United States v. McElroy

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

Nos. 08-2088, 08-2471

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

DANIEL W. McELROY AND AIMEE J. KING McELROY,

Defendants, Appellants.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Ripple,* and Boudin, Circuit Judges.

James L. Sultan, with whom Charles W. Rankin, Kerry A.
Haberlin, and Rankin & Sultan were on brief for the appellants.
John-Alex Romano, Attorney, Criminal Division, U.S. Department
of Justice, with whom Michael K. Loucks, Acting United States
Attorney, and Jonathan F. Mitchell, Assistant United States
Attorney, were on brief for the appellee.

November 20, 2009

*
Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
 RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Daniel McElroy and Aimee King

McElroy were indicted by a grand jury on one count of conspiring to

defraud the United States of employment and income taxes and to

commit insurance fraud by use of the mails, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 371; three counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1341; and fourteen counts of procuring false tax returns, in

violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). After trial, a petit jury

returned a verdict against them on all counts. The district court

subsequently sentenced Mr. McElroy to 108 months’ imprisonment and

Ms. McElroy to 78 months’ imprisonment.1 Both defendants now

appeal their respective convictions and sentences. For the reasons

set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.2

I. BACKGROUND

From 1993 to 2001, the defendants owned and operated

Daily A. King (“DAK”), Pro Temp and Precission, temporary

employment agencies that supplied manual laborers to area

businesses. The Government maintains that the defendants were, in

fact, operating a single business and defrauded the Government of

more than $9.9 million in payroll taxes by paying their temporary

1
To assist the reader, we shall refer to each defendant by
first name when that convention facilitates comprehension.
2
The jurisdiction of the district court is based on 18
U.S.C. § 3231. Our jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

-2-
workers in cash and by failing to report those payments to the

Government or to the workers’ compensation insurance carriers.

At trial, the Government offered testimony of DAK, Pro

Temp and Precission employees showing that the companies operated

out of the same office space at 14 Bristol Drive, Easton,

Massachusetts. Aimee managed and oversaw the employees who worked

in that office. DAK literature stated that Aimee was the

President. The former employees testified that DAK, Pro Temp and

Precission all employed the same temporary workers. The former

employees explained how Aimee maintained a computerized payroll

system for some of the temporary workers, who were paid by check,

but maintained separate payroll records on floppy disks for other

temporary workers, who were paid in cash. One former employee who

worked in the Bristol Drive office testified that she assumed that

she had been working for one company. A former temporary worker,

Lucia Raposo, testified that, despite her request to receive her

salary by check, she sometimes received cash.

Marta Rodriguez, a former DAK employee, testified that

she occasionally saw Aimee and Daniel distribute cash in the office

to cover payroll. Other witnesses explained how Daniel employed

them to pick up cash from the office and distribute it to the

temporary workers at the client locations. Two clients, owners of

local businesses who had utilized DAK, Pro Temp and Precission for

their employment needs, testified that Daniel attended meetings and

-3-
negotiated service arrangements with them. The clients were aware

that the temporary workers were sometimes paid in cash at their

locations.

Two auditors from different workers’ compensation

insurance companies testified about policies the defendants took

out for DAK, Pro Temp or Precission and how, at various times, the

defendants attended audit meetings concerning the policies. Many

of the policy documents were mailed to the defendants. The

Government introduced falsified payroll summaries and IRS forms

that federal agents recovered when they raided the Bristol Drive

office.

IRS Special Agent Joseph Guidoboni testified as a summary

witness about the defendants’ reporting obligations to the IRS. He

testified that, based on his review of the companies’ business

records, the defendants paid taxes on the payroll they distributed

in check form, but paid no taxes on the payroll they distributed in

cash. He concluded that the total amount of unpaid federal taxes

from 1997 to the first quarter of 2001 was $9,982,690.51. An

insurance fraud investigator, Neil Johnson, also testified as a

summary witness about employers’ obligations to maintain workers’

compensation insurance and how insurers calculate premiums based,

in part, on reported payroll. He concluded that the total loss in

insurance premiums to the workers’ compensation companies was

$6,457,500.

-4-
 The Government also called Dich Trieu, Xieu Van Son and

Charles Wallace to testify about their involvement with the

defendants, DAK, Pro Temp and Precission. Trieu and Van Son

explained that Daniel asked them to lend their names and sign

documents setting up Pro Temp and Precission. Trieu and Van Son

complied. They also recruited temporary workers for the companies,

cashed company checks and helped distribute cash to the temporary

workers. They testified that Aimee oversaw the companies’ payroll

record-keeping operations and wrote checks to move money between

company accounts. She also wrote checks on company accounts to

obtain cash for the cash payroll system. Van Son testified that he

occasionally would deposit checks drawn on company accounts for

large quantities of cash and give it to Aimee, but he generally

handed the cash off to Charles Wallace. Wallace testified that the

defendants employed him to do the accounting for DAK, Pro Temp and

Precission. Wallace attended many of the business meetings with

clients and insurance companies; he also prepared and filed the

false tax forms with the IRS.

The defendants’ theory of defense was that Trieu, Van Son

and Wallace had duped them into joining the tax and insurance fraud

scheme. They impugned the credibility of Trieu, Van Son and

Wallace by exploring their prior criminal histories, untruthful

statements under oath and, with respect to Van Son, his penchant

for gambling.

-5-
 A jury convicted the defendants on all counts. The

district court calculated a total offense level of 31 for Daniel

with a criminal history category of I. It calculated a total

offense level of 28 and a criminal history category of I for Aimee.

In calculating their offense levels for the tax counts, the court

added the amount of unpaid state taxes to the amount of unpaid

federal taxes, which caused each of the defendants to receive a

base level that was one point higher than they would have received

if only federal taxes had been included in the calculation. Daniel

was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment and Aimee was sentenced

to 78 months’ imprisonment.

II. DISCUSSION

A.

We first address whether the district court erred in

declining to suppress evidence seized during the raid of the

Bristol Drive office pursuant to a search warrant. We examine the

affidavit submitted to the magistrate judge “‘in a practical,

commonsense fashion,’” and give “‘considerable deference’ to the

issuing magistrate’s conclusion that probable cause has been

established.” United States v. Woodbury, 511 F.3d 93, 98 (1st Cir.

2007) (quoting United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir.

1999)).

-6-
 1.

On June 25, 2001, a magistrate judge issued a search

warrant allowing FBI and IRS agents to search the offices of DAK,

Pro Temp and Precission at 14 Bristol Drive. This warrant was

based on the affidavit of FBI Agent Nancy McCormick. In her

affidavit, Agent McCormick described a fraudulent scheme involving

the defendants. Her description was based, in part, on the

testimony of Michael Powers, who had been a DAK bookkeeper three

years earlier. Agent McCormick also described financial records

obtained during the Government’s investigation showing cash

withdrawals by the three companies of nearly $40 million between

1997 and 2001, despite a 1994 injunction prohibiting Aimee from

paying employees in cash.3 Her affidavit also described

surveillance video showing Daniel and Aimee operating a business

out of the Bristol Drive office during April 2001.

Acting under the search warrant, federal agents seized

payroll sign sheets, envelopes with cash, a weekly schedule for

distribution of payroll and spreadsheet summaries of what the

Government characterizes as false payroll information. Agents also

3
On September 24, 1992, the Department of Labor filed a
lawsuit against Aimee and the Daily Agency, a predecessor of DAK.
See Trial Tr. vol. 8, 93-96, Feb. 6, 2008. The parties settled
that lawsuit in August 1994 and the Department of Labor thereby
enjoined Aimee and the Daily Agency from paying any employees in
cash. Instead, they were to “make all payment by check or other
paper.” See Trial Tr. vol. 4, 132-35, Jan. 30, 2008.

-7-
seized more than 500 floppy disks, some of which contained payroll-

related documents.

2.

The defendants submit that issuance of the warrant was

based primarily on stale evidence provided by Michael Powers who

had been employed as DAK’s bookkeeper from June 1996 to May 1998.

They maintain that other information in the search warrant

affidavit failed to bridge the three-year gap between the end of

Powers’s employment and the date when the search warrant was

issued. The defendants further contend that the information Powers

provided concerning the defendants’ conduct at a former office

location was insufficient to establish that criminal activity was

occurring at the new address, 14 Bristol Drive.4 Cf. Emery v.

Holmes, 824 F.2d 143, 149 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that information

on the new location of a car was not sufficient to refresh stale

information regarding the car). They also contend that cash

withdrawals are common in business operations, do not evidence

criminal activity and therefore are not relevant or probative in

establishing probable cause for a search. The defendants further

submit that the good-faith exception does not apply, because the

evidence was so stale that no law enforcement officer reasonably

could have relied upon it.

4
DAK, Pro Temp and Precission had moved into the 14 Bristol
Drive office in December 2000.

-8-
 The Government submits that the affidavit contained

sufficient information to permit the magistrate judge to infer that

evidence of a scheme to defraud would be found at 14 Bristol Drive

in July 2001. It maintains that the passage of three years from

when Powers was employed with DAK to when a search warrant was

obtained did not render the information stale because Powers

described an ongoing scheme during his employment at DAK that

illustrated a pattern of continuing fraudulent activity unlikely to

terminate on its own. It notes that a 2001 surveillance video

evidenced that the defendants were operating their business at 14

Bristol Drive and contends that a search of the premises was likely

to turn up business records, which “‘defy claims of staleness.’”

Appellee’s Br. 27 (quoting United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554,

574 (6th Cir. 2006)). The Government contends that the withdrawal

of $40 million between 1997 and 2001 was suspicious, given the

outstanding injunction prohibiting cash payments to employees.

Finally, the Government concludes that, even if the warrant was

based on impermissibly stale information, the agents relied on the

warrant in objective good faith because they took various steps to

corroborate and update Powers’s information.

3.

In United States v. Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562 (1st Cir.

1996), we articulated the governing principle that must guide

-9-
judicial decision making when some of the information tendered in

support of a search warrant is remote in time:

When an affidavit tendered in support of a
warrant application contains information that
is remote in time, a magistrate may still hold
it to be adequate if it also contains
sufficient recent facts corroborating the
older data and linking that data to the
present.

Id. at 568. Here, the defendants submit that the new information,

alone, does not establish probable cause that criminal activity was

taking place. However, the magistrate judge must make a

determination based on the totality of the circumstances. See

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (“[W]e reaffirm the

totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has

informed probable cause determinations.”). Powers’s interviews

established that the defendants had engaged in fraud for several

years by paying employees in cash to avoid making full workers’

compensation and IRS payments. Evidence of large cash withdrawals

and surveillance video showing the continued operation of a

business adequately refreshed Powers’s information. Consequently,

the magistrate judge did not exceed the bounds of his discretion in

concluding that the evidence, when assessed in its totality,

constituted probable cause to believe that evidence of illegal

activity would be found at the address.5 The methodology followed

5
See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(a) (4th ed.
2004) (“Because the probable cause determination is to be based
upon all the relevant facts and circumstances, [] more recent

-10-
in assessing the tendered information conformed to the standards

set forth by the Supreme Court in Gates, and the evidence was

sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. The district

court’s denial of the motion to suppress was correct.

B.

We next review whether the prosecutor’s remarks regarding

a trial exhibit constituted reversible error.

In the absence of a contemporaneous objection, we review

a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error; we shall

reverse only if the defendants can demonstrate that there was

error, that the error was obvious and that the error affected the

defendants’ substantial rights by altering the outcome of the

trial. United States v. Shoup, 476 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2007).

1.

At trial, government witnesses testified about a disk

labeled “Pro Temp Q Data” (“Exhibit 375”) that had been found on

Aimee’s computer desk. IRS Special Agent James Donahue testified

that the disk had “either QuickBooks or Quicken data” on it. Trial

Tr. vol. 6, 62, Feb. 1, 2008. When the prosecutor asked what that

was, Agent Donahue responded that “Quicken is generally sort of

events may take on greater significance when considered together
with other facts which are not as current but which were much more
incriminating at the time they occurred.”); see also Stephen A.
Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure 126 (8th
ed. 2007) (noting that stale information may be refreshed by
corroborating, recent information).

-11-
like an electronic checkbook.” Trial Tr. vol. 6, 63, Feb. 1, 2008.

Charles Wallace, who handled bookkeeping and accounting for the

defendants, testified that he recognized the disk and stated that

it “would have been [a] backup disk for the checkbook for Pro

Temp.” Trial Tr. vol. 9, 67, Feb. 7, 2008. During closing

argument, the prosecutor asserted that Aimee was involved with

directing and monitoring the Pro Temp and Precission cash payroll

scheme, stating: “This disk has Pro Temp’s checkbook on it. Mrs.

McElroy had Pro Temp’s checkbook sitting on her computer desk when

it was searched by the FBI and the IRS.” Trial Tr. vol. 12, 17,

Feb. 12, 2008. The prosecutor later told the jury that the disk

“is a smoking gun” and reiterated that it “is [a] checkbook for Pro

Temp.” Trial Tr. vol. 12, 95, Feb. 12, 2008.

2.

The defendants submit that the Government

mischaracterized the contents of Exhibit 375 and that this

mischaracterization affected the outcome of the trial because the

jury did not have access to the actual contents of the disk. They

note that the transactions on the disk all occurred in 1995, and

therefore could not have been a checkbook for an ongoing business.

The defendants maintain that a new trial is warranted.

The Government submits that testimony that Quicken was

akin to an “electronic checkbook” and Wallace’s statement that the

disk was a backup copy of Pro Temp’s checkbook adequately supported

-12-
the prosecutor’s remarks. The Government observes that it made no

representation with regard to the age of the data and maintains

that the disk likely had been used recently because the disk was

found in June 2001, after the companies had moved offices.

The Government further submits that, even if the exhibit

was mischaracterized, the misrepresentation had no effect on Daniel

because its probative value was to show Aimee’s involvement in Pro

Temp operations. It maintains that a new trial is not warranted

for Aimee because the Government did not misrepresent deliberately

the disk, because defense counsel argued to the jury that the disk

was an old backup that might have been waiting for reuse and

because the Government did not have the opportunity to give a

curative statement because of the defendants’ failure to object.

Finally, the Government notes that there was other evidence tying

Aimee to the fraudulent scheme.

There was no plain error. Most importantly, the

Government’s statements that the disk was the Pro Temp checkbook

were not misleading in light of the earlier Government testimony.

The prosecutor’s remark was fair comment. Moreover, the defendants

had the opportunity to challenge the Government’s interpretation of

the disk’s role in the business. Although the defendants argue

that the contents of the disk undermine the Government’s attempt to

construe it as a checkbook, they do not appear to have sought to

have the contents of the disk admitted into evidence.

-13-
 Even if the statement had been inappropriate, we

certainly cannot say that this reference by the prosecutor

“poisoned the well.” See United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387,

398 (1st Cir. 2007). “We weigh several factors in determining

whether prosecutorial misconduct has so poisoned the well that a

new trial is required: (1) the severity of the misconduct; (2) the

context in which it occurred; (3) whether the judge gave any

curative instructions and the likely effect of such instructions;

and (4) the strength of the evidence against the defendant.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). The misconduct in this case

was not severe; indeed, it was not misconduct. There was

sufficient evidence against the defendants for the jury to return

a guilty verdict. The defendants’ involvement in the fraudulent

scheme was established by the testimony of the former DAK, Pro Temp

and Precission employees. For example, the former employees who

worked in the office with Aimee testified that she managed the

office and supervised the operation of the computerized and floppy-

disk payroll systems. Aimee wrote checks transferring money

between the companies and witnesses testified that she handled

large quantities of cash in the office. Daniel was heavily

involved in distributing the cash and working with Wallace to hide

the cash payroll component from the IRS and insurers. The

Government also introduced testimony from one of the insurance

agents that Aimee attended a meeting concerning one of the workers’

-14-
compensation insurance policy audits. Put in context, the

prosecutor’s statements concerning the disk do not amount to plain

error.

C.

We now turn to whether the district court committed

reversible error by admitting into evidence summary testimony and

charts. The defendants objected to admission of the evidence and

we review the district court’s decision to admit evidence for an

abuse of discretion. United States v. Stierhoff, 549 F.3d 19, 27

(1st Cir. 2008).

1.

Several individuals testified at trial about the amount

of money that the defendants allegedly had failed to pay the IRS.

IRS Special Agent Joseph Guidoboni testified as a summary witness.

He related that he had computed the unreported payroll for the

three companies and had concluded that the total amount of unpaid

federal taxes was $9,982,690.51. His calculations were based on

witness testimony, at least 1000 documents (including tax returns)

and records of the defendants’ check payroll system.

Neil Johnson, an insurance fraud investigator, also

testified as a summary witness. He stated that he had calculated

insurance losses based on a review of the companies’ workers’

compensation insurance applications and related documents, tax

returns filed with the IRS, tax returns provided to auditors and

-15-
worksheets prepared by the insurers. He prepared summary charts

estimating the total loss in insurance premiums to be $6,457,500.

These charts were admitted into evidence over the defendants’

objections.

2.

The defendants submit that the testimony of Agent

Guidoboni and Mr. Johnson, as well as their exhibits, were not

admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 because the rule

only allows the introduction of summary evidence that summarizes

documents, as opposed to evidence that summarizes testimony.6

While not contesting the admissibility of the evidence under Rule

611(a) and Rules 702 and 703, they claim that the evidence should

not have been admitted under Rule 403 because Agent Guidoboni and

Mr. Johnson relied on the testimony of Wallace, whose credibility,

they contend, was hotly contested at trial. In the defendants’

view, the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that

it had to weigh the credibility of the testimony that formed the

basis of Agent Guidoboni’s and Mr. Johnson’s testimony. They

contend that the error was unfairly prejudicial because it allowed

6
Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 states,

The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or
photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in
court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary,
or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be
made available for examination or copying, or both, by
other parties at reasonable time and place. The court
may order that they be produced in court.

-16-
the Government to “bolster the credibility” of Wallace.

Appellant’s Br. 51.

The Government characterizes the testimony of Mr. Johnson

and Agent Guidoboni and their charts as permissible pedagogical

devices used to “‘clarify and simplify complex testimony or other

information’” and to help counsel present its argument to the jury.

Appellee’s Br. 46 (quoting United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d

390, 397 (1st Cir. 2006)). The Government contends that the

evidence was admissible under Rule 611(a).7 See Milkiewicz, 470

F.3d at 397. The Government also submits that Mr. Johnson’s

summary charts and testimony were permissible summaries of

documents under Rule 1006. As to the testimony and charts

introduced by Agent Guidoboni, the Government maintains that

testimony of an IRS agent may be admissible under Rules 702 and

703, even if the district court does not qualify the agent as an

expert.8 See United States v. Hatch, 514 F.3d 145, 164 (1st Cir.

7
Federal Rule of Evidence 611 states, in relevant part,

(a) Control by court. The court shall exercise
reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to
(1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for
the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless
consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from
harassment or undue embarrassment.
8
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states,

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as

-17-
2008) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion

in allowing an IRS agent to testify about tax issues despite not

being admitted as an expert witness).

Addressing Rule 403, the Government submits that the

evidence was not excludable because it was clear from Agent

Guidoboni’s testimony that he relied only partly on Wallace’s

testimony. It observes that both Agent Guidoboni and Mr. Johnson

relied on numerous documents and that the district court acted

within its discretion in admitting the testimony and exhibits.

United States v. Kornegay, 410 F.3d 89, 96 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Trial

judges enjoy wide latitude in making Rule 403 rulings and are only

overturned after a showing of an egregious error.”).

an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably
to the facts of the case.

Federal Rule of Evidence 703 states,

The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or
inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury
by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the
court determines that their probative value in assisting
the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.

-18-
 3.

Our case law permits the use of summary tools to clarify

complex testimony and evidence. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d at 396-98.

Although the defendants argue in their reply brief that this case

can be distinguished from Milkiewicz because the summary evidence

was admitted into evidence, that case does not rule out the

possibility of such evidence being admitted. In Milkiewicz we said

that “in most cases a Rule 1006 chart will be the only evidence the

fact finder will examine concerning a voluminous set of documents.”

Id. at 396 (emphasis in original). In some instances, however, a

Rule 1006 chart may itself be admitted into evidence or summary

witness testimony may be permitted pursuant to Rule 611(a). Id. at

397-98; see also Stierhoff, 549 F.3d at 27-28. Rule 611(a)

testimony and exhibits “typically are used as pedagogical devices

to clarify and simplify complex testimony or other information and

evidence or to assist counsel in the presentation of argument to

the court or jury.” Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d at 397 (internal

quotation marks omitted). In some cases, “such pedagogical devices

may be sufficiently accurate and reliable that they, too, are

admissible in evidence, even though they do not meet the specific

requirements of Rule 1006.” Id. at 398.

With regard to summary witness testimony, we have urged

caution, noting that such witnesses are allowed only in limited

situations. United States v. Flores-de-Jesus, 569 F.3d 8, 18 (1st

-19-
Cir. 2009). We noted: “The reluctance of courts to allow the

government an additional opportunity to present its case in a tidy

package at the end of its presentation of evidence, even when the

summary evidence is, by definition, completely consistent with the

rest of the trial record, confirms that the imprimatur problem with

such repetitive testimony is inescapable whether that testimony

comes at the beginning or end of the government's case.” Id. at

19. Nevertheless, we have found summary witnesses to be

appropriate within the context of tax cases: “We have recognized

as a general proposition that testimony by an IRS agent that allows

the witness to apply the basic assumptions and principles of tax

accounting to particular facts is appropriate in a tax evasion

case.” Stierhoff, 549 F.3d at 27-28. We held that “in a tax

evasion case, a summary witness may be permitted to summarize and

analyze the facts of record as long as the witness does not

directly address the ultimate question of whether the accused did

in fact intend to evade federal income taxes.” Id. at 28.9

9
Our cases are generally consistent with other circuits’
treatment of summary witness evidence offered in complex cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Harms, 442 F.3d 367, 375-76 (5th Cir.
2006); United States v. Pree, 408 F.3d 855, 869-72 (7th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Sabino, 274 F.3d 1053, 1067 (6th Cir. 2001),
modified on other grounds, 307 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927, 935 (2d Cir. 1988); see also 4 Jack
B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence §
611.02[2][a][vii] (2d ed. 2009); 6 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A.
Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 1006.08[4] (2d ed. 2009).

-20-
 Applying these principles to the situation before us, we

conclude that the testimony of Agent Guidoboni and Mr. Johnson, as

well as their exhibits, were properly admitted. Agent Guidoboni’s

testimony and exhibits fell within the permissible uses of Rules

1006 and 611(a) evidence we described in Milkiewicz and Stierhoff.

His testimony did “no more than analyze facts already introduced

into evidence and spell out the tax consequences that necessarily

flow from those facts.” Id.; see also United States v. DeSimone,

488 F.3d 561, 577 (1st Cir. 2007) (“The chart listed complicated

transactions from many sources to summarize the government’s

calculations concerning taxable income, an essential part of the

government’s case.”). Moreover, the same reasoning that would

permit an IRS agent to give summary testimony in a tax evasion case

applies to an insurance executive giving summary testimony about

unpaid workers’ compensation insurance premiums. Consequently, the

summary testimony and exhibits of Mr. Johnson were proper as well.10

Finally, the summary evidence was not admitted in

contravention of Rule 403. The testimony of agent Guidoboni and

Mr. Johnson was probative of the defendants’ knowledge of their tax

and insurance obligations and their intent to commit fraud. The

alleged prejudice to the defendants--that Agent Guidoboni relied on

10
Although the evidence was admissible in this case, we again
emphasize the need for caution when summary witness testimony and
exhibits are offered and note that they are allowed only in limited
situations. See United States v. Flores-de-Jesus, 569 F.3d 8, 18-
19 (1st Cir. 2009).

-21-
the contested testimony of Charles Wallace--was minimal because the

defendants had an opportunity to cross-examine both Agent Guidoboni

and Wallace. Agent Guidoboni acknowledged that he did not verify

independently how much of the unreported cash payroll had been paid

to the temporary workers, but he also testified that he did verify

that the payroll reported in the companies’ IRS filings actually

reflected the companies’ computerized check payroll records. Thus,

Agent Guidoboni’s testimony did not merely bolster Wallace’s

testimony; it traced the documentary evidence until no paper trail

existed and drew inferences about the unpaid taxes from that

situation. Mr. Johnson testified that he relied primarily on the

documentary evidence. The jury was free to credit or reject the

testimony of Agent Guidoboni, Mr. Johnson and Wallace

independently. The district court properly exercised its

discretion in admitting the evidence and the defendants have not

shown that an “egregious error” occurred. See United States v.

Kornegay, 410 F.3d 89, 96 (1st Cir. 2005). Indeed, we believe that

the district court acted well within its discretion.

D.

We now address whether the district court committed

reversible error by allowing the prosecutors to elicit out-of-court

testimony identifying Aimee. We review the district court’s

admission of a statement after an objection for an abuse of

discretion and shall vacate a jury verdict only if the improperly

-22-
admitted statement was not harmless. United States v. Upton, 559

F.3d 3, 15 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 2009 WL 1983336 (2009).

1.

Lucia Raposo testified for the Government. She worked at

a fish processing plant staffed by employees of DAK, Pro Temp and

Precission. At trial, the Government asked her whether she had

ever seen Aimee. Raposo said that she had seen Aimee in a car with

George Wallace11 at the plant. The Government asked how she knew

that the person she saw was Aimee. She replied that a woman named

Kelly DeMello was with her when they saw the car, and DeMello had

stated: “That’s Aimee King with George Wallace. Don’t worry.

We’re going to fix it.” Trial Tr. vol. 2, 46, Jan. 28, 2008. The

defendants moved to strike, but the court denied their motion.

2.

The defendants submit that Raposo’s testimony regarding

DeMello’s statement was inadmissible hearsay. They maintain that

it was not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803 because it

did not explain or describe an event nor was DeMello’s

identification made under the stress of a startling event or

condition.12 See United States v. Berrios, 132 F.3d 834, 838 (1st

11
George Wallace, Charlie Wallace’s brother, was one of the
DAK employees who helped distribute cash payroll. He testified at
the trial but not about this incident.
12
Federal Rule of Evidence 803 states, in relevant part:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even

-23-
Cir. 1998). The defendants contend that the error was not harmless

because Raposo’s statement attributed Aimee’s knowledge of and

participation in cash payments to temporary workers at client

sites. They maintain that, given the lack of other evidence

against her besides Wallace’s testimony, Aimee may not have been

convicted had the evidence been excluded.

The Government maintains the statement was admissible

under Rule 803(1). It notes that DeMello’s statement explained an

event: that Aimee was in the car with George Wallace. The

Government further maintains that DeMello’s statement was

contemporaneous with the event because of her use of the present

tense phrase, “[t]hat’s Aimee.” Appellee’s Br. 55. It further

submits that, even if the statement was improperly admitted, the

statement did not implicate Aimee in the cash payroll scheme and

that there was other evidence against Aimee, such as the business

records recovered from 14 Bristol Drive, the testimony of Wallace

and other testimony.

though the declarant is available as a witness:

(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant
was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately
thereafter.

(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition.

-24-
 3.

In Berrios, 132 F.3d at 838, a witness testified

regarding whether a person in the photograph was “Pablo.” Her

knowledge of Pablo was based on a previous occasion when her

husband said, “this is Pablo.” Id. We held that the statement was

inadmissible:

By echoing her husband’s introduction of
Pablo, Fortin's proposed testimony meets the
prerequisites of hearsay. The introduction of
Pablo is a statement not made by the declarant
in testimony offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. For [Fortin’s] testimony to
be tenable the statement made by her husband
must have been true. Because we have no way
of verifying that Mr. Fortin was sufficiently
familiar with Pablo to identify him to Mrs.
Fortin, her testimony about Pablo is classic
hearsay and was properly excluded.

Id. This case might, at first glance, seem dispositive of the

question before us. However, upon closer examination, it becomes

apparent that it really does not address directly the situation

presented to us today. Indeed, it does not deal directly with the

exception to the hearsay rule that the Government urges is

applicable in this case. Rather, it deals only with the antecedent

question of whether the identification--“this is Pablo”--was

hearsay. The district court in that case had excluded the

testimony as hearsay, and we affirmed, reasoning that, although the

wife certainly could testify that her husband had said those words,

the truth of the identification was entirely dependent on his

knowledge of the identity of the individual who had entered the

-25-
couple’s car. There was no evidence of record as to the basis of

the husband’s knowledge of that person.

There can be little quarrel with the case’s analysis, as

far as it goes. The identification was hearsay. The husband’s

intent was to tell his wife that the person in the back of the car

went by the name “Pablo.” The truth of that assertion is not

something to which the wife could testify from her own knowledge or

experience; she could only testify as to the fact that the

statement was made. The court’s analysis ended at this point.

There simply was no independent examination by the district court

in Berrios as to whether an exception to the hearsay rule applied.

The reason for that omission is not evident from the text of the

appellate decision.

In the case before us today, by contrast, the parties

agree that the statement here is hearsay. Ms. Raposo testified

that Kelly DeMello pointed out a couple in a car outside the

building where both Raposo and Kelly DeMello worked. DeMello said

“That’s Aimee King with George Wallace. Don’t worry we are going

to fix it.” Trial Tr. vol. 2, 46, Jan. 28, 2008. The

identification of Aimee by DeMello was not a matter within the

knowledge or experience of Raposo; it was entirely dependent on the

knowledge or experience of DeMello.

We turn, then, to whether this hearsay statement is

subject to an exception to the hearsay rule. In the Government’s

-26-
view, the identification is admissible, despite its hearsay status,

under Rule 803(1) as a present sense impression. The Reporter’s

notes to this exception state that the underlying theory of this

exception is that the substantial contemporaneity of the event and

statement negates the possibility of deliberate or conscious

misrepresentation by the declarant. “Moreover, if the witness is

the declarant, he may be examined on the statement. If the witness

is not the declarant, he may be examined as to the circumstances as

an aid in evaluating the statement.” Advisory Committee’s Notes on

Fed. Rule Evid. 803(1) (citing Edmund Morris Morgan, Basic Problems

of Evidence 340-41 (1962)). In commenting on this exception,

McCormick notes that, “[l]ike all hearsay exceptions and exclusions

other than admissions, present sense impressions and excited

utterances require that the declarant have first hand knowledge,

which can sometimes be proved entirely by the statement.” 2 K.

Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 271, p.252 (6th ed. 2006). The same

treatise also notes that the exception is limited to “describing or

explaining” the event or condition perceived and that the statement

must be made either while the event is taking place or immediately

thereafter.

Notably, this exception does not include, explicitly, a

requirement for corroboration. Id.; see also United States v.

Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2001). In McCormick’s view, the

lack of such a requirement is justified because the “underlying

-27-
rationale offers sufficient assurances of reliability.” McCormick,

supra, at p.254. In most settings, the “limitation of the

exception in terms of time and subject matter . . . insure[s] that

the witness who reports the making of the statement will have

perceived the event or at least observed circumstances strongly

suggesting it.” Id. The declarant and the reporting witness are

present at the event or condition and both experience, at least to

some degree, the event or condition sought to be admitted into

evidence. Therefore, the testimony of the witness describing the

circumstances in which the hearsay utterance was made corroborate,

to a significant degree, the trustworthiness of the statement.13

In the most frequently encountered applications of this

exception, the requirements of the exception do provide, by virtue

of their restrictive language, sufficient assurance of the accuracy

of the declarant’s statement and of the absence of fabrication: an

event or condition occurs under circumstances which the declarant

13
Indeed, another treatise suggests that the Advisory
Committee notes to the present sense impression exception, in
noting that the witness may be examined as to the circumstances
surrounding the declarant’s utterance, amounts to an implied
recognition of a corroboration requirement. 4 Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of
Evidence Manual § 803.02[2][b] (9th ed. 2009). The treatise
suggests further that most federal courts have read the exception
to require such corroboration. See id. at §§ 803.02[2][6],
803.03[1] (collecting cases). Notably, the treatise quickly adds,
however, that this “requirement” does not imply that the witness
must be able to testify as to the exact circumstances under which
the declarant made the statement; such a rigid requirement would
rob the exception of much of its practical effect by making the
declarant’s statement simply cumulative of the witness’s utterance.

-28-
and the witness experience under the same or nearly the same

conditions. The declarant makes a statement describing the event

at or very near the time of the observation and that statement is

heard by the witness. There is no question that the declarant has

firsthand knowledge of the occurrence. See McCormick, supra, at

p.252. We admit the statement because the circumstances under

which it was given--immediately after an observation--diminish

substantially the opportunity for fabrication. We are comforted as

to the correctness of our decision because the witness also

experienced, at least to some degree, the situation under which the

statement was made.

Identifications certainly are not beyond the ambit of the

present sense exception in all instances.14 Nevertheless, it must

be acknowledged that they place an additional demand on the

underpinnings of that exception. Admission of a hearsay

identification requires that we accept not only the trustworthiness

of the declarant’s observation, but also his ability to name the

particular actors in the event or condition that he observed. The

admitting court must take care to ensure that, in addition to

14
Indeed, both federal and state courts have admitted
identifications under this exception. See, e.g., United States v.
Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Earley, 657 F.2d 195, 198 (8th Cir. 1981); Jones v. State, 780
N.E.2d 373, 376-77 (Ind. 2002); McDowell v. State, 807 So. 2d 413,
421 (Miss. 2001). We have no reason to address, of course, the
question of prior identifications or non-identifications through
lineup or photo array under the present sense impression exception.
See United States v. Brewer, 36 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 1994).

-29-
meeting the exception’s explicit requirement that the statement be

made as the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or

immediately thereafter, it is evident that the declarant possessed

the requisite information to make the asserted identification.

In light of this analysis, resolution of the present

issue presents unique difficulties. The district court had to

determine whether the record contained enough evidence to permit

the conclusion that DeMello knew Aimee sufficiently to permit

DeMello to make an accurate identification of Aimee. In short, the

district court had to determine whether DeMello had sufficient

firsthand knowledge of Aimee’s physical appearance to permit her to

make the identification in question. There is some evidence in the

record from which such firsthand knowledge might be inferred.

DeMello was the wife of Sea Fresh owner Rick DeMello. As part of

her role at Sea Fresh, she received and distributed payroll from

the defendants' companies. However, there is no evidence in the

record that this working relationship required in-person meetings

between DeMello and Aimee. We also note that the Government never

asked Raposo whether the person in the courtroom, seated at the

defendants’ table, was the person who had been identified by

DeMello. Under these circumstances, and because we may decide the

issue on the alternate ground of harmless error, we believe it

prudent to pretermit any definitive ruling on this issue.

-30-
 Even if the district court had abused its discretion in

admitting the statement, the error would have been harmless. The

jury had Wallace’s testimony as well as the business records

recovered from 14 Bristol Drive. The jury also heard the testimony

of Van Son, Pro Temp’s recruiter and payroll manager, who later

became its president. We acknowledge that both of these

individuals had pleaded guilty to offenses related to this case and

appear to have testified for the Government as part of their plea

agreements. Nevertheless, other unbiased witnesses implicated

Aimee in the conspiracy. For example, former employees testified

about Aimee’s management of the cash payroll record-keeping system

and how Aimee was primarily responsible for transferring money

between the companies. Marta Rodriguez, a former employee,

testified that she saw Aimee handle a large quantity of cash for

payroll purposes in the office. Given the minor role that Raposo’s

testimony played in the trial and the fact that it was up to the

jury to credit the other incriminating evidence and weigh the

credibility of Van Son and Wallace, the admission of Raposo’s

statement was harmless.

-31-
 E.

We now turn to the sentencing hearing and examine whether

the district court erred by including unpaid state taxes in the

total tax loss amount used to calculate the base offense level for

sentencing the defendants.

“We review a district court’s answers to abstract legal

questions, including its interpretation of the federal sentencing

guidelines, de novo.” United States v. Jordan, 549 F.3d 57, 60

(1st Cir. 2008). Whether the district court erred by including

state tax amounts from the defendants’ relevant conduct is a

question involving the application of law to fact, which we review

on a sliding scale. See United States v. Sicher, 576 F.3d 64, 70

& n.6 (1st Cir. 2009) (“While we have used the language of ‘de

novo’ review to apply to a trial judge's legal conclusion from the

facts, we think this is more like a mixed question of law and fact,

with a sliding scale of review depending on whether the trial

judge's conclusion is more law-oriented or more fact-driven.”).

Because this question involves both questions of law and fact, the

sliding scale standard of review is particularly appropriate in

this case. We shall apply closer scrutiny to the legal component

of the sentencing and review the district court’s factual findings

with greater deference.

-32-
 1.

The defendants submit that a “relevant conduct” analysis

should not apply in the court’s calculation of their base offense

levels because U.S.S.G. §§ 2T1.1 and 2T1.4 provide explicit

instructions regarding the calculation for “tax loss” attributable

to federal tax offenders. They maintain that this language trumps

§ 1B1.3's broad rule of construction for relevant conduct and that

tax loss should therefore be based solely on federal tax loss. The

defendants observe that the Guidelines provide no formula for

calculating state tax loss and that the district court’s

interpretation of the Guidelines would lead to sentencing

disparities based on which states impose state income tax.

The Government notes that Application Note 2 to § 2T1.1

states: “In determining the total tax loss attributable to the

offense (see § 1B1.3(a)(2)), all conduct violating the tax laws

should be considered as part of the same course of conduct or

common scheme or plan unless the evidence demonstrates that the

conduct is clearly unrelated.”15 The Government maintains that the

district court did not err by treating the defendants’ failure to

pay state taxes as relevant conduct to be included in the total tax

loss. The Government points out that the evasion of state taxes

mirrored the fraudulent federal tax scheme and that both involved

15
The Government cites to the 2000 Guidelines. Other than
additions to the application notes in the 2007 Guidelines, not
relevant here, the 2000 and 2007 Guidelines are identical.

-33-
a common purpose and were nearly identical in execution and

regularity.

2.

We see no reason why state tax evasion, when proven to be

sufficiently similar to the convicted crime, should not be included

in the § 2T1.1 calculation of “tax loss.” At the outset, we note

that the four circuits that have considered this issue have held

that state tax offenses may be included with state tax evasion in

the total loss calculation.16 The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth circuits,

in particular, interpret U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) as allowing state

tax evasion totals to be included with federal tax evasion amounts

where there was a “common scheme or plan” and the same “course of

conduct” for the state and federal offenses. United States v.

Maken, 510 F.3d 654, 659 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Baucom,

486 F.3d 822, 829 (4th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, Davis

v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 870 (2008); United States v. Powell,

16
See United States v. Maken, 510 F.3d 654, 659 (6th Cir.
2007) (holding that the district court did not err in determining
that state tax losses constituted “relevant conduct”); United
States v. Baucom, 486 F.3d 822, 829 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that
the district court erred in failing to include state tax amounts in
the calculation of relevant conduct), vacated on other grounds,
Davis v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 870 (2008); United States v.
Fitzgerald, 232 F.3d 315, 318, 321 (2d Cir. 2000) (affirming
inclusion of state and city tax amounts in a total loss
calculation); United States v. Powell, 124 F.3d 655, 665-66 (5th
Cir. 1997) (holding that the district court properly included
evaded state taxes as “relevant conduct” in calculating the total
tax loss).

-34-
124 F.3d 655, 664-65 (5th Cir. 1997); see also U.S.S.G. §

1B1.3(a)(2).

The plain language of Application Note 2 requires that a

sentencing court factor relevant conduct into a total tax loss

calculation. Thus, contrary to the defendants’ suggestion, no

ambiguity exists as to whether relevant conduct is to be considered

in calculating § 2T1.1 tax losses.

In determining whether state tax evasion constitutes

relevant conduct, we look to the commentary to § 1B1.3. Section

1B1.3 provides specific factors to be considered in determining

whether certain conduct was part of a “common scheme or plan” or

the “same course of conduct.” “For two or more offenses to

constitute part of a common scheme or plan, they must be

substantially connected to each other by at least one common

factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose,

or similar modus operandi.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.9.

“Factors that are appropriate to the determination of whether

offenses are sufficiently connected or related to each other to be

considered as part of the same course of conduct include the degree

of similarity of the offenses, the regularity (repetitions) of the

offenses, and the time interval between the offenses.” Id.

The Government has established that the defendants’

evasion of state taxes was part of the same “course of conduct” or

“common scheme or plan” as their evasion of federal taxes. The

-35-
sentencing record demonstrates that the defendants did not comply

with Massachusetts state tax law--particularly relevant criminal

conduct in this case. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 62C, § 73(a). There

is no question that the defendants’ victims were similar (federal

and state governments), the defendants committed both crimes with

the same accomplices (Wallace, Van Son and Trieu), had a common

purpose (tax evasion), and evinced similar modus operandi (fronting

a legitimate business and falsifying filings). Additionally, the

events occurred simultaneously, further supporting the conclusion

that the state tax evasion qualifies as relevant conduct. Thus,

the district court correctly considered the state tax evasion to be

relevant conduct in this case.

The district court correctly included the state tax loss

within its relevant conduct loss calculation.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

AFFIRMED.

-36-