IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 00-31473
_____________________
JAMES WALTZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN WADE CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
Respondent-Appellee.
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
UDC No. 99-CV-1870
_________________________________________________________________
February 8, 2002
Before GARWOOD, JOLLY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
James Waltz, a state prisoner, pleaded guilty to manslaughter
in accordance with an eleventh-hour plea agreement with the State
of Louisiana. During the plea hearing, Waltz received the required
warnings and was informed that the court would impose a sentence of
forty years in prison. He agreed to the terms of the plea
agreement and asserted that he had not been promised anything
outside the agreement. In his state petition for habeas corpus,
however, Waltz contended that his guilty plea was not knowing and
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
voluntary because his attorney, Gregory Caver, induced him to
accept the agreement by promising Waltz that he would have to serve
only five years in prison. Finding insufficient evidence to show
that Waltz’s attorney had made such a promise before Waltz pleaded
guilty, the state court denied relief.
Waltz asserted the same claims in his federal habeas petition,
relying in part on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s intervening
decision to sanction Caver for a laundry-list of professional
misconduct including one charge relating to Waltz’s guilty plea.
The district court denied relief. We granted a Certificate of
Appealability to decide whether Caver induced Waltz to plead guilty
by promising him a five-year prison sentence, and we now affirm the
judgment of the district court.
I
In 1994, the state charged Waltz with second-degree murder in
connection with the April 1994 death of Dennis Lines. Shortly
before his trial in state court was scheduled to begin, Waltz
struck a deal with the state and agreed to plead guilty to
manslaughter. As Waltz concedes, the trial judge explained the
consequences of a guilty plea and informed Waltz that he would
receive a sentence of forty years in prison if he accepted the plea
agreement. Waltz voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial and
agreed to the forty-year prison term. Most relevant to the present
question, Waltz also asserted under oath that he had not been
promised “anything whatsoever that has not been said on the record
2
here today.” The trial court then sentenced him to forty years in
prison.
In a later petition for post-conviction relief in state court,
Waltz asserted that he accepted the plea agreement only because his
attorney, Gregory Caver, promised that he would have to serve only
five years of his forty-year prison sentence.1 At a February 1998
evidentiary hearing conducted in state court, several of Waltz’s
sisters testified on his behalf. According to his sisters, Caver
told them that the state had offered Waltz a plea bargain and that
Caver would obtain a pardon for Waltz to reduce the sentence to
five years if they provided him with more money. Waltz testified
that, because he was not permitted to speak with his sisters during
the negotiations, they signaled their approval of the arrangement
by nodding their heads.2 Based on this testimony, Waltz argued
that his guilty plea was based on Caver’s promise to have his
sentenced reduced to five years.
The state habeas court, however, did not find Waltz’s account
to be credible. The court relied instead on the prosecuting
attorney’s testimony that he and Caver had not discussed early
1
Caver allegedly assured Waltz that the prosecutor had agreed
to commute Waltz’s sentence after five years because of his medical
condition. Caver did not testify at the hearing, however, because
he could not be located.
2
Waltz also testified that Caver coached him during the plea
colloquy by signaling how he should answer the judge’s questions.
The prosecuting attorney, however, testified that he did not notice
any such signals.
3
release or any other form of commutation of Waltz’s sentence. The
judge who took Waltz’s guilty plea similarly testified that he was
unaware of any promise to release Waltz early. The state habeas
court therefore denied Waltz’s request for relief because his
guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and was not
tainted by a false promise by Caver. The state appellate court
affirmed in July 1998, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied
Waltz’s petition for review in September 1999.
In June 1999, the Louisiana Supreme Court suspended Caver for
a minimum of five years based on sixteen instances of professional
misconduct, including one count related to Waltz.3 Specifically,
the court found:
In 1994, James Waltz retained respondent to
represent him in a criminal matter.
Subsequently, Mr. Waltz pled guilty to
manslaughter after respondent promised him he
would receive a two-year sentence. Instead,
Mr. Waltz received a forty-year sentence.
Respondent promised to file an appeal and was
paid $500 to do so. Respondent failed to file
the appeal, communicate with his client, and
account for and return the unearned portion of
the legal fee.
In re Caver, 733 So.2d 1208, 1209 (La. 1999).
In his federal habeas petition, Waltz again argued that his
guilty plea was induced by Caver’s promise that he would not have
3
Although he did not testify during the disciplinary
proceedings, Caver apparently admitted to harming forty-nine
clients.
4
to serve more than five years of his sentence.4 After reviewing
the record of the state habeas proceedings, the magistrate judge
concluded that the “State court’s resolution of the facts in light
of the evidence presented was entirely reasonable” and was “based
largely upon credibility calls that are fully supported by the
inconsistencies in the testimony.” The district court accepted the
magistrate judge’s recommendation and denied Waltz’s petition.
Waltz then requested a Certificate of Appealability from this
Court. We found that he had “made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right” and granted a COA “with respect
to the issue whether Caver promised Waltz that he would receive a
five-year prison term as part of the plea bargain, and whether the
promise induced Waltz to plead guilty.”
II
Under the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”), we may not issue a writ of habeas corpus concerning “any
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings” unless the state court’s adjudication of that claim
(1) unreasonably applied clearly established federal law or (2) was
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented at the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000); see
4
Waltz’s federal petition also alleged that the trial judge
impermissibly participated in plea negotiations. The district
court rejected this contention, and we denied Waltz’s request for
a Certificate of Appealability as to the issue.
5
also Chambers v. Johnson, 218 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2000).
Waltz makes arguments under each prong of the statute, but we
find it clear that the state habeas court in this case correctly
applied federal law. Thus, the central issue is whether the state
habeas court’s conclusion that Waltz’s plea was not induced by
Caver’s alleged promise involved an unreasonable determination of
the facts.
Although the Supreme Court has declined to adopt a per se rule
rendering guilty pleas invulnerable to collateral attack, a
defendant seeking to mount such a challenge must overcome the
“formidable barrier” created by the defendant’s sworn statements
during the plea colloquy. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-
74 (1977) (citing Fontana v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215
(1973)).5 The Court in Mary v. Johnson summarized the applicable
standard:
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware
of the direct consequences, including the
actual value of any commitments made to him by
the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel,
must stand unless induced by threats (or
promises to discontinue improper harassment),
misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or
unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by
promises that are by their nature improper as
having no proper relationship to the
prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).
5
See also Barnes v. United States, 579 F.2d 364, 366 (5th Cir.
1978) (“Where, from the transcript, the plea-taking procedures are
clear and regular on their face, a petitioner asserting the
existence of a bargain outside the record and contrary to his own
statements under oath bears a heavy burden.”).
6
467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court has therefore left open the possibility that
a defendant may be entitled to relief if he can show that the
guilty plea was the product of a misrepresentation by his attorney
or by the prosecutor. See Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 75; see also
Davis v. Butler, 825 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir. 1987) (“If Davis's
attorney did promise a pardon within three years, it could have
rendered Davis's guilty plea unknowing and involuntary.” (citations
omitted)).
In the present case, Waltz was informed of his rights and he
expressly denied the existence of any promises outside the plea
agreement during his colloquy before the sentencing judge. To
refute this testimony, Waltz points to his testimony and the
testimony of his sisters at the state habeas hearing indicating
that Caver promised him a shorter sentence than the forty-year
sentence that was formally imposed.
The state habeas court began by observing that Waltz had the
burden of showing that his guilty plea was involuntary because it
was the product of fraud or misrepresentations by counsel.
Applying this standard to the facts in the instant case, the court
found that Waltz’s evidence was not sufficient to show that Caver
had, in fact, made any actual promise of a shorter sentence or an
early release. Instead, the evidence at most proved that Caver
intended to seek an early release of some kind for Waltz. Cf.
Davis, 825 F.2d at 894 (observing that the defendant must show “‘an
7
actual promise has been made to [him] rather than there being
merely an 'understanding' on his part’” (citation omitted)).
Although Waltz did put forward some evidence that Caver
promised him an early release, the state habeas court’s
determination of the facts was not unreasonable based on the
evidence presented at the hearing. The court concluded that
Waltz’s testimony concerning the alleged promise was not credible
because it was not consistent with the allegations in the habeas
petition or with the testimony of other witnesses. The court found
more plausible testimony by various witnesses indicating that Caver
simply intended to seek parole or clemency for Waltz. The court
also declined to place significant weight on the testimony of
Waltz’s sisters. Since his sisters did not have an opportunity to
convey to Waltz the terms of any promises that Caver made to them,
the court reasoned that Waltz could not have relied on any
representations made to his sisters. These findings and the
conclusion that Waltz’s plea was voluntary are consistent with the
evidence presented at the hearing and are therefore not
unreasonable determinations of fact.
The only remaining question is whether the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s later decision to sanction Caver--based in part on the
alleged fraudulent promise to Waltz--affects the statutory
presumption that the state habeas court’s factual findings were
correct or affects our holding that the state court did not make an
unreasonable determination of facts. We hold that it does not.
8
Our review under the AEDPA is strictly limited to determining
whether the state habeas court’s decision “was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)
(emphasis added). Because the state supreme court did not issue
its decision sanctioning Caver until over a year after the
conclusion of Waltz’s state habeas hearing, the state supreme
court’s subsequent findings in an ancillary matter are not relevant
to our review of the state habeas court’s judgment.
It is not our job to speculate how the state supreme court
would resolve any possible conflicts between the factual findings
in Caver’s disciplinary proceedings and those of the state habeas
court. If Waltz wishes to pursue this argument, he must do so
first in the state courts. We, of course, express no opinion on
the merits of the argument.
III
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the state habeas
court’s decision involved neither an unreasonable application of
federal law nor an unreasonable determination of facts in the light
of the evidence before it. As a consequence, the district court
correctly held that Waltz is not entitled to habeas relief.
AFFIRMED.
9