In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-3448
N ICHOLAS S TAMAT and P ENNY S TAMAT,
Debtors-Appellants,
v.
W ILLIAM T. N EARY, United States Trustee,
Trustee-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 08 C 6543—Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 27, 2010—D ECIDED M ARCH 24, 2011
Before R OVNER, E VANS, and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Nicholas and Penny Stamat
filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code on July 26, 2007. The Trustee alleged that the
Stamats omitted numerous assets and transactions
from their filings and accompanying documentation,
including past business interests, two limited partner-
ships, a $10,000 settlement payment, and $90,000 ob-
2 No. 09-3448
tained through a refinancing of a second home, and
misreported their 2006 income. The Trustee filed a com-
plaint objecting to the discharge of the Stamats’ debt
under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(2), (4), and (5), arguing that the
Stamats concealed estate assets with the intent to
defraud their creditors, fraudulently made false state-
ments under oath, and failed to satisfactorily explain the
loss of assets. The bankruptcy court denied discharge
under all three grounds. The Stamats appealed that
ruling to the district court, which affirmed the denial of
discharge under section 727(a)(4) for fraudulently
making a false oath. We also find that the Stamats made
numerous omissions, that these omissions displayed a
reckless disregard for the truth, and were material to the
Stamats’ bankruptcy case. Therefore, we affirm the
denial of discharge under section 727(a)(4).
I. BACKGROUND
Nicholas Stamat is a medical doctor who operates
Stamat Pediatrics. Penny Stamat has a bachelor’s degree
in math and accounting, owns and operates a billing
company, On Time Billing, and handles billing for her
husband’s medical practice. The Stamats filed a joint
voluntary Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition on July 26, 2007,
requesting the discharge of over $1.5 million in secured
and unsecured debt. They also filed the required official
bankruptcy Schedules and Statement of Financial Affairs
(“SOFA”). See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B); Fed. R. Bankr. P.
Official Form 6; Fed. R. Bankr. P. Official Form 7. On
December 21, 2007, the United States Trustee filed his
No. 09-3448 3
complaint objecting to the discharge of the Stamats’
debts on three statutory grounds: concealing property
with the intent to defraud creditors, making false oaths
with fraudulent intent, and failing to satisfactorily
explain the loss of substantial assets or deficiency of
assets to meet their liabilities. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(2),
(4), and (5). The Trustee argued that the bankruptcy
petition and accompanying SOFA and Schedules in-
cluded a number of misstatements and omissions.
In response to Question 1 of their original SOFA, the
Stamats listed the gross income they received from
their businesses in 2006 as $53,309. That number was
incorrect, since the Stamats’ 2006 tax return showed
that the gross income of Stamat Pediatrics in 2006 was
$265,012, that the gross income of On Time Billing in
2006 was $22,188, and that after the deduction of
expenses, the Stamats’ personal income was $20,559 for
the tax year.
Other inaccuracies also surfaced. On November 14,
2007, the Trustee conducted the First Meeting of Creditors
(“§ 341 meeting”).1 At this meeting, the Stamats dis-
closed past investment or business interests in various
entities, including: (a) Meyer Medical Physicians Group,
(b) 4425 E. 63rd Medical Center, and (c) Hoffman/Elk
Grove Physician Group. Dr. Stamat practiced with Meyer
1
Section 341(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states that, “[w]ithin
a reasonable time after the order for relief in a case under
this title, the United States trustee shall convene and preside
at a meeting of creditors.”
4 No. 09-3448
Medical Physicians Group from 1986 until it filed for
bankruptcy and ceased to exist in 2001. Dr. Stamat
owned an interest in 4425 E. 63rd Medical Center, an
investment entity that held title to the building out of
which Meyer Medical operated one of its offices. The
investment was sold in 2003, and Dr. Stamat received a
small profit. Hoffman/Elk Grove was bought before
Meyer Medical’s existence, and Dr. Stamat never
received any monies back from this investment. These
interests were not initially disclosed in response to Ques-
tion 18 of the SOFA,2 and the Stamats amended Ques-
tion 18 on May 8, 2008 to reflect their interest in these
three entities.3
2
Question 18 reads in pertinent part:
If the debtor is an individual, list the names, addresses,
taxpayer-identification numbers, nature of the busi-
nesses, and beginning and ending dates of all busi-
nesses in which the debtor was an officer, director,
partner, or managing executive of a corporation,
partner in a partnership, sole proprietor, or was self-
employed in a trade, profession, or other activity
either full- or part-time with six years immediately
preceding the commencement of this case, or in which
the debtor owned 5 percent or more of the voting or
equity securities within six years immediately pre-
ceding the commencement of this case.
3
The Stamats also did not initially list an interest in
Dr. Stamat’s medical practice, Stamat Pediatrics, LLC, or an
interest in On Time Billing, LLC, Mrs. Stamat’s billing practice,
(continued...)
No. 09-3448 5
At the § 341 meeting, the Stamats also disclosed owner-
ship interests in the following limited partnerships
during the six years before their bankruptcy filing: (a)
Trailhead Land Investment, L.P. and (b) Eagle Crest Golf
Club, Ltd. Partnership. These interests were not dis-
closed in response to Question 18 of the SOFA.
Dr. Stamat also testified that he worked as a part-time
police officer for the Thornton Police Department.
Dr. Stamat’s position with the police department was not
reported in the Stamats’ original Schedules or SOFA,
but Dr. Stamat’s income of approximately $80 a month
from his position with the police department was
included in the business income listed on Schedule I.
On May 8, 2008, the Stamats amended Schedule I and
Question 1 of the SOFA to reflect Dr. Stamat’s employ-
ment and income as a part-time police officer separately
from his business income. Dr. Stamat also testified that
he owned two guns, which were not disclosed in the
Stamats’ original schedules. One month after the § 341
meeting, on December 7, 2007, the Stamats amended
their Schedule B to include the two guns.
Finally, Dr. Stamat stated at the § 341 meeting that in
September of 2005, he paid $10,000 to Oak Brook
Financial to settle pending litigation against the Stamats.
Mrs. Stamat later testified that this payment was made
to settle an outstanding judgment for nonpayment of a
(...continued)
in response to Question 18; however, both Stamat Pediatrics
and On Time Billing were disclosed in Schedule B.
6 No. 09-3448
loan. The settlement payment was also not listed in the
original schedules or Question 10 of the SOFA.4 The
Stamats amended Question 10 of the SOFA on May 8,
2008 to reflect this settlement payment.
On April 16, 2008, the Stamats appeared for a
Rule 2004 Examination (“2004 Examination”) at the Office
of the U.S. Trustee, at which they produced numerous
documents, including tax returns, pursuant to a sub-
poena for documents issued by the Trustee. At this ex-
amination, Mrs. Stamat admitted that she and her
husband had refinanced their Michigan home twice in
the two years before filing their bankruptcy petition,
receiving in excess of $90,000 in cash. The loan proceeds
were deposited into the Stamats’ personal account and
the monies were used to run Dr. Stamat’s medical
practice and for personal living expenses. After
disclosing the two transactions, the Stamats submitted
all related records in their possession to the United
States Trustee.
The bankruptcy court held a bench trial, during which
the Stamats testified regarding the above omissions.
Mrs. Stamat also testified about a 2001 lawsuit involving
Standard Bank regarding property liens. Mrs. Stamat was
4
Question 10 of the SOFA, entitled “Other transfers,” states:
“List all other property, other than property transferred in
the ordinary course of the business or financial affairs of
the debtor, transferred either absolutely or as security within
two years immediately preceding the commencement of
this case.”
No. 09-3448 7
questioned regarding the existence of a counterclaim
pending against Standard Bank, and stated, “I don’t
know who sued who.” When asked if she was aware
of whether or not “you and Dr. Stamat have asked the
court to find their mortgage invalid,” she answered,
“[w]ell, we were suing them since 2001, so I guess in
there we were trying to do that.” The Trustee argued
that a counterclaim existed against Standard Bank,
which was not disclosed in their original or amended
schedules. The record does not include court documents
from the Standard Bank litigation.
After the bench trial, the bankruptcy court found that
the Stamats’ debt was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C.
§§ 727(a)(2), (4), and (5). The bankruptcy court deter-
mined that the Stamats concealed estate assets with the
intent to defraud their creditors, made fraudulent
false statements under oath, and failed to satisfactorily
explain the loss of assets. The Stamats appealed that
ruling to the district court, which affirmed the bank-
ruptcy court’s decision to deny discharge pursuant to
section 727(a)(4) for fraudulently making a false oath,
without reaching the grounds under sections 727(a)(2)
and (5). This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
The primary benefit of filing for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7 is that the financial discharge gives the debtor
a “fresh start.” In re Chambers, 348 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir.
2003). However, this privilege is reserved for the “honest
but unfortunate debtor.” Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279,
8 No. 09-3448
286-87 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see Peterson v. Scott (In re Scott), 172 F.3d 959, 966
(7th Cir. 1999). The Bankruptcy Code provides that a
bankruptcy court “shall grant the debtor a discharge,”
but then lists several exceptions that deny the privilege
of discharge to dishonest debtors. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a).
One of those exceptions, found in section 727(a)(4),
provides in relevant part that the court shall grant the
debtor a discharge, unless “the debtor knowingly and
fraudulently, in or in connection with the case . . . made a
false oath or account . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A). We
have stated that the Trustee must establish grounds for
denial of discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. In re Scott, 172 F.3d at 966-67.
Other circuits and bankruptcy courts in this circuit
have specified that to prevail on a claim under this sub-
section, the Trustee must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that: (1) the debtor made a statement
under oath; (2) the statement was false; (3) the debtor
knew the statement was false; (4) the debtor made the
statement with fraudulent intent; and (5) the statement
related materially to the bankruptcy case. The Cadle Com-
pany v. Duncan (In re Duncan), 562 F.3d 688, 695 (5th Cir.
2009) (citing Sholdra v. Chilmark Fin. LLP (In re Sholdra), 249
F.3d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 2001)); Keeney v. Smith (In re Keeney),
227 F.3d 679, 685 (6th Cir. 2000); In re Self, 325 B.R. 224,
245 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005); In re Olbur, 314 B.R. 732, 745
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). “In bankruptcy, ‘exceptions to
discharge are to be construed strictly against a creditor
and liberally in favor of the debtor.’ ” In re Kontrick,
No. 09-3448 9
295 F.3d 724, 736 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Zarzynski,
771 F.2d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 1985)).
We review the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law
de novo and its factual findings for clear error. In re
Resource Tech. Corp., 624 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 2010). “If
the bankruptcy court’s account of the evidence is
plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,
we will not reverse its factual findings even if we would
have weighed the evidence differently.” Freeland v.
Enodis Corp., 540 F.3d 721, 729 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation and
quotation omitted). Mixed questions of law and fact are
subject to de novo review. Mungo v. Taylor, 355 F.3d 969,
974 (7th Cir. 2004).
With respect to section 727(a)(4), the bankruptcy court
specifically discussed the refinancing of the Stamats’
second home and their failure to list their partnership
interests, and found that that the Trustee proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Stamats made
numerous false oaths that they knew or should have
known were inaccurate, and that the cumulative effect
of their false statements was material and established
a pattern of reckless indifference to the truth. The
district court affirmed the denial of discharge under
section 727(a)(4), finding that the Stamats’ failure to
report the refinancing of their second home, their part-
nership interests, counterclaim, $10,000 settlement pay-
ment, and the error in the reporting of their 2006
income were material omissions that showed a reckless
disregard for the truth. We affirm the denial of discharge.
The Stamats first argue that certain omissions cited by
the bankruptcy court were not in fact omissions because
10 No. 09-3448
the disclosure of those interests was not required. The
Stamats contend that there was no need to disclose
their interests in Meyer Medical, Hoffman/Elk Grove
Physician Group, and 4425 E. 63rd Medical Center given
that these assets were no longer in existence at the time
the bankruptcy petition was filed. However, the bank-
ruptcy petition does not exempt assets no longer in exis-
tence. Question 18 of the SOFA asks for all business
interests “within six years immediately preceding the
commencement of this case,” (emphasis in original), and,
in fact, asks for “beginning and ending dates.” (emphasis
added). The Stamats do not contend that these invest-
ments were outside the six-year window, only that dis-
closure was not required because these entities did not
exist at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Given the
clarity of the question, we cannot agree.
The Stamats next contend that their “passive invest-
ment interests” in Trailhead Land Investment and
Eagle Crest Golf Club did not require disclosure under
Question 18 of the SOFA because the Stamats were
merely “limited partners” in these enterprises. As both
the bankruptcy and district courts noted, there are, in
fact, sections of the SOFA that exclude limited partner-
ships. Official Form 7 of the SOFA states that “[d]ebtors
that are or have been in business, as defined below, also
must complete Questions 19-25.” The form goes on to
state that:
An individual debtor is ‘in business’ for the pur-
pose of this form if the debtor is or has been,
within six years immediately preceding the
filing of this bankruptcy case, any of the following:
No. 09-3448 11
an officer, director, managing executive, or
owner of 5 percent or more of the voting or equity
securities of a corporation; a partner, other than a
limited partner, of a partnership; a sole proprietor
or self-employed full-time or part-time.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. Official Form 7 (emphasis added). As
the Stamats correctly point out, “limited partners” are
exempt from answering Questions 19-25 of the SOFA.
However, Question 18 does not exclude “limited part-
ners.” While the Stamats argue that the same caveat must
be read into Question 18, the question plainly requires
disclosure of “all businesses in which the debtor was . . . [a]
partner, . . . [or] partner in a partnership,” and thus, by
its terms, does not exclude limited partnerships. While
a limited interest in a partnership may not be as sig-
nificant as a greater interest, we cannot ignore the dis-
tinction the Form itself makes, and find that the failure
to include these interests was an omission.
Next, the Stamats challenge both the settlement pay-
ment to Oak Brook Financial and the two refinances of
their Michigan home as omissions. The Stamats do not
argue that the $10,000 payment and the $90,000
refinancing do not constitute transfers of property,
rather, they claim that these transactions occurred “in the
ordinary course of business or financial affairs,” and
therefore did not require disclosure under Question 10
of the SOFA.5
5
As to the settlement payment, we note that during the
bankruptcy proceedings, the Stamats contended that they did
(continued...)
12 No. 09-3448
Neither the SOFA nor the Bankruptcy Code define the
phrase “in the ordinary course of business or financial
affairs” with respect to Question 10. The Stamats argue
that in order for a transfer to be outside the “ordinary
course,” there must be evidence of intent to conceal or
fraudulently convey property or assets. While we do not
doubt that such a transfer would be outside the
ordinary course, we do not find such conduct to be re-
quired. In examining the “ordinary course of business”
defense under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, we
have found that the “ordinary course of business” refers
to “normal commercial and financial relationships,”
such as, for example, “customary credit transactions,” and
that factors to consider include the length of time the
parties were engaged in the type of transaction at
issue, whether the amount or form of tender differed
from past practices, and whether the debtor engaged in
any unusual collection or payment activity. Kleven v.
Household Bank F.S.B., 334 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2003).
“Although a history of dealing between parties is
certainly the strongest factor supporting a determination
that the business between a debtor and [the transferee]
is ordinary, we do not believe it is absolutely necessary
in every case.” Id.
(...continued)
not understand the $10,000 payment to be a transfer of
property, or believed that it had taken place prior to the two-
year period relevant to Question 10. The Stamats do not
now make these arguments.
No. 09-3448 13
In this case, the Stamats borrowed $10,000 and made a
payment to Oak Brook Financial to settle an unpaid
loan. Mrs. Stamat testified that Dr. Stamat and others
had taken out a loan, the exact amount of which she
did not recall. She stated:
[W]e got sued for like his part of it, 80 some thou-
sand maybe. And then they came to a settlement
agreement. And we had put down 25,000. And
then we had to pay 15,000 back. And I paid all
but 2,000 I had left to pay. And I didn’t have
the money. So they came back to us for 15,000
which was the judgment. And then we settled
with them for 10.
There is no evidence in the record that such a payment
was a customary or regularly occurring one, and based
on the non-customary nature of the transaction testified
to by Mrs. Stamat, we cannot find under the circum-
stances that the payment falls within the “ordinary
course of business or financial affairs.”
With respect to the $90,000 received from the
refinancing of the Stamats’ Michigan home, the Stamats
argue that the bankruptcy court actually determined
that the use of the proceeds was in ordinary course. In
its order, under the section “Defendants’ Testimony
at Trial,” the bankruptcy court wrote that “[t]he refin-
ancing and the use of the proceeds therefrom in the
medical practice, was done in the ordinary course of
business.” The district court found “[t]he Stamats take
the finding out of context; the Bankruptcy Court stated
that the Stamats so testified at trial; it does not follow
14 No. 09-3448
that the Bankruptcy Court necessarily agreed with this
testimony.” Neary v. Stamat, 2009 WL 2916834, at *4
(N.D. Ill. 2009). The bankruptcy court’s statement, while
falling under the overall heading “Findings of Fact,” did
appear under the subheading “Defendants’ Testimony
at Trial.” Mrs. Stamat stated, with respect to the refin-
ancing, “[t]o me, that would be an ordinary course of
business.” However, as the Stamats point out, when
asked by the bankruptcy court whether she was “saying
that you viewed this in the ordinary course of business
of the company,” Mrs. Stamat stated that she did not
understand the refinancing was a transfer of property,
and did not specifically answer the court’s question
about whether she felt the refinancing was within the
ordinary course. Nevertheless, we do not find that
the bankruptcy court actually determined that the re-
financing and use of the funds was within the
ordinary course, especially in light of the bankruptcy
court’s reliance on the “disappearance of equity from
their second home” in its section 727(a)(4) analysis.
Some bankruptcy courts examining “ordinary course,”
both in the section 727 context and in others, have found
that the payment of living expenses occurs in the “ordinary
course of affairs.” See In re Oliver, 414 B.R. 361, 377-78
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2009); see also In re Keenan, 195 B.R. 236,
241 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996) (“meeting his personal ex-
penses was unquestionably within the ‘ordinary course’
of . . . financial affairs”). Bankruptcy courts have sug-
gested, however, that the transfer of funds between the
debtor’s personal account and corporations controlled
by the debtor is not part of the ordinary course of busi-
No. 09-3448 15
ness. See, e.g., In re Phillips, 418 B.R. 445, 462-63
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (“The Plaintiff established at trial
the existence of numerous substantial transfers between
the Debtor and various corporations controlled by the
Debtor within the two years prior to the filing. . . . [W]hile
there is insufficient evidence to establish fraudulent
transfer for purposes of denial of discharge under
§ 727(a)(2)(A), it was clearly established that there were
transfers of the Debtor’s interests outside the ordinary
course of business.”). Here, the Stamats acknowledge
using the proceeds to pay for both personal expenses
and expenses related to Stamat Pediatrics, a separate
legal entity. Furthermore, the bankruptcy court in its
section 727(a)(5) analysis found that the Stamats failed
to satisfactorily explain the loss of the proceeds, which
means that all specific uses of the proceeds were not
established. In light of this record, we cannot find that
the refinancing and use of the $90,000 was in the
ordinary course of business or financial affairs.
Next, although the bankruptcy court analyzed the
Stamats’ reporting of their business income under its
section 727(a)(2) analysis, in finding that the Stamats
acted with reckless disregard under section 727(a)(4), it
referenced their “numerous false statements.” With
respect to whether Question 1 of the SOFA required the
Stamats to report only their personal profit as opposed
to their businesses’ gross income, the Stamats argue that
their medical practice and the billing company are both
limited liability companies, and as such, legally distinct
from their owners. They contend that the “gross income”
the debtor receives from the operation of the businesses
16 No. 09-3448
is not the gross income the LLC earns, but rather just
the net profit paid to the debtor. The Stamats are
correct that Question 1 requests “the gross amount of
income the debtor has received from . . . operation of the
debtor’s business.” (emphasis added). Like the district
court, however, we decline to resolve the question of
what Question 1 specifically requires. Even if Question 1
only required the Stamats to report their own personal
profit, the amount they reported, $53,309, was incorrect.
This figure differed from the actual amount reported
on their 2006 tax return, which was $20,559.
The Stamats argue that an over-reporting of income
cannot constitute an intent to defraud. As both the bank-
ruptcy and district courts noted, a showing of reckless
disregard for the truth is sufficient to prove fraudulent
intent. See In re Chavin, 150 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1998)
(citing In re Yonikus, 974 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1992));
see also In re Duncan, 562 F.3d at 695 (finding that “the
cumulative effect of false statements may, when taken
together, evidence a reckless disregard for the truth
sufficient to support a finding of fraudulent intent” under
section 727(a)(4)) (citations omitted); In re Costello, 299
B.R. 882, 899-90 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003). While an over-
reporting of one’s income by itself would likely not
amount to fraudulent intent, this error was part of a
larger picture of omissions and errors. Here, the totality
of the Stamats’ omissions and errors rises above mere
negligence to the level of reckless disregard for the truth.
Given the Stamats’ level of education and business
experience, their failure to disclose the required past
No. 09-3448 17
business interests, property transfers, and income as
discussed above shows a reckless disregard sufficient for
the bankruptcy court’s finding of intent under section
727(a)(4), and we do not disturb that finding. See, e.g., In re
Chavin, 150 F.3d at 729 (“Chavin is a mature and experi-
enced businessman . . . .”); In re Scott, 172 F.3d at 970
(discussing expectations of sophisticated debtors under
section 727(a)(3)). The Stamats’ amendments to their filings
on December 7, 2007 and May 8, 2008 also do not negate a
finding of intent or cure the initial failures. See Payne v.
Wood, 775 F.2d 202, 205 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The operation
of the bankruptcy system depends on honest reporting.
If debtors could omit assets at will, with the only
penalty that they had to file an amended claim once
caught, cheating would be altogether too attractive.”).
Finally, a fact is material “if it bears a relationship to
the debtor’s business transactions or estate, or concerns
the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the existence
and disposition of the debtor’s property.” Retz v. Samson,
et al. (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); see also Costello, 299
B.R. at 900. “In determining whether or not an omission
is material, the issue is not merely the value of the
omitted assets or whether the omission was detrimental
to creditors.” Matter of Beaubouef, 966 F.2d 174, 178 (5th
Cir. 1992) (quoting 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 727.04[1], at
727-59). Other courts have held that the debtor “may
not escape a section 727(a)(4)(A) denial of discharge by
asserting that the admittedly omitted or falsely stated
information concerned a worthless business relationship
or holding; such a defense is specious.” Id. (quoting In re
18 No. 09-3448
Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir. 1984)). In other
contexts, we have stated that the “successful functioning
of the Bankruptcy Code hinges both upon the bankrupt’s
veracity and his willingness to make a full disclosure.”
Ross v. RJM Acquisitions Funding LLC, 480 F.3d 493, 496
(7th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Mascolo, 505 F.2d 274, 278
(1st Cir. 1974)). Given that the omitted interests relate to
the Stamats’ estate and assets, we cannot find that the
Stamats’ omissions were immaterial. 6
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the order of the district
court affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of dis-
charge is A FFIRMED.
6
Because we rely on the above omissions to affirm the bank-
ruptcy court’s denial of discharge, we need not address the
existence (or not) of an undisclosed counterclaim, or the
bankruptcy court’s findings under sections 727(a)(2) and
727(a)(5).
3-24-11