FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 10 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AXHI GUZE, No. 08-72775
Petitioner, Agency No. A099-653-260
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 2, 2011**
San Francisco, California
Before: HUG, SKOPIL, and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
Axhi Guze (“Guze”) is a native and citizen of Macedonia. He seeks asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). The immigration judge (“IJ”) found Guze not to be
credible, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the IJ.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The facts are known to the parties. We do not repeat them here.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny Guze’s
petition.
We review an IJ’s adverse credibility finding for substantial evidence. “[S]o
long as one of the identified grounds is supported by substantial evidence . . . we
are bound to accept the IJ’s adverse credibility finding.” Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d
959, 964 (9th Cir. 2004).
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility finding because
during the merits hearing to adjudicate petitioner’s application, several
inconsistencies surfaced that proved fatal to Guze’s credibility.
First, Guze gave inconsistent accounts about when he joined the Democratic
Party (DPA). During his credible fear interview, Guze stated he joined the party in
2001, but during the merits hearing Guze testified that he joined the DPA a full
three years earlier, in 1998. This is not a small discrepancy, since Guze’s
membership in the DPA is the primary – if not sole – basis for his persecution
claim. This is not the sort of date confusion that might cause us to reverse an
adverse credibility determination. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1044
(9th Cir. 2010) (noting that under the REAL ID Act, an inconsistency may support
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an adverse credibility determination as long as the inconsistency is not so trivial
that “under the total circumstances [it has] no bearing on a petitioner’s veracity”).
There were also significant inconsistencies regarding when and why the
police began harassing Guze. Guze initially stated that the police began targeting
him in 1998, but the documentary evidence he provided indicates that the police
did not begin their harassment until after 2000, when his son joined the National
Liberation Army. Because the police did not start their scrutiny until after Guze’s
son joined an armed guerilla organization, it is entirely plausible that the police
searches were for legitimate law enforcement-related reasons (i.e., to search for
arms). Additionally, while Guze claims that he was jailed in 1998, his wife
testified that Guze was arrested in 2001. This is a key discrepancy because it not
only casts doubt on whether the police targeted Guze before 2000, but also casts
doubt on the reasons Guze offers about why the police came to his home.
Finally, Guze provided inconsistent answers regarding his alleged
detainment on account of his political activity. During his credible fear interview
Guze stated categorically that he had not been jailed, and Guze made no mention of
any detainment in his asylum application. However, in his testimony during the
merits hearing, Guze claims for the first time that the police jailed him because of
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his politics. Guze’s answer, that he misinterpreted the meaning of “jail,” even if
plausible, does not fully account for the omission in the first place.
In sum, any one of these inconsistencies, standing alone, would be sufficient
to support the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. Taken together, the IJ’s finding
must stand.
We also affirm the IJ’s decision to deny Guze withholding of removal.
When applying for withholding of removal, an alien bears the burden of showing
that his or her “life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” INA § 241(b)(3)(A). The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision
to require “a clear probability of persecution” on one of the five enumerated
grounds in the Act. I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 413 (1984). Therefore, an alien
who seeks withholding of removal must show that it is “more likely than not” that
she will face persecution if returned to her country of removal. Id. at 429-30. This
standard is more onerous than the standard an applicant must meet under asylum.
Al Harbi v. I.N.S., 242 F.3d 882, 888-89 (9th Cir. 2001). Because we conclude that
substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, we conclude that
Guze also failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal. See Farah v.
Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Similarly, Guze’s CAT claim must also fail. Where a CAT claim is based
on testimony that an IJ has found to be not credible, and there is no other evidence
that would independently support a finding that the applicant is likely to be
tortured if returned to his country of removal, an alien is not eligible for relief. See
id. at 1156-57.
DENIED.
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