FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JEFF POKORNY; LARRY BLENN;
KENNETH BUSIERE, on behalf of
themselves and those similarly
situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. No. 08-15880
QUIXTAR, INC.; JAMES RON D.C. No.
3:07-CV-00201-SC
PURYEAR, JR.; GEORGIA LEE
PURYEAR; WORLD WIDE GROUP OPINION
LLC; BRITT WORLDWIDE LLC;
AMERICAN MULTIMEDIA, INC.; BRITT
MANAGEMENT, INC.; BILL BRITT;
PEGGY BRITT,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Samuel Conti, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
October 6, 2009—San Francisco, California
Filed April 20, 2010
Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Marsha S. Berzon,
Circuit Judges, and Lyle E. Strom,* District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Schroeder
*The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, Senior United States District Judge for
the District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
5973
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 5977
COUNSEL
Stuart H. Singer, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for the plaintiffs-
appellees.
5978 POKORNY v. QUIXTAR
William L. Stern, San Francisco, California, for the
defendants-appellants.
OPINION
SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Quixtar Inc. (“Quixtar”), the
successor-in-interest to Amway Corporation, markets a vari-
ety of products and services that it sells to consumers through
a network of individual distributors that it refers to as “Inde-
pendent Business Owners” (“IBOs”). All of the IBOs signed
on to agreements that included the mandatory alternative dis-
pute resolution (“ADR”) provisions that the district court held
unconscionable. The other remaining Defendants-Appellants
are senior IBOs: Bill and Peggy Britt are members of Britt
Worldwide LLC, and owners of American Multimedia Inc.
and Britt Management Inc. (collectively, the “Britt Defen-
dants”); James and Georgia Puryear are members of World
Wide Group LLC (collectively, the “Puryear Defendants”).
Both the Britt Defendants and the Puryear Defendants pro-
duce and market “business support materials” and other ser-
vices to junior IBOs.
Plaintiffs-Appellees are junior IBOs. Jeff Pokorny, Larry
Blenn, and Kenneth Busiere (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are
California residents who filed this litigation as a class action
against Quixtar, the Britt Defendants, and the Puryear Defen-
dants alleging they operate an illegal pyramid scheme in vio-
lation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., and California Busi-
ness and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. and 17500 et seq.
Relying on the mandatory ADR provisions included in its
agreements with its IBOs, Quixtar, joined by the Britt and
Puryear Defendants (collectively, “Defendants”), moved to
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 5979
dismiss Plaintiffs’ suit or, in the alternative, to stay the action
and compel Plaintiffs to resolve their claims through Quix-
tar’s ADR process. The district court denied Defendants’
motion, holding that the ADR provisions of Quixtar’s agree-
ments with its IBOs are unconscionable under California law.
Quixtar now appeals that interlocutory ruling pursuant to 9
U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B), and contends (1) that the district court
should not have applied California law and (2) that it erred in
holding that the ADR provisions are unconscionable. We
affirm the well-reasoned decision of the district court.
BACKGROUND
Quixtar is a Virginia corporation with its corporate head-
quarters in Michigan. It describes itself as a leader in the e-
commerce business and maintains that it provides millions of
Americans with the opportunity to own their own businesses
as distributors of a variety of nutrition, beauty, household, and
related products. These distributors, known as IBOs, earn
immediate income by reselling products they purchase from
Quixtar to consumers. Additionally, Quixtar awards monthly
bonuses to IBOs dependent on the volume of their own prod-
uct purchases, as well as on the volume of product purchases
by any individuals they recruit and register as IBOs. Some
senior IBOs also reap profits by producing and selling “busi-
ness support materials” (“BSM”) to junior IBOs. These
include books, magazines, audio tapes, video tapes, meetings,
and seminars designed to help IBOs manage their Quixtar
businesses and recruit new IBOs.
An individual becomes a Quixtar IBO by submitting an
application and entering into a registration agreement with
Quixtar that must be renewed annually. The registration
agreement includes an “Agreement to Arbitrate,” which incor-
porates by reference the “Dispute Resolution Procedures”
found in the Quixtar IBO Rules of Conduct. Pokorny first reg-
istered as an IBO in 1994, and both Blenn and Busiere
became IBOs in 2005. IBOs who purchase BSM are also
5980 POKORNY v. QUIXTAR
encouraged to complete the “Business Support Materials
Arbitration Agreement” (“BSMAA”), which likewise incor-
porates by reference the Dispute Resolution Procedures in the
IBO Rules of Conduct. Both Pokorny and Blenn allegedly
agreed to the BSMAA. It is the three-step ADR process man-
dated by the IBO Rules of Conduct and incorporated by refer-
ence in the Agreement to Arbitrate and the BSMAA that is at
the heart of this appeal.
In 2007, Pokorny and Blenn, later joined by Busiere, filed
this lawsuit against Defendants in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California, asserting claims
under RICO on behalf of a proposed nationwide class of
IBOs, and claims for unfair business practices and false
advertising under California law on behalf of a proposed Cali-
fornia class of IBOs. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants operate
a two-tiered pyramid scheme that has scammed junior IBOs
like themselves out of millions of dollars.
First, Plaintiffs assert that Quixtar and its senior IBOs,
including the Britt Defendants and the Puryear Defendants,
fraudulently induce individuals to become IBOs by promising
them they will be able to resell Quixtar products for a profit,
when in reality the price an IBO must pay for Quixtar prod-
ucts is so high that any profit through resale is virtually
impossible. Further, once a new recruit becomes an IBO, the
recruit is instructed to purchase Quixtar products only for the
new recruit’s personal use and to focus on recruiting and reg-
istering new IBOs, rather than to market and resell products
to retail customers.
Second, Plaintiffs contend that Quixtar and its senior IBOs
fraudulently induce junior IBOs to purchase BSM by telling
them the BSM are necessary to the success of an IBO busi-
ness and will help them realize tremendous wealth. But the
main purpose of the BSM is actually to teach junior IBOs
how to recruit and register new IBOs, not to assist IBOs in
conducting their own successful Quixtar business. Although
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 5981
this business model leads to great profits for Quixtar and its
most senior IBOs, Plaintiffs allege it results in significant
losses to junior IBOs.
Plaintiffs also allege that they are not required to follow the
three-step ADR process outlined in the Quixtar IBO Rules of
Conduct and mandated by the Agreement to Arbitrate and the
BSMAA because it is unconscionable and therefore unen-
forceable. That process is as follows:
As the first step, the Rules of Conduct require an aggrieved
IBO to attempt to resolve any dispute it has with another IBO
or with Quixtar through a non-binding process of “Informal
Conciliation.” During Informal Conciliation, Quixtar’s Busi-
ness Conduct and Rules Department works with the affected
parties to resolve the dispute. Quixtar equates Informal Con-
ciliation to a “standard commercial mediation.”
If Informal Conciliation does not end the dispute, the Rules
of Conduct next require an aggrieved IBO to initiate the
equally non-binding process of “Formal Conciliation,” by
requesting a hearing before the Independent Business Own-
ers’ Association International (“IBOAI”) Hearing Panel. The
IBOAI Hearing Panel is made up of three members of the
IBOAI Board. Quixtar describes the IBOAI as “the voice of
the IBO,” and asserts that through its Board the IBOAI “pro-
vides an open channel of communication with [Quixtar] on all
aspects of the business, taking an active role in shaping its
future.”
Although any IBO may join the IBOAI for a small annual
fee, an IBOAI member may not participate in the election of
Board members unless it has achieved the “Platinum” level of
business generation that Plaintiffs maintain only the most
senior IBOs can achieve. Plaintiffs were not members of the
IBOAI, nor did they achieve the Platinum level.
During Formal Conciliation, the aggrieved IBO presents
testimony and documentary evidence concerning its dispute to
5982 POKORNY v. QUIXTAR
the IBOAI Hearing Panel. According to the Rules of Conduct,
“[t]he Hearing Panel’s primary goal is to mediate or conciliate
each dispute by determining the facts and issues and recom-
mending to [Quixtar] any possible resolutions or remedy in
accordance with the Rules of Conduct.” The Rules of Conduct
further state that the Hearing Panel’s recommendations “must
be consistent with the Rules of Conduct,” and that “Hearing
Panel members are bound by the Rules of Conduct as adopted
by [Quixtar], and may not modify, alter, amend, or ignore the
current positions of the Rules of Conduct.” The Hearing
Panel, in turn, may request review of the dispute by the
IBOAI Board, which must then issue a recommended resolu-
tion to the parties and to Quixtar. Like the Hearing Panel’s
recommendation, however, the Board’s recommendation
“must be consistent with the Rules of Conduct,” and the
Board “may not amend, alter, modify, or ignore the clear pro-
visions of the Rules of Conduct.”
Once Quixtar receives a recommendation from the Hearing
Panel or the IBOAI Board, it reviews the complete case file
and, at its discretion, may conduct its own investigation into
the dispute. Quixtar then issues a final decision accepting,
reversing, or modifying the recommendation. The Rules of
Conduct state that only Quixtar “may impose or act upon any
of the actions and/or sanctions recommended by the Hearing
Panel or [IBOAI] Board.”
If an aggrieved IBO is not satisfied with the result reached
through the non-binding conciliation process, the Rules of
Conduct require the IBO to submit the dispute to binding arbi-
tration. This step can be taken no sooner than 90 days after
the IBO first notifies the other party of its claim, and must not
be taken before the Informal and Formal Conciliation pro-
cesses have been completed. Further, any demand for arbitra-
tion must be made “within two years after the issue has arisen,
but in no event after the date when the initiation of legal pro-
ceedings would have been barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.” The Rules of Conduct govern all aspects of the
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 5983
binding arbitration process, including how the arbitrator is
selected and how costs and fees associated with the arbitration
are assessed.
Because Plaintiffs did not participate in the three-stage
ADR process mandated by the Rules of Conduct, Quixtar,
joined by the Britt and Puryear Defendants, moved the district
court to dismiss the complaint with prejudice or, in the alter-
native, to stay the action and compel Plaintiffs to resolve their
claims through non-binding conciliation or binding arbitra-
tion. Plaintiffs opposed Defendants’ motion, arguing that they
never agreed to the ADR process outlined in the Rules of
Conduct and that the contractual provisions purportedly
requiring them to participate in it are unconscionable and
therefore unenforceable. Defendants also maintained that
Michigan law applies, even though Plaintiffs are all California
residents, because Quixtar is headquartered in Michigan and
the ADR provisions say Michigan law is to apply in arbitra-
tion.
The district court denied Defendants’ motion. Applying
California law, it held that both the non-binding conciliation
and the binding arbitration portions of the Agreement to Arbi-
trate, the BSMAA, and the Rules of Conduct (collectively, the
“Quixtar ADR agreements”) are procedurally and substan-
tively unconscionable. The court further determined that
Quixtar’s ADR process as a whole is “simply too tainted to
be saved through minor adjustments” because it is “so perme-
ated with unconscionable provisions” that severing the uncon-
scionable provisions and enforcing the remaining ones
“would have virtually no effect.” It therefore ruled that the
entire ADR scheme mandated by the Quixtar ADR agree-
ments is unenforceable. Defendants timely appealed, and the
district court granted their request to stay its proceedings
pending the appeal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 9 U.S.C.
§ 16(a)(1)(B) to review the district court’s denial of a petition
to compel arbitration.
5984 POKORNY v. QUIXTAR
DISCUSSION
I. Choice of Law
Defendants first argue that the district court erred in apply-
ing California law to determine whether the Quixtar ADR
agreements are unconscionable. We review de novo the dis-
trict court’s decision concerning the appropriate choice of
law. Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 936
(9th Cir. 2001). We agree with the district court that Califor-
nia law applies, because Quixtar has failed to establish that
Michigan has a legitimate interest in the application of its law
under the circumstances of this case.
[1] Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) pro-
vides that arbitration agreements in commercial contracts
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Thus, “[i]n determining the validity
of an agreement to arbitrate, federal courts ‘should apply ordi-
nary state-law principles that govern the formation of con-
tracts.’ ” Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298
F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting First Options of Chi-
cago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)). Before a fed-
eral court may apply state-law principles to determine the
validity of an arbitration agreement, it must determine which
state’s laws to apply. It makes this determination using the
choice-of-law rules of the forum state, which in this case is
California. See Paracor Fin., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp.,
96 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th Cir. 1996).
[2] Under California law, the choice-of-law rules differ
depending on whether the parties have included a choice-of-
law agreement in their contract and, if so, whether the claims
being litigated fall within the scope that agreement. See Wash.
Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior Court, 15 P.3d 1071, 1077, 1080
(Cal. 2001). In the district court, Defendants asserted that
Michigan law, rather than California law, should apply, on the
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 5985
basis of a choice-of-law clause in the Rules of Conduct stating
that “the law of Michigan shall apply in all arbitrations under
these rules.” The district court rejected that argument because
the question of whether the Quixtar ADR agreements are
unconscionable does not fall within the scope of the choice-
of-law clause. The court therefore applied the “governmental
interest analysis” used by California courts when there is no
controlling choice-of-law agreement. See id.
On appeal, Defendants concede in their opening and reply
briefs that the governmental interest analysis applied by the
district court is the correct choice-of-law test. Although they
attempted to retreat from this position in a letter filed pursuant
to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) and at oral argu-
ment, their efforts came too late and their argument for a dif-
ferent choice-of-law test was waived. See Eberle v. City of
Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 817-18 (9th Cir. 1990). Therefore, in
accordance with the Defendants’ prior concession, we assume
the district court applied the proper choice-of-law test.
Under the governmental interest analysis, California courts
engage in a three-step process to determine whether a foreign
state’s law governs an issue in an action brought in California.
Wash. Mut. Bank, 15 P.3d at 1080-81. The California
Supreme Court has summarized the process:
First, the court determines whether the relevant law
of each of the potentially affected jurisdictions with
regard to the particular issue in question is the same
or different. Second, if there is a difference, the court
examines each jurisdiction’s interest in the applica-
tion of its own law under the circumstances of the
particular case to determine whether a true conflict
exists. Third, if the court finds that there is a true
conflict, it carefully evaluates and compares the
nature and strength of the interest of each jurisdic-
tion in the application of its own law “to determine
which state’s interest would be more impaired if its
5986 POKORNY v. QUIXTAR
policy were subordinated to the policy of the other
state[,]” and then ultimately applies “the law of the
state whose interest would be the more impaired if
its law were not applied.”
Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 137 P.3d 914, 922
(Cal. 2006) (quoting Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d
719, 723 (Cal. 1976)) (internal citations omitted). The party
advocating the application of a foreign state’s law bears the
burden of identifying the conflict between that state’s law and
California’s law on the issue, and establishing that the foreign
state has an interest in having its law applied. Wash. Mut.
Bank, 15 P.3d at 1081. If it fails to meet either of these bur-
dens, the court “may properly find California law applicable
without proceeding to the third step in the analysis.” Id.
The district court concluded at the first step of the govern-
mental interest analysis that “there is a material difference
between Michigan and California law regarding unconsciona-
bility,” because “[w]hile Michigan law recognizes the avail-
ability of alternative goods, services, or employment as a
defense to procedural unconscionability, California law does
not.” Plaintiffs argue that this difference is not material, and
that we may affirm the district court’s choice of California
law because Defendants failed to carry their burden at the first
step of the governmental interest analysis. We are not entirely
convinced there is a material difference between the applica-
tion of Michigan and California law with regard to the issue
of procedural unconscionability on the facts of this case.
Because of the unique nature of the IBO relationship, as por-
trayed by Quixtar’s own marketing, there may be no available
alternative arrangement within the meaning of Michigan law.
See Nw. Acceptance Corp v. Almost Gravel, Inc., 412 N.W.2d
719, 723 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Allen v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co.,
171 N.W.2d 689, 692-94 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969). Even if we
assume there is a material difference, however, the district
court properly concluded at the second step of the analysis
that Defendants failed to establish that Michigan has a legiti-
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 5987
mate interest in the application of its law to the circumstances
of this case.
[3] Defendants contend that Michigan has an interest in
applying its law of procedural unconscionability because
Quixtar is headquartered in Michigan and Michigan has an
interest in providing companies headquartered within its juris-
diction a uniform body of contract law on which they may
rely nationwide. Cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Skyline Indus. Servs.,
Inc., 528 N.W.2d 698, 704 n.31 (Mich. 1995) (Michigan has
an interest in regulating the conduct of two parties to a con-
tract where one was a Michigan corporation and the other was
a corporation headquartered in Michigan). Here, however, the
three individuals seeking protection from the agreements at
issue are all California residents with no discernable connec-
tion to Michigan. Michigan therefore has little to no interest
in the application of its law of procedural unconscionability
to Plaintiffs’ challenge to the validity and enforceability of the
Quixtar ADR agreements. See Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws § 188, cmt. c (1971). California, on the other
hand, has a substantial interest in applying its law of proce-
dural unconscionability to that issue. See Int’l Bus. Machines
Corp. v. Bajorek, 191 F.3d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999); Kluss-
man v. Cross Country Bank, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 728, 740-41 (Ct.
App. 2005). Consequently, there is no “true conflict” between
the interests of the states. Kearney, 137 P.3d at 922. More-
over, even if California’s substantial interest did conflict in
some degree with Michigan’s minimal one, the California
interest is considerably stronger and would clearly prevail.
See id. The district court correctly determined that California
law applies.
II. Validity of the ADR Agreements
Defendants argue that the district court erred in ruling that
both the non-binding conciliation and the binding arbitration
provisions of the Quixtar ADR agreements are unconsciona-
ble and therefore unenforceable under California law. We
5988 POKORNY v. QUIXTAR
review de novo the district court’s denial of a petition to com-
pel arbitration, including its interpretation of the validity and
scope of the underlying arbitration agreement. Ticknor, 265
F.3d at 936; see also Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1135 (9th
Cir. 2003) (district court’s conclusion that an agreement is
unconscionable raises a question of law subject to de novo
review).
[4] Under California law, an arbitration agreement, like
any other contractual clause, is unenforceable if it is both pro-
cedurally and substantively unconscionable. Davis v.
O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007).
California courts apply a “sliding scale” analysis in making
this determination: “the more substantively oppressive the
contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconsciona-
bility is required to come to the conclusion that the term is
unenforceable, and vice versa.” Id. (quoting Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal.
2000)). Thus, although both procedural and substantive
unconscionability must be present for the contract to be
declared unenforceable, they need not be present to the same
degree. Harper v. Ultimo, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 418, 422 (Ct. App.
2003). Here, both are present to a high degree.
A. Procedural Unconscionability
[5] In assessing procedural unconscionability, the court,
under California law, focuses on the factors of surprise and
oppression in the contracting process, including whether the
contract was one drafted by the stronger party and whether the
weaker party had an opportunity to negotiate. See Davis, 485
F.3d at 1073. An agreement or any portion thereof is proce-
durally unconscionable if “the weaker party is presented the
clause and told to ‘take it or leave it’ without the opportunity
for meaningful negotiation.” Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118
Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002). Thus, we have said
that a contract is procedurally unconscionable under Califor-
nia law if it is “a standardized contract, drafted by the party
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 5989
of superior bargaining strength, that relegates to the subscrib-
ing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or
reject it.” Ting, 319 F.3d at 1148.
[6] We agree with the district court that the Quixtar ADR
agreements are procedurally unconscionable. Defendants do
not dispute that Quixtar, a large corporation doing business
throughout the United States, occupied a superior bargaining
position to that of Plaintiffs. Defendants also do not dispute
that Plaintiffs did not individually participate in the negotia-
tion of the terms of the ADR agreements, or that the agree-
ments were presented to Plaintiffs on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. This oppressive behavior is the quintessential character-
istic of a procedurally unconscionable agreement. See Szetela,
118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867. Moreover, Quixtar failed to attach
a copy of the Rules of Conduct, containing the full description
of the non-binding conciliation and binding arbitration pro-
cesses, to the registration forms containing the Agreement to
Arbitrate, or to the BSMAA. In addition, those rules were
subject to unilateral amendment by Quixtar at any time. Thus,
Plaintiffs were not even given a fair opportunity to review the
full nature and extent of the non-binding conciliation and
binding arbitration processes to which they would be bound
before they signed the registration agreements or the
BSMAA. These problems multiply the degree of procedural
unconscionability of the ADR agreements. See Harper, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 422-23 (concluding that an arbitration agreement
which merely incorporated by reference the applicable arbi-
tration rules, which were subject to change, was procedurally
unconscionable).
Defendants, however, assert that the Quixtar ADR agree-
ments are not procedurally unconscionable for three reasons:
(1) Quixtar negotiated the terms of its ADR process with the
IBOAI, although not with the junior IBOs; (2) the Agreement
to Arbitrate appeared in plain text on the front page of the reg-
istration agreements signed by Plaintiffs, although the Rules
of Conduct did not; and (3) Plaintiffs could have refused to
5990 POKORNY v. QUIXTAR
become Quixtar distributors. None of these arguments save
the ADR agreements.
First, although the IBOAI may have negotiated the terms of
the ADR process with Quixtar, there is no evidence that
Plaintiffs’ interests were represented by the IBOAI during
those negotiations. Plaintiffs, as junior IBOs, never joined the
IBOAI. Even if they had, they never achieved the level of
Platinum business required to vote for the members of the
IBOAI Board. It was the members of that Board that voted to
accept the ADR process. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ lawsuit challenges
not only the activities of Quixtar, but also the activities of
senior IBOs who are among the Platinum members that con-
trol the IBOAI and elect its Board members. The interests of
the IBOAI never corresponded with Plaintiffs’ interests.
The fact that Plaintiffs signed or renewed registration forms
containing the Agreement to Arbitrate does not assist Defen-
dants. The forms incorporated by reference the Rules of Con-
duct over which Plaintiffs had no say. Plaintiffs signatures
thus served to make each a party to a contract they now chal-
lenge as unconscionable. As the district court noted, the Plain-
tiffs must have signed on to the Agreement because
“otherwise, no party to a contract would ever be able to argue
unconscionability.”
[7] It similarly does not help Defendants to argue that
Plaintiffs could have gone into another line of work. The
availability of alternative business opportunities does not pre-
clude a finding of procedural unconscionability under Califor-
nia law. See Davis, 485 F.3d at 1074-75; Nagrampa v.
MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1283 (9th Cir. 2006); Sze-
tela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867. The district court therefore
properly rejected Quixtar’s arguments and correctly deter-
mined that the Quixtar ADR agreements are procedurally
unconscionable.
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 5991
B. Substantive Unconscionability
[8] “Substantive unconscionability addresses the fairness
of the term in dispute.” Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867. The
focus of the inquiry is whether the term is one-sided and will
have an overly harsh effect on the disadvantaged party. Har-
per, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 423. Thus, mutuality is the “para-
mount” consideration when assessing substantive
unconscionability. Abramson v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 9 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 422, 436 (Ct. App. 2004). “Agreements to arbitrate
must contain at least ‘a modicum of bilaterality’ to avoid
unconscionability.” Id. at 437 (quoting Armendariz, 6 P.3d at
693) (some internal quotations omitted).
1. Non-Binding Conciliation
The district court held that the “requirement that an IBO
engage in Informal and Formal Conciliation prior to arbitra-
tion is substantively unconscionable, and exceedingly so.” It
cited to the lack of mutuality of the requirement, the short-
ened statute of limitations created by the Rules of Conduct,
Quixtar’s unilateral and unchecked right to reverse or modify
the IBOAI Hearing Panel’s or Board’s recommendation, and
the inability of an IBO to effectively challenge the Rules of
Conduct through the conciliation process, before concluding
that “[t]he ADR deck could not possibly be stacked more in
Quixtar’s favor than it is here.”
We agree with the district court and hold that the non-
binding conciliation portion of the Quixtar ADR agreements
is substantively unconscionable under California law. The
California Court of Appeal addressed the validity of a similar
ADR agreement in Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 16
Cal. Rptr. 3d 296 (Ct. App. 2004). In that case, the plaintiff-
employee signed an agreement under which he was required
to resolve any employment dispute with the defendant-
employer by first engaging in discussions with various levels
of management, and then submitting any remaining claims to
5992 POKORNY v. QUIXTAR
binding arbitration within 180 days of either the date the dis-
pute first arose or the date he was terminated. Id. at 299-300
& n.4. The court identified three aspects of this ADR agree-
ment that it concluded rendered it substantively unconsciona-
ble. Id. at 307-08. First, the agreement lacked mutuality
because only the plaintiff was required to resolve his claims
through the ADR process, and no similar requirement bound
the defendant. Id. at 307. Second, by “requiring [the] plaintiff
to submit to an employer-controlled dispute resolution mecha-
nism (i.e., one without a neutral mediator),” the defendant
“would receive a ‘free peek’ at [the] plaintiff’s case, thereby
obtaining an advantage if and when [the] plaintiff were to
later demand arbitration.” Id. And third, the ADR agreement
placed stringent time limitations on the plaintiff’s assertion of
any claims against the defendant without placing any similar
limitations on the defendant’s right to bring claims against the
plaintiff. Id. at 307-08.
[9] The non-binding conciliation provisions of the Quixtar
ADR agreements suffer from similar deficiencies. Although
the Quixtar ADR agreements require an IBO to submit any
claim it has against Quixtar to Informal and Formal Concilia-
tion, they impose no similar obligation on Quixtar when it has
a claim against one of its IBOs. Defendants contend that the
obligation is bilateral, citing to a portion of the Rules of Con-
duct that first sets forth a narrow exception to the rule requir-
ing IBOs to use the non-binding conciliation process, and then
states: “In all other cases the parties will try to resolve the dis-
pute as provided for under these Rules.” A fair reading of the
Rules of Conduct as a whole does not support Defendants’
position. All of the obligations and procedures relating to the
non-binding conciliation process refer directly to IBOs, not
Quixtar. That is because the stated purpose of the Rules of
Conduct is to “define and establish (1) certain principles to be
followed in the development and maintenance of an Indepen-
dent Business . . . ; and (2) the rights, duties, and responsibili-
ties of each [IBO].” Conspicuously absent from this purpose
is the creation of any duties or responsibilities for Quixtar. To
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 5993
the contrary, in the Rules of Conduct Quixtar reserved to
itself “the sole right to adopt, amend, modify, supplement, or
rescind any or all of these Rules, as necessary with respect to
cases of Rules enforcement.”
[10] It was for this very reason that the Fifth Circuit held
that a similar ADR scheme in a prior version of the Rules of
Conduct promulgated by Quixtar’s predecessor Amway was
illusory and unenforceable under Texas law. See Morrison v.
Amway Corp., 517 F.3d 248, 254-57 (5th Cir. 2008). Thus, it
is clear that, unlike its IBOs, Quixtar is not bound to follow
the ADR process outlined in the Rules of Conduct. The dis-
trict court therefore properly concluded that the obligation to
engage in non-binding conciliation is not mutual.
[11] As was the case in Nyulassy, the unilateral require-
ment that an IBO submit its claims against Quixtar to Infor-
mal and Formal Conciliation before proceeding to arbitration
unfairly hampers IBOs by subjecting them to “an employer-
controlled dispute resolution mechanism” that provides Quix-
tar with a “free peek” at the IBO’s case against it. 16 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 307. That the non-binding conciliation process is
employer-controlled cannot be fairly disputed. The Informal
Conciliation is conducted by Quixtar’s own Business Conduct
and Rules Department. During Formal Conciliation, Quixtar
has the unilateral right to issue a final decision accepting,
rejecting, or modifying the recommendation it receives from
either the IBOAI Hearing Panel or the IBOAI Board. Thus,
the non-binding conciliation process amounts to little more
than an exploratory evidentiary hearing for Quixtar. It will
ultimately make the final decision on the matter regardless of
what the IBOAI Hearing Panel or Board may recommend.
This procedure clearly gives Quixtar an unfair advantage if
and when the IBO decides to demand arbitration. Id.
[12] Finally, as in Nyulassy, the ADR agreements in this
case place time restrictions on an IBO’s right to bring a claim
against Quixtar, but do not place similar limitations on Quix-
5994 POKORNY v. QUIXTAR
tar’s right to bring a claim against an IBO. Id. at 307-08. As
the district court explained, the Rules of Conduct “cut[ ] the
window for seeking relief at both ends. At the front end, the
IBO cannot initiate an arbitration against Quixtar until at least
90 days after the claim arises, because it must go through
Conciliation first. At the back end, the IBO only has two
years to initiate the arbitration (or less if the applicable statute
of limitations is shorter).” Thus, while Quixtar may seek
immediate binding relief on any claim it has against an IBO,
that same IBO must wait at least 90 days before it can seek
binding relief on a claim it has against Quixtar. Further com-
plicating matters, by reserving to itself final say on the recom-
mendations made by the IBOAI Hearing Panel and Board
during Formal Conciliation, Quixtar can drag out the non-
binding conciliation process much longer than 90 days, as the
Rules of Conduct impose no timetable on Quixtar for making
its decision. An IBO, meanwhile, has no similar ability to
delay Quixtar from seeking binding relief on any claim Quix-
tar asserts against it.
In addition, the non-binding conciliation provisions of the
Quixtar ADR agreements provide no meaningful opportunity
for an IBO to challenge the Rules of Conduct. As the district
court concluded, the Rules of Conduct are “self-perpetuating”
and therefore “inherently biased” against an IBO that seeks to
challenge them. The Rules of Conduct explicitly state that
both the IBOAI Hearing Panel and Board are “bound by the
Rules of Conduct” during conciliation; that they “may not
modify, alter, amend, or ignore the current positions of the
Rules of Conduct”; and that any recommendation they make
to Quixtar “should promote and further the goal of compli-
ance” and “must be consistent with the Rules of Conduct.” No
similar limitations are placed on Quixtar’s resolution of a
claim once it receives a recommendation from the Hearing
Panel or Board. To the contrary, the Rules of Conduct specifi-
cally state that “Quixtar reserves to itself the sole right to
adopt, amend, modify, supplement, or rescind any or all of
these Rules, as necessary with respect to cases of Rules
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 5995
enforcement.” Thus, while Quixtar may change any Rule of
Conduct with which it does not agree during the non-binding
conciliation process, its IBOs do not even have a vehicle for
ever challenging those Rules. This lopsided advantage
enjoyed by Quixtar is precisely the type of one-sidedness that
the doctrine of substantive unconscionability is designed to
protect against. See Harper, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 423.
Defendants attempt to salvage the Informal and Formal
Conciliation requirements in the Quixtar ADR agreements by
arguing that under Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d
1205 (9th Cir. 1998), the non-binding conciliation process is
an enforceable condition precedent to binding arbitration. We
agree with the district court that Quixtar’s reliance on Wolsey
is misplaced. Although we ultimately reversed the district
court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration in that case,
we decided only that non-binding arbitration qualifies as an
“arbitration” within the meaning of the FAA, and that the par-
ties’ agreement incorporated California’s arbitration rules
through its choice-of-law clause. Id. at 1207-13.
[13] As the district court explained, Plaintiffs in this case
are not challenging the general proposition that when parties
enter into a valid and enforceable agreement to engage in a
non-binding dispute resolution process before submitting their
claims to binding arbitration or litigation, courts should
require compliance with that agreement. Instead, Plaintiffs
contend that the unfair and one-sided limitations in this non-
binding conciliation process render it unconscionable and
therefore unenforceable.
2. Binding Arbitration
The district court also held that the binding arbitration por-
tion of the Quixtar ADR agreements is substantively uncon-
scionable. In support of this conclusion, the court cited to the
lack of mutuality in the requirement that IBOs engage in bind-
ing arbitration, the reduced statute of limitations imposed by
5996 POKORNY v. QUIXTAR
the Rules of Conduct, the unilateral confidentiality require-
ment imposed on IBOs, the inclusion of an arbitration selec-
tion process that unfairly favors Quixtar, and the inclusion of
a fee-shifting provision that requires the losing party to bear
the costs of the arbitration, including the prevailing party’s
attorneys’ fees. Defendants dispute the district court’s deter-
minations as to each of these points. We agree with the dis-
trict court and hold that the binding arbitration portion of the
Quixtar ADR agreements is substantively unconscionable
because it lacks even “a modicum of bilaterality.” Abramson,
9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 437.
[14] Like the requirement to engage in non-binding concil-
iation, the requirement to engage in binding arbitration is not
mutual. Under the Rules of Conduct, an IBO must submit any
claim it has against Quixtar or another IBO that is not satis-
factorily resolved through the non-binding conciliation pro-
cess to binding arbitration if it wishes to pursue the claim
further. The Rules of Conduct contain no provision requiring
Quixtar to initiate any claim it has against an IBO using the
Quixtar ADR process. Thus, as the district court pointed out,
although Quixtar may be forced into binding arbitration when
an IBO initiates the dispute, Quixtar is free to initiate and liti-
gate any claim it has against an IBO in court without ever
submitting the claim to binding arbitration. Requiring one
party to arbitrate its claims but not the other is a paradigmatic
form of substantive unconscionability under California law.
See Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 984 (Cal. 2003);
Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 693.
Also lacking in mutuality is the requirement that an IBO
make a demand for arbitration “within two years after the
issue has arisen, but in no event after the date when the initia-
tion of legal proceedings would have been barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.” This provision in the Rules
of Conduct creates a disparity between IBOs and Quixtar
because it reduces the potentially longer statute of limitations
for any claim an IBO may wish to bring against Quixtar or
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 5997
another IBO to two years, whereas, if there is a longer statute
of limitations, Quixtar may initiate a claim against an IBO in
court after the expiration of two years. This is because it is not
required to arbitrate its claims.
[15] Defendants attempt to defend the reduced limitations
period by arguing that a contracted-for limitations period is
enforceable under California law so long as it is both reason-
able and mutual. See Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d
1038, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2001). The problem with the contrac-
tual reduction in the limitations period in this case, of course,
is that it is not mutual. Soltani recognized that lack of mutual-
ity is relevant to assessing substantive unconscionability, 258
F.3d at 1043, and relied on West v. Henderson, 278 Cal. Rptr.
570, 575-76 (Ct. App. 1991), which held that lack of mutual-
ity makes contractual provisions “suspect” and upheld a non-
mutual provision only after finding that it was supported by
a specific justification. Particularly in situations like this one,
where no special circumstance necessitates a non-mutual pro-
vision, a unilateral reduction in the statute of limitations is an
indicator of substantive unconscionability. See Nyulassy, 16
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307-08.
[16] Another indicator of substantive unconscionability is
the confidentiality requirement in the Rules of Conduct. This
prohibits IBOs engaged in the arbitration process from dis-
closing “to any other person not directly involved in the con-
ciliation or arbitration process (a) the substance of, or basis
for, the claim; (b) the content of any testimony or other evi-
dence presented at an arbitration hearing or obtained through
discovery; or (c) the terms [or] amount of any arbitration
award.” This confidentiality requirement takes effect the
moment an IBO “becomes aware of a potential Rule violation
or of a claim against another IBO or [Quixtar].” Thus, once
an IBO is aware that it has a potential claim against Quixtar,
it is forever barred from disclosing to anyone not involved in
the resolution of that claim the basis for it, the evidence sup-
porting it, or the outcome of the arbitration. Quixtar, on the
5998 POKORNY v. QUIXTAR
other hand, is not similarly prohibited from making such dis-
closures up until the time an IBO formally demands arbitra-
tion. Additionally, Quixtar can avoid the confidentiality
requirement altogether when it brings its own claims against
an IBO because it is not required to first assert those claims
using the Quixtar ADR process.
[17] In Davis, we held that a similar confidentiality clause
in an employer’s dispute resolution program was substan-
tively unconscionable, even though in that case the confiden-
tiality requirement applied equally to the employer and any
aggrieved employee. 485 F.3d at 1071, 1078-79. There, the
confidentiality clause prohibited the parties from divulging
“to any third party or person not directly involved in the
mediation or arbitration the content of the pleadings, papers,
orders, hearings, trials, or awards in the arbitration.” Id. at
1071. We said that the “confidentiality clause as written
unconscionably favors” the employer because the restrictions
it imposed “would prevent an employee from contacting other
employees to assist in litigating (or arbitrating) an employee’s
case.” Id. at 1078. This “inability to mention even the exis-
tence of a claim” to other current or former employees “would
handicap if not stifle an employee’s ability to investigate and
engage in discovery,” could possibly “prevent others from
building cases,” and would place the employer “ ‘in a far
superior legal posture’ by preventing [employees] from
accessing precedent while allowing [the employer] to learn
how to negotiate and litigate its contracts in the future.” Id.
(quoting Ting, 319 F.3d at 1152). Because the confidentiality
clause swept so broadly, we concluded that it was substan-
tively unconscionable. Id. at 1078, 1084.
In our earlier opinion in Ting, the defendant telephone com-
pany had an agreement with its customers requiring disputes
to be resolved through arbitration. 319 F.3d at 1133 & n.4.
The agreement contained a confidentiality provision that
stated: “Any arbitration shall remain confidential. Neither [the
customer] nor [the company] may disclose the existence, con-
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 5999
tent or results of any arbitration or award, except as may be
required by law or to confirm and enforce an award.” Id. at
1151 n.16. We recognized that although this provision was
“facially neutral,” it favored the defendant company because
the company would be a repeat player in the arbitration pro-
cess, continually arbitrating the same claims and accumulat-
ing “a wealth of knowledge on how to negotiate the terms of
its own unilaterally crafted contract.” Id. at 1151-52. The
defendant’s customers, meanwhile, would be unable to access
precedent and might be unable to obtain the information
needed to build a case of intentional misconduct or unlawful
discrimination against the defendant. Id. at 1152. For these
reasons, we held the confidentiality provision was unconscio-
nable.
The confidentiality provision in this case, like the confiden-
tiality provisions at issue in Davis and Ting, unfairly favors
Quixtar because it prevents Plaintiffs from discussing their
claims with other potential plaintiffs and from discovering rel-
evant precedent to support their claims. The unfair advantage
enjoyed by Quixtar is especially acute because the Rules of
Conduct state that discovery is only available to the extent the
arbitrator “considers necessary to the full and fair exploration
of the issues in dispute.” Thus, while handicapping the Plain-
tiffs’ ability to investigate their claims and engage in mean-
ingful discovery, the confidentiality provision does nothing to
prevent Quixtar from using its continuous involvement in the
Quixtar ADR process to accumulate “a wealth of knowledge”
on how to arbitrate future claims brought by IBOs. Ting, 319
F.3d at 1152. The district court therefore properly concluded
that the confidentiality clause in the Rules of Conduct is sub-
stantively unconscionable.
[18] Also contributing to the total substantive uncons-
cionability of the binding arbitration provisions is the arbitra-
tion selection procedure mandated by the Rules of Conduct.
Under this procedure, once an IBO initiates an arbitration pro-
ceeding, the case administrator mails each party an “Arbitra-
6000 POKORNY v. QUIXTAR
tion Selection Letter” containing the names of at least five
arbitrators associated with JAMS who have attended an “ori-
entation” conducted by Quixtar, and encouraging the IBO to
select one of these arbitrators. The IBO then has fourteen days
from the date of the Arbitration Selection Letter to object to
the use of a Quixtar-trained JAMS arbitrator, in which case a
new list of JAMS arbitrators not trained by Quixtar is sent to
the parties. If the IBO opts to use a Quixtar-trained JAMS
arbitrator, the parties are billed at the arbitrator’s published
hourly rate, but the daily fee cannot exceed a fixed amount.
If, however, the IBO opts instead to use a non-Quixtar-trained
JAMS arbitrator, the parties are billed at the arbitrator’s pub-
lished hourly rate without the daily fee cap.
In another federal case involving Quixtar and its predeces-
sor Amway, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri held that a prior version of the Rules of
Conduct requiring the use of an Amway-trained JAMS arbi-
trator was substantively unconscionable under Michigan law.
Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., No. 03-3290-CV-W-RED,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46777, at *38-43 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 16,
2005), aff’d on other grounds, 453 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2006).
The court described in detail the orientation that Amway used
to train its arbitrators:
[The] “training” covered a two day period and then
a third day of “interviews.” The training covered
subjects including profiles of the people who started
and now run Amway, the benevolent and indepen-
dent culture of Amway, procedures to the [sic] uti-
lized in arbitration, and a summary of various
complaints the arbitrators could anticipate. The arbi-
trator candidates even participated in some “role
playing” as successful Amway distributors. Also
included throughout the two days were assurances
that Amway was not a pyramid scheme and that the
business was legitimate.
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 6001
Id. at *38-39. The court concluded that “the training atmo-
sphere and content of the discussions was designed to produce
a very favorable view of [Quixtar and Amway],” and that the
orientation included “subtle manipulation on issues which
could be expected to be considered by the arbitrators.” Id. at
*39-40.
The district court in this case observed that Quixtar “still
trains possible arbitrators with the same process, and still
maintains a ‘Roster of Neutrals’ who have participated in the
training” described by the court in Nitro. Defendants do not
dispute this. In fact, it is from the JAMS arbitrators listed on
the Roster of Neutrals that the case administrator must select
at least five names to include as recommended arbitrators in
the Arbitration Selection Letter. We therefore agree with the
district court that these letters, sent to the parties at the outset
of the arbitration selection process, “unfairly benefit[ ] Quix-
tar” by “encourag[ing] the use of a decidedly unfair process,
without describing any possible disadvantages of using
[Quixtar-]trained [arbitrators].” It does not matter that the let-
ters disclosed to IBOs that the recommended arbitrators had
attended an orientation conducted by Quixtar, or that the let-
ters provided the names of the principal speakers at the orien-
tation each arbitrator attended. The use of Quixtar-trained
arbitrators is to Quixtar’s advantage, and the IBOs who
receive the letters are not informed of that pertinent fact.
Defendants contend, however, that the arbitration selection
process is not unconscionable because, unlike the version of
the Rules of Conduct at issue in Nitro, the current Rules allow
an IBO to opt out of using a Quixtar-trained JAMS arbitrator
and instead select a non-Quixtar-trained JAMS arbitrator or
an arbitrator from the American Arbitration Association
(“AAA”). This is not a realistic alternative. As the district
court noted, the use of an AAA or any other non-JAMS arbi-
trator “is not actually a route available to an IBO dissatisfied
with the JAMS options” because a non-JAMS arbitrator may
only be used if JAMS is “unable or unwilling to perform its
6002 POKORNY v. QUIXTAR
responsibilities” as case administrator. And the option of
using a non-Quixtar-trained JAMS arbitrator presents IBOs
with the unpalatable choice of selecting a possibly biased
arbitrator whose daily fees are capped, or selecting a neutral
arbitrator with no daily fee cap. As the district court suc-
cinctly stated, an IBO “should not have to pay extra” to avoid
the unfairness created by Quixtar’s orientation program. The
district court therefore properly determined that the arbitration
selection process is substantively unconscionable.
[19] Finally, the Rules of Conduct include a fee-shifting
clause that unfairly exposes IBOs to a greater financial risk in
arbitrating claims than they would face if they were to litigate
those same claims in federal court. This clause states that
“[t]he Arbitrator shall, in the award, assess arbitration fees,
costs, expenses, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and compensation
as provided in the applicable Fees/Costs Schedule, in favor of
the prevailing party and, in the event any fees or costs are due
the [case administrator], in favor of the Administrator.”
The district court characterized this clause as a “loser pays”
provision that unfairly favors Quixtar. The court explained
that “[a]n IBO who initiates an arbitration against Quixtar
under the [Rules of Conduct] and does not prevail will poten-
tially be responsible not only for the full cost of the arbitration
itself, but also for Quixtar’s reasonable attorney’s fees.” The
court went on to point out that “litigation in federal court pro-
vides for a successful RICO plaintiff to recover attorney’s
fees, but does not expose such a plaintiff to the risk of having
to pay the defendant’s fees if the suit is unsuccessful.” See 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c). We agree that because the fee-shifting
clause puts IBOs who demand arbitration at risk of incurring
greater costs than they would bear if they were to litigate their
claims in federal court, the district court properly held that the
clause is substantively unconscionable. See Ting, 319 F.3d at
1151 (fee-splitting scheme in defendant’s service agreement
with its customers unconscionable “because it imposes on
some consumers costs greater than those a complainant would
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 6003
bear if he or she would file the same complaint in court”);
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.
2002) (dispute resolution agreement that required an
aggrieved employee who brought a claim against her
employer to split the arbitrator’s fee with the employer ren-
dered the entire arbitration agreement unenforceable); Armen-
dariz, 6 P.3d at 687 (“[W]hen an employer imposes
mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment, the arbi-
tration agreement or arbitration process cannot generally
require the employee to bear any type of expense that the
employee would not be required to bear if he or she were free
to bring the action in court.”).
Defendants contend that under United States Supreme
Court precedent, Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing
that arbitration of their claims in accordance with the Quixtar
ADR process will expose them to actual financial hardship,
rather than the mere risk of such hardship, and that Plaintiffs
have failed to carry this burden. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-
Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2000). The issue
in Green Tree, however, was whether an arbitration agree-
ment that did not mention fees and costs was unenforceable
because it failed to “affirmatively protect a party from poten-
tially steep arbitration costs.” Id. at 82. Here we have an arbi-
tration agreement that actually includes a fee-shifting
provision and that places those costs on the IBO if it loses in
a process already stacked against it.
[20] The district court therefore properly determined that
the binding arbitration portion of the Quixtar ADR agree-
ments, like the non-binding conciliation portion, is unenforce-
able because it is both substantively and procedurally
unconscionable.
C. Severability
[21] Under California law, a court has discretion to either
sever an unconscionable provision from an agreement, or
6004 POKORNY v. QUIXTAR
refuse to enforce the agreement in its entirety. Ingle v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003). “In
exercising this discretion, courts look to whether the ‘central
purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality’ or ‘the ille-
gality is collateral to [its] main purpose.’ ” Id. (quoting
Adams, 279 F.3d at 895). Defendants argue that the district
court should have severed any unconscionable clauses in the
Quixtar ADR agreements and enforced the remaining provi-
sions rather than refusing to enforce the Quixtar ADR process
as a whole.
[22] We agree with the district court that the Quixtar ADR
agreements are “simply too tainted to be saved through minor
adjustments,” and hold that the entire ADR process mandated
by those agreements is unconscionable and therefore unen-
forceable. The unconscionable portions of the Quixtar ADR
agreements include the unilateral requirement that IBOs sub-
mit their claims to Informal and Formal Conciliation, the pro-
hibition against modification of the Rules of Conduct by the
IBOAI Hearing Panel or Board during Formal Conciliation,
the right of Quixtar to reverse or modify the recommendations
of the IBOAI Hearing Panel and Board at the conclusion of
Formal Conciliation, the statute of limitations for submitting
a claim to binding arbitration, the unilateral requirement that
IBOs submit their claims to binding arbitration, the confiden-
tiality requirement, the arbitration selection process, and the
fee-shifting clause. As the district court noted, severing the
offending provisions of the Quixtar ADR agreements and
enforcing what remains “would have virtually no effect”
because the agreements are “permeated with unconscionable
provisions.” The district court therefore did not abuse its dis-
cretion when it refused to sever the unconscionable clauses
from the Quixtar ADR agreements and enforce the remaining
provisions. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 695.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold the district court prop-
erly determined that the Quixtar ADR agreements are uncon-
POKORNY v. QUIXTAR 6005
scionable and therefore unenforceable under California law.
We deny Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice as moot. We
affirm the order of the district court denying Defendants’
motion to dismiss or to compel arbitration.
AFFIRMED.