruptcy, or the existence of the Cape Cod Five debt.
Golenbock and Stein’s regular reports and cash flow statements
submitted to the U.S. Trustee’s Office did not reflect the
payments they were making in connection with the Wellfleet
property expenses.
In November 1991, Golenbock testified in a bankruptcy
deposition conducted by one of her creditors. After being
confronted with the creditor’s knowledge of her prior interest
in the Wellfleet property, she admitted that she had owned it.
She stated, however, that it had been sold in 1989 to Otis.
Golenbock further testified that she had transferred the
property because she could not pay the mortgage.
In 1994, after Golenbock and Stein’s bankruptcy cases
had been converted to Chapter 7 liquidations, another 341
meeting was conducted, this time by their appointed bankruptcy
trustee. Both Stein and Golenbock testified under oath at that
meeting. They affirmed that the only property they still owned
was their primary residence, and did not disclose any interest
in the Wellfleet property. The trustee only learned about their
involvement in the Wellfleet property in 1997, when he heard it
from the U.S. Trustee’s Office.
In April 1995, Golenbock and Stein received their
bankruptcy discharges. By August 1995, while title to the
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Wellfleet property was still in Otis’s name in trust, Golenbock
and Stein resumed making the mortgage payments directly from
Golenbock’s bank account. In March, 1996, both bankruptcy cases
were closed.
D. The sale of the Wellfleet property
In early 1996, Golenbock contacted a real estate broker
to list the Wellfleet property for sale. Golenbock and Stein,
not Otis, dealt directly with the real estate broker during the
sale process. In June 1996, the Wellfleet property was sold for
$175,000, and a check for $65,906.66, most of the profits, was
issued to Otis. She endorsed it to Golenbock on behalf of Max
Golenbock-Stein, Golenbock and Stein’s six-year-old son.
Although the funds were deposited in Golenbock’s client
trust account in Max’s name, the account was used for Golenbock
and Stein’s personal and business purposes. For example, $5,100
was paid from the account to Stein for “New England School of
Law,” which Stein was attending, and nearly $10,000 in checks
were paid from the account to Golenbock personally, for no
stated purpose. The account was also used to deposit a $27,500
settlement check received from an insurance company for one of
Golenbock’s law clients, and to issue the $25,000 disbursement
check to the client. The rest of the profits from the sale, in
the form of two checks totaling over $8,000, were issued to Otis
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by the real estate broker. Otis also endorsed those over and
they were deposited into Golenbock’s master client account.
E. The B.B.O. testimony
Before any criminal charges were filed against
Golenbock, the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers (B.B.O.)
initiated an investigation of her professional conduct with
regard to a number of matters. On December 21, 1995, Golenbock
testified in the first of seven depositions before the
Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers. She did not know of any
potential criminal investigation at that time, and answered
questions about clients she had represented and the handling of
funds, as well as her bankruptcy filing. There were no
references to the Wellfleet property in this deposition.
On or around January 11, 1996, before the next
scheduled deposition, the B.B.O. notified Golenbock by letter
that it was concerned about certain aspects of her bankruptcy
proceeding. This letter did not mention the Wellfleet property.
Golenbock’s attorney became concerned about the possibility of
a criminal proceeding, and advised her to assert her Fifth
Amendment privilege. On April 25, 1996, Golenbock again
appeared before the B.B.O. Again, none of the questions
referred to the Wellfleet property. Golenbock declined to
answer any questions, asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege.
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Golenbock then changed attorneys, retaining Edward
Barshak for his expertise in B.B.O. practice. Barshak advised
her as follows, as recounted in his affidavit:
I told her that if she continued to remain
silent, she would be penalized. The penalty
would be that the BBO would hold her silence
against her. Specifically, the BBO would be
allowed to draw from her silence any adverse
inferences relating to any area of the
investigation she refused to discuss. I
also told her that those adverse inferences
would mean that the BBO would find against
her in relation to those areas of the
investigation and that as a result, she
would be disbarred or suspended.
On November 1, 1996, Golenbock again appeared before
the B.B.O., and this time chose to forego her Fifth Amendment
privilege and to answer the questions put to her. She answered
additional questions on November 15, 1996. The testimony in
these depositions concerned the Wellfleet property and other
matters relevant to the subsequent criminal case against her.
Otis also testified before the B.B.O. on multiple
occasions beginning in January, 1996. There, she stated that
she became aware of Golenbock’s and Stein’s bankruptcy filings
“at some point.” In 1992, Otis had submitted to the Internal
Revenue Service a 1991 pleading from Golenbock’s and Stein’s
bankruptcy cases, as well as a copy of the deed, in response to
an inquiry concerning her 1992 tax return. Otis also told the
B.B.O. that she made none of the mortgage payments and provided
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none of the funds to do so. However, she and her husband
reported the income and mortgage payments on the Wellfleet
property in their federal income tax returns for the years
1991-1994. Otis also testified that all the expenses of the
Wellfleet property were being paid from its rental income. Her
tax returns, however, reflected that there was no rental income
for several years. In 1991, the one year in which there was
reported rental income, it amounted to less than half of the
mortgage payments.
F. The motion to suppress
On March 18, 1998, all three defendants were charged
with one count of bankruptcy fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
152 and one count of conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. A superseding indictment charging
the same offenses was returned on August 5, 1998.
The government sought to offer in evidence some of the
statements that Golenbock had made to the B.B.O. On July 6,
1998, Golenbock moved to suppress those statements. She
contended that she had been coerced to answer questions by the
threat that assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege would be
used against her in the B.B.O. proceeding. Stein did not join
in the motion or file a separate motion to suppress. In support
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of her motion, Golenbock submitted her affidavit and that of
Barshak, quoted supra.
On August 20, 1998, the district court denied
Golenbock’s motion in a written decision, stating:
In this case, Golenbock did not face the
ominous choice “between the rock and the
whirlpool,” because, although she was
subject to a negative inference based upon
her silence, she was not subject to
automatic disbarment. Instead, in the
B.B.O. proceeding she, like defendants in
any civil proceeding, had to choose between
remaining silent and risking an adverse
inference on the one hand, and giving
testimony that could be used against her in
a subsequent criminal proceeding on the
other. Because Golenbock’s testimony was
not coerced, as that term is defined in
Garrity [v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 492
(1967)], her motion to suppress statements
made to the B.B.O. will be denied.
At trial, the government introduced excerpts from thirty-three
pages of B.B.O. testimony, which were admitted in evidence
against Golenbock. The excerpts included Golenbock’s testimony
concerning her payment of the mortgage, tax and other payments
on the Wellfleet property, as well as the proceeds of the sale
of the property. Neither Golenbock nor Stein made a
contemporaneous objection.
G. The criminal trial
The two-week jury trial of all three defendants
commenced in March, 1999. At trial, an expert testified that
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the value of the Wellfleet property, as of October 4, 1990, was
$120,000. There were two mortgages totaling approximately
$100,000 and approximately $2,000 worth of tax liens.
By way of defense at the trial, Golenbock and Stein
contended that they did not have to list the conveyance of the
Wellfleet property in their bankruptcy schedules because the
transfer was in the ordinary course of business (i.e. real
estate development). After the property was conveyed to Otis,
defendants contended, Golenbock managed the property and Stein
“looked after necessary repairs and made sure the bills were
paid.” The mortgage was paid with monies Otis provided to
Golenbock in her role as property manager. The main source of
income for these payments was the Adams Street Realty Trust,
composed of rental properties in Lowell, Massachusetts.
Golenbock and Stein had transferred their beneficial interest in
those properties to Otis in November, 1991, with the bankruptcy
court’s permission. The tenants of the Lowell properties often
paid in cash, defendants asserted, which accounted for Golenbock
and Stein’s cash payments for the mortgage and other expenses
associated with the Wellfleet property. Stein was the only
defendant who testified at trial.
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Stein and Otis moved for acquittal under Fed. R. Crim.
P. 29 at the close of the government’s case. The court denied
both motions.
Neither Stein nor Otis renewed her motion for acquittal
after the close of her defense. On April 12, 1999, the jury
found Golenbock and Stein guilty of both counts. Otis was
convicted on the conspiracy count and acquitted on the
substantive bankruptcy fraud count.
H. Sentencing
On July 8, 1999, the trial court determined that
Golenbock and Stein each had an adjusted offense level of 16.
The computation was based on a base offense level of 6, with
upward adjustments for their roles in the offense as leaders,
supervisors, organizers, or managers of Otis; for more than
minimal planning and more than one victim; and for the amount of
the intended loss, which was determined to be $73,906.66.
Golenbock and Stein were each sentenced to twenty-one
months of imprisonment followed by thirty-six months of
supervised release. Otis received a sentence of five months in
prison and twenty-four months of supervised release.
II.
In these consolidated appeals, the defendants advance
various arguments. First, Golenbock and Stein assert that the
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district court erred in not suppressing at trial testimony
provided by Golenbock in proceedings conducted by the Board of
Bar Overseers. Golenbock and Stein also dispute the court’s
sentencing enhancement based on the intended loss for which they
were responsible. Stein and Otis contend the evidence was
insufficient to support their convictions. Stein further
maintains that her sentence should not have been enhanced to
reflect a leadership role in the offense. Finally, Otis argues
that the indictment was deficient as to the charges against her.
We find no reversible error as to any of these matters, and
affirm the defendants’ convictions and sentences.
A. Golenbock’s B.B.O. testimony (Golenbock and Stein)
Golenbock and Stein both contend that because
Golenbock’s B.B.O. testimony was coerced, it should have been
suppressed at their criminal trial.3 In reviewing the denial of
a motion to suppress, we review the district court's findings of
fact for clear error, and its conclusions of law and rulings on
the constitutionality of the government's conduct de novo. See
United States v. Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 2000).
Golenbock argues that she reasonably believed that if
she refused to testify before the B.B.O., she could be subject
3
Because Stein’s appeal on this issue is derivative of
Golenbock’s, we address them together referring only to
Golenbock.
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to an adverse inference as to the matters at issue in that
proceeding, with the practical outcome being her disbarment.
She contends that this impending threat of disbarment rendered
her testimony involuntary and thus inadmissible at her criminal
trial. We think, however, that the penalty of adverse inference
and possible disbarment was too conditional to establish a
conclusion that her B.B.O. testimony was compelled in
contravention of the Fifth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment secures an individual’s privilege
"to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for
such silence." Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967)
(Douglas, J.) (plurality opinion quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 8 (1963)). The Fifth Amendment not only protects
against being involuntarily called as a witness against oneself
in a criminal prosecution,
but also privileges him not to answer
official questions put to him in any other
proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or
informal, where the answers might
incriminate him in future criminal
proceedings.
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
The Fifth Amendment has been held to protect
individuals from the threat of substantial economic sanction for
exercising their rights. See id. at 82-83 (state contractors
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barred from state business for five years for refusal to testify
before grand jury); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968)
(police officer discharged for refusal to testify before grand
jury). In Spevack, the Court held that an attorney’s refusal,
on grounds of self-incrimination, to produce financial records
and to testify at a judicial inquiry in a disciplinary
proceeding was not a constitutionally permissible basis for his
disbarment. Four members of the court described disbarment as
a “costly” sanction within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
and went on to state:
The threat of disbarment and the loss of
professional standing, professional
reputation, and of livelihood are powerful
forms of compulsion to make a lawyer
relinquish the [Fifth Amendment] privilege.
Spevack, 385 U.S. at 516.
On the same day, the Court similarly held that
statements elicited as a result of compelling a choice between
self-incrimination and the loss of a public job were
inadmissible in a later criminal proceeding. See Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 498 (1967). There, police officers were
summoned to appear before a state investigative body examining
irregularities in criminal cases. They were informed that
anything they said could be used against them in subsequent
criminal proceedings, but if they refused to answer they would
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be subject to removal from office. Id. at 494. The officers
answered the questions. Later, they were indicted and tried for
crimes relating to the earlier questioning, and their statements
were used at trial. Id. at 495. The Supreme Court reversed
their convictions on the ground that their testimony was
involuntary because it was under threat of job termination. Id.
at 497-98.4
Where, however, invocation of the Fifth Amendment does
not, by itself, result in forfeiture of the job or license in
question, the fact that claiming the Fifth may, as a practical
matter, result in damage to one’s chances of retaining the
privilege at stake does not necessarily establish a
constitutional violation. The effect must be "capable of
forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids."
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977); see also
Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 1974) ("[N]ot every
undesirable consequence which may follow from the exercise of
4Where the government seeks to compel testimony by threat of
loss of livelihood, the witness may rightfully refuse to answer
unless he is protected against the use of the compelled answers
in any subsequent criminal case. See United States v.
Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 462 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Turley,
414 U.S. at 78). A state may compel incriminating answers to
its questions, however, if the testimony and its fruits are
rendered unavailable for use in subsequent criminal proceedings,
i.e. through a grant of immunity. See Turley, 414 U.S. at 84-
85.
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the privilege against self-incrimination can be characterized as
a penalty.").
Hence the Supreme Court has adhered to the “prevailing
rule” that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid allowing adverse
inferences to be drawn against parties to civil actions from
their refusal to testify in response to probative evidence
offered against them. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317
(1976). In Baxter, the Court held that permitting the drawing
of an adverse inference from a prisoner’s silence in a prison
disciplinary hearing was constitutionally permissible. See id.
at 316-20. The Baxter court differentiated the effects of the
prisoners’ silence from the automatic penalties at issue in
other cases:
In this respect, this case is very different
from the circumstances before the Court in
the Garrity-Lefkowitz decisions, where
refusal to submit to interrogation and to
waive the Fifth Amendment privilege,
standing alone and without regard to the
other evidence, resulted in loss of
employment or opportunity to contract with
the State. There, failure to respond to
interrogation was treated as a final
admission of guilt.
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Id. at 317-18.5 The Supreme Court later distinguished its
holding in Baxter from a case in which, pursuant to a New York
statute, an attorney was divested of his state political party
offices when he refused to waive his constitutional immunity
before a special grand jury:
Baxter did no more than permit an inference
to be drawn in a civil case from a party's
refusal to testify. Respondent's silence in
Baxter was only one of a number of factors
to be considered by the finder of fact in
assessing a penalty, and was given no more
probative value than the facts of the case
warranted; here, refusal to waive the Fifth
Amendment leads automatically and without
more to imposition of sanctions.
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 n.5 (1977).
Relying on Garrity, Golenbock insists that she was
forced to choose between her livelihood as an attorney and
incriminating herself in the B.B.O. investigation. Unlike the
police officers in Garrity, however, Golenbock was not subject
to automatic loss of her position if she asserted her right not
to testify. While refusal to waive the Fifth Amendment might
increase the risk that she would be disbarred, disbarment would
5Golenbock points out that in Baxter, there was no pending
criminal prosecution, and the State had not sought to make
evidentiary use of the inmate’s silence at the disciplinary
hearing in any criminal proceeding. See 425 U.S. at 317. We
have applied Baxter, however, to situations involving criminal
charges. See, e.g., United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711,
716 (1st Cir. 1980).
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not result automatically and without more. Hence, she was not
threatened with a “penalty” within the meaning of Garrity for
invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege.
Attorney Barshak's affidavit makes this point clear.
He stated that “the B.B.O. would be allowed to draw from her
silence any adverse inferences relating to any area of the
investigation she refused to discuss.” (Emphasis added). It is
true that Barshak went on to opine to his client that “those
adverse inferences would mean that the B.B.O. would find against
her in relation to those areas of investigation and that as a
result, she would be disbarred or suspended.” His prediction of
disbarment, however, rested on his estimate of how the B.B.O.
would exercise its ability to draw adverse inferences. Mr.
Barshak did not suggest that the B.B.O. was required to disbar
her as an automatic sanction for Golenbock’s failure to waive
her constitutional rights.
The B.B.O.’s own rules and practice make it plain that
Golenbock was not faced with an automatic sanction. The B.B.O.
makes its decisions based on a preponderance of the evidence,
with the Bar Counsel bearing the burden of proof. See Rules of
the Board of Bar Overseers, § 3.28. Nothing in the record
suggests that the B.B.O. has either a formal rule or an
unwritten policy or practice to disbar or suspend attorneys
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simply for invoking Fifth Amendment privileges. Hence, the
consequences of Golenbock’s
assertion of the privilege before the B.B.O. were the same as in
any civil proceeding, in that the fact-finder could -- but was
not required to -- draw an adverse inference from such an
assertion. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 317; see also Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Elio, 39 F.3d 1239, 1248 (1st Cir. 1994).
Golenbock contends, nevertheless, that the risk of
disbarment arising from her refusal to testify was sufficiently
coercive to render her B.B.O. testimony inadmissible. This
argument ignores the reasoning of Baxter, on which this court
has relied to distinguish between the threat of automatic loss
of one’s livelihood and the threat of an inference that might
lead to such a loss. In United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711
(1st Cir. 1980), we held that a state police officer’s self-
incriminating statements made during a theft investigation were
not coerced, where nothing in relevant police department rules
mandated dismissal for invoking Fifth Amendment rights. We
observed:
In all of the cases flowing from Garrity,
there are two common features: (1) the
person being investigated is explicitly told
that failure to waive his constitutional
right against self-incrimination will result
in his discharge from public employment (or
a similarly severe sanction imposed in the
case of private citizens); and (2) there is
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a statute or municipal ordinance mandating
such procedure.
Id. at 716. In Indorato, we said that absent elements of this
nature, fear of punishment as a consequence of claiming one’s
rights does not protect one from the government’s subsequent use
of self-incriminating statements in a criminal trial.6 See id.
As said, there is no evidence of any B.B.O. rule
mandating that claiming one’s constitutional right to remain
silent must necessarily result in disbarment. Golenbock could
have asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege and later argued to
the B.B.O. fact-finder that the evidence against her, as a
whole, was inadequate to warrant disbarment. We conclude that
“[n]either Garrity nor any of its progeny brings defendant
within the ambit of the coerced testimony doctrine.” Indorato,
628 F.2d at 716. We affirm the district court’s denial of
Golenbock’s motion to suppress.
B. Intended loss calculation (Golenbock and Stein)
The district court increased Golenbock and Stein’s base
offense levels by six levels because of the amount of the
6
We recognize that Golenbock’s fear of disbarment was based
on the advice of a seasoned attorney. However, the fact that,
as a matter of strategic choice in the B.B.O. proceeding,
Golenbock could have had good reason to fear disbarment if she
did not testify is not the same as being faced with automatic
disbarment for failure to testify. One can imagine situations
where the adverse inferences drawn from refusing to testify
might be overcome by other factors.
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intended loss for which they were responsible.7 The court
determined that the intended loss was approximately $74,000,
which it characterized as “the amount of the net gain over the
mortgage and expenses.” The district court’s findings were
based on the facts that the Wellfleet property was sold in June,
1996, for $175,000, and that $73,906.66 remained after the
mortgages, tax obligation and brokerage commission were deducted
from the escrow.
We review a district court's intended loss findings for
clear error. See United States v. Robbio, 186 F.3d 37, 43 (1st
Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Cali, 87 F.3d 571, 575
(1st Cir. 1996) (clear error standard applied to sentence
enhancements even where defendant objected in district court).
"Courts can, and frequently do, deal with rough estimates, and
as such, a party dissatisfied with a sentencing court's
quantification of the amount of loss . . . must go a long way to
demonstrate clear error.” United States v. Rowe, 202 F.3d 37,
42 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
Golenbock and Stein argue that the district court’s
calculation was flawed because it did not take into account the
7
The district court’s sentence enhancement was based on the
loss to creditors Golenbock and Stein intended, not the
creditors' actual loss. It is undisputed that the Wellfleet
property was ultimately discovered by the bankruptcy trustee and
that the proceeds of the property’s sale were recovered.
-25-
more than five years of “carrying costs” that defendants had
paid while the property grew in value from its $120,000 purchase
price in 1990 to its $175,000 sale price in 1996. During this
time period, Golenbock and Stein made insurance and mortgage
payments totaling approximately $70,000. Golenbock and Stein
argue that the creditors reaped the benefit of an increase in
the value of the property that was created by Golenbock and
Stein’s payments. Golenbock and Stein argue there was no
intended loss whatsoever, because the amount they paid to carry
the property over the five years approximately equaled the net
value in 1996. Had they kept the sales proceeds, their net
would be zero after subtracting the payments they made.
But we believe the district court’s intended loss
calculation was justifiable and well within the standards of the
Sentencing Guidelines and relevant case law. Section 2F1.1 of
the Guidelines provides that an offense level shall be increased
by six levels if the loss or intended loss amounts to more than
$70,000. Intended loss need not be determined with precision;
“[t]he court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss,
given the available information.’" United States v. Pervaz, 118
F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, cmt.
(n.8)); see also United States v. Parsons, 141 F.3d 386, 392
(1st Cir. 1998) (loss is a proxy for the seriousness of the
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offense). Section 2F1.1 does not otherwise specify or restrict
the means by which intended loss may be calculated in a
bankruptcy case. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 cmt (n.8) (providing
special rules for calculating loss in particular types of cases,
including loan fraud).8
Here, it was reasonable for the district court to treat
the $74,000 net gain realized on the 1996 sale of the property
as the measure of the creditors’ intended loss. For each of the
five previous years during which Golenbock and Stein held it,
their exclusive control gave them the economic use of the
property in addition to the profit they later realized when the
property was sold. Golenbock and Stein could rent the property
to others and on occasion did so. In lieu of renting it, they
could and did themselves enjoy its use. In either event the
property, during all of the years when they were paying the
carrying charges, had immediate value to those who controlled
it, just as ownership of one’s home provides continuous economic
value distinct from the capital gain when the home is eventually
8
Golenbock and Stein seek to bolster their argument by
relying on loan fraud cases and the Sentencing Guidelines’
commentary on loan fraud. The Guidelines recognize loan fraud
as a specific exception to the usual methods of calculating loss
set forth in §§ 2F1.1 and 2B1.1. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 cmt.
(n.8(b)). We find no error in the district court’s refusal to
extend the exceptional methodology used for loan fraud cases to
bankruptcy fraud.
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sold. In the circumstances, we think the district court could
reasonably treat the economic value of the property during the
years Golenbock and Stein fraudulently withheld it from their
creditors as offsetting its carrying expenses, leaving the
$74,000 net gain on the 1996 sale as the amount Golenbock and
Stein would have realized had the fraud succeeded and,
conversely, as the loss the fraud would have caused to the
creditors had the scheme worked. Golenbock and Stein clearly
never intended by paying the mortgage and other expenses to
benefit their creditors; during this period they alone retained
the exclusive right to the property’s use. We do not find clear
error in the district court’s refusal to subtract Golenbock and
Stein’s annual payments from the $74,000.
Nor is there error in the fact that the court evaluated
the intended loss at the time Golenbock and Stein sold the
Wellfleet property, rather than at the time they filed for
bankruptcy. Like conspiracy, bankruptcy concealment has been
described as a continuing offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3284;9 United
9 Section 3284 provides:
The concealment of assets of a debtor in a
case under title 11 shall be deemed to be a
continuing offense until the debtor shall
have been finally discharged or a discharge
denied, and the period of limitations shall
not begin to run until such final discharge
or denial of discharge.
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States v. Gilbert, 136 F.3d 1451, 1453 (11th Cir. 1998); Sultan
v. United States, 249 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1957) (noting that
§ 3284, in addition to describing a statute of limitations, has
substantive consequences). “[C]oncealment by its nature is an
act which goes on until detected or its consequences are
purged.” Sultan, 249 F.2d at 386. The fraud was still ongoing
at the time the Wellfleet property was sold, as the concealment
had not yet been revealed at that point. Hence, it was proper
for the court to base its intended loss findings on the value of
the property at the time of the sale.
C. Sentencing enhancement (Stein)
The district court found that Stein was "an organizer,
leader, manager, or supervisor" for the purposes of U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(c), and accordingly added two levels to her base offense
level. Stein argues that the evidence does not support the
district court's conclusion. Because a sentencing court's role-
in-the-offense determination is necessarily fact-specific, we
review deferentially and only for clear error or mistake of law.
See United States v. Alicea, 205 F.3d 480, 485 (1st Cir. 2000).
The government must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that Stein's role satisfies the requirements of
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§ 3B1.1(c). See id. at 485. A two-level increase pursuant
to § 3B1.1(c) is justified
if the sentencing court supportably finds
that (1) the criminal enterprise involved at
least two complicit participants (of whom
the defendant may be counted as one), and
(2) the defendant, in committing the
offense, exercised control over, organized,
or was otherwise responsible for
superintending the activities of, at least
one of those other persons.
United States v. Cruz, 120 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc).
In determining whether the defendant qualifies for the
enhancement, the Sentencing Guidelines instruct courts to
consider seven factors:
the exercise of decision making authority,
the nature of participation in the
commission of the offense, the recruitment
of accomplices, the claimed right to a
larger share of the fruits of the crime, the
degree of participation in planning or
organizing the offense, the nature and scope
of the illegal activity, and the degree of
control exercised over others.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. (n.4). This list of factors is
"representative rather than exhaustive." United States v.
Tejada-Beltran, 50 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir. 1995).
Stein opposed this enhancement in objections to the
presentence report (PSR) and at sentencing. On appeal, Stein
makes a very brief and general argument that the sentencing
enhancement was erroneous because there was no evidence that she
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supervised or managed Otis’s criminal conduct. We perceive no
clear error.
The court could have reasonably found that Stein,
together with Golenbock, devised and carried out a plan to
conceal the Wellfleet property from bankruptcy creditors and the
trustee by having Otis hold it for them in trust. Stein signed
the backdated deed of the Wellfleet property to Otis. Stein met
with the bankruptcy attorney, provided the information for her
filing and attended the meetings of creditors. After they
conveyed title to Otis, Stein and Golenbock forwarded the tax
forms to her.
The testimony of Stein’s and Golenbock’s secretaries
reflects that Stein as well as Golenbock exercised continuing
decision-making authority with respect to the Wellfleet
property. Stein paid or authorized the payment of bills,
sometimes with handwritten directions on the bills. And with
Golenbock, Stein received tax documents and insurance forms at
her address. Stein and Golenbock made the arrangements with the
real estate broker when the property was being sold. When the
proceeds for the sale of the Wellfleet property were issued to
Otis, amounting to more than $70,000, Otis signed them over to
accounts from which Stein benefitted.
-31-
It is true that there is little evidence that Stein
alone -- i.e., acting separately from Golenbock – directed
Otis’s activity related to the concealment. However, Stein does
not contend that two organizers cannot act jointly to direct the
activity of another, and we have found no authority so stating.
Hence, we perceive no clear error in the district court’s
determination that Stein was a leader, supervisor, organizer or
manager of Otis.
D. Sufficiency of the evidence (Stein and Otis)
On appeal, Stein and Otis challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence presented against them. It is well-established
that in order to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence after
a conviction, the defendant must have preserved her Rule 29
motion by moving for an acquittal at the close of the defense’s
evidence at trial. See United States v. Castro-Lara, 970 F.2d
976, 980 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Concemi, 957
F.2d 942, 950 (1st Cir. 1992).
Absent a renewal of the motion for acquittal
after presenting the case for the defense,
the motion for acquittal is considered
waived. Hence, in order to prevail on a
challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, “the defendants must then
demonstrate “clear and gross” injustice.’”
Concemi, 957 F.2d at 950 (internal citations omitted).
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Here, Stein and Otis moved for acquittal under Fed. R.
Crim. P. 29 at the close of the government’s evidence. Neither
afterward renewed her Rule 29 motion at the close of the
defense's evidence. Hence, we apply the “clear and gross
injustice” standard to this portion of Stein and Otis’s appeal.
See id. After careful review, we conclude that the evidence
presented at trial against Stein and Otis was sufficient to
support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
1. Stein
Stein argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support her conviction because she simply “followed Golenbock’s
lead at every step of the way, without knowing that Golenbock
was concealing the property from the bankruptcy trustee.” She
contends that the evidence showed that only Golenbock and Otis
controlled the property. There is no support for the
conclusion, Stein argues, that she knowingly retained an
interest in the Wellfleet property or that she intentionally
concealed (or conspired to conceal) it from her bankruptcy
creditors. We disagree, based on reasonable inferences from
other evidence described in section II.C., supra, as well as
from the following evidence.
Stein filed her bankruptcy separately from Golenbock’s.
Stein’s bankruptcy schedules and statement of financial affairs
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not only failed to list the Wellfleet property as a property in
which she held an interest, but also failed to list the Cape Cod
Five as a creditor, failed to disclose (as the forms required
had Stein’s interest been transferred, as claimed, the previous
December) that she had previously been a part owner of the
Wellfleet property within the year before she filed for
bankruptcy, and failed to disclose the civil litigation relating
to a hot tub at the Wellfleet property. In other words, there
is evidence that even if Stein was unaware that she had retained
a continuing interest in the Wellfleet property after the
alleged December 31, 1989, transfer to Otis, she failed to make
appropriate disclosure as to multiple relevant aspects of her
relationship to the Wellfleet property, including her
involvement before the transfer.
Stein attended 341 meetings and answered questions,
affirming that the information contained in the schedules was
truthful and accurate. Her bankruptcy attorney, Jeffrey
Schreiber, testified that all the information on the schedules
was obtained from Stein or Golenbock. Schreiber testified that
he did not learn of the Wellfleet property from Stein or
Golenbock, however, but from a B.B.O. attorney only a couple of
years before the trial in this case.
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Stein contended at trial that the Wellfleet property
in fact was legitimately and wholly conveyed to Otis nine months
before the bankruptcy filing. Sufficient evidence would have
enabled a reasonable jury to conclude otherwise, however.
First, while the deed to Otis was dated and notarized nine
months earlier, it was not recorded until October 4, 1990, a
week after the filing of the individual bankruptcy petitions by
Stein and Golenbock. Stein's testimony as to where the deed
was signed and notarized was confused. She testified that the
deed was signed and notarized in Andover, which is in Essex
County, but on its face the deed indicates that it was executed
and notarized in Middlesex County, where Golenbock and Stein
resided. Second, Golenbock and Stein continued to pay the
mortgage and other expenses relating to the property after
December 31, 1989, strongly suggesting no actual transfer to
Otis. They did not receive the stated consideration for the
transfer. Their names were not changed on bills relating to the
property until 1991. Stein conceded that she had never
attempted to list the property for sale with a real estate
broker, but had just talked to Otis, a close friend, about it.
Additionally, the Declaration of Trust for the B.Z. Realty
Trust, of which Otis was supposedly the trustee, was recorded
only at the time the deed was recorded; this document was
-35-
purported to have been executed on August 1 of either 1989 or
1990 (both dates appeared on it). From this evidence, the jury
could have concluded that Stein had never transferred nor
intended to transfer her interest in trust to Otis on December
31, 1989, prior to the bankruptcy. Indeed, the jury could have
determined that, even if prepared on that date, the deed was not
delivered then or that it may even have been made later and
backdated, after Golenbock and Stein had filed for bankruptcy.
In any case, the evidence suggests that the deed had been
fabricated as part of defendants’ scheme to conceal the property
from bankruptcy creditors.
Stein testified that between 1992 and 1994, the
Wellfleet property payments were all made from the Adams Street
Trust account because Otis had purchased the beneficial interest
in that trust. This testimony was corroborated by that of her
secretary, Beverly Rubin. However, neither Stein nor Rubin
provided any supporting documents. Furthermore, there was
contradictory evidence: checks and other payments relating to
the Wellfleet property, made during that time period, from
accounts and sources other than the Adams Street Trust account,
including their bankruptcy debtor-in-possession checking
account. In addition, Stein’s signature appears on non-Adams
Street Trust checks in the early 1990s on payments for the
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Wellfleet property, after the property was sold to Otis.
Furthermore, after Stein and Golenbock received their bankruptcy
discharges, but while their bankruptcy cases were still open,
they began paying the Cape Cod Five loans directly from an
account in Golenbock’s name. Two of those checks were signed by
Stein in October, 1995. Moreover, despite the stated
consideration of $108,000, no funds appear to have changed hands
as between Otis and the purported sellers, nor was the Cape Cod
Five notified of the purported sale to Otis.
Hence, the jury could have concluded that the sale to
Otis was a sham and that Golenbock and Stein paid the Wellfleet
expenses from their own funds, and that Stein’s testimony at
trial about the payments was false. See United States v.
Jimenez-Perez, 869 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1989) (the jury “could
legitimately have presumed that the fabrication was all the more
proof of [defendants’] guilt”). As the evidence was sufficient
for the jury to have concluded that Stein knowingly and
fraudulently concealed her interest in the Wellfleet property
from her bankruptcy creditors, and conspired with Golenbock and
Otis to do so, there was no clear and gross injustice in her
conviction.
2. Otis
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Otis argues that there was insufficient evidence that
she willfully joined the conspiracy to conceal the Wellfleet
property from Golenbock’s and Stein’s bankruptcy creditors. She
contends that she was unaware of any improprieties throughout
the concealment scheme, and hence lacked the requisite intent to
be convicted of conspiracy. We hold that a reasonable jury
could have concluded otherwise.
The government points out that Golenbock and Otis were
close friends and Golenbock was a godmother to one of Otis’s
sons. This alone, of course, would be insufficient to establish
that Otis knew of the concealment, although, together with other
probative evidence, it might be a further factor making such
knowledge more likely. The government points out that Golenbock
issued a $15,000 check to Otis a few days after the bankruptcy
filing, then recorded the earlier-dated deed of the Wellfleet
property to Otis one week later. From this, the government
argues, the jury could have found that Otis knowingly was being
paid to hold the property for Golenbock’s and Stein’s benefit.
Precisely when Otis’s involvement began is not
critical. “[I]t is well settled that one may join a conspiracy
subsequent to its original formation by adopting its goals and
adhering to its purposes.” United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d
165, 191 (1st Cir. 1969) (citing Blumenthal v. United States,
-38-
332 U.S. 539, 559 (1947)). Where a defendant knows of the
bankruptcy and holds or disposes of assets for the debtor, the
evidence is “sufficient to warrant the jury’s inferring
purposeful knowledge and participation in the plan first set in
motion previously” by the debtor. Sultan, 249 F.2d at 387.
Here, even if Otis had been unaware of the concealment at the
time of the conveyance, there is ample circumstantial evidence
for a jury to find that she later was knowingly and willfully
involved in the conspiracy.
First, there is evidence that Otis knew of the
bankruptcy proceedings during the time period that she held the
Wellfleet property in trust (August 1989 or August 1990 to June
1996). In 1992, Otis submitted a pleading from Golenbock’s
bankruptcy case to the IRS. Moreover, she admitted her
awareness of the bankruptcy in her B.B.O. deposition in January,
1996.
Second, there was evidence that Otis, who was an
attorney herself, would have known that the circumstances of the
transfer and subsequent handling of the Wellfleet property were
irregular. The jury could have inferred that as the supposed
purchaser of the property, Otis was aware that the purported
transfer to her was a sham. She admitted that she made none of
the expense payments for the property and was not involved in
-39-
renting it. Although the deed stated she took the property
subject to the Cape Cod Five’s two mortgages, Otis never
received mortgage bills, as they were sent to Golenbock and
Stein’s office. When the decision was made to sell the
property, Golenbock and Stein, not Otis, conducted the
communications with the broker. And when the property was
sold, Otis turned over all the proceeds to Golenbock’s and
Stein’s minor son.
Moreover, there is evidence that Otis actively
attempted to cover up these irregularities. Although she
acknowledged that she did not provide any of the funds to pay
the loans, she fraudulently claimed the mortgage interest
deduction for several years on her federal income tax returns.
Furthermore, Otis made false statements in a B.B.O. deposition
about the matter. The jury saw the transcripts and heard the
tapes of her testimony, from which they could have drawn
additional negative inferences both to her credibility and her
culpability. See Jimenez-Perez, 869 F.2d at 11.
In sum, there is evidence from which the jury could
have reasonably concluded that Otis knew of the bankruptcy and
participated in the conspiracy to conceal the Wellfleet
property. Hence, there was no clear and gross injustice in her
conviction.
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E. Defective indictment (Otis)
Otis was convicted only on the conspiracy charge, set
forth in Count II of the superseding indictment. She now
contends that Count II failed to adequately inform her of which
paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 152 was charged. Because she did not
challenge the sufficiency of the indictment below, we review for
plain error only. See United States v. Murphy, 762 F.2d 1151,
1155 (1st Cir. 1985); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
Count II charges that Otis, Golenbock and Stein
“did knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully
conspire and agree among themselves to
commit the following offense against the
United States:
to knowingly and fraudulently conceal from
creditors and the trustee in bankruptcy
proceedings under Title 11 of the United
States Code (the bankruptcy laws), captioned
In re: Wendy B. Golenbock, case number
90-41635-JFQ and In re: Cheryl B. Stein,
case number 90-41638-JFQ, in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Massachusetts, property belonging to the
estates of the debtors WENDY B. GOLENBOCK
and CHERYL B. STEIN, to wit, their
beneficial interest in the real property
located on Bond Street in Wellfleet,
Massachusetts (also at times referred to as
South Wellfleet), also identified at times
as being on Old Wharf Road or Paine Avenue
or lots 63 and 80, and their agreement with
SUSAN OTIS, aka SUSAN ALEKMAN concerning her
holding that real property in trust for the
benefit of WENDY B. GOLENBOCK and CHERYL B.
STEIN, all in violation of Title 18, United
States Code Sections 152 and 2.
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(Emphasis added.)
Otis argues that in Count II, the statement “all in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152 and 18 U.S.C. § 2" was not clear
enough to notify her of what crimes she was alleged to have
committed. An indictment is sufficient “if the offense is
described with sufficient clarity to show a violation of law,
and enables the accused to know the nature and cause of the
accusation against him and to plead an acquittal or conviction
in bar of future prosecution for the same offense.” United
States v. Fusaro, 708 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1983) (citing
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974)). Generally, an
indictment passes muster if it sets forth the offense in the
words of the statute, including all the elements of the offense.
See United States v. Penagaricano-Soler, 911 F.2d 833, 839 (1st
Cir. 1990).
18 U.S.C. § 152 (App. 1994), the version of the statute
under which defendants were charged, describes several forms of
criminal conduct in the bankruptcy context, including
concealment of assets, false oaths and claims, and bribery. 10
10Before it was amended in 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 152 did not
contain paragraph numbers. See Pub. L. 103-394, § 312(a)(1)(A).
The amended statute applies only to bankruptcy cases filed with
the bankruptcy court after October, 1994. See id. at § 702. As
Golenbock and Stein’s bankruptcy petitions were filed in
September, 1990, we apply the earlier version of the statute.
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Otis was charged with a violation of the first provision (now
the first paragraph) of § 152, prohibiting concealment of
assets, which sets forth in relevant part:
Whoever knowingly and fraudulently conceals
from the receiver, custodian, trustee,
marshal, or other officer of the court
charged with the control or custody of
property, or from creditors in any
bankruptcy proceeding, any property
belonging to the estate of a bankrupt;
. . . Shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
Count II of the superseding indictment tracks the
above-cited paragraph with sufficient clarity to place Otis on
notice of the elements of the charged offense. See United
States v. Grant, 971 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1992) (elements of
bankruptcy concealment are knowing concealment of property of
one’s bankruptcy estate from the bankruptcy trustee, with
specific intent to defraud creditors). Count II sets forth the
time and place of offense, identifies the relevant bankruptcy
proceedings at issue, the property alleged to have been
concealed, and the persons from whom it was concealed. See
United States v. Arge, 418 F.2d 721, 724 (10th Cir. 1969) (an
indictment for bankruptcy concealment must allege time and
place, knowing and fraudulent intent, a description of the
property concealed, the persons from whom it was concealed, and
-43-
that it was property of the bankrupt estate). Moreover, the
indictment identifies the intent: that Otis “knowingly,
willfully, and unlawfully” conspired to commit the offense, and
that she “knowingly and fraudulently” concealed the property.
See id. Hence, we conclude that the charging language in Count
II adequately set forth both the language and elements of the
first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 152 and informed Otis of the
relevant offense.
Otis also contends that the indictment was defective
because it cited to 18 U.S.C. § 2 without setting forth its
specific language.11 Charges under § 2 need not be specifically
referenced in an indictment, however. See United States v.
Footman, 215 F.3d 145, 153-54 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v.
Andrade, 135 F.3d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 1998). Hence, there is no
11Section 2 provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the
United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its
commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be
done which if directly performed by him or
another would be an offense against the
United States, is punishable as a principal.
We have stated that § 2 is a general definitional statute that
does not describe a separate offense from the underlying
substantive crime. See United States v. Mitchell, 23 F.3d 1, 2
(1st Cir. 1994).
-44-
error, plain or otherwise, in the omission of the specific
language of § 2, and we affirm Otis’s conviction on the
indictment.
Affirmed.
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