UNITED STATE S DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_______________________________________
)
AARON L. SCHNITZLER a.k.a. )
TYSON Q. BECHT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 11-1318 (RBW)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al., )
)
Defendants. )
_______________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this civil action brought pro se, the plaintiff, a South Dakota state prisoner, alleges that
he has “declared [himself] not a citizen of the United States of America[,]” but that the United
States has refused to recognize his renunciation of citizenship. Complaint for Violation of Civil
Rights (“Compl.”) at 5. The plaintiff seeks to “compel the Attorney General of the United States
of America to act on [his] request of Renunciation and/or declair [sic] the INA: Act 349 – Loss
of Nationality by Native-Born or Naturalized citizen (5), (6) unconstitutional based on the 14th
Amendment ‘equal protection’ and/or the due process clause of the 5th Amendment.”1 Id.
The defendants move to dismiss this case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They assert that because the plaintiff’s application to
renounce his citizenship has already been acted upon, his claim is moot. The Court agrees and,
1
The plaintiff names as defendants the United States of America and its Departments of
Justice, Homeland Security and State. See Complaint’s caption. Other members of this Court
have held that “the responsibility [to decide renunciation requests] lies with the Director of the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), a component of Homeland Security.”
Walker v. Holder, 714 F. Supp. 2d 44, 47 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Kaufman v. Holder, 686 F. Supp.
2d 40, 41 (D.D.C. 2010)).
thus, will grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss the mandamus claim as moot. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (2012) (conferring original jurisdiction to district courts over “any action in the nature of
mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to
perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”). In addition, the Court finds that the plaintiff lacks
standing to bring his constitutional claim for declaratory relief and, thus, will dismiss the
complaint in its entirety. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. U.S., 101 F.3d 1423, 1427
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (listing the doctrines of standing and mootness as “‘core component[s]’ which
are ‘essential and unchanging part[s] of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III[.]’”)
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)) (alterations in original).
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff is a South Dakota state prisoner serving a 15-year term of imprisonment for
his conviction of “sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen . . . .” Schnitzler v. Reisch,
518 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 (D.S.D. 2007). According to the defendants, the plaintiff’s sentence
currently expires in 2015. Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (“Defs.’ P. & A.”) [Doc. # 17-1] at 1 (citing Order at 2, Aaron
Schnitzler v. Reisch, Cabinet Secretary, South Dakota Department of Corrections, et al., No.
4:06-cv-04064-LLP (D.S.D. Sept. 28, 2001)).2
After the plaintiff initiated this action on July 20, 2011, the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) informed the plaintiff by letter of December 12, 2011, that
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(6) (2006), United States citizens seeking to renounce their
2
The defendants have not submitted a copy of the Order for inclusion in this record, but
the plaintiff does not dispute its existence or that his sentence currently expires in 2015.
2
citizenship “must appear at a USCIS field office for an in-person interview before a USCIS
officer.” Defs.’ P. & A., Exhibit (“Ex.”) B.3 Because the plaintiff is incarcerated, the USCIS
further informed him that it would hold his application in abeyance until such time when he is
able to personally appear, and that holding the request in abeyance “will not prejudice [the]
USCIS’ consideration of [the] request.” Id.
DISCUSSION
The Plaintiff’s Mandamus Claim
The remedy of mandamus “is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary
situations.” Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980) (citations omitted).
Thus, “only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power will justify
issuance of the writ.” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289
(1988) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473
F.3d 345, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that mandamus is “an extraordinary remedy reserved for
really extraordinary cases”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Mandamus relief is
available only if “(1) the plaintiff has a clear right to relief; (2) the defendant has a clear duty to
act; and (3) there is no other adequate remedy available to the plaintiff.” In re Medicare
Reimbursement Litig., 414 F.3d 7, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Power v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d
781, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). With respect to the first two requirements, mandamus relief is
available “only where the duty to be performed is ministerial and the obligation to act peremptory
3
The plaintiff has filed a “Motion to Throw Out or Reject U.S.C.I.S. Letter Dated Dec.
12, 2011” [Doc. # 20], which will be denied because no cogent argument for striking the letter is
presented. The plaintiff has filed a similar motion with regard to the defendants’ motion to
dismiss [Doc. # 19], which, too, will be denied as baseless.
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and plainly defined. The law must not only authorize the demanded action, but require it; the
duty must be clear and indisputable.” Lozada Colon v. U.S. Dep't of State, 170 F.3d 191 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To the extent that defendant Homeland Security had a ministerial duty to act on the
plaintiff’s application to renounce his citizenship, which is also the relief the plaintiff seeks from
the complaint, it has done so. Therefore, the Court will grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss
the claim for mandamus relief as moot. See Newdow v. Bush, 391 F. Supp. 2d 95, 107 (D.D.C.
2005) (“Federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot cases because their constitutional
authority extends only to actual cases or controversies.”) (quoting Iron Arrow Honor Society v.
Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Plaintiff’s Declaratory Judgment Claim
In addition to mandamus relief, the plaintiff seeks a declaration that 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)
(5)(6), applicable to persons making a formal renunciation of nationality, is unconstitutional.
Compl. at 5. “To demonstrate standing under Article III of the Constitution, [the plaintiff] must
show an injury in fact caused by the defendant and redressable by judicial relief.” Singh v.
Napolitano, 710 F. Supp. 2d 123, 128 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Stilwell v. Office of Thrift
Supervision, 569 F.3d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks and other citation
omitted). “A qualifying injury must be ‘concrete and particularized’ and either ‘actual or
imminent.’” Id. (quoting City of Dania Beach, Fla. v. FAA, 485 F.3d 1181, 1185 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (citation omitted).
The plaintiff states that “[r]egardless [of the] letter Dated December 12, 2011[,] ‘exact’
relief has not been given, no relief has been given . . . [because] I’m an inmate and cannot travel.
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The fact still remains that I am still considered a United States citizen.” Statement of Facts and
Brief to the Court [Doc. # 24] at 2. These circumstances alone, however, do not give rise to
Article III standing and the plaintiff has not stated any other facts from which an actual injury
may be found or reasonably inferred. The USCIS has represented that the plaintiff will not be
prejudiced by its decision to hold his application in abeyance until he is able to comply with
§ 1481(a)(6). Defs.’ Ex. B. Therefore, the plaintiff has not established his standing to challenge
the constitutionality of § 1481(a)(5)(6). See Singh, 710 F. Supp. 2d at 128 (“[E]ven assuming
that there has been a delay in completing the FBI name check, the plaintiff has not alleged an
injury-in-fact necessary for Article III standing to raise a claim against the Attorney General.”);
see also Koos v. Holm, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108 (W.D. Tenn. 2002) (“After Koos fully serves
his sentence, he is free to travel to another country and renounce his citizenship to a United
States Consular Officer. As he is a prisoner at this time, he may not exercise this right.”); see id.
(reasoning that “[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of
many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal
system.”) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983)) (other citation omitted).
Because “the jurisdictional prerequisite of a ‘case or controversy’ applies with equal force
to actions for declaratory relief,” Nedow, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 107, the Court must also dismiss the
plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack
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of jurisdiction. In addition, the Court will deny as moot the plaintiff’s three pending motions,
which in any event are baseless.4
________s/______________
Reggie B. Walton
DATE: May 25, 2012 United States District Judge
4
A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
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