Forest Guardians v. United States Forest Services

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

April 21, 2011
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

FOREST GUARDIANS and
CARSON FOREST WATCH,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

No. 06-2306
v. (D.C. No. 1:05-CV-00372-JB-DJS)
(D. N.M.)
UNITED STATES FOREST
SERVICE,

Defendant-Appellee.
.

ORDER

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, and SEYMOUR, TACHA *, KELLY,
LUCERO, MURPHY, HARTZ, O’BRIEN, TYMKOVICH, GORSUCH,
HOLMES, and MATHESON **, Circuit Judges ***.

*
The Honorable Deanell R. Tacha participated in the en banc court’s
consideration of this matter while still on active status. She took senior status
effective January 27, 2011, but has participated fully in this order.
**
The Honorable Scott M. Matheson, Jr., was officially sworn in on
December 30, 2010. However, he did not participate in this order.
***
The Honorable Michael W. McConnell, who participated in the
original panel decision, resigned his commission on August 31, 2009 and did not
participate in the en banc court’s consideration of this matter.
 On March 8, 2010, this court entered an order granting the appellants’

petition for en banc rehearing. Having now considered the parties’ briefs and

heard oral argument on the matter, the court has voted unanimously to vacate the

March 8, 2010 order granting en banc rehearing as improvidently granted. As a

result, that order is vacated.

The case is referred back to the original panel for action on the petition for

panel rehearing. The remaining members of the original panel, who are in

agreement on the matter, 28 U.S.C. § 46(d), grant the appellants’ petition for

panel rehearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40. The

previously issued opinion, Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service, 579 F.3d

1114 (10th Cir. 2009), is withdrawn. The attached opinion is substituted in its

place.

Entered for the Court,

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

2
 FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

April 21, 2011
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

FOREST GUARDIANS and
CARSON FOREST WATCH,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. No. 06-2306

UNITED STATES FOREST
SERVICE,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. 1:05-CV-00372-JB-DJS)

Steven Sugarman (Alletta Belin with him on the brief), Belin & Sugarman, Santa
Fe, New Mexico, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

David C. Shilton, Attorney, Environment & Natural Resources Division,
Department of Justice (Ronald J. Tenpas, Assistant Attorney General; Andrew A.
Smith and Mark R. Haag, Attorneys, Environment & Natural Resources Division,
Department of Justice; Kathryn Toffenetti and Mary Ann Joca, Office of General
Counsel, U.S. Department of Agriculture, with him on the brief), Washington,
D.C., for Defendant-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. ****

PER CURIAM.

ORDER ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

This matter is before the court on Forest Guardians and Carson Forest

Watch’s petition for rehearing. The panel has voted to grant a limited

rehearing to modify some of the language in our panel opinion. The court’s

opinion filed on August 26, 2009, is withdrawn and an amended opinion is

attached to this order.

OPINION

Plaintiffs-Appellants Forest Guardians and Carson Forest Watch

(collectively, “Forest Guardians”) challenge the approval by the United States

Forest Service (“USFS”) of a timber sale and restoration project in New Mexico’s

Carson National Forest, claiming violations of the National Forest Management

Act (“NFMA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600 et seq., and the USFS’s regulations. Forest

Guardians sought declaratory and injunctive relief; the district court denied them

****
The Honorable Michael W. McConnell, who participated in the panel
decision regarding this appeal, resigned his commission on August 31, 2009. As
a result, he did not participate in the reissuance of this opinion. The remaining
two judges are in agreement with respect to this disposition, however. See 28
U.S.C. § 46(d).

-2-
relief and granted judgment in favor of the USFS. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

As part of the National Forest System, the Carson National Forest is

maintained under a land and resource management plan (the “Carson Forest

Plan”), pursuant to the NFMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1604. The Carson Forest Plan was

adopted in 1986 and “sets forth broad, programmatic management direction for

the Carson National Forest.” J. App. at 151 (Admin. R. Excerpt, “Management

Recommendations for the Northern Goshawk in the Southwestern United States,”

dated Aug. 1992); 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e). The Carson Forest Plan includes a

monitoring program that provides that Management Indicator Species (“MIS”) be

identified and that five years of baseline monitoring of each MIS be undertaken,

followed by periodic monitoring of MIS population and trends. MIS are

analogous to the storied canaries of coal mines; “[t]hey are a ‘bellwether’ for

other species that have the same special habitat needs or population

characteristics and serve as a proxy for determining the effects of management

activities on other species.” Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth (UEC II), 439 F.3d

1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Carson Forest Plan, as amended, identified eleven wildlife species, including

-3-
the Abert’s squirrel, 1 as MIS used to monitor the condition of the forest’s

ecosystems. These species were “considered to be representative [of] a variety of

other species . . . and were determined to reflect the habitat needs for the majority

of the forest’s species.” J. App. at 214 (Admin. R. Excerpt, “Supplement to the

Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Agua/Caballos Proposed Projects”).

They “were selected because population changes are believed to indicate the

effects of management activities that occur [in] the forest.” Id.

To implement the Carson Forest Plan, the USFS approves plans and

projects for specific areas of the Carson National Forest. See Ohio Forestry Ass’n

v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 735 (1998). Such projects must be consistent with

the applicable forest plan. Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth (UEC III), 443 F.3d

732, 737 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing the NFMA “consistency clause,” 16 U.S.C. §

1604(i)). The Agua/Caballos Project (“A/C Project”), at issue here, consists of

site-specific silvicultural treatments, 2 timber cutting and sales, and related

1
David R. Patton, A Model to Evaluate Abert Squirrel Habitat in
Uneven-Aged Ponderosa Pine, 12 Wildlife Soc’y Bull. 408, 408 (1984) (“The
Abert squirrel has been described as unique among North American mammals.
This uniqueness is exemplified by its conspicuous tufts of hair on its ears, by
variation in the color pattern of isolated populations, and by its close association
with a single tree species—ponderosa pine . . . .” (citation omitted)). The Abert’s
squirrel is also referred to as the “tassel-eared squirrel.” Aplee. Supp. App. at
414.
2
See generally McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical
Terms 1935 (6th ed. 2003) (defining “silviculture” as “[t]he theory and practice of
controlling the establishment, composition, and growth of stands of trees for any
(continued...)

-4-
activities. The A/C Project was proposed in 1992, and it was first approved by

the USFS in June 2002. Several parties, including the Appellants here,

successfully appealed the approval on the grounds that the plan’s MIS analysis

was incomplete. The A/C Project was remanded to the USFS to complete the

MIS analysis, i.e., to evaluate the effects of the project on the identified MIS, and

to solicit further public comment and issue a new decision.

After the USFS undertook an updated forest-wide MIS assessment and

sought comments, the revised A/C Project was approved in April of 2004 in a

Record of Decision (the “ROD”). On July 12, 2004, Forest Guardians filed an

administrative appeal of the USFS’s final approval of the A/C Project; that appeal

was rejected in August of 2004. Forest Guardians then filed this action in federal

district court alleging that the USFS’s approval of the A/C Project violated the

NFMA, the National Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”), and the USFS’s

regulations. The district court denied relief. The court declined to address the

merits of Forest Guardians’ NEPA claim because it found those claims had not

been administratively exhausted. Similarly, the court declined to reach the merits

of Forest Guardians’ NFMA regulatory claim. Regarding that claim, after

2
(...continued)
of the goods and benefits that they may be called upon to produce”); see also id.
at 2014 (defining “stand” as “[a] group of plants, distinguishable from adjacent
vegetation, which is generally uniform in species composition, age, and
condition”); XVI The Oxford English Dictionary 489 (2d ed. 2001) (defining
“stand” as “[a] standing growth or crop . . . spec. one of trees”).

-5-
determining that the USFS’s 2000 transition regulations applied to the A/C

Project, the court held that Forest Guardians had not administratively exhausted

any claim that the USFS failed to consider the 2000 regulations. Finally, the

district court held that the USFS had not violated either the NFMA’s consistency

provision or its substantive provision. Forest Guardians now appeals. 3

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Because the NFMA does not provide a private right of action, we review

the USFS’s approval of the A/C Project as a final agency action under the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq. UEC III, 443

F.3d at 739. The district court’s decision is considered de novo, but we will not

overturn the decision of the USFS “unless it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. §

706(2)(A)).

While administrative agencies generally are afforded a
presumption of regularity, an agency’s decision will nonetheless
be arbitrary and capricious if the agency entirely . . . failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise. Furthermore, we must determine whether the disputed
decision was based on consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Deference to
the agency is especially strong where the challenged decisions

3
Forest Guardians does not pursue its NEPA claim on appeal.

-6-
 involve technical or scientific matters within the agency’s area
of expertise.

Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Approval of the A/C Project and Administrative Exhaustion

1. Forest Guardians’ Failure to Exhaust

In 1982, the USFS revised its planning regulations (“the 1982 Rules”), 36

C.F.R. pt. 219 (1999), which govern USFS’s management at both the program and

project levels. In November 2000, the USFS significantly amended these

regulations and replaced them with the 2000 planning rules, codified at 36 C.F.R.

pt. 219 (2001). National Forest System Land and Resource Management

Planning, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,514, 67,568–81 (Nov. 9, 2000); see UEC III, 443 F.3d

at 737. Rather than being immediately promulgated, these new regulations

provided that from November 9, 2000, until the promulgation of a new, final rule,

the USFS “must consider the best available science [or “BAS”] in implementing .

. . [a forest] plan.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.35(a) (2001). These transition provisions

ultimately remained effective until new rules were implemented in January 2005;

similarly, these new rules prescribe that the USFS “must take into account the

best available science.” 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1027 (Jan. 5, 2005); see 36 C.F.R. §§

219.11 (2008).

As thoroughly explained by the district court, Forest Guardians had argued

to the agency that the 1982 Rules were applicable to the USFS’s evaluation and

-7-
approval of the A/C Project. J. App. at 79, 83 (Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. & Order, filed

Aug. 22, 2006). Forest Guardians adopted the same position in its initial filings

with the district court. See Aplt. Opening Br. Attach. at 31. Now, on appeal,

Forest Guardians does not dispute the district court’s contrary, accurate

conclusion that the 2000 transition provisions and their BAS standard, rather than

the 1982 Rules, apply to the A/C Project; “any projects proposed during the

transition period must conform with the best available science standard set forth

in the 2000 transition provisions.” UEC III, 443 F.3d at 747; see id. at 746

(concluding, based on the USFS’s interpretive rule adopted in 2004, that “during

the transition period between November 2000 and promulgation of a final rule,

the Forest Service should use the ‘best available science’ under § 219.35(a) for

project decisions” (quoting UEC II, 439 F.3d at 1189) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). 4 Rather, Forest Guardians’ primary argument is directed toward the

USFS’s alleged failure to consider and apply the BAS standard in evaluating the

project and the inequity of expecting Forest Guardians to present arguments

regarding the BAS standard during the administrative appeal process.

4
Because this September 2004 interpretive rule was not issued until
after the administrative appeal process was completed in this case, we point to
that rule only as further support for the now-undisputed conclusion that the 2000
BAS standard was applicable to the A/C Project. National Forest System Land
and Resource Management Planning; Use of Best Available Science in
Implementing Land Management Plans, 69 Fed. Reg. 58,055, 58,055–56 (Sept.
29, 2004). The interpretive rule clearly prescribed that “the 1982 rules are no
longer applicable for projects proposed during the transition period.” UEC III,
443 F.3d at 747.

-8-
 We previously have explained why the applicability of the 1982 Rules

versus the 2000 transition provisions and their BAS standard can be an important

distinction in the evaluation of forest plans:

Deciding whether the 1982 regulations apply to the Project
. . . is important because the 1982 regulations and the 2000
transition provisions contain key differences governing species
monitoring. The 1982 rules, for example, require the Forest
Service to monitor the “population trends of the management
indicator species” and determine “relationships to habitat
changes.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(6). And we have held that
these obligations apply to “project level as well as plan level
management actions.” Conversely, the 2000 transition provisions
contain no such explicit language governing monitoring but
merely require “the responsible official to consider the best
available science in implementing” a forest plan. 36 C.F.R. §
219.35(a), (d) (2001); 65 Fed. Reg. 67,514, 67,579 (Nov. 9,
2000).

UEC III, 443 F.3d at 744–45 (alterations and second citation omitted); see also

UEC II, 439 F.3d at 1190 (stating that “the standards of the 1982 Rules and the

2000 Transitional Rule are—at least—distinct” (quoting Forest Watch v. U.S.

Forest Serv., 410 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 2005))); Sierra Club v. Wagner, 555 F.3d

21, 25 (1st Cir. 2009) (“One might think from the name that ‘best available

science’ is an unexceptionable standard, but according to [the plaintiff], the 1982

rules provided a set of precise tests for evaluating a project’s impact on species

that are more rigorous and were intentionally weakened by the 2000 rules.”).

This court and others have run into confusion in applying the 2000 transition

provisions. See UEC III, 443 F.3d at 745 (citing cases).

-9-
 Forest Guardians asserts that the USFS failed to consider or apply the 2000

BAS standard in planning and approving the A/C Project. Forest Guardians

further argues that the A/C Project’s approval would be affected by the “key

differences” between that standard and the 1982 Rules. Cf. Wagner, 555 F.3d at

25–26 (finding that the plaintiff had forfeited its argument regarding the

applicability of the 1982 Rules when it had neither raised the argument to the

district court nor explained “whether or how the allegedly more rigorous

standards of the 1982 rules would likely have altered the Forest Service’s ultimate

evaluation of the two projects”). The district court, however, determined that

because Forest Guardians failed to raise the BAS argument during the

administrative appeal process—instead arguing that the 1982 Rules

applied—Forest Guardians failed to exhaust this claim, as is necessary for judicial

review. The district court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the

BAS argument. We review de novo the district court’s jurisdictional conclusion.

Urban ex rel. Urban v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 724 (10th

Cir. 1996).

Plaintiffs must exhaust available administrative remedies before the USFS

prior to bringing their grievances to federal court. 7 U.S.C. § 6912(e) 5; 36 C.F.R.

5
The statute prescribes:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person shall exhaust all
administrative appeal procedures established by the Secretary or
(continued...)

-10-
§ 215.21. To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, plaintiffs “generally must

structure their participation so that it alerts the agency to the parties’ position and

contentions, in order to allow the agency to give the issue meaningful

consideration.” Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 495 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th

Cir. 2007) (quoting Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 764 (2004))

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Claims not properly raised before an agency

are waived, unless the problems underlying the claim are ‘obvious’ or otherwise

brought to the agency’s attention.” Id. (citation omitted). The claim must be

presented “in sufficient detail to allow the agency to rectify the alleged

violation.” Id.; see also Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 183 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir.

1999) (“[T]he claims raised at the administrative appeal and in the federal

complaint must be so similar that the district court can ascertain that the agency

was on notice of, and had an opportunity to consider and decide, the same claims

now raised in federal court.”); Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305

F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Claims must be raised with sufficient clarity to

5
(...continued)
required by law before the person may bring an action in a court of
competent jurisdiction against–

(1) the Secretary;

(2) the Department; or

(3) an agency, office, officer, or employee of the Department.

7 U.S.C. § 6912(e).

-11-
allow the decision maker to understand and rule on the issue raised, but there is

no bright-line standard as to when this requirement has been met . . . .”). The

exhaustion requirement thus helps prevent premature claims and “ensure[s] that

the agency possessed of the most expertise in an area be given first shot at

resolving a claimant’s difficulties.” 6 Id.

6
Indeed, courts and legal scholars have opined extensively upon the
numerous policy justifications that support the application of the exhaustion
doctrine in the administrative context. As a theory, “exhaustion promotes the
twin general goals of protecting administrative agency authority and promoting
judicial efficiency.” John C. Dubin, Torquemada Meets Kafka: The
Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine to Inquisitorial Administrative
Proceedings, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1289, 1309 (1997); see also United States v. L.A.
Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952) (“[O]rderly procedure and good
administration require that objections to the proceedings of an administrative
agency be made while it has opportunity for correction in order to raise issues
reviewable by the courts.”). According to Dubin, embodied within these general
goals are four specific objectives:

(1) implementing congressional intent to delegate authority to the
agency by discouraging frequent and deliberate flouting of
administrative procedures; (2) further protecting agency
autonomy by allowing the agency in the first instance to apply its
special expertise and correct its errors; (3) providing more
efficient judicial review by permitting the parties to develop the
facts of the case in the agency proceedings; and (4) promoting
judicial economy by avoiding needless repetition of
administrative and judicial factfinding and perhaps mooting the
judicial controversy.

Dubin, supra, at 1307.

In practice, “the requirement that plaintiffs exhaust their administrative
remedies . . . greatly minimizes the threat of sandbagging”—i.e., the concern that
plaintiffs will “shirk their duty” to raise claims before the agency, “only to
present new evidence at trial that undermines” the agency’s decision. Susannah
(continued...)

-12-
 The district court concluded that § 6912(e)’s exhaustion requirement is

jurisdictional. Administrative exhaustion is often an affirmative defense, rather

than a jurisdictional prerequisite. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007)

(“[T]he usual practice under the Federal Rules is to regard exhaustion as an

affirmative defense.”). Judicially created exhaustion doctrines, in particular, are

prudential in nature. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992),

superseded by statute on other grounds, Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,

Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). But a statutory exhaustion

requirement may be jurisdictional if it provides “more than simply a codification

of the judicially developed doctrine of exhaustion.” Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.

749, 765–66 (1975). We must evaluate each statute separately, showing “regard

for the particular administrative scheme at issue.” Id.; see also McCarthy, 503

U.S. at 144 (“Of ‘paramount importance’ to any exhaustion inquiry is

congressional intent.” (quoting Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 501

(1982))). Among other criteria, we look for “sweeping and direct statutory

6
(...continued)
T. French, Judicial Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA Litigation, 81
Calif. L. Rev. 929, 972–73 (1993); see also Lori Oosterbaan, Note, From
Misapplication to No Application of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine in Social
Security Cases: Sims v. Apfel, 32 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 693, 704 (2001) (explaining
that the exhaustion doctrine “prevents the claimant from unfairly surprising the
agency with new issues upon judicial review”); see also Brotherhood of Ry.,
Airline & S.S. Clerks v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 676 F.2d 132, 139 (5th Cir. 1982)
(“Permitting the parties to hide trumps up their sleeve for appeal can only exalt
endless gamesmanship over fair play and finality of judgment.”).

-13-
language that goes beyond a requirement that only exhausted actions be brought.”

Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Underwood v. Wilson, 151 F.3d 292, 294 (5th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation

marks omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by Bock, 549 U.S. at 214–15;

see also Salfi, 422 U.S. at 757 (noting that the section’s language was “sweeping and

direct and [ ] states that no action shall be brought under § 1331, not merely that

only those actions shall be brought in which administrative remedies have been

exhausted”).

The courts of appeals are split as to whether 7 U.S.C. § 6912(e) is

jurisdictional. See Dawson Farms, LLC v. Farm Serv. Agency, 504 F.3d 592,

603–06 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing the views of the various circuits). We need

not resolve this issue. Regardless of whether it is jurisdictional, the explicit

exhaustion requirement in § 6912(e) is, nonetheless, mandatory. Forest

Guardians, 495 F.3d at 1170; McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144 (“Where Congress

specifically mandates, exhaustion is required.”); see also Bastek v. Fed. Crop Ins.

Corp., 145 F.3d 90, 94–95 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that § 6912(e) “unambiguously

required plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing suit,

and their failure to do so deprived them of the opportunity to obtain relief in the

district court”). Forest Guardians concedes that it did not exhaust its BAS

argument during the administrative process. It suggests that we should excuse the

exhaustion requirement, but its arguments are unavailing.

-14-
 Section 6912(e) does not contain any explicit exceptions to the exhaustion

requirement. However, judicially created exhaustion doctrines are “subject to

numerous exceptions,” McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969), and

several circuits have extended these exceptions to § 6912(e). 7 See Dawson

Farms, 504 F.3d at 606 (discussing § 6912(e) and the “extraordinary

circumstances” and “limited bases” warranting an excuse of administrative

exhaustion); Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 440 F.3d 992,

1000 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that exhaustion under § 6912(e) may be excused “if

the complaint involves a legitimate constitutional claim, if exhaustion would

cause irreparable harm, if further administrative procedures would be futile, or if

the issues to be decided are primarily legal rather than factual” (citation

omitted)); McBride Cotton & Cattle Corp. v. Veneman, 290 F.3d 973, 980–82 (9th

Cir. 2002) (excusing a failure to exhaust under § 6912(e) where the suit alleged a

constitutional claim that was colorable, collateral to the substantive claim, and its

resolution would not serve the purposes of exhaustion because exhaustion would

be futile); cf. Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons

from Environmental Cases, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 26, 64–65 (1984)

(discussing judicially created exceptions to exhaustion in the environmental

litigation context, observing that “exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are

7
But see Bastek, 145 F.3d at 94–95 (refusing to consider exceptions to
§ 6912(e)’s requirement because “courts are not free to dispense with” such a
mandatory statutory exhaustion requirement).

-15-
not clearly delineated,” and arguing that courts “should be more insistent on

requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies in environmental cases” and,

more specifically, that “if there is significant doubt whether the facts fall into an

exception [to the exhaustion doctrine], courts should require exhaustion”). We

have never decided which, if any, of these exceptions are applicable, nor need we

do so now. Even assuming that we could bypass § 6912(e)’s express direction, no

exception is warranted on the facts of this case.

Forest Guardians argues that it would have been futile to present its BAS

challenge to the agency because the USFS has already adopted the position in

federal court that it considered and applied the BAS standard of the 2000

regulations to the A/C Project decision. See Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Civil

Aeronautics Bd., 621 F.2d 369, 370–71 (10th Cir. 1980) (excusing a statutory

exhaustion requirement under agency’s “reasonable grounds” exception because,

inter alia, the agency “in this Court [wa]s adamant in its belief that it does have

the authority to” take the challenged action). But despite the USFS’s perceived

stance on that issue, exhaustion of the BAS argument would not have been

“futile” in the sense that courts have applied this exhaustion exception.

Specifically, there is no argument that: the USFS lacked the authority or the

ability to resolve the challenge to the project approval, see McBride Cotton &

Cattle Corp., 290 F.3d at 982; Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 440 F.3d at 1000–01;

this is purely a question of statutory interpretation, see Frontier Airlines, 621

-16-
F.2d at 371; or the court would not benefit from allowing the USFS to develop a

full administrative record on the issue for our review, see Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins.

Co., 440 F.3d at 1000–02; see also Salfi, 422 U.S. at 765 (“Exhaustion is

generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency

processes, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have an

opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the

benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate

for judicial review.”). Thus, assuming, arguendo, we could excuse § 6912(e)’s

exhaustion requirement, Forest Guardians has not proffered reasons that

demonstrate that an exception is warranted.

Forest Guardians further argues that administrative exhaustion of the BAS

argument should not be required because it would be unfair to require exhaustion

of a claim that it did not know that it had at the time it filed its administrative

appeal. Forest Guardians reasons that when it filed its appeal with the USFS in

July 2004, Tenth Circuit case law indicated that the 1982 Rules would be

applicable to the A/C Project. Forest Guardians points to Utah Environmental

Congress v. Bosworth (UEC I), 372 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2004), which was issued

on June 23, 2004. Related decisions in this circuit dealing with the application of

the 1982 Rules and the 2000 BAS standard were not released until after the

administrative appeal was decided in August 2004. It is true that in UEC I, we

applied the 1982 Rules under the stated rationale that they were the regulations in

-17-
effect in December 2000, the time of the USFS decision at issue. UEC I, 372

F.3d at 1222 n.1. We also noted, however, that the regulations had changed in

2000. Id. In addition, Judge Baldock’s concurrence observed that “the Forest

Service’s adoption of new planning regulations effectively moots the issue [of

interpreting the 1982 Rules] in future cases.” Id. at 1232 n.1 (Baldock, J.,

concurring). Accordingly, even though the 1982 Rules were applied in UEC I,

that same case provided Forest Guardians—pre-administrative appeal—with

notice that the 1982 Rules would not necessarily apply to the A/C Project.

It is not inequitable to require Forest Guardians to have made an argument

about the 2000 BAS standard in July 2004, even if there was some confusion as to

the proper standard. Forest Guardians’ reliance on Bowen v. City of New York,

476 U.S. 467, 482–87 (1986), for the proposition that requiring exhaustion would

be unfair, is misplaced. In Bowen, the Supreme Court waived the administrative

exhaustion requirement because plaintiffs had been subjected to an “unrevealed

policy that was inconsistent in critically important ways with established

regulations.” Id. at 485. Here, by contrast, the published federal regulation in

effect on the date Forest Guardians filed its administrative appeal indicated that

during the transition period beginning November 9, 2000, “the responsible

official must consider the best available science in implementing and, if

appropriate, amending the current plan.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.35(a); see also Forest

Watch, 410 F.3d at 118 (“[T]he plain language of the 2000 Transitional Rule

-18-
dictates that the ‘best available science’ standard applies when the agency is

‘implementing’ a forest plan during the relevant time period.”). Thus, rather than

being victimized by an unpublished policy, Forest Guardians was provided notice

by the plain language of the regulation that the applicability of the 2000 BAS

standard was, at the very least, a pertinent issue. In addition, the ensuing

uncertainty regarding the application of the 1982 Rules and the 2000 BAS

standard was commented upon publicly by courts as well as the USFS prior to the

filing of Forest Guardians’ administrative appeal. See, e.g., Citizens for Better

Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 967–69 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting

concerns that arose regarding the 2000 transition provisions); National Forest

System Land and Resource Management Planning; Extension of Compliance

Deadline, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,552 (May 17, 2001). We would expect such public

commentary to have conveyed to a litigant the potential applicability of the BAS

standard to a project in July 2004 and, consequently, the reasonableness of

advancing an argument relating to that standard, even if only as an alternative to a

1982 Rules argument.

Therefore, because Forest Guardians did not argue during the

administrative process that USFS failed to consider and apply the 2000 BAS

standard when it implemented the A/C Project, we conclude that Forest Guardians

failed to adequately present the BAS argument in its administrative appeal and

thus has forfeited it. See Forest Guardians, 495 F.3d at 1171; cf. Utah Envtl.

-19-
Cong. v. Troyer (UEC IV), 479 F.3d 1269, 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 2007)

(McConnell, J., dissenting in part) (“At no point has plaintiff UEC argued that the

projects violated the ‘best available science’ standard . . . . If UEC had argued

that the decisions in question were deficient under the ‘best available science’

standard, the Forest Service would have been able to respond, and the district

court would have been able to make appropriate findings.”). Therefore, we do not

reach the merits of Forest Guardians’ BAS claim. 8

8
Forest Guardians suggests that our decision in Ecology Center, Inc.
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2006), requires us to reverse the
approval of the A/C Project. In Ecology Center, the USFS had approved a project
based on the 1982 Rules. Id. at 1192. However, we concluded that the 2000
transition provisions, and in particular the BAS standard, applied. Id. at 1191–92.
We pointed out that neither party had provided the Record of Decision, and that
the excerpt of the ROD offered by the Forest Service “does not even include the
phrase ‘best available science’ anywhere in the pages provided.” Id. at 1192 n. 3.
We noted that “‘a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment
which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the
propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.’” Id. at
1195 (alteration omitted) (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196
(1947)). Because the USFS applied the wrong standard, we remanded the case to
the district court with instructions to vacate the approval of the project.
Moreover, we did so without regard to the specific challenges raised by the
plaintiffs. Id. (“[W]e need not decide if Ecology Center’s myriad of pointed
arguments regarding Forest Services’s failure to comply with the Forest Plan’s
habitat and monitoring requirements demonstrates that the Forest Service engaged
in a clear error of judgment when it approved the Griffin Springs Project.”). We
reached a similar decision in UEC IV, 479 F.3d at 1287–88, and in Utah Envtl.
Cong. v. Richmond (UEC V), 483 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that
“we are faced with the same scenario we encountered in Ecology Center”).

As we proceed to hold in the following section, however, the USFS in this
case applied the correct standard—the best available science—as well as the 1982
Rules. Thus, while the USFS’s failure to consider the “best available science” in
(continued...)

-20-
 2. Forest Guardians’ Chenery Argument

The Supreme Court’s decision in SEC v. Chenery Corporation stands for

the proposition that a reviewing court may not affirm an agency decision based on

reasoning that the agency itself never considered in its administrative

proceedings. See Chenery, 318 U.S. at 87. Forest Guardians contends that

affirmance of the district court’s order would violate Chenery because we would

be upholding the USFS’s decision when it “did not consider or mention – let

alone apply – the controlling ‘best available science’ standard of the 2000

regulations when it planned and authorized the Agua-Caballos timber sale

project.” Pl-Aplt’s Amended Reply Br. at 1.

We disagree. Even assuming, arguendo, that the practical effect of the

district court’s decision was to permit USFS to prevail on the merits against

Forest Guardians based on the BAS standard, we conclude that this outcome

would not contravene Chenery. To be sure, the USFS approved the A/C Project

under the 1982 Rules. But it could also approve the project at the same time as

representing the best available science. And our review of the record shows that

the USFS did just that.

In Chenery, managers of the Federal Water Service Corporation (“Federal”)

sought approval of a corporate reorganization plan by the Securities and

8
(...continued)
Ecology Center and UEC IV required us to remand its decisions in those cases, we
need not do so here.

-21-
Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Chenery, 318 U.S. at 82. The plan provided

that the company’s class B common stock would be surrendered for cancellation,

and that its preferred and class A common stock would be converted into common

stock of a new corporation. Id. at 84. While the plan was pending, several

officers, directors, and controlling stockholders of Federal (collectively,

“respondents”) purchased over 12,000 shares of preferred stock in the new

company. Id. Aware of this development, the SEC approved of Federal’s

reorganization plan only upon the condition that the preferred stock that the

respondents acquired would not be permitted to share on parity with other

preferred stock, reasoning that respondents, as managers of Federal, were

fiduciaries who were obligated under their “duty of fair dealing” to refrain from

trading in the securities of the corporation while the reorganization plan was

pending. Id. at 85. In reaching this conclusion, the SEC’s “opinion plainly

show[ed] that . . . [its] decision . . . was explicitly based upon the applicability of

principles of equity announced by courts.” Id. at 87. The respondents then

challenged the SEC’s conditional approval of the reorganization plan in federal

court.

On appeal, the SEC defended its decision under the court-announced

equitable principles. Id. at 88–89. Additionally, however, it offered an

alternative justification for its decision: even if the court declined to uphold its

decision on equitable grounds, “the order should nevertheless be sustained

-22-
because the effect of trading by management is not measured by the fairness of

individual transactions between buyer and seller, but by its relation to the timing

and dynamics of the reorganization which the management itself initiates and so

largely controls.” Id. at 90 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In addressing the SEC’s arguments, the Court first rejected its reliance

upon principles of equity, concluding that, contrary to the SEC’s determination,

“courts do not impose upon officers and directors of a corporation any fiduciary

duty to its stockholders which precludes them, merely because they are officers

and directors, from buying and selling the corporation’s stock.” Id. at 88. Next,

the Court suggested that the SEC’s alternative argument potentially could have

supported its decision. Id. 90–92. However, it explicitly declined to consider the

merits of that argument, concluding that the SEC’s “action must be judged by the

standards which the Commission itself invoked.” Id. at 89 (emphasis added).

Because the SEC’s alternative argument was not “[that] upon which its action was

based,” the Court held that its decision could not be sustained on that ground. Id.

at 92.

Therefore, in Chenery, the Supreme Court endeavored to preclude agencies

from fashioning post-hoc justifications for their actions. See, e.g., Allen v.

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[T]o the extent a harmless-error

determination rests on . . . matters not considered by the [administrative law

judge], it risks violating the general rule against post hoc justification of

-23-
administrative action recognized in SEC v. Chenery . . . and its progeny.”

(citation omitted)); NLRB v. Indianapolis Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., 802 F.2d 280,

285 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The [agency’s] appellate counsel cannot fill in the holes in

the agency’s decision . . . .”).

In complying with the Chenery principle, we must “look to the [agency’s]

opinion” in order to “ascertain the precise basis of its determination.” 318 U.S. at

87. In other words, we must thoroughly examine the administrative record to

ensure that the agency’s proffered justifications for its decision reflect the

reasoning upon which it actually relied. And our prior cases involving the 2000

transitional rules did exactly that, examining the USFS’s decisions and the

underlying documents to ascertain whether the agency made reference to the 2000

rules or to the BAS standard. Compare UEC IV, 479 F.3d at 1287 (“Although we

have concluded that the Forest Service was bound to apply the best available

science standard . . . it is obvious from the record on appeal that the Forest

Service failed to do so.”), and UEC V, 483 F.3d at 1136 (“In this case, there is no

evidence that the Forest Service utilized the ‘best available science’ standard . . . .

Indeed, the ROD approving the project never used the phrase ‘best available

science,’ much less considered the substantive quality of the science utilized in

approving the project.”), with Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Russell (UEC VI), 518 F.3d

817, 830 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Although the Forest Service did not specifically cite

the 2000 regulation requiring application of the best available science standard in

-24-
its Decision Notice, the administrative record establishes that the agency

considered the best available science . . . .”).

As in UEC VI, our examination of the record before us reveals that, even

though the USFS did not explicitly cite the 2000 transitional rules in the ROD

pertaining to the A/C Project, it considered and relied upon what it believed to be

the BAS when it approved the Project. 9 See UEC VI, 518 F.3d at 830. More

specifically, we conclude that the record in this case is far from “barren,” see

Chenery, 318 U.S. at 93, of any indication that the USFS applied the BAS

standard.

As the district court recognized, the A/C Project ROD explicitly stated that

the USFS was relying upon the “best available scientific information” when it

approved the A/C Project. See J. App. at 87 (“The ‘monitoring plan, like the EIS,

is based on the best available scientific information at this time, some of which is

referenced in the EIS.’” (emphasis added) (quoting J. App. at 291 (A/C Project

9
Indeed, the district court recognized this possibility. At a July 20,
2006, hearing the court stated:

But there’s nothing in the UEC [III] decision that says that the
agency can’t have considered both standards. And even though
the agency doesn’t cite to the 2000 transition provision, they do
say that they were using the best available scientific information.

Unlike Ecology Center, here the Forest Service did
consider the best available science standard, as they stated in the
ROD . . . .

J. App. at 361 (Mot. Hr’g Tr., dated July 20, 2006) (emphasis added).

-25-
ROD, dated May 2004))). As the A/C Project ROD explains, the Project was

designed to comply with the Carson Forest Plan, as well as the amendments to

that Plan. Id. at 298. In the ROD regarding the 1996 Amendment to the Carson

Plan, the USFS observed that it had employed “[t]he best available scientific data

and information on habitat needs for goshawk and Mexican spotted owl . . . to

develop and evaluate the proposed action and alternatives,” Aplee. Supp. App. at

432 (1996 Amendment ROD) (emphasis added), and recognized that the

“Management Recommendations for Northern Goshawk in the Southwestern US

[(Reynolds, et al. 1992)]” (“Reynolds Report”), was the “best known information

on northern goshawk management in [the] Region,” id. at 428 (emphasis added);

see also id. at 426 (“There was no compelling proof that other information or

recommendations offered were better than the science my resource specialists

used.” (emphasis added)). The Reynolds Report is then cited in the A/C Project

ROD, see J. App. at 293, in the Final Environmental Impact Statement to the

Agua/Caballos Project (“FEIS”), see Aplee. Supp. App. at 449, 480, in the

subsequent Final Supplement to the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the

Agua/Caballos Proposed Projects (“FSFEIS”), see Aplee. Supp. App. at 480, 492,

524, and in the Management Indicator Species Assessment for the Carson

National Forest (“MIS”), see J. App. at 199, 206. 10 Since the A/C Project

10
The Reynolds Report “describe[s] the Abert’s squirrel as an
important prey species for the goshawk.” J. App. at 199. At the very least then,
(continued...)

-26-
implemented the Carson Forest Plan, as amended in 1996, this demonstrates that

the USFS considered and applied what it believed to be the best available

science—the Reynolds Report—when it approved the Project. See J. App. at 289

(discussing the 1996 Amendment in the introductory section).

Moreover, the record contains evidence that the USFS also considered what

Forest Guardians proffered as the “best available science” when it approved the

A/C Project. In its supplemental brief addressing this court’s inquiry regarding

evidence of the BAS standard in the administrative record, Forest Guardians

criticized the USFS’s reliance upon the Reynolds report, contending that Dr.

Jennifer Frey’s 2003 Monitoring Report (“Frey Report”), J. App. at 227– 45, and

Dr. Norris Dodd’s Management Guidelines (“Dodd Guidelines”) represented the

“best available science” at the time that the A/C Project was approved. See Aplt.

Supp. Br. at 2–4, 6. Both the Frey Report and the Dodd Guidelines, however, are

referenced repeatedly throughout the FSEIS. See Aplee. Supp. App. at 496, 503,

518. Furthermore, the USFS actually relied upon these documents, concluding

10
(...continued)
the Reynolds Report’s management analysis with respect to the goshawk was
directly germane to the management and viability of the Abert’s squirrel, the MIS
at issue here. See Aplee. Supp. App. at 415 (presenting the Reynolds Report’s
analysis of “[s]pecial [h]abitat [n]eeds” of the Abert’s squirrel); see also id.
(listing the Abert’s squirrel (i.e., “[t]assel-eared squirrel”) as one of the prey
species of the goshawk and noting that “information” concerning the “special
habitat needs” of “these selected prey species” was “gleaned” from the scientific
“literature” in “identify[ing] a set of ‘desired forest conditions’ needed to provide
abundant and sustainable populations of each of these species”).

-27-
that “[s]urveys for Abert’s squirrel activity areas in stands identified for treatment

in the Agua/Caballos analysis area [would] be based on Dodd and Frey.” Id. at

503 (emphasis added). In sum, in formulating and finalizing the A/C Project

ROD, the USFS considered the “best available science”—as the substance of that

term was understood in this case by the USFS and by Forest Guardians.

It should not be very surprising that the USFS relied upon the BAS to

ensure that the A/C project complied with the 1982 Rules. Operating under the

1982 Rules, the USFS was required to rely on scientific evidence offered by

experts who had studied the particular species that the Project impacted. For

example, the 1982 Rules required an interdisciplinary scientific approach in

creating forest plans and implementing the goals of the regulations and the plans.

See 36 C.F.R. § 219.5 (1983). In pertinent part, the Rules provided:

(a) A team representing several disciplines shall be used for
regional and forest planning to insure coordinated planning of the
various resources. Through interactions among its members, the
team shall integrate knowledge of the physical, biological,
economic and social sciences, and the environmental design arts
in the planning process. . . .
....

(b) In appointing team members, the responsible line officer shall
determine and consider the qualifications of each team member
on the basis of the complexity of the issues and concerns to be
addressed through the plan. The team shall collectively represent
diverse specialized areas of professional and technical
knowledge applicable to the planning area, and the team
members shall have recognized relevant expertise and experience
in professional, investigative, scientific, or other responsible
work in speciality areas which they collectively represent. The

-28-
 team may consist of whatever combination of Forest Service staff
and other Federal government personnel is necessary to achieve
an interdisciplinary approach. The team is encouraged to consult
other persons when required specialized knowledge does not
exist within the team itself.

Id. § 219.5(a), (b) (emphasis added). With respect to the management of wildlife

resources (such as the Abert’s Squirrel, which is the subject of the controversy in

this case), the 1982 Rules provided:

Fish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable
populations of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate
species in the planning area. For planning purposes, a viable
population shall be regarded as one which has the estimated
numbers and distribution of reproductive individuals to insure its
continued existence is well distributed in the planning area. . . .

(a) Each alternative shall establish objectives for the maintenance
and improvement of habitat for management indicator species
selected under paragraph (g)(1) of this section, to the degree
consistent with overall multiple use objectives of the alternative.
To meet this goal, management planning for the fish and wildlife
resource shall meet the requirements set forth in paragraphs
(a)(1) through (a)(7) of this section.

Id. § 219.19 & (a) (emphasis added). With respect to the habitat of management

indicator species (of which the Abert’s Squirrel is the relevant one in this case),

subparagraph (a)(1) provided:

On the basis of available scientific information, the
interdisciplinary team shall estimate the effects of the changes in
vegetation type, timber age classes, community composition,
rotation age, and year-long suitability of habitat related to
mobility of management indicator species. Where appropriate,
measures to mitigate adverse effects shall be prescribed.

Id. § 219.19(a)(1) (emphasis added).

-29-
 Therefore, this is not a situation where USFS’s consideration of the BAS

would have involved a dramatic shift in the methodology it employed under the

1982 Rules. In contrast, the alternative arguments that the SEC advanced in

Chenery were completely different. See Chenery, 318 U.S. at 92–93 (contrasting

the SEC’s argument in agency proceedings, where “it purported merely to be

applying an existing judge-made rule of equity,” with its additional argument

before the Court , where it “rel[ied] upon ‘its special administrative

competence’”). Furthermore, while the 2000 transitional rules eliminated the

need for site-specific projects to jump through the procedural hoops of the 1982

Rules regarding monitoring during the transitional period, as UEC III makes

clear, the USFS was obliged to evaluate the environmental impact on the habitat

of relevant species of proposed site-specific projects on the basis of the scientific

information available, under the new BAS requirement. See UEC III, 443 F.3d at

746–47.

The USFS still had to comply of course with the dictates of specific forest

plans, which often included monitoring requirements. The Carson Plan under

which the A/C Project operated embodied extensive monitoring requirements.

The “Monitoring Plan,” J. App. at 138, indicates the monitoring method,

frequency, expected precision/reliability, and other outputs that the Carson Forest

Plan requires, see id. at 602. It further explains that the “population and habitat

trends of management indicating species” and the “[p]opulation and habitat trends

-30-
of State and Federally listed plants and animals and sensitive species” will be the

“[i]tems [m]onitored,” id. at 602.

However, the fact that the USFS felt obliged under the Carson Plan to

endeavor to clear the procedural hurdles set out in the 1982 Rules is immaterial to

the Chenery question—that is, the question of whether the district court was

required to vacate the agency decision because it failed to apply the BAS

standard. As to that question, the relevant inquiry is whether “the agency

considered the best available science,” even though it “did not specifically cite

the 2000 regulations requiring application of the best available science standard.”

UEC VI, 518 F.3d at 830. And we have answered that inquiry in the affirmative. 11

In sum, we conclude that, even though it did not explicitly cite the 2000

transitional rules in formulating and finalizing the A/C Project, the USFS did

exactly what the plain language of those rules directed it to do: “consider the best

available science in implementing and, if appropriate, amending the current

plan.” 36 C.F.R. § 219.35 (emphasis added). Because it is clear from the record

that the USFS considered and applied what it believed to be the best available

science in approving the A/C Project, even if we assume that the practical effect

of the district court’s decision was to rule in favor of USFS on Forest Guardian’s

BAS challenge, Chenery would not bar this result.

11
Indeed, the Monitoring Plan itself relied upon the “[p]oint-counting
method developed by Reynolds.” J. App. at 144.

-31-
C. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B)

Forest Guardians next asserts that the A/C Project runs counter to the

Carson Forest Plan and the NFMA’s substantive obligation to “provide for

diversity of plant and animal communities based on the suitability and capability

of the specific land area in order to meet overall multiple-use objectives.” 16

U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B); UEC II, 439 F.3d at 1188. Forest Guardians argues that

the USFS’s explanation for its approval of the A/C Project runs counter to the

evidence that was before the agency. See UEC III, 443 F.3d at 739. Specifically,

Forest Guardians contends that the approval was arbitrary and capricious because

the project’s detrimental effects on the Abert’s squirrel is incompatible with the

NFMA requirement to protect species diversity. Although the USFS argues that

this project-specific argument should fail because the NFMA’s statutory diversity

requirements apply to forest plans rather than particular projects, we have

recognized that individual projects, as well as the overarching forest plan, must

comply with the NFMA. UEC II, 439 F.3d at 1188 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i)).

Forest Guardians’ basic argument is that the A/C Project violates the

NFMA substantive requirement to provide for diversity because, even though

population levels for the Abert’s squirrel are below the USFS’s minimum viable

population threshold and are declining, the A/C Project calls for the destruction of

-32-
additional squirrel habitat, which will lead to further decline in population. 12 The

case that Forest Guardians cites for the proposition that the NFMA mandates the

maintenance of minimum viable populations of certain species as part of the

USFS’s § 1604(g)(3)(B) obligation actually relies on a version of the now-

superseded 1982 Rules. See Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc., 305 F.3d at 961 (quoting

36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1999) 13). The ROD for the A/C Project itself, however, does

prescribe that “viable populations” of MIS be maintained. See J. App. at 291.

Even assuming that a failure to maintain a viable population of Abert’s squirrel

could equate to a violation of the statutory diversity requirement of §

1604(g)(3)(B), however, Forest Guardians ultimately fails to carry its heavy

burden to establish that the USFS’s conclusion regarding environmental impact

and the effect of the A/C Project on the Abert’s squirrel ran counter to the

12
Forest Guardians also had argued to the district court that the USFS’s
approval was inconsistent with the Carson Forest Plan because that plan required
the Abert’s squirrel be maintained at populations “greatly exceeding minimum
viable populations.” Aplt. Opening Br. Attach. at 39–40, 45. The district court
rejected this argument, noting that while the “greatly exceeding” language had
appeared in documents used in the planning process, it did not appear in the forest
plan itself. On appeal, Forest Guardians does not pursue this assertion. Nor does
Forest Guardians dispute that this language did not appear in the Carson Forest
Plan or argue that it had been incorporated into the plan as a mandatory standard.
See Ecology Ctr. v. Castaneda, 574 F.3d 652, 660 (9th Cir. 2009) .
13
When in effect, 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 had read in part: “Fish and
wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable populations of existing native
and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area. For planning
purposes, a viable population shall be regarded as one which has the estimated
numbers and distribution of reproductive individuals to insure its continued
existence is well distributed in the planning area.”

-33-
evidence before the agency.

The Carson Forest Plan itself specifically had been developed with

favorable effects on the Abert’s squirrel in mind: “By creating a diversity of

stand conditions and providing juxtaposition of stands over time and space,

suitable habitat components of Abert[’s] . . . squirrels will be maintained over

time.” 14 J. App. at 137. Numerous planning documents and the ROD show the

extensive analysis undertaken in connection with the A/C Project and reflect the

USFS’s rationale for its conclusion that the A/C Project is compliant with the

Carson Forest Plan and the NFMA, including with regard to the Abert’s squirrel.

In its 2003 forest-wide MIS assessment, for example, the USFS collected and

assessed data on the Abert’s squirrel, including the effects of various management

activities on its habitat types, its habitat trends, and quantitative population trend

data and viability. The assessment noted that while “[i]ndiscriminate logging can

degrade Abert’s squirrel habitat,” and “historic heavy harvesting” and fire

suppression have resulted in a less diverse habitat in certain vegetation structural

stages, the current habitat condition for the Abert’s squirrel “is poor to fair, but in

a slight upward trend.” J. App. at 201.

This thorough assessment concluded that in contrast to historical practices,

14
See generally Patton, supra note 1, at 409 (noting that “unlike other
tree squirrels, [the Abert’s squirrel] does not store food for winter use” and is
dependent on trees for its existence and that “[e]vidence and field experience
indicate that tree density, size, and dispersion pattern contribute to squirrel
habitat”); see also supra note 2 (offering definitions of “stand”).

-34-
“[m]ore recent management has tended to focus on thinning from below” and

“group selections across the Forest”—practices that “enhance[] Abert’s squirrel

habitat” and “that in turn should assure its survival.” Id. at 202. Examining

various sources of data, the MIS assessment concluded that the Abert’s squirrel

population in the Carson National Forest is “stable, but likely lower than

potential” and they are “in no danger of extinction.” Id. at 204. Overall, the

USFS concluded, “the Carson National Forest is sustaining viable populations of

Abert’s squirrel. Continued implementation of prescribed burning and thinning

should continue to improve the squirrel’s habitat.” Id.

The 2003 Supplement to the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the

project considered the findings of that 2003 MIS assessment—including an

extensive, Abert’s-squirrel-specific examination of environmental factors, habitat

conditions and trends, population trend and viability, and effect of proposed

activities—and determined that, over the long term, implementation of any of the

proposed alternatives for the A/C Project “would either maintain or improve

habitat conditions and populations for [MIS].” Id. at 215. Also used in the

planning process was the 2004 Final Supplement to the Final Environmental

Impact Statement for the A/C Project. This report explained that twelve years of

environmental analysis had gone into the A/C Project, extensively described

habitat and population developments for the Abert’s squirrel, and reported that

the project “would maintain an upward trend for Abert’s squirrel quality habitat

-35-
across the Carson National Forest.” Id. at 247, 248–50. Thus, the ROD concluded

that the A/C Project would “contribute to improving or maintaining [MIS] habitat

and sustaining their populations on the Carson National Forest.” Id. at 292. The

ROD prescribed that prior to implementation of activities within squirrel habitats,

stands within those habitats would be reevaluated for Abert’s squirrel activity and

treatments would be deferred within high-activity areas. Id. at 291.

We grant considerable discretion and deference to federal agencies on

matters that require a high level of technical or scientific expertise. Marsh v. Or.

Natural Res.

Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989); UEC III, 443 F.3d at 739. Although Forest

Guardians alleges that the evidence shows that there has been a decline in the

Abert’s squirrel population, that the population is below optimal levels, and that

the decline was caused at least partly by USFS timber sales, we do not find that it

has demonstrated that the agency’s A/C Project decision runs counter to the

evidence. Specifically, none of the evidence pointed to by Forest Guardians

sufficiently supports its proposition that if “the USFS has authorized destruction

of some of the Abert’s squirrel remaining habitat” then it follows that “the A-C

project decision violates the USFS’s statutory duty” under the NFMA. Aplt.

Opening Br. at 55. Forest Guardians points to isolated statements—contained in a

2003 report from a monitoring program initiated by the USFS—that note some

declines in the Abert’s squirrel population densities within the Carson National

-36-
Forest and conclude that logging and “intensive, widespread thinning” can have

an adverse effect on the habitat and population of that species. J. App. at 229–30,

238. The report also opines that compared to previous estimates, the squirrel

densities observed were extremely low after a major decline in 2002.

This same report, however, concluded that its density estimates might be

artificially low due to the timing of the monitoring and that climate-related

factors may account for some of the decline. “Though a party may cite studies

that support a conclusion different from the one the Forest Service reached, it is

not our role to weigh competing scientific analyses.” Castaneda, 574 F.3d at 659.

Running throughout Forest Guardians’ argument appears to be the general

assumption that any timber harvesting equates to negative effects on the Abert’s

squirrel habitat and population. Without more, Forest Guardians’ sparse evidence

and its unproven proposition cannot defeat the USFS’s contrary conclusion. See

J. App. at 202 (“Management practices of thinning from below and group

selections across the Forest enhance[] Abert’s squirrel habitat[, which] in turn

should assure its survival.”); cf. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 997 (9th

Cir.) (“A habitat disturbance does not necessarily mean that a species’ viability

will be threatened.”), abrogated in part on other grounds by Winter v. Natural

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), as recognized by Am. Trucking Ass’ns

v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 & n.10 (9th Cir.2009).

We find that the USFS’s approval was not arbitrary and capricious and its

-37-
explanation did not run counter to the evidence before it. It was rational for the

agency to conclude that the A/C Project was consistent with the mandates of the

NFMA and the Carson Forest Plan, including in its effect on the Abert’s squirrel.

The USFS did not violate the NFMA’s statutory requirement to provide for

species diversity by approving the A/C Project.

D. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i)

Finally, Forest Guardians contends that the A/C Project is not consistent

with the Carson Forest Plan’s monitoring requirements and therefore violates the

NFMA “consistency provision.” 15 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i); Ohio Forestry Ass’n, 523

U.S. at 730 (noting that before the USFS can begin a project it must “ensure that

the project is consistent with the [applicable] Plan”). More specifically, Forest

Guardians asserts that the A/C Project violates the requirement imposed to

monitor population trends of MIS species in the site-specific project area. The

monitoring program of the Carson Forest Plan states: “The purpose of monitoring

and evaluating the implementation of the Forest Plan is to inform the decision

15
Although Forest Guardians previously had framed this argument as a
violation of the monitoring requirements of the 1982 Rules, a deficient
monitoring claim still may be viable, regardless of whether the 1982 Rules were
incorporated into the applicable forest plan, if the monitoring provisions are part
of the plan itself. UEC V, 483 F.3d at 1135–36 (“[T]he Forest Service is
obligated to apply the new regulations and is also bound to apply the terms of the
1986 forest plan, including the obligation to monitor the management indicator
species listed in the plan, to the extent the plan does not conflict with the ‘best
available science’ standard.”); see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(f) (2005) (noting that
the USFS must comply with plans developed prior to November 9, 2000, that
“specifically require[] population monitoring or population surveys” for MIS).

-38-
maker of the progress toward achieving the goals, objectives, and standards and

guidelines.” J. App. at 138. Monitoring also will determine whether “standards

are being followed” and “if the effects of implementing the Forest Plan are

occur[r]ing as predicted.” Id. As discussed above, the monitoring program

requires that MIS be identified and that five years of baseline data of each MIS be

collected, followed by periodic monitoring of MIS population and habitat trends.

The A/C Project likewise adopted a monitoring plan, to be periodically assessed

and updated, designed to apprise interested parties “of progress toward the goals

and objectives” and “provide information on the impacts of [USFS] activities on

[MIS] to ensure viable populations are maintained.” Id. at 291.

Forest Guardians asserts that the USFS failed to comply with the

monitoring requirements and methodologies of the Carson Forest Plan, including

the requirement to acquire five years of baseline data, and thus the approval of the

A/C Project is inconsistent with the plan. Cf. UEC III, 443 F.3d at 749 (“In

essence, [the plaintiff] argues that the Forest Plan requires the collection of . . .

data as a condition precedent to the approval of the . . . [p]roject.”). Regardless

of whether the A/C Project’s monitoring is deficient, however, no cognizable

claim regarding this alleged failure exists, because the project’s approval was not

conditioned upon meeting monitoring requirements. This court has clarified that

while a forest plan’s forest-wide monitoring program does not constitute final

agency action, “we may review a monitoring program to the extent it bears on the

-39-
approval of a particular project.” Id. “[I]f a project’s approval is conditioned

upon the fulfillment of certain monitoring obligations, a plaintiff may bring a

claim of deficient monitoring. Without such a relationship, a claim of deficient

monitoring simply is not cognizable.” Id. at 750; see also UEC V, 483 F.3d at

1134 (noting that the plaintiff must establish “the required nexus” between the

monitoring and the project approval).

While the Carson Forest Plan monitoring program does outline that MIS

should be monitored, there is nothing in the program that conditions approval of

any individual project—such as the A/C Project—on fulfillment of these

monitoring goals. Indeed, the monitoring program appears to contemplate

monitoring being conducted on a forest-wide, rather than project-wide, level, and,

further, being “at best tentative and exploratory.” J. App. at 149. The Carson

Forest Plan is distinguishable from those in cases where we have found a showing

of “the required nexus” between the monitoring and the project. In UEC V, for

example, the forest plan prescribed that if certain conditions were revealed during

the monitoring process, then further evaluation or a change in management

direction could occur. UEC V, 483 F.3d at 1133. In other words, that plan laid

out a specific standard that made the monitoring requirements a condition

precedent to management activities. Id. at 1134. In UEC II, we found that a

project approval by the USFS did not satisfy the monitoring provisions of the

applicable forest plan with regards to the Mexican spotted owl. UEC II, 439 F.3d

-40-
at 1194. In that case, however, the forest plan contained species monitoring

requirements designed to ensure that no decrease to any threatened, endangered,

or sensitive animals resulted from “management activities.” Id. That plan

included a requirement that this “no decrease” standard be met, as demonstrated

by the monitoring of the Mexican spotted owl. Id.

Forest Guardians has not pointed to any similar language demonstrating a

connection between the Carson Forest Plan’s monitoring program and the A/C

Project, i.e., “no showing has been made that the applicable Forest Service

regulations and directives conditioned approval” of the A/C Project “on the

successful monitoring of [MIS] at either a forest-wide or project level” or on the

meeting of a certain standard. UEC III, 443 F.3d at 750. Thus, we agree with the

district court that Forest Guardians has no cognizable claim regarding USFS’s

alleged failure to comply with the monitoring requirements of the Carson Forest

Plan. 16

16
The district court also noted that the structure of the Carson Forest
Plan indicates that the monitoring was not meant to be a condition precedent to
project approval:

The Forest Plan was adopted in 1986, and at that time the USFS
planned timber projects going forward beginning in 1987. See AR
000597-000599. If the USFS had intended the Monitoring Plan
requirements to be condition precedents to site-specific project
approval, then the USFS would have planned on being non-compliant
and in violation of NFMA’s consistency requirements the year after
the Forest Plan was adopted, because it would have been impossible
at that point to have five years of baseline MIS monitoring. Such an
(continued...)

-41-
 III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED. Forest Guardians’ pending motions to supplement the

administrative record and to file a supplemental appendix are GRANTED.

16
(...continued)
intention would have been inconsistent with the way the Forest Plan
was set up.

Aplt. Opening Br. Attach. at 41. Unfortunately, the referenced pages of the
administrative record were not included in the parties’ appendices, so we cannot
verify this reasoning. Forest Guardians has not disputed this portion of the
district court’s opinion, however. Cf. Ecology Ctr., 451 F.3d at 1192 n.3 (relying
on the excerpt of the document provided and assuming there were no relevant
provisions within the portion not provided).

-42-