United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-2678
RAMÓN COLLAZO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
R. JAMES NICHOLSON,
Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs;
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Gustavo A. Gelpí, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Baldock,* Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Elaine Rodríguez-Frank, for appellant.
Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney,
with whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and
Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,
Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellees.
July 24, 2008
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Appellant Ramón Collazo brought
suit against his employer, appellees R. James Nicholson and the
Department of Veterans Affairs, alleging that he was discriminated
against in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. He argues that he suffered mental
and emotional distress as a result of the hostile work environment
created by appellees. After reviewing affidavits and documentation
provided by both parties, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Nicholson because the conduct at issue, in the
court's view, was "not sufficiently severe or pervasive" to create
a hostile work environment.
We affirm the district court's judgment, but on an
alternate ground. Even if Collazo's allegations are true, the
remedy he seeks (compensatory damages for mental anguish, pain,
suffering, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment) is not available
under the statute.
I.
We recite the relevant facts in the light most favorable
to Collazo, the nonmoving party. Skinner v. Cunningham, 430 F.3d
483, 485 (1st Cir. 2005).
After working at the San Juan VA Medical Center for
several years, first as a volunteer and then as a paid employee in
various capacities, Collazo was promoted to the position of Patient
Services Assistant in August 1998, under the supervision of José
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Rivera. Collazo, in his sixties during this period, contends that
Rivera threatened him and directed age-discriminatory remarks at
him, leading Collazo to file four incident reports and two VA
police reports. The last incident report, filed on April 23, 2003,
discussed an incident that had occurred on April 16, 2003. Several
of Collazo's allegations of abuse were corroborated by Rivera's co-
workers and/or hospital patients in affidavits submitted by Collazo
in opposition to the appellee's motion for summary judgment.
While Collazo was initiating complaints against his
supervisor, he also became the subject of patient complaints
submitted to the VA. In June 2003, the VA Medical Center Director
convened an Administrative Board of Investigation to investigate
these complaints. During the course of the investigation over the
next several months, Collazo was transferred to another position
within the Medical Center with no patient contact. On August 11,
2003, the Administrative Board completed its investigation and
reported that Collazo had difficulty listening to patients and
understanding their specific situations, showing empathy and care,
and asking appropriate questions to offer helpful responses to his
patients' needs. The Board recommended that Collazo be relocated
to areas with minimal contact with the public, where he would have
little or no contact with patients or employees who were at high
risk of becoming violent in the workplace. In October 2003, the VA
reassigned Collazo to the task of address correction and patient
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demographics. The transfer did not result in a change of pay grade
or position description, but did remove Collazo from direct
supervision by Rivera.
On April 25, 2003, Collazo filed an informal EEO
harassment complaint, alleging he suffered age discrimination in
connection with the incident on April 16, 2003, when Rivera
threatened him, and when the VA temporarily reassigned him, also on
April 16, 2003, to a non-patient processing area. In October 2004,
the EEO issued a decision in favor of the VA, concluding that
Collazo "was not discriminated against on the basis of his age in
violation of the ADEA by being threatened or when he was reassigned
to a non-patient processing area." This decision was upheld by the
EEOC Office of Federal Operations on appeal.
On July 14, 2005, Collazo filed suit in federal court,
alleging only that he suffered a hostile work environment on the
basis of his age, in violation of the ADEA. In his complaint,
Collazo sought a declaration that a settlement agreement executed
by the parties in 1998 was violated;1 compensatory damages for his
mental anguish, pain, suffering, humiliation, and loss of
enjoyment; and attorney's fees. On November 15, 2005, the
appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing that Appellant failed
to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. The
district court granted appellees' motion, finding that Collazo had
1
Collazo has not pursued this claim on appeal.
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failed to show that the alleged incidents he identified were
"sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work
environment claim under the ADEA." Collazo filed this timely
appeal.
II.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment
de novo, with all reasonable inferences resolved in favor of the
nonmoving party. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d
165, 170 (1st Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate where
there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
see id. "We may affirm the district court's decision on any
grounds supported by the record." Estades-Negroni v. Assocs. Corp.
of N. Am., 377 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2004).
"[E]nacted in 1967 as part of an ongoing congressional
effort to eradicate discrimination in the workplace," McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995), the ADEA makes
it unlawful for an employer to "discharge . . . or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age," 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). To state
a claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff must establish that he
"suffered an adverse job action, that this was motivated by age,
and that he suffered injury as a result of it." Meléndez-Arroyo v.
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Cutler-Hammer de P.R. Co., 273 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001); see
also Hoffman v. Applicators Sales & Serv., Inc., 439 F.3d 9, 17
(1st Cir. 2006).
The district court concluded that Collazo failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA
because the incidents of harassment he described were, as a matter
of law, "not sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile
work environment claim under the ADEA." However, there is a more
basic problem with Collazo's claim. Collazo has "failed to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted" because the remedy he
seeks, compensatory damages for the alleged mental anguish, pain,
suffering, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment he suffered as a
result of being required to work in a hostile work environment
based on his age, is not available to him under the statute. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).2 Although we have recognized hostile work
environment claims under the ADEA, see Rivera-Rodríguez v. Frito
Lay Snacks Caribbean, 265 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir. 2001), it is well-
established that the statute does not allow compensatory damages
for pain and suffering,3 Vazquez v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d
2
Collazo's claim should have been disposed of below by a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
3
In contrast to the ADEA, Title VII permits claims for
compensatory damages for emotional distress and pain and suffering
arising from a discriminatorily hostile or abusive work
environment. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)-(b); see Villescas v. Abraham,
311 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002) ("Congress had another
opportunity to enlarge the remedies available under the federal
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107, 109 (1st Cir. 1978); see also Comm'r of Internal Revenue v.
Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 326 (1995) (noting unanimity among the
circuits on this principle). Modeled after the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, the remedy provisions of the ADEA allow
awards for "only those pecuniary benefits connected to the job
relation," including unpaid wages or overtime compensation.4 Kolb
v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 872 (1st Cir. 1982) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); McKennon,
513 U.S. at 357. Aside from monetary relief, federal courts may
also grant "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to
effectuate the purposes of the Act," including reinstatement or
promotion, if warranted. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
Here, Collazo has made no claim for pecuniary benefits
related to his job or any equitable relief. His claim is limited
to compensatory damages for pain and suffering. Therefore, even if
he could establish a hostile work environment claim based on the
record before us, the damages he seeks are not available.
employee ADEA when it amended Title VII and other Acts in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to permit compensatory damages, subject to caps,
and it conspicuously chose not to do so for ADEA claims.").
4
For willful violations, the statute "authorizes an award of
liquidated damages equal to the back pay award." McKennon, 513
U.S. at 357; 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Because liquidated damages are
predicated on a plaintiff's lost wages or compensation award and
Collazo has not raised a claim for any such losses in this case, he
is also not entitled to liquidated damages. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(incorporated into 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)) (stating that liquidated
damages may be awarded in an amount equal to the pecuniary losses
suffered).
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Affirmed.
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