UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4928
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN MAURICE USSERY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00032-MR-DLH-1)
Submitted: May 23, 2014 Decided: June 6, 2014
Before WYNN, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henderson Hill, Executive Director, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN
NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Ross H. Richardson, First Assistant
Federal Defender, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, William M. Miller,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jonathan Maurice Ussery pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012), and was sentenced to seventy-nine months in
prison. Ussery reserved the right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress the firearm recovered
subsequent to a Terry ∗ stop. We affirm the judgment of the
district court.
When considering a district court’s ruling on a motion
to suppress, we review its factual findings for clear error and
its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d
263, 269 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1572 (2014).
Where the district court has denied a motion to suppress, we
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government. United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th Cir.
2013).
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer
may stop a person for investigative purposes when the officer
has reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts “that
criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’” United States v. Arvizu, 534
U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). Whether
there is reasonable suspicion to justify the stop depends on the
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Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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totality of the circumstances, including the information known
to the officer and any reasonable inferences to be drawn at the
time of the stop. Id. at 273-74; United States v. Foster, 634
F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). The reasonable suspicion
assessment is a “commonsensical proposition,” and deference
should be accorded to police officers’ determinations based on
their practical experience and training. United States v.
Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 782 (4th Cir. 2004).
With these standards in mind, and having carefully
reviewed the transcript of the suppression hearing, the record,
and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the officers had
reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop and that the
district court properly denied Ussery’s motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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