IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 409A12
FILED 13 JUNE 2013
CATRYN DENISE BRIDGES
v.
HARVEY S. PARRISH and BARBARA B. PARRISH
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel
of the Court of Appeals, ___ N.C. App. ___, 731 S.E.2d 262 (2012), affirming an
order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint entered on 3 November 2011 by Judge
Thomas D. Haigwood in Superior Court, Johnston County. Heard in the Supreme
Court on 6 May 2013.
Wake Forest University School of Law Appellate Advocacy Clinic, by John J.
Korzen, for plaintiff-appellant.
Poyner Spruill LLP, by Steven B. Epstein, for defendant-appellees.
Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, L.L.P., by
Christopher R. Kiger, for North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys,
amicus curiae.
MARTIN, Justice.
Plaintiff, Catryn Bridges, seeks money damages from defendants, Harvey
and Barbara Parrish, for the criminal acts of their 52-year-old son Bernie. Plaintiff
alleges that Harvey and Barbara negligently stored their firearm, which Bernie
wrongfully took from their home and used to shoot plaintiff. We hold these parents
are not liable for the criminal conduct of their 52-year-old son.
BRIDGES V. PARRISH
Opinion of the Court
Plaintiff made the following allegations in her complaint: Plaintiff dated
Harvey and Barbara’s son, Bernie, for seven months in 2010. At that time she was
unaware that Bernie had a history of escalating violence towards the women with
whom he had romantic relationships and he had been charged with, among other
things, first-degree kidnapping, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill or
inflict serious injury, and possession of a firearm by a felon in 2007. During the
events at issue here, Bernie lived in a building on Harvey and Barbara’s property,
while they attempted to provide their son with guidance, advice, and financial
assistance. Harvey and Barbara owned a number of firearms, to which Bernie
occasionally had access. During Bernie’s relationship with plaintiff, Harvey and
Barbara met her on many occasions.
According to the complaint, plaintiff ended her relationship with Bernie in
November 2010 because he exhibited “controlling, accusatory and risky” behavior.
They resumed their relationship in January 2011. The dysfunctional relationship
dynamics again escalated. In a conversation on 7 March 2011, Bernie accused
plaintiff of seeing other men. The next day Bernie drove to plaintiff’s workplace and
shot her in the abdomen with one of Harvey and Barbara’s guns.
Following the assault, rather than suing Bernie, plaintiff filed a civil
complaint alleging that Harvey and Barbara “knew or should have known that
Bernie Parrish posed a risk of serious harm to Plaintiff” yet “failed to take
reasonable and/or necessary steps to keep [their] guns in a safe and secure place, or
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Opinion of the Court
otherwise adequately locked and located such that Bernie Parrish could not get
access to and possession of any such guns.” Harvey and Barbara filed a motion to
dismiss, which the trial court allowed. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On appeal plaintiff proposed three theories of liability against Harvey and
Barbara, only one of which is before us: a negligence claim alleging Harvey and
Barbara breached a common law duty to secure their firearms from their son.
Bridges v. Parrish, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 731 S.E.2d 262, 264-65 (2012). The Court
of Appeals majority declined to find that such a duty arose under North Carolina
common law. Id. at ___, 731 S.E.2d at 266-67. The dissenting judge would have
reversed the trial court’s decision and allowed plaintiff to proceed with a claim for
negligent storage of a firearm. Id. at ___, 731 S.E.2d at 268-69 (Geer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). We affirm.
Our review of the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure is de novo. We consider “whether the
allegations of the complaint, if treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under some legal theory.” Coley v. State, 360 N.C. 493,
494-95, 631 S.E.2d 121, 123 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff has asserted a common law negligence claim. To state a common
law negligence claim, plaintiff must show “(1) a legal duty; (2) a breach thereof; and
(3) injury proximately caused by the breach.” Stein v. Asheville Bd. of Educ., 360
N.C. 321, 328, 626 S.E.2d 263, 267 (2006) (citation omitted). In the case before us,
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Opinion of the Court
the only element contested is whether Harvey and Barbara owed plaintiff a legal
duty.
We have stated that “[n]o legal duty exists unless the injury to the plaintiff
was foreseeable and avoidable through due care.” Id. at 328, 626 S.E.2d at 267
(citing Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 349 N.C. 196, 205, 505 S.E.2d 131, 137
(1998)). The criminal acts of a third party are generally considered “unforeseeable
and independent, intervening cause[s] absolving the [defendant] of liability.” Id. at
329, 626 S.E.2d at 268 (alterations in original) (quoting Foster v. Winston-Salem
Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 638, 281 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1981)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). For this reason, the law does not generally impose a duty to
prevent the criminal acts of a third party. Id. at 328, 626 S.E.2d at 268.
As an exception to this rule, our common law may allow a defendant to be
held liable for the criminal acts of a third party in cases of “special relationships”—
“when the defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff or the third person justifies
making the defendant answerable civilly for the harm to the plaintiff.” Id. at 329,
626 S.E.2d at 268. Plaintiff has waived her argument that Harvey and Barbara had
a special relationship with Bernie. Bridges, ___ N.C. App. at ___ n.1, 731 S.E.2d at
265 n.1 (majority opinion). Accordingly, to state a claim for negligence based on a
special relationship, plaintiff’s complaint must allege facts sufficient to show that
her relationship with Harvey and Barbara justified requiring them to use due care
to prevent the attack on her.
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Opinion of the Court
Special relationships create a responsibility to take “affirmative action for the
aid or protection of another,” 2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 A cmt. b (1965),
and they arise only in narrow circumstances. For example, “the parent of an
unemancipated child may be held liable in damages for failing to exercise
reasonable control over the child’s behavior if the parent had the ability and the
opportunity to control the child and knew or should have known of the necessity for
exercising such control.” Moore v. Crumpton, 306 N.C. 618, 623, 295 S.E.2d 436,
440 (1982) (citations omitted). In addition, a landowner has a “duty to safeguard
his business invitees from the criminal acts of third persons” if those criminal acts
are foreseeable. Foster, 303 N.C. at 640, 281 S.E.2d at 39 (citation omitted).
Further, common carriers owe a duty “to provide for the safe conveyance of their
passengers as far as human care and foresight can go.” Smith v. Camel City Cab
Co., 227 N.C. 572, 574, 42 S.E.2d 657, 658 (1947) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Other special relationships include those between innkeepers and
their guests and people who voluntarily accept custody of another. See 2
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 A. In these cases special relationships creating
liability have arisen through circumstances such as voluntary assumption of
another’s care and well-being or the ability to control the third person at the time of
the criminal acts.
Here, plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any allegations that, if taken as true,
demonstrate that Harvey and Barbara had a special relationship with her that gave
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Opinion of the Court
rise to a legal duty. Like the defendants in Moore, Harvey and Barbara did not
prevent their child from accessing a deadly weapon that the child used to harm
another person. Moore, 306 N.C. at 620, 295 S.E.2d at 438. While parents may be
held liable for the actions of their children in some circumstances, we noted in
Moore that “[t]he opportunity to control a young man of [17 years] obviously is not
as great as with a younger child. . . . Short of standing guard over the child twenty-
four hours a day, there was little that the defendant father could do to prevent” the
harm to the plaintiff. Id. at 626, 295 S.E.2d at 442. We did not hold the parents in
Moore responsible for the criminal actions of their 17-year-old son. Id. at 626, 628,
295 S.E.2d at 441-42, 443. Even more so, Harvey and Barbara are not liable for the
criminal actions of their 52-year-old son.
Because plaintiff has not stated a claim that supports a finding of negligence
based on a special relationship, the only remaining theory of liability is that Harvey
and Barbara negligently breached a duty owed to plaintiff as a member of the
general public. Relying on previous cases that have characterized firearms as
dangerous instrumentalities, plaintiff argues that Harvey and Barbara had a duty
to secure their firearms. We disagree. While our prior cases articulate a duty to
exercise due care in the use of dangerous instrumentalities, they do not mandate a
home storage requirement. Cf. Edwards v. Johnson, 269 N.C. 30, 35, 152 S.E.2d
122, 126 (1967) (“It is settled law with us that the highest degree of care is exacted
of those handling firearms.” (emphasis added)); Belk v. Boyce, 263 N.C. 24, 31, 138
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S.E.2d 789, 794 (1964) (“[A] very high degree of care is required from all persons
using firearms in the immediate vicinity of others regardless of how lawful or
innocent such use may be.” (emphasis added)). The mere possession of a legal yet
dangerous instrumentality does not create automatic liability when a third party
takes that instrumentality and uses it in an illegal act. As long as the dangerous
instrumentalities are kept in accordance with statutory regulations, the law does
not impose civil liability under the present allegations.
The General Assembly has enacted a myriad of statutes relating to the use
and storage of firearms. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. §§ 14-269.2 (prohibiting firearms on
educational property or at school-sponsored activities), -269.7 (prohibiting persons
under the age of eighteen from possessing handguns), -315.1 (making it a crime to
not secure firearms in premises shared with a minor), -415.11 (2011) (regulating
concealed carry permits). The General Assembly, however, has not elected to
impose civil liability in the circumstances presented in the case before us.
Moreover, as defendants observe, “not a single appellate court has recognized a
cause of action for negligent storage of a firearm broad enough to encompass the
claim Plaintiff pleads here.”
As amicus curiae aptly explains, “under Plaintiff’s theory, a negligent-based
cause of action would exist against a homeowner virtually any time a gun (or any
other object that could be used to injure someone) was stolen from the homeowner’s
premise[s] and then used in the commission of a violent crime that injures another
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Opinion of the Court
person.” It logically follows that holding gun owners responsible for the criminal
use of their guns by unauthorized adult users would unfairly burden those who
lawfully own and store guns in their homes. Cf. Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615,
632, 507 S.E.2d 882, 892 (1998).
Even when all plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, Harvey and Barbara
cannot be held liable for their 52-year-old son’s criminal actions, which are
“unforeseeable and independent, intervening cause[s] absolving [defendants] of
liability.” Stein, 360 N.C. at 329, 626 S.E.2d at 268 (first alteration in original)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Our General Assembly is a “far
more appropriate forum than the courts for implementing policy-based changes to
our laws,” Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 169, 594 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2004), so long
as such policy-based changes are kept within constitutional bounds, see Britt v.
State, 363 N.C. 546, 550, 681 S.E.2d 320, 323 (2009). Accordingly, we affirm the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
AFFIRMED.
Justice BEASLEY took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
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