COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Petty and Senior Judge Haley
PUBLISHED
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
LARRY GEORGE SNELLINGS
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0079-13-4 JUDGE JAMES W. HALEY, JR.
NOVEMBER 19, 2013
STAFFORD COUNTY FIRE
AND RESCUE DEPARTMENT,
VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES
GROUP SELF-INSURANCE AND
VACO RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS, INC.
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Kathleen Grace Walsh for appellant.
J. David Griffin (Winchester Law Group, P.C., on brief), for
appellees.
Larry George Snellings (“claimant”) appeals the determination of the Workers’
Compensation Commission (“the commission”) that the presumption in Code § 65.2-402 does
not apply to his claim for benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act (“Act”). Finding no
error in the commission’s decision, we affirm.
Background
On appeal from a decision of the commission, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to Stafford County Fire and Rescue Department and its insurers (collectively
“employer”), the parties prevailing below. Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Goad, 15 Va. App. 710,
712, 427 S.E.2d 215, 217 (1993). On April 13, 2011, claimant, an emergency medical technician
with employer, suffered a stroke. Upon admission to the hospital, claimant underwent a CT scan
of his head which revealed a clot in the “anterior branches [of his] left cerebral artery.” The scan
also noted an “unrelated left middle fossa cyst.” An echocardiogram revealed no heart
abnormalities.
When claimant was discharged from the hospital, his diagnoses included: (a) acute
cerebrovascular event [CVA]; (b) hypertension; (c) hyperlipidemia; (d) uncontrolled diabetes;
and (e) dysarthria. His face drooped, and he was unsteady on his feet with weakness in his right
upper and lower extremities.
Claimant underwent several physical examinations during the months following his
discharge. None of them revealed any evidence of heart abnormalities or heart disease.
As a result of his stroke, claimant filed a workers’ compensation claim seeking temporary
total disability benefits and continuing medical benefits pursuant to Code § 65.2-603. Claimant
offered no medical evidence regarding the cause of his stroke. Instead, he maintained he was a
member of the class of employees protected by Code § 65.2-402 and that his stroke was an
occupational disease, thereby entitling him to the presumption that his disability was work
related. The deputy commissioner agreed.
On appeal, the commission reversed on the basis that claimant’s evidence failed to prove
his stroke was caused by hypertension or heart disease, as required by Code § 65.2-402.
Accordingly, the commission concluded the deputy commissioner erred in applying the
presumption in Code § 65.2-402. Finally, because claimant offered no proof as to the cause of
his stroke, the commission found he failed to establish his stroke was compensable as an
occupational disease or ordinary disease of life pursuant to Code §§ 65.2-400 and 65.2-401.
Claimant now appeals the commission’s ruling1 that the presumption in Code § 65.2-402
does not apply to his claim.
1
Employer assigns error to the deputy commissioner’s finding that claimant suffered
from a disability. As we agree with the commission’s conclusion that appellant failed to
establish a compensable claim, this issue is moot.
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Analysis
Code § 65.2-402(B) creates a presumption that heart disease and hypertension are
occupationally related. It provides in relevant part as follows:
Hypertension or heart disease causing the death of, or any health
condition or impairment resulting in total or partial disability of
(i) salaried or volunteer firefighters . . . shall be presumed to be
occupational diseases, suffered in the line of duty, that are covered
by this title unless such presumption is overcome by a
preponderance of competent evidence to the contrary.
(Emphasis added.)
“[T]he purpose of the statutory presumption is to establish by law, in the absence of
evidence, a causal connection between certain occupations and death or disability resulting from
specified diseases.” Bass v. Richmond Police Dep’t, 258 Va. 103, 112, 515 S.E.2d 557, 561
(1999). “[T]he underlying premise of Code § 65.2-402(B) . . . [is to] establish[] the presumptive
causal link between occupational stress and heart disease [and hypertension].” Patton v.
Loudoun Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 36 Va. App. 392, 398, 551 S.E.2d 6, 9 (2001).
Claimant maintains the commission erred in vacating his award because it “ignored” his
diagnosis of hypertension, a condition he maintains entitled him to the presumption in Code
§ 65.2-402(B). He also notes that medical literature2 suggests an ischemic stroke, a blood clot in
the brain, “can be caused by clogged arteries.” Claimant does not argue, however, heart disease
or hypertension caused his stroke.
As the plain language of Code § 65.2-402(B) states, hypertension and heart disease are
not occupational diseases under all circumstances. They are defined as occupational diseases
only if they “cause . . . any health condition or impairment resulting in total or partial disability.”
2
Claimant cites an article on stroke from the U.S. National Library of Medicine (2013),
at http://www.nim.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000726.htm, but as this article was not
included in the evidence presented below, we may not consider it.
-3-
See Industrial Dev. Auth. v. Board of Supervisors, 263 Va. 349, 353, 559 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2002)
(“When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning
of that language.”).
Code § 65.2-402 creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of fire fighters and police
officers that a causal connection exists between a claimant’s hypertension or heart disease and
his employment. See Fairfax Cnty. Fire & Rescue Dep’t v. Mitchell, 14 Va. App. 1033, 1035,
421 S.E.2d 668, 670 (1992). While this presumption eliminates the need for a claimant who is a
fire fighter to establish that his employment caused his disease, it does not relieve him of the
initial burden to prove the existence of hypertension or heart disease causing a disability.
Thus, the issue before us is whether claimant’s heart disease or hypertension caused a
health condition resulting in total or partial disability. See Berry v. County of Henrico, 219 Va.
259, 264-65, 247 S.E.2d 389, 392 (1978) (in creating a statutory presumption in favor of
employee, “the General Assembly intended the presumption to apply in those instances where an
[employment] examination . . . fails to make a positive finding of the disease which subsequently
brings about the disability or death of the fire fighter” (emphasis added)).
We defer to the commission’s factual findings regarding causation, and assess only
whether its findings were supported by credible evidence. See Bass, 258 Va. at 115, 515 S.E.2d
at 563 (“[U]nlike the commission, the reviewing court is not charged with determining anew
whether the employer’s evidence of causation should be accorded sufficient weight to constitute
a preponderance of the evidence on that issue.”). See also A New Leaf, Inc. v. Webb, 257 Va.
190, 196, 511 S.E.2d 102, 104 (1999) (whether employee suffered from an occupational disease
is a legal question, but the nature and cause of her impairment is a factual issue).
Here, no evidence was before the commission from which it could find that claimant’s
stroke resulted from hypertension or heart disease. Cf. Portsmouth Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Clark, 30
-4-
Va. App. 548, 551, 513 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1999) (presumption applied where cardiovascular
specialist opined that orthostatic hypotension caused stroke); City of Waynesboro Police v.
Coffey, 35 Va. App. 264, 544 S.E.2d 860 (2001) (six medical opinions as to cause of death).
Thus, even though appellant suffered from hypertension,3 he was not entitled to the statutory
presumption because he offered no proof his hypertension resulted in his disability, i.e. his
stroke.
For these reasons, the decision of the commission is affirmed.
Affirmed.
3
Appellant concedes he does not suffer from heart disease.
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