FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-16775
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
v. 2:09-cv-00689-
KEVIN BIBBINS, RLH-GWF
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Roger L. Hunt, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
November 5, 2010—San Francisco, California
Filed April 20, 2011
Before: John T. Noonan, Richard A. Paez, and
Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges
Opinion by Judge Paez
5211
5214 UNITED STATES v. BIBBINS
COUNSEL
Richard F. Boulware, Assistant Federal Public Defender, and
Franny A. Forsman, Federal Public Defender, Office of the
Federal Public Defender, Las Vegas, Nevada, for defendant-
appellant Kevin Bibbins.
Roger Yang, Assistant United States Attorney, Robert L. Ell-
man, Appellate Chief, and Daniel G. Bogden, United States
Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office, Las Vegas,
Nevada, for plaintiff-appellee United States of America.
OPINION
PAEZ, Circuit Judge:
After a court trial in front of a magistrate judge, Kevin Bib-
bins was convicted of two misdemeanors: (1) resisting a gov-
ernment employee or agent, in violation of 36 C.F.R.
§ 2.32(a)(1); and (2) obstructing a license plate, in violation
of 36 C.F.R. § 4.2(b) and Nevada Revised Statutes § 482.275.
The charges arose out of a traffic stop that escalated into an
altercation between Bibbins and four park rangers in Lake
Mead National Recreation Area, Nevada. Bibbins appeals
both convictions. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND1
On April 8, 2008, Bibbins was stopped by park rangers
Michelle Schonzeit and Eric Westpfahl while he was driving
a motor home in Lake Mead National Recreation Area. The
motor home was towing a pickup truck. The rangers stopped
1
We draw this factual background from the magistrate judge’s Findings
and Decision and from evidence presented at Bibbins’s trial. Bibbins; park
rangers Brian Lake, Therese Picard, Michelle Schonzeit, and Eric Westp-
fahl; and Dr. Mark Rosen testified at the trial.
UNITED STATES v. BIBBINS 5215
Bibbins to inform him that a garbage bag had slipped over the
back edge of the pickup truck and had obscured the truck’s
license plate. After Bibbins pulled over, Schonzeit
approached the front cabin of the motor home and informed
Bibbins that his truck’s license plate was obscured, to which
Bibbins replied, “You don’t need to see my damn license
plate—it’s there.” Schonzeit then asked Bibbins several times
whether he had any weapons in his vehicle. Bibbins eventu-
ally told Schonzeit that he did not have any weapons. After
dispatching Bibbins’s drivers license and registration informa-
tion to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
(LVMPD), Schonzeit and Westpfahl learned that Bibbins had
an active felony warrant from Clark County, Nevada, and that
Bibbins’s record included prior charges of assaulting officers
and other violent conduct. Schonzeit called for assistance, and
park rangers Brian Lake and Therese Picard soon reported to
the scene. The four rangers all testified that they formulated
a plan to ask Bibbins to exit the motor home and walk to the
back of the truck so that they could arrest him, per the request
of the LVMPD.
Using a microphone, Lake instructed Bibbins to exit the
motor home and walk towards the rangers, who were standing
at the back of the pickup truck. As Bibbins made his way
towards the back of the truck, he was instructed to place his
hands above his head, which he did not do. While walking
towards the rangers, Bibbins announced that his leg was bro-
ken. Three of the rangers testified that they noticed Bibbins
walking with a limp, and they all testified that they heard him
say his leg was broken as he walked towards the back of the
pickup truck. Bibbins was not wearing a walking boot to
immobilize his leg, nor was he using crutches. Bibbins testi-
fied, however, that he had a walking boot in his motor home,
but could not wear it while driving because the width of the
boot made it impossible to operate the pedals. Bibbins testi-
fied that he did not put on his walking boot after being
ordered to leave the motor home because he thought the rang-
ers wanted him to exit immediately. Bibbins also had crutches
5216 UNITED STATES v. BIBBINS
in his pickup truck. An audio recording of the event confirms
that Bibbins told the rangers that his crutches were in the
truck, but the rangers did not allow him to retrieve the
crutches.
When Bibbins reached the back of the pickup truck, he
tightly gripped the truck’s tailgate. Bibbins testified that at
that point, his right leg was very sore from driving without the
walking boot and he was unable to put his full weight on his
right leg. Bibbins further testified that he was worried that his
leg would break again if he put his full weight on it. Bibbins
also testified that he had not taken his prescribed pain medica-
tion that day. Lake testified that he instructed Bibbins not to
grab the back of the truck and ordered Bibbins to spread his
legs. Bibbins responded by repeating that his leg was broken.
The rangers then grabbed Bibbins’s arms and attempted to
pull them behind his back. Lake grabbed Bibbins’s left arm
while Schonzeit and Westpfahl grabbed Bibbins’s right arm.
Picard stood ready to handcuff Bibbins.
At this point, the testimony of the rangers and Bibbins dif-
fers. Bibbins testified that the rangers forced his hands behind
his back, disengaged, and then tased him. The rangers testi-
fied that when they attempted to put Bibbins’s hands behind
his back, he continued to tightly grip the tailgate of the truck
and tensed his arms. The rangers testified that Bibbins then
shifted his weight towards Lake (who was standing to Bib-
bins’s left) and raised his right arm. There is inconsistency
between the rangers as to whether Bibbins actually freed his
right arm from the grip of Schonzeit and Westpfahl. The rang-
ers then let go of Bibbins, backed away, and drew their tasers.
Lake ordered Bibbins to get on the ground, to which Bibbins
responded, “I can’t. My leg is broke.” Lake then immediately
tased Bibbins in two places in his back. The electronic current
from the taser caused Bibbins to fall to the ground. Bibbins
then complied with all of the rangers’ instructions.2
2
It is worth emphasizing that despite the detailed narrative that the rang-
ers provided, the incident happened very quickly. The magistrate judge
UNITED STATES v. BIBBINS 5217
At Bibbins’s trial, Dr. Mark Rosen offered expert testimony
about the nature of Bibbins’s leg injury. Dr. Rosen did not
treat Bibbins, but reviewed all of Bibbins’s medical records.
Dr. Rosen confirmed that Bibbins had broken his leg earlier
in 2008, and that his leg had not healed at the time of his
arrest. At the time of his arrest, Bibbins was under instruc-
tions from his doctor to use his walking boot and crutches and
not to put his full weight on his right leg. Dr. Rosen also testi-
fied that it would have been painful for Bibbins to walk with-
out crutches or his walking boot, and that it was probably
difficult for Bibbins to balance with his legs spread apart. Dr.
Rosen also explained that clutching the tailgate of the pickup
truck was consistent with Bibbins’s testimony that he was try-
ing to avoid putting weight on his injured leg.
In light of all the evidence, the magistrate judge found Bib-
bins guilty of the charged offenses: (1) resisting a government
employee, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1); and (2)
obstructing a license plate, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.2(b)
and Nev. Rev. Stat. § 482.275. The judge sentenced Bibbins
to thirty hours of community service and restricted Bibbins
from entering Lake Mead National Recreation Area for one
year. Bibbins appealed the magistrate judge’s decision to the
assigned district judge, who affirmed the convictions. Bibbins
timely appealed the district court’s final judgment.
II. ANALYSIS
Because Bibbins appeals a final judgment of the district
court, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo a lower court’s interpretation of a federal reg-
observed that “[a]lthough the rangers described the foregoing events in a
deliberate, step-by-step manner, the time counter on the video/audio
recording indicates that only 20 seconds passed from the point at which
Ranger Lake first told [Bibbins] to spread his legs through the completion
of the tazering and handcuffing.”
5218 UNITED STATES v. BIBBINS
ulation. United States v. Hoff, 22 F.3d 222, 223 (9th Cir.
1994) (per curiam). We also review de novo a lower court’s
interpretation of state law. Feldman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322
F.3d 660, 665 (9th Cir. 2003).
A. Resisting a Government Employee
[1] Bibbins was convicted of violating 36 C.F.R.
§ 2.32(a)(1), a regulation of the National Park Service that
prohibits “[t]hreatening, resisting, intimidating, or intention-
ally interfering with a government employee or agent engaged
in an official duty, or on account of the performance of an
official duty.” Specifically, Bibbins was convicted of violat-
ing the “resisting” offense of the regulation.
[2] Bibbins contends that the “resisting” offense of 36
C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1) contains a willfulness element and that the
evidence at trial was insufficient to show that he acted willfully.3
The question of the mens rea requirement for a violation of
the “resisting” offense of § 2.32(a)(1) is one of first impres-
sion for this court. We agree with Bibbins that willfulness is
a necessary element of the “resisting” violation. We ulti-
mately conclude, however, that substantial evidence supports
the magistrate judge’s finding that Bibbins acted willfully.
3
Throughout this opinion, we use the words “willful,” “purposeful,” and
“intentional” interchangeably. See United States v. Awad, 551 F.3d 930,
939 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that “in the criminal context, a ‘willful’ act is
‘one undertaken with a bad purpose’ ”) (quoting Bryan v. United States,
524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998)); United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d
1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a “ ‘purpose’ corresponds to
the concept of specific intent”) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S.
394, 405 (1980); Model Penal Code & Commentaries § 2.02 cmt. at
233-34 (1985)).
UNITED STATES v. BIBBINS 5219
1. Mens Rea of the “Resisting” Offense of 36 C.F.R.
§ 2.32(a)(1)
[3] To determine the mens rea for a violation of the “resist-
ing” term of § 2.32(a)(1), we start with the plain language of
the regulation.4 Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Syl-
vania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); United States v.
Bucher, 375 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Reno v.
Nat’l Trans. Safety Bd., 45 F.3d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“[T]he plain meaning of language in a regulation governs
unless that meaning would lead to absurd results.”). Section
2.32(a)(1) does not explicitly state a mens rea element. We do
not construe this silence to mean that the statute does not
include a mens rea requirement. See United States v. Johal,
428 F.3d 823, 826-27 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e construe [a] stat-
ute in light of the background rules of the common law in
which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly
embedded.”) (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600,
605 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To deduce the
mens rea for a violation of the “resisting” offense of
§ 2.32(a)(1) we must consider the plain meaning of the word
“resisting.” Because “resisting” is undefined in the regulation,
the word “will be interpreted as taking [its] ordinary, contem-
porary, common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S.
37, 42 (1979).
[4] As the magistrate judge noted, the dictionary definition
of the word “resist” is: “to exert oneself to counteract or
defeat, strive against: OPPOSE.” Webster’s Third New Inter-
national Dictionary 1932 (1993 ed.) (capitalization in origi-
4
Besides looking to the plain language of the statute, we typically also
look to the intent of Congress to determine what mental state is required
to prove a violation of a statute. United States v. Nguyen, 73 F.3d 887, 890
(9th Cir. 1995). In this case, a violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1) is a regu-
latory offense. We could not find any relevant regulatory history to advise
us of the mental state requirement for a violation of the “resisting” term
of § 2.32(a)(1). Accordingly, we focus our analysis on the plain language
of the regulation.
5220 UNITED STATES v. BIBBINS
nal). From this definition, we do not think a person can
“resist” someone or something without forming an intention
to do so. Accordingly, we hold that the resisting offense of
§ 2.32(a)(1) includes a mens rea element of willfulness.5
Even if the dictionary definition of “resisting” were
ambiguous—which we do not believe it is—several other
considerations counsel in favor of a willfulness requirement.
First, the structure of § 2.32(a)(1) suggests that willfulness is
a necessary element of the “resisting” offense. We generally
interpret statutory provisions containing multiple enumerated
offenses to require consistent mens rea elements. See United
States v. Vela, 624 F.3d 1148, 1154 n.9 (9th Cir. 2010); see
also United States v. Crews, 621 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir.
2010). We similarly believe that § 2.32(a)(1) should be inter-
preted to require consistent mens rea elements for all of its
enumerated offenses.
We can not help but notice that all of the offenses con-
tained in § 2.32(a)(1) are actions that are typically done with
purpose. The “threatening” offense of § 2.32(a)(1) appears to
contain a willfulness requirement because the dictionary defi-
nition of “threat” expressly includes an intent component. See
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2832 (1993
ed.) (defining a “threat” as an “expression of an intention to
inflict loss or harm on another by illegal means and especially
by means involving coercion or duress of the person threat-
ened.” (emphasis added)). Similarly, the “intimidating”
offense probably contains a willfulness mens rea element
5
We avoid casting our analysis in terms of “specific intent” and “gen-
eral intent,” because these expressions have long been “the source of a
good deal of confusion.” United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403
(1980). Instead, we employ this court’s “preferred practice,” and clarify
the precise mens rea required by § 2.32(a)(1). See United States v. Bell,
303 F.3d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that our court “discourage[s]
the use of generic specific intent instructions” and that “[t]he preferred
practice . . . is [to give] an intent instruction that properly reflects the
intent requirements of the charged offense.”).
UNITED STATES v. BIBBINS 5221
because the verb “intimidate” is defined as “to make timid or
fearful: inspire or affect with fear.” Id. at 1184. Although one
could arguably intimidate someone by accident (for example,
as a person is intimidated by a dangerous animal), it seems
unlikely that the National Park Service would criminalize
accidental intimidation. Thus, we believe the plain meaning of
the “intimidating” offense includes a willfulness requirement.
Finally, we have previously held the obvious: that the “inten-
tionally interfere” offense of § 2.32(a)(1) requires a showing
of the defendant’s intent. Bucher, 375 F.3d at 934. Therefore,
the plain meanings of each of the offenses enumerated in
§ 2.32(a)(1) all suggest that willfulness is required, which
strengthens our conviction that the “resisting” violation also
includes such a mens rea element.
Second, our conclusion that the “resisting” violation of
§ 2.32(a)(1) includes a willfulness element is consistent with
our precedent of frequently interpreting Forest Service regula-
tions to require such an element. As we have explained,
“[s]trict criminal liability is strong medicine, and, accord-
ingly, we have read criminal intent requirements into some
Forest Service regulations, where their language remotely
suggested it.” United States v. Kent, 945 F.2d 1441, 1446 (9th
Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Semenza, 835 F.2d 223,
225 (9th Cir. 1987) (construing 36 C.F.R. § 261.7(a), which
prohibits “allowing unauthorized livestock to enter or be in
the National Forest System” to require the government to
prove that the violator acted willfully); United States v. Laun-
der, 743 F.2d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 1984) (interpreting a statute
that prohibits “permit[ting]” or “suffer[ing]” a fire to spread
out of control in a national forest to require a showing of will-
fulness). Our predilection towards reading an intent element
into regulations of the National Forest Service also supports
our conclusion that in order to prove that a defendant violated
the “resisting” offense of § 2.32(a)(1), the government must
prove that the defendant acted willfully.
Finally, to the extent that “resisting” has a legal meaning
that is distinct from the colloquial definition that we apply
5222 UNITED STATES v. BIBBINS
here, the legal connotation of the term confirms the correct-
ness of our holding that the “resisting” offense of § 2.32(a)(1)
contains an element of willfulness. The Model Penal Code
(“MPC”) defines two generic misdemeanors that are similar
to the “resisting” offense under § 2.32(a)(1), and both of these
MPC definitions require a showing of purposefulness. In par-
ticular, a person commits “Obstructing Administration of Law
or Other Governmental Function” under MPC § 242.1 if he
acts purposefully. Similarly, a person commits “Resisting
Arrest or Other Law Enforcement” under MPC § 242.2 if he
acts “for the purpose of preventing a public servant from
effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other duty.”
(emphasis added). To the extent the “resisting” offense in 36
C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1) was designed to conform to other misde-
meanor offenses that involve resisting an officer or govern-
ment employee, a willfulness mens rea element is appropriate.
Therefore, we conclude that for a defendant to be convicted
of violating the “resisting” offense contained in 36 C.F.R.
§ 2.32(a)(1), the government must prove that the defendant
acted willfully.
2. Bibbins’s Conviction of Violating § 2.32(a)(1)
The magistrate judge correctly analyzed the “resisting”
offense as if it included an intent requirement. We therefore
review for substantial evidence Bibbins’s challenge to the suf-
ficiency of evidence for his conviction.6 United States v.
Douglass, 780 F.2d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir. 1986). There is sub-
6
Bibbins argues that the magistrate judge incorrectly used a preponder-
ance standard in finding that Bibbins intended to resist the rangers.
Although the magistrate judge could have more artfully explained his
weighing of the evidence, “[a]ppellate review does not require that we sus-
pend reason while interpreting the language employed by [magistrate]
judges.” United States v. Pisello, 877 F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir. 1989). We
conclude that the magistrate judge was aware of the government’s obliga-
tion to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and we therefore review
Bibbins’s conviction for substantial evidence. Id.; see also Williams v.
Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006).
UNITED STATES v. BIBBINS 5223
stantial evidence to support a conviction if “after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact” could have found Bibbins guilty. Jack-
son v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in origi-
nal); United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc).
[5] We hold that there was substantial evidence in the
record to support Bibbins’s conviction. Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was evi-
dence that Bibbins tensed his arms and made fists, jerked his
right arm out of Schonzeit’s and Westpfahl’s grip, did not get
on the ground when ordered to do so, and rotated his body to
the right. Despite Bibbins’s uncontradicted testimony that he
was under severe pain during the incident and that he repeat-
edly informed the rangers of his broken leg, a rational fact-
finder could find that Bibbins willfully resisted the rangers.
We therefore conclude that his conviction was supported by
substantial evidence.
3. Bibbins’s Necessity Defense
We must also address Bibbins’s argument that he is entitled
to the necessity defense. During closing argument, Bibbins’s
attorney argued to the magistrate judge that if Bibbins had
intentionally resisted the rangers, he had done so out of neces-
sity. The magistrate judge, however, did not mention the
necessity defense in his written Findings and Decision. Bib-
bins renewed his necessity defense argument in his appeal to
the district judge, but the district judge similarly did not
address the defense in his order. Because Bibbins’s attorney
did not request special findings under Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 23(c), we review the district court’s denial of
Bibbins’s necessity defense for substantial evidence. As
explained above, there is substantial evidence to support the
magistrate judge’s rejection of the necessity defense if “after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prose-
cution, any rational trier of fact” could have rejected the
5224 UNITED STATES v. BIBBINS
defense. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original). In
other words, to prevail, Bibbins must demonstrate that no
rational factfinder, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government, would reject his necessity
defense. Bibbins has not made such a showing.
To succeed on his necessity defense, Bibbins must show:
(1) that he was faced with a choice of evils and
chose the lesser evil; (2) that he acted to prevent
imminent harm; (3) that he reasonably anticipated a
causal relation between his conduct and the harm to
be avoided; and (4) that there were no other legal
alternatives to violating the law.
United States v. Arellano-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1119, 1125-26
(9th Cir. 2001). We agree with the district court’s rejection of
Bibbins’s necessity defense because there is substantial evi-
dence to support a finding that Bibbins was not forced to
choose between two evils.
[6] The first prong of the necessity defense requires a
showing that Bibbins was faced with a choice between two
evils and chose the lesser one. See id. at 1126. This prong
reflects the underlying utilitarian principle of the necessity
defense. United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir.
1992). We have explained that the necessity defense “justifies
criminal acts taken to avert a greater harm, maximizing social
welfare by allowing a crime to be committed where the social
benefits of the crime outweigh the social costs of failing to
commit the crime.” Id. at 196. Bibbins argues that he was
forced to choose between two evils: protecting his leg or
resisting the officers. We disagree.
[7] Even if we assume without deciding that sustaining leg
pain is the kind of “evil” that the necessity defense is
designed to prevent, we think a reasonable factfinder, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
UNITED STATES v. BIBBINS 5225
could find that Bibbins could have protected his leg without
resisting the officers. Specifically, Bibbins could have more
articulately vocalized his need for medical help or proposed
an alternative way to comply with the rangers’ instructions.
We therefore cannot say that no reasonable factfinder would
reject Bibbins’s necessity defense. Accordingly, we hold that
the district court’s rejection of Bibbins’s necessity defense
was supported by substantial evidence, and we affirm his con-
viction of violating 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1).
B. Obstructing a License Plate
[8] Bibbins was also convicted of violating 36 C.F.R.
§ 4.2(b), which prohibits “[v]iolating a provision of [s]tate
law.” The district court held that Bibbins violated Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 482.275, which provides: “[t]he license plates for a
motor vehicle . . . must be attached thereto . . . during the cur-
rent calendar year or registration period.” Section 482.275
also requires that “[e]very license plate must at all times be
securely fashioned to the vehicle . . . in a place and position
to be clearly visible, and must be maintained free from for-
eign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible.” Criti-
cally, § 482.275 applies only to license plates on “motor
vehicles.” Under Nevada law, a “motor vehicle” is defined as
a vehicle that is “self-propelled.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 482.075.
It is undisputed that the license plate on Bibbins’s towed
pickup truck was obstructed by a small garbage bag. The par-
ties dispute whether the pickup truck qualifies as a “motor
vehicle” under Nevada law in light of the fact that the truck
was towed at the time Bibbins was cited for obstructing the
license plate’s visibility.
[9] There is no authority from the Nevada courts that
addresses the question of whether § 482.275 applies to towed
vehicles. In deciding this question of first impression, we
“must use [our] best judgment to predict how the [Nevada]
Supreme Court would decide [the] issue.” Helfand v. Gerson,
105 F.3d 530, 537 (9th Cir. 1997). In so doing, we may “be
5226 UNITED STATES v. BIBBINS
aided by looking to well-reasoned decisions from other juris-
dictions.” Takahashi v. Loomis Armored Car Serv., 625 F.2d
314, 316 (9th Cir. 1980).
[10] Bibbins argues that a towed vehicle, by definition, is
not self-propelled. We disagree. We think the most sensible
interpretation of the term “self-propelled” is that the word
defines a quality rather than an action. To conclude that “self-
propelled” refers to an action would lead to the absurd result
that a vehicle ceases to be a “motor vehicle” under Nevada
law whenever it is parked, stopped, or not powering itself.
[11] We are also persuaded by the courts of other states,
which have uniformly held that the term “self-propelled”
describes a quality that is not abated when a vehicle is not
propelling itself. See, e.g., Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135,
1136 (Utah 1988); State v. Tacey, 150 A. 68, 69 (Vt. 1930);
see also Parnell v. State, 261 S.E.2d 481, 482 (Ga. App.
1979); State v. Ridinger, 266 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Mo. 1954);
Rogers v. State, 183 S.W.2d 572, 572 (Tex. Crim. App.
1944); State v. McGary, 683 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Wash. App.
1984). As the Vermont Supreme Court explained,
“[m]anifestly it was the design, mechanism, and construction
of the vehicle, and not its temporary condition, that the Legis-
lature had in mind when framing the definition of a motor
vehicle.” Tacey, 150 A. at 69. We find this reasoning convinc-
ing. Moreover, two treatises with entries on “motor vehicles”
both conclude that a vehicle remains “self-propelled” when it
is towed or inoperable. See 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 1; 7A
Am.Jur.2d Automobiles § 5.
[12] To support his contention that his pickup truck was
not self-propelled while it was being towed, Bibbins relies on
an opinion by the Nevada Attorney General, which states that
“[a]lthough a dune buggy is capable of self-propulsion, it is
not self-propelled while being towed on the highways of
Nevada, and as such it is not a motor vehicle as defined by
NRS 482.075.” 1969 Nev. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 619 (Septem-
UNITED STATES v. BIBBINS 5227
ber 18, 1969). Opinions of the Nevada Attorney General are
not binding on the Nevada courts. Blackjack Bonding v. City
of Las Vegas Mun. Court, 116 Nev. 1213, 1218 (Nev. 2000).
We are not persuaded by the 1969 opinion, which contains
scant reasoning to support its conclusion that dune buggies
are not motor vehicles while being towed. Because it would
be illogical to consider “self-propelled” an impermanent qual-
ity, we affirm Bibbins’s conviction for obscuring a license
plate, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.2(b).
III. CONCLUSION
Because substantial evidence supports Bibbins’s conviction
for willfully violating 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1), we AFFIRM his
conviction. We also AFFIRM Bibbins’s conviction for violat-
ing 36 C.F.R. § 4.2(b).
AFFIRMED.