FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BLUETOOTH HEADSET
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.
MICHAEL JONES; AMY KARLE; LORI
RAINES; KIMBERLY RYAN; BETTY
DUMAS; BETSEE FINLEE; EVAN
NASS; ALEKSANDRA SPEVACEK,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, No. 09-56683
and D.C. No.
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN; BILL 2:07-ml-01822-
CLENDINENG; WILLIAM E. GERKEN; DSF-E
BENJAMIN T. RITTGERS; HENRY OPINION
TOWSNER; SCOTT M. UNIVER;
AARON J. WALKER,
Objectors-Appellants,
v.
GN NETCOM, INC.; MOTOROLA,
INC.; PLANTRONICS, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
February 7, 2011—Pasadena, California
Filed August 19, 2011
11095
11096 IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Before: Michael Daly Hawkins and Raymond C. Fisher,
Circuit Judges, and Jack Zouhary,* District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Hawkins
*The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY 11099
COUNSEL
Theodore H. Frank, Center for Class Action Fairness, Wash-
ington, D.C., for the objectors-appellants.
Daniel L. Warshaw, Pearson, Simon Warshaw & Penny,
Sherman Oaks, California, for the plaintiffs-appellees.
Terrence J. Dee, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois, for the
defendants-appellees.
OPINION
HAWKINS, Senior Circuit Judge:
The settlement agreement approved in this products liabil-
ity class action provides the class $100,000 in cy pres awards
11100 IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY
and zero dollars for economic injury, while setting aside up
to $800,000 for class counsel and $12,000 for the class repre-
sentatives—amounts which the court subsequently awarded in
full in a separate order. William Brennan and other class
members (collectively “Objectors”) challenge the fairness and
reasonableness of the settlement and appeal both the approval
and fee orders, arguing the district court abused its discretion
in failing to consider whether the gross disproportion between
the class award and the negotiated fee award was reasonable.
We agree that the disparity between the value of the class
recovery and class counsel’s compensation raises at least an
inference of unfairness, and that the current record does not
adequately dispel the possibility that class counsel bargained
away a benefit to the class in exchange for their own interests.
We therefore vacate both orders and remand so that the dis-
trict court may conduct a more searching inquiry into the fair-
ness of the negotiated distribution of funds, as well as
consider the substantive reasonableness of the attorneys’ fee
request in light of the degree of success attained.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
I. Background
Plaintiffs filed twenty-six putative class actions in courts
around the country against Motorola, Inc., Plantronics, Inc.,
and GN Netcom, Inc. (collectively “defendants”), alleging
defendants knowingly failed to disclose the potential risk of
noise-induced hearing loss1 associated with extended use of
their wireless Bluetooth headsets at high volumes, in violation
of state consumer fraud protection and unfair business prac-
tice laws.2 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation coor-
1
Plaintiffs define noise-induced hearing loss as the gradual and perma-
nent loss of hearing over time caused by unsafe levels of noise.
2
Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated California’s Consumers Legal
Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq., False Advertising Law, Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq., and Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus.
& Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., as well as Illinois’ Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act, 815 ILCS 510, and Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505.
IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY 11101
dinated these cases in In re Bluetooth Headset Products
Liability Litigation in the Central District of California.3
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Consolidated Complaint
sought money damages on behalf of millions of individuals
who had purchased Bluetooth headsets since June 30, 2002,4
purportedly in reliance on allegedly misleading representa-
tions about the safety and usability of the product. Plaintiffs
alleged that defendants advertised “talk times” of three hours
or longer, while in reality, consumers could not safely use the
headsets for more than a few minutes each day without expos-
ing themselves to the risk of noise-induced hearing loss—a
risk that defendants failed to disclose in any of their market-
ing materials. The complaint did not state a claim for personal
injury but asserted economic injury, alleging plaintiffs would
not have purchased their Bluetooth headsets but for defen-
dants’ willful false advertising. Plaintiffs sought actual dam-
ages in the amount paid for the product, which they claimed
to be between $70 and $150 per headset, along with injunc-
tive relief, restitution, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and
costs.
Class counsel spent considerable time researching legal and
industry standards on acceptable noise levels, surveying warn-
ings on other audio devices, obtaining acoustic test results and
other documents from defendants, and working with experts
to review this data and evaluate the risk of noise-induced
hearing loss. The parties voluntarily exchanged discovery and
held at least three in-person meetings to discuss the merits of
the litigation and discovery issues before participating in a
3
Another lawsuit raising similar questions of law and fact, Kirkpatrick
v. Motorola, No. 07-5570 (DSF), was subsequently filed and also consoli-
dated with the multi-district litigation.
4
The district court ultimately certified a class comprised of all persons
and entities in the United States who between June 30, 2002 and February
19, 2009 purchased a Bluetooth headset manufactured by one of the defen-
dants. More than 100 million Bluetooth headsets were sold during that
period.
11102 IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY
formal mediation session, overseen by a retired California
Court of Appeal Justice.
Unable to reach a settlement at that time, defendants shortly
thereafter filed a joint motion to dismiss on various grounds,
insisting their products are safe and denying any wrongdoing
on their part. The motion to dismiss was fully briefed by both
sides, but before the court heard argument, and before any
motion was made to certify a class for merits purposes, the
parties successfully participated in another mediation session
and filed a proposed class action settlement agreement pur-
porting to resolve all claims.
II. The Terms of the Settlement Agreement
In exchange for plaintiffs’ general release and waiver of all
asserted claims defendants agreed to: (1) post acoustic safety
information on their respective websites and in their product
manuals and/or packaging for new Bluetooth headsets; (2)
pay a total of $100,000 in cy pres awards to be distributed
among four non-profit organizations dedicated to the preven-
tion of hearing loss;5 (3) pay notice costs up to $1.2 million;
(4) pay documented costs to class counsel up to $38,000, or
if notice costs fell below $1.2 million, no more than $50,000;
(5) pay attorneys’ fees in an amount set by the district court,
not to exceed $800,000; and (6) pay an incentive award in an
amount set by the district court, not to exceed $12,000, to be
divided among the nine class representatives.6 Approval of the
settlement was not conditioned on any minimum attorneys’
5
The recipient organizations are the Center for Independent Living
Research at the University of Tennessee College of Medicine, the National
Hearing Conservation Association, the American Speech and Hearing
Association, and the Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness.
6
These negotiated attorneys’ fee and incentive awards were provided
under what is known as a “clear sailing agreement,” wherein the defendant
agrees not to oppose a petition for a fee award up to a specified maximum
value.
IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY 11103
fee award, minimum costs award, or the payment of any
incentive award to any plaintiff.
III. Approval of the Settlement Agreement
Pursuant to the district court’s preliminary approval order
directing the provision of notice, the parties implemented a
comprehensive notice plan comprised of direct mailings, mag-
azine advertisements, and a dedicated Internet website, reach-
ing about 80% of potential class members an average of more
than 2.5 times each. Of the millions of potential class mem-
bers, 715 people validly elected to opt out of the settlement.
Fifty people, including the seven Appellants before us now,
sent in objections to the settlement and were given an oppor-
tunity to be heard at the fairness hearing. After considering
the objections, the district court entered an Order (“Approval
Order”) and Final Judgment certifying the class for settlement
purposes only, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3), and approving the settlement agreement as fair, rea-
sonable, and adequate.
IV. Award of Fees and Costs
After ordering class counsel to produce additional unredac-
ted billing records and reviewing the files submitted, the dis-
trict court later entered a separate order (“Fee Order”)
awarding $850,000 to class counsel for fees and costs, based
on a lodestar method calculation, and $12,000 to be distrib-
uted among the nine representative plaintiffs.
Objectors timely appealed both the Approval and Fee
Orders.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s approval of a class action set-
tlement for clear abuse of discretion. Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g
Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 963 (9th Cir. 2009). Such review is “ex-
11104 IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY
tremely limited,” and we “will affirm if the district judge
applies the proper legal standard and his findings of fact are
not clearly erroneous.” In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213
F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir. 2000).
We also review for abuse of discretion a district court’s
award of fees and costs to class counsel, as well as its method
of calculation. Lobatz v. U.S. W. Cellular of Cal., Inc., 222
F.3d 1142, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2000). Findings of fact underly-
ing an award of fees are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 1148.
DISCUSSION
[1] Objectors contest both the fee award and the approval
order, but their objections are motivated by the same issue:
what they claim are excessive attorneys’ fees, negotiated
unfairly by class counsel and ultimately awarded unreason-
ably by the court. Objectors argue that the district court
should not have approved as fair and reasonable a settlement
agreement that, on its face, so disproportionately advances the
interests of class counsel over those of the class itself. They
further contend that, even if the approval order can be upheld,
class counsel should not have been awarded eight times the
amount of the class recovery. Rather, they argue, the two
negotiated sums should have been viewed as a “constructive
common fund” and fees limited to an appropriate percentage
thereof.
We would ordinarily begin our review with the Approval
Order, whose vacatur would render moot the challenge to the
Fee Order. However, because Objectors’ challenge to the fair-
ness of the settlement agreement relies, in large part, on a
determination that the requested fees were substantively
unreasonable, we instead begin by temporarily assuming the
Approval Order to be valid and proceed to examine the rea-
sonableness of the fee award first, before then returning to
review the Approval Order itself.
IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY 11105
I. Attorneys’ Fee Award
A. Applicable Legal Standards
[2] While attorneys’ fees and costs may be awarded in a
certified class action where so authorized by law or the par-
ties’ agreement, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h), courts have an indepen-
dent obligation to ensure that the award, like the settlement
itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have already agreed to
an amount. See Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 963-64
(9th Cir. 2003); Knisley v. Network Assoc., 312 F.3d 1123,
1125 (9th Cir. 2002); Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
192 F.3d 1323, 1328-29 & n.20 (9th Cir. 1999). The reason-
ableness of any fee award must be considered against the
backdrop of the “American Rule,” which provides that courts
generally are without discretion to award attorneys’ fees to a
prevailing plaintiff unless (1) fee-shifting is expressly autho-
rized by the governing statute; (2) the opponents acted in bad
faith or willfully violated a court order; or (3) “the successful
litigants have created a common fund for recovery or
extended a substantial benefit to a class.” Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 275 (1975) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); accord Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885
F.2d 1473, 1481 & n.25 (9th Cir. 1989).
The award of attorneys’ fees in a class action settlement is
often justified by the common fund or statutory fee-shifting
exceptions to the American Rule, and sometimes by both. See
Staton, 327 F.3d at 972; see also Court Awarded Attorney
Fees, Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 250 (1985)
(purpose of common-fund exception is to “avoid the unjust
enrichment of those who benefit from the fund that is created,
protected, or increased by the litigation and who otherwise
would bear none of the litigation costs”). We have approved
two different methods for calculating a reasonable attorneys’
fee depending on the circumstances.
The “lodestar method” is appropriate in class actions
brought under fee-shifting statutes (such as federal civil
11106 IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY
rights, securities, antitrust, copyright, and patent acts), where
the relief sought—and obtained—is often primarily injunctive
in nature and thus not easily monetized, but where the legisla-
ture has authorized the award of fees to ensure compensation
for counsel undertaking socially beneficial litigation. See
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir.
1998); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank
Prods. Liability Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 821 (3d Cir. 1995).
The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the number
of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the liti-
gation (as supported by adequate documentation) by a reason-
able hourly rate for the region and for the experience of the
lawyer. Staton, 327 F.3d at 965. Though the lodestar figure is
“presumptively reasonable,” Cunningham v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 488 (9th Cir. 1988), the court may
adjust it upward or downward by an appropriate positive or
negative multiplier reflecting a host of “reasonableness” fac-
tors, “including the quality of representation, the benefit
obtained for the class, the complexity and novelty of the
issues presented, and the risk of nonpayment,” Hanlon, 150
F.3d at 1029 (citing Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526
F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975)7). Foremost among these consider-
7
Kerr identifies twelve factors relevant to a determination of reasonable
attorneys’ fees:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of
the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the
attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation,
and the ability of the attorneys; (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the
case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
526 F.2d at 70. Many of these factors are “subsumed within the initial cal-
culation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable rate.” Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 n.9 (1983), and the Kerr factors only war-
IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY 11107
ations, however, is the benefit obtained for the class. See Hen-
sley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434-36 (1983); McCown v.
City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (ulti-
mate reasonableness of the fee “is determined primarily by
reference to the level of success achieved by the plaintiff”).
Thus, where the plaintiff has achieved “only limited success,”
counting all hours expended on the litigation—even those rea-
sonably spent—may produce an “excessive amount,” and the
Supreme Court has instructed district courts to instead “award
only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the
results obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 440.
[3] Where a settlement produces a common fund for the
benefit of the entire class, courts have discretion to employ
either the lodestar method or the percentage-of-recovery
method. In re Mercury Interactive Corp., 618 F.3d 988, 992
(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249, 1256
(9th Cir. 2000)). Because the benefit to the class is easily
quantified in common-fund settlements, we have allowed
courts to award attorneys a percentage of the common fund in
lieu of the often more time-consuming task of calculating the
lodestar. Applying this calculation method, courts typically
calculate 25% of the fund as the “benchmark” for a reason-
able fee award, providing adequate explanation in the record
of any “special circumstances” justifying a departure. Six (6)
Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301,
1311 (9th Cir. 1990); accord Powers, 229 F.3d at 1256-57;
Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272
(9th Cir. 1989).
[4] Though courts have discretion to choose which calcula-
tion method they use, their discretion must be exercised so as
rant a departure from the lodestar figure in “rare and exceptional cases,”
Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (quot-
ing Penn. v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,
565 (1986) (quotation marks omitted). At least one factor is no longer
valid—whether the fee was fixed or contingent. See Davis v. City and
Cnty. of S.F., 976 F.2d 1536, 1546 (9th Cir. 1992).
11108 IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY
to achieve a reasonable result. See In re Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings, 109 F.3d at 607 (citing In re Wash. Pub. Power
Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 n.2 (9th Cir.
1994)). Thus, for example, where awarding 25% of a “mega-
fund” would yield windfall profits for class counsel in light of
the hours spent on the case, courts should adjust the bench-
mark percentage or employ the lodestar method instead. Six
Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1311; see In re Prudential Ins.
Co. America Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d
283, 339 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that basis for inverse rela-
tionship between size of fund and percentage awarded for fees
is that “in many instances the increase in recovery is merely
a factor of the size of the class and has no direct relationship
to the efforts of counsel” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
B. Approval of the Attorneys’ Fee Award in the
Present Case
The district court here applied the lodestar method,
although it never announced a lodestar figure. After finding
numerous defects in class counsel’s proposed computation of
its $1.6 million lodestar, including duplicative entries, exces-
sive charges for most categories of services, a substantial
amount of block billing, and use of an inflated hourly rate, the
court announced that its own analysis revealed the lodestar
still “substantially exceeds” the $800,000 defendants agreed
to pay.
Citing our previous observation that a “defendant is inter-
ested only in disposing of the total claim asserted against it,”
Staton, 327 F.3d at 964, Objectors argue the district court
should have treated this settlement as producing a “construc-
tive common fund” and employed a percentage-of-recovery
method to assess the reasonableness of the $800,000 fee
award, rather than relying exclusively on a lodestar calcula-
tion. Several courts have embraced the constructive common
fund approach, warning that “private agreements to structure
artificially separate fee and settlement arrangements” should
IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY 11109
not enable parties to circumvent the 25% benchmark require-
ment on “what is in economic reality a common fund situa-
tion.” In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 821; see Johnston v.
Comerica Mortg. Corp., 83 F.3d 241, 246 (8th Cir. 1996)
(“[I]n essence the entire settlement amount comes from the
same source. The award to the class and the agreement on
attorney fees represent a package deal.”); cf. Manual for Com-
plex Litig. § 21.75 (4th ed. 2008) (“If an agreement is reached
on the amount of a settlement fund and a separate amount for
attorney fees . . . the sum of the two amounts ordinarily
should be treated as a settlement fund for the benefit of the
class.”). Plaintiffs insist this is not a common-fund case
because the relief obtained was primarily injunctive in nature
and because, as prevailing parties under California Civil Code
§ 1750’s fee-shifting provision, they are entitled to attorneys’
fees calculated under the lodestar method.
[5] Whether or not we view this as a common-fund case,
we agree with Objectors that the district court needed to do
more to assure itself—and us—that the amount awarded was
not unreasonably excessive in light of the results achieved.
Notably, the district court made (1) no explicit calculation of
a reasonable lodestar amount; (2) no comparison between the
settlement’s attorneys’ fees award and the benefit to the class
or degree of success in the litigation; and (3) no comparison
between the lodestar amount and a reasonable percentage
award. On this record, we lack a sufficient basis for determin-
ing the reasonableness of the award.
First, our discomfort is not with the choice of the lodestar
method as a primary basis for calculation, but rather the
absence of explicit calculation or explanation of the district
court’s result. The district court “s[aw] no need” to calculate
a precise lodestar amount in light of defendants’ willingness
to pay and because reducing the award below $800,000 would
in no way benefit the class or enhance the cy pres award. But
a defendant’s advance agreement not to object cannot relieve
the district court of its duty to assess fully the reasonableness
11110 IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY
of the fee request. See Staton, 327 F.3d at 963-64; Knisley,
312 F.3d at 1125. Under the lodestar method, the district court
must calculate the lodestar figure based on the number of
hours reasonably expended on the litigation, adjusting the fig-
ure to account for the degree of success class counsel attained,
along with other factors. From the face of the Fee Order, how-
ever, we do not have sufficient information from which to
conclude that the district court included a reasonable number
of hours in its lodestar “calculation” or that it “considered the
relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the
results obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (“It [is] important
. . . for the district court to provide a concise but clear expla-
nation of its reasons for the fee award.”); accord McCown,
565 F.3d at 1102 (“Once the district court completes its analy-
sis of the final lodestar amount, it must explain how it arrived
at its determination with sufficient specificity to permit an
appellate court to determine whether the district court abused
its discretion in the way the analysis was undertaken.”).
Instead, we know only that the district court believed the
lodestar figure to be less than $1.6 million but greater than
$800,000.
Second, the district court declined to reduce the award
because the injunctive relief and cy pres payment provided “at
least minimal benefit,” even while acknowledging that “the
settlement did not achieve all the goals of the suit.” The dis-
trict court appears to have conflated the Rule 23(e) standard
for approval of a settlement agreement (which requires con-
sideration of whether the settlement agreement offers plain-
tiffs more than they are likely to achieve at trial) with the
requirement that the fee award be “reasonable in relation to
the results obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. Although the
court stated that the “substantial reduction” below the lodestar
accounted for the fact that “there were a number of claims for
which class counsel achieved no relief,” we remain in the
dark both as to how substantial a reduction it was and what
level of success plaintiffs in fact achieved. The district court
made no findings in its Approval Order with regard to the
IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY 11111
value vel non of the injunctive relief, noting only that the cy
pres award was an appropriate form of relief given the large
class size. Nor did it discuss in the Fee Order the value of the
injunctive relief or whether it in fact was “socially beneficial”
as would justify a fee award under California Civil Code
§ 1750’s fee-shifting provision. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h),
2003 Advisory Cmte. Notes (“Settlements involving non-
monetary provisions for class members also deserve careful
scrutiny to ensure that these provisions have actual value to
the class.”); In re TD Ameritrade Accountholder Litig., 266
F.R.D. 418, 423 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]he standard [under
Rule 23(e)] is not how much money a company spends on
purported benefits, but the value of those benefits to the
class.” (citing O’Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz United States, LLC,
214 F.R.D. 266, 304 (M.D. Pa. 2003))). With neither a lode-
star figure nor a sense of what degree of success this settle-
ment agreement achieved, we have no basis for affirming the
fee award as reasonable under the lodestar approach.
Third, even though a district court has discretion to choose
how it calculates fees, we have said many times that it
“abuses that ‘discretion when it uses a mechanical or formu-
laic approach that results in an unreasonable reward.’ ” In re
Mercury Interactive Corp., 618 F.3d at 992 (quoting Powers,
229 F.3d at 1256). Thus, even though the lodestar method
may be a perfectly appropriate method of fee calculation, we
have also encouraged courts to guard against an unreasonable
result by cross-checking their calculations against a second
method. See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d
1043, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2002); see also In re Gen. Motors, 55
F.3d at 820. Just as the lodestar method can “confirm that a
percentage of recovery amount does not award counsel an
exorbitant hourly rate,” the percentage-of-recovery method
can likewise “be used to assure that counsel’s fee does not
dwarf class recovery.” In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 821 n.40.
“If the lodestar amount overcompensates the attorneys
according to the 25% benchmark standard, then a second look
to evaluate the reasonableness of the hours worked and rates
11112 IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY
claimed is appropriate.” In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceed-
ings, 109 F.3d at 607.
[6] If the district court here took that second look, the
record does not reflect it. Absent any explanation from the
district court, we are concerned that the amount awarded was
83.2% of the total amount defendants were willing to spend
to settle the case, viewing the $800,000 allotment for attor-
neys’ fees, the $12,000 allotment for an incentive award, the
$100,000 cy pres award, and the $50,000 allotment for fees
as a “constructive common fund.” Twenty-five percent of this
$962,000 fund, by contrast, would have yielded only
$240,500 in attorneys’ fees. Even if we included the $1.2 mil-
lion notice costs in the constructive fund (and accordingly
reduced the fees to $38,000), the attorneys’ fees awarded
would constitute 37.2% of this $2.15 million fund, in contrast
to a 25% benchmark figure of $537,500. Plaintiffs urge us to
find that the fee award is justified because the injunctive relief
confers a valuable benefit and was the primary objective of
the lawsuit, but the district court did not make findings on the
value of the injunctive relief, so we cannot evaluate whether
it justifies an otherwise disproportionate award.8
[7] While we cannot say the disproportion between the fee
award and the benefit obtained for the class was per se unrea-
sonable, in the absence of an adequate explanation of the
award, “we have no choice but to remand the case to the dis-
trict court to permit it to make the necessary calculations and
provide the necessary explanations.” McCown, 565 F.3d at
1102 (citing Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d
1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006)).
8
We note, however, that the value of the injunctive relief is not apparent
to us from the face of the complaint, which seeks to recover significant
monetary damages for alleged economic injury, nor from the progression
of the settlement talks, the last of which occurred after defendants had
already voluntarily added new warnings to their websites and product
manuals.
IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY 11113
On remand, the district court should (1) decide whether to
treat the settlement as a common fund; (2) choose the lodestar
or percentage method for calculating a reasonable fee and
make explicit calculations; (3) ensure that the fee award is
reasonable considering, inter alia, the degree of success in the
litigation and benefit to the class; and (4) if standard calcula-
tions yield an unjustifiably disproportionate award, adjust the
lodestar or percentage accordingly.
II. Approval of the Settlement Agreement
A. Applicable Legal Standards
[8] Approval of the settlement agreement was not condi-
tioned on the award of attorneys’ fees and costs or an incen-
tive award, and therefore our vacatur of the fee award does
not necessitate invalidation of the approval order. See, e.g.,
Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 969 (affirming approval of the settle-
ment but reversing and remanding the award of attorneys’
fees). Nonetheless, because the parties expressly negotiated a
possibly unreasonable amount of fees, and because the district
court did not take this possibility into account in reviewing
the settlement’s fairness the first time around, we must vacate
and remand the Approval Order as well, so that the court may
appropriately factor this into its Rule 23(e) analysis. On
remand, the district court should reconsider its approval of the
settlement after recalculating a reasonable amount of fees for
class counsel.
[9] Courts have long recognized that “settlement class
actions present unique due process concerns for absent class
members.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. One inherent risk is that
class counsel may collude with the defendants, “tacitly reduc-
ing the overall settlement in return for a higher attorney’s
fee.” Knisley, 312 F.3d at 1125; see Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S.
717, 733 (1986) (recognizing that “the possibility of a tradeoff
between merits relief and attorneys’ fees” is often implicit in
11114 IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY
class action settlement negotiations); In re Gen. Motors, 55
F.3d at 805.
[10] To guard against this potential for class action abuse,
Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires
court approval of all class action settlements, which may be
granted only after a fairness hearing and a determination that
the settlement taken as a whole is fair, reasonable, and ade-
quate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); see Staton, 327 F.3d at 972
n.22 (court’s role is to police the “inherent tensions among
class representation, defendant’s interests in minimizing the
cost of the total settlement package, and class counsel’s inter-
est in fees”); Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.
The factors in a court’s fairness assessment will naturally
vary from case to case, but courts generally must weigh:
(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s case; (2) the risk,
expense, complexity, and likely duration of further
litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action sta-
tus throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in
settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and
the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and
views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental
participant; and (8) the reaction of the class members
of the proposed settlement.
Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th
Cir. 2004); Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370,
1375 (9th Cir. 1993).
The district court considered each of these factors and
found that several of them favored settlement approval: (1)
plaintiffs’ case was not particularly strong in light of defen-
dants’ significant defenses; (2) further litigation would be
time-consuming, complex, and expensive for both sides; (3)
the settlement provided injunctive and cy pres awards, which
did not do the class any harm and which was more than plain-
IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY 11115
tiffs might achieve at trial given the litigation risks; (4) the
parties had already consulted experts and exchanged signifi-
cant discovery permitting an informed decision about settle-
ment; and (5) the settlement was negotiated over an extended
period of time by experienced counsel on both sides, and was
mediated and approved by a retired judge.
But where, as here, a settlement agreement is negotiated
prior to formal class certification, consideration of these eight
Churchill factors alone is not enough to survive appellate
review.
[11] Prior to formal class certification, there is an even
greater potential for a breach of fiduciary duty owed the class
during settlement. Accordingly, such agreements must with-
stand an even higher level of scrutiny for evidence of collu-
sion or other conflicts of interest than is ordinarily required
under Rule 23(e) before securing the court’s approval as fair.
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026; accord In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d
at 805 (courts must be “even more scrupulous than usual in
approving settlements where no class has yet been formally
certified”); Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat’l Bank &
Trust Co. of Chicago, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1987) (Pos-
ner, J.) (“[W]hen class certification is deferred, a more careful
scrutiny of the fairness of the settlement is required.”); Wein-
berger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982) (Friendly,
J.) (reviewing courts must employ “even more than the usual
care”); see also Manual for Complex Litig. § 21.612 (4th ed.
2004). The district court’s approval order must show not only
that “it has explored [the Churchill] factors comprehensive-
ly,” but also that the settlement is “not [ ] the product of collu-
sion among the negotiating parties.” In re Mego Fin. Corp.,
213 F.3d at 458.
[12] Collusion may not always be evident on the face of a
settlement, and courts therefore must be particularly vigilant
not only for explicit collusion, but also for more subtle signs
that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-
11116 IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY
interests and that of certain class members to infect the nego-
tiations. Staton, 327 F.3d at 960; see also Third Circuit Task
Force, 108 F.R.D. at 266. A few such signs are:
(1) “when counsel receive a disproportionate distri-
bution of the settlement, or when the class receives
no monetary distribution but class counsel are amply
rewarded,” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1021; see Murray v.
GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 952 (7th Cir.
2006); Crawford v. Equifax Payment Servs., Inc.,
201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2000);
(2) when the parties negotiate a “clear sailing”
arrangement providing for the payment of attorneys’
fees separate and apart from class funds, which car-
ries “the potential of enabling a defendant to pay
class counsel excessive fees and costs in exchange
for counsel accepting an unfair settlement on behalf
of the class,” Lobatz, 222 F.3d at 1148; see Weinber-
ger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524
(1st Cir. 1991) (“[L]awyers might urge a class settle-
ment at a low figure or on a less-than-optimal basis
in exchange for red-carpet treatment on fees.”); and
(3) when the parties arrange for fees not awarded to
revert to defendants rather than be added to the class
fund, see Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d
781, 785 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.).
B. Approval of the Settlement Agreement in the
Present Case
[13] Here, the pre-certification settlement agreement
included all three of these warning signs. As discussed earlier,
the settlement’s provision for attorneys’ fees is apparently dis-
proportionate to the class reward, which includes no monetary
distribution. The settlement included a “clear sailing agree-
ment” in which defendants agreed not to object to an award
IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY 11117
of attorneys’ fees up to eight times the monetary cy pres relief
afforded the class. Moreover, the settlement also contained a
“kicker”: all fees not awarded would revert to defendants
rather than be added to the cy pres fund or otherwise benefit
the class. Confronted with these multiple indicia of possible
implicit collusion, the district court had a special “obligat[ion]
to assure itself that the fees awarded in the agreement were
not unreasonably high,” Staton, 327 F.3d at 965, for if they
were, “the likelihood is that the defendant obtained an eco-
nomically beneficial concession with regard to the merits pro-
visions, in the form of lower monetary payments to class
members or less injunctive relief for the class than could oth-
erwise have been obtained,” id. at 964.
[14] The Approval Order, however, does not provide ade-
quate assurance. Rather than inquire further into why the par-
ties had negotiated such a disproportionate distribution
between fees and relief, the district court did not scrutinize the
clear sailing attorneys’ fee provision because (1) the parties
claimed to negotiate the “core terms” of the settlement agree-
ment with a neutral mediator before turning to fees, (2) the
attorneys’ fee provision was severable from the agreement,
and (3) the fees were to come from a separate fund and thus
would have no bearing on the amount of class recovery.
But these factors did not obviate the need to examine the
fee provision in light of the rest of the agreement. First, the
mere presence of a neutral mediator, though a factor weighing
in favor of a finding of non-collusiveness, is not on its own
dispositive of whether the end product is a fair, adequate, and
reasonable settlement agreement. While the Rule 23(a) ade-
quacy of representation inquiry is designed to foreclose class
certification in the face of “actual fraud, overreaching or col-
lusion,” the Rule 23(e) reasonableness inquiry is designed
precisely to capture instances of unfairness not apparent on
the face of the negotiations. Staton, 327 F.3d at 960 (emphasis
in original). In a Third Circuit class action settlement where
class counsel provided verbal assurances that “attorneys’ fees
11118 IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY
were negotiated separately, after we agreed on everything
else,” the Third Circuit refused “to place such dispositive
weight on the parties’ self-serving remarks.” In re Gen.
Motors, 55 F.3d at 804; see generally Third Circuit Task
Force, 108 F.R.D. at 266-70 (suggesting guidelines for miti-
gating the potential for collusion while still facilitating suc-
cessful settlement). Similarly here, the district court should
have pressed the parties to substantiate their bald assertions
with corroborating evidence.
Second, the district court should not have ignored the clear
sailing fee provision simply because approval of the award
was not dependent on the approval of fees. “[T]he very exis-
tence of a clear sailing provision increases the likelihood that
class counsel will have bargained away something of value to
the class.” Weinberger, 925 F.2d at 525. Therefore, when con-
fronted with a clear sailing provision, the district court has a
heightened duty to peer into the provision and scrutinize
closely the relationship between attorneys’ fees and benefit to
the class, being careful to avoid awarding “unreasonably
high” fees simply because they are uncontested. Staton, 327
F.3d at 954.
Furthermore, that a provision is severable does not render
it irrelevant to the overall reasonableness of the agreement,
for “[i]t is the settlement taken as a whole, rather than the
individual component parts, that must be examined for overall
fairness. . . . The settlement must stand or fall in its entirety.”
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026 (citing Officers for Justice v. Civil
Serv. Comm’n of S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 628 (9th Cir. 1982))
(emphasis added). By disregarding the contents of the clear
sailing fee provision here, including both the disproportionate
amounts negotiated and the reversionary kicker arrangement,
the district court effectively “delete[d]” it from the settle-
ment—an approach that is beyond the scope of the court’s
discretion. Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 630 (noting that,
while “the district court may suggest modifications,” it “may
not delete, modify, or substitute certain provisions” of the set-
IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY 11119
tlement agreement but rather “must consider the proposal as
a whole and as submitted”); accord Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.
Simply put, a severable clause simply may not be severed
from the court’s Rule 23(e) analysis.
Finally, “[t]hat the defendant in form agrees to pay the fees
independently of any monetary award or injunctive relief pro-
vided to the class in the agreement does not detract from the
need carefully to scrutinize the fee award.” Staton, 327 F.3d
at 964. Even when technically funded separately, the class
recovery and the agreement on attorneys’ fees should be
viewed as a “package deal.” Johnston, 83 F.3d at 245-46.
Although we do not go so far as to hold that the district court
must treat the package as a constructive common fund for
purposes of analyzing the reasonableness of the fee award,
assessment of the settlement’s overall reasonableness must
take into account the defendant’s overall willingness to pay.
Ordinarily, “ ‘a defendant is interested only in disposing of
the total claim asserted against it,” and “ ‘the allocation
between the class payment and the attorneys’ fees is of little
or no interest to the defense.’ ” Staton, 327 F.3d at 964 (quot-
ing In re Gen. Motors, 55 F.3d at 819-20). A district court
therefore must ensure that both the amount and mode of pay-
ment of attorneys’ fees are fair, regardless of “whether the
attorneys’ fees come from a common fund or are otherwise
paid.” Zucker, 192 F.3d at 1328 & n.20.
For this same reason, a kicker arrangement reverting
unpaid attorneys’ fees to the defendant rather than to the class
amplifies the danger of collusion already suggested by a clear
sailing provision. If the defendant is willing to pay a certain
sum in attorneys’ fees as part of the settlement package, but
the full fee award would be unreasonable, there is no apparent
reason the class should not benefit from the excess allotted for
fees. The clear sailing provision reveals the defendant’s will-
ingness to pay, but the kicker deprives the class of that full
potential benefit if class counsel negotiates too much for its
fees. Although the district court here reasoned that class coun-
11120 IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY
sel’s possibility of recovering nothing in fees rendered the
clear sailing provision fair, awarding class counsel nothing
would not cure an otherwise unfair settlement if those funds
should have been negotiated to revert to the class rather than
to the “putative wrongdoer[s].” See Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d at
785. Unless the district court is able to conclude that in this
particular case, a kicker provision is in the class’ best interest
as part of the settlement package, the kicker makes it less
likely that the settlement can be approved if the district court
determines the clear sailing provision authorizes unreasonably
high attorneys’ fees.
[15] Although clear sailing provisions are not prohibited,
they “by [their] nature deprive[ ] the court of the advantages
of the adversary process” in resolving fee determinations and
are therefore disfavored. Weinberger, 925 F.2d at 525; see
Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 907-08 (2d Cir. 1985)
(Newman, J., concurring), abrogated on other grounds by
Amchem. Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). Given
the questionable features of the fee provision here, the court
was required to examine the negotiation process with even
greater scrutiny than is ordinarily demanded, and approval of
the settlement had to be supported by a clear explanation of
why the disproportionate fee is justified and does not betray
the class’s interests. Because the district court did not provide
such explanation, we must vacate the Approval Order and
remand for further consideration.9
9
Because we vacate both orders, we need not address whether Objectors
would have independent standing to challenge the Fee Order alone were
the Approval Order to remain intact. See Zucker, 192 F.3d at 1326;
Lobatz, 222 F.3d at 1147; Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249, 1256 (9th Cir.
2000); but see Glasser v. Volkswagen of Am., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
9943, at *10-11 (9th Cir. May 17, 2011) (no standing to challenge fee
award alone where objector expressly disclaimed recovery under a “con-
structive common fund” theory).
IN RE BLUETOOTH HEADSET PRODUCTS LIABILITY 11121
CONCLUSION
On remand, the district court may reach any number of
conclusions: it may find the $800,000 attorneys’ fee award
reasonable in light of the hours reasonably expended and the
results achieved, and re-approve both orders; it may deter-
mine the fee request is excessive but find no further evidence
that class counsel betrayed class interests for their own bene-
fit, and thus uphold the agreement while lowering the fee
award; or it may find the fee request excessive and conclude
that class counsel therefore negotiated an unreasonable settle-
ment and direct the parties back to the negotiating table.
In vacating the Approval and Fee Orders, we express no
opinion on the ultimate fairness of what the parties have nego-
tiated, for we have no business “substitut[ing] our notions of
fairness for those of the district judge.” Officers for Justice,
688 F.2d at 626 (internal citations omitted). Rather, we vacate
and remand to allow the district court to properly exercise its
discretion in accordance with the principles discussed here.
VACATED and REMANDED. Each party shall bear its
own costs on appeal.