REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 1129
September Term, 2012
JOSHUA GABRIEL PRINCE
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Eyler, Deborah S.,
Wright,
Nazarian,
JJ.
Opinion by Nazarian, J.
Filed: February 26, 2014
I shot an arrow into the air,
It fell to earth, I knew not where . . .
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, The Arrow and the Song 1
In this appeal, we have not an arrow but a “trajectory rod,” which a police officer used
to show the path a bullet took when the appellant, Joshua Prince, fired a rifle from above at
his ex-girlfriend as she cowered behind the rear bumper of her car in a parking garage. Mr.
Prince was charged with attempted murder and other charges, tried before a jury in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, and convicted. On appeal, he challenges the circuit
court’s decision to allow the State to introduce the testimony about the rifle’s firing pattern
and the bullet’s trajectory through the roof and interior of her car. He also contends that the
trial court improperly denied his counsel’s request for a continuance to allow him to develop
expert testimony regarding his mental state. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Prince moved into the Bethesda apartment complex of his then-girlfriend, Allanna
Garbe on August 28, 2010. Ms. Garbe had discouraged the move; she felt their relationship
should move more slowly, but he apparently saw things differently and took an apartment
one floor up from hers in the same building. The transition went badly and, as we shall see,
spiraled quickly from there: Mr. Prince felt “disappointed and upset” when Ms. Garbe did
not help him move in, and Ms. Garbe expressed discomfort at how quickly he viewed the
relationship as progressing. On the evening of September 1, 2010, she went to his apartment
1
Longfellow, The Arrow and the Song (1845), reprinted in John Bartlett, Bartlett’s
Familiar Quotations 436 (18th ed. 2012).
and, in a conversation that lasted thirty to forty minutes and that she later characterized as
“peaceful,” she told him that she no longer wanted to be in a relationship.
A few nights later, on September 3, 2010, Mr. Prince saw Ms. Garbe leave her
apartment with a male friend. He sent her a series of text messages beginning around 10:00
p.m. asking what she was doing and telling her that he loved her. His behavior escalated from
there: he showed up at Ms. Garbe’s apartment within moments after she and her friend
returned to her apartment (around midnight), and when she came out to speak with him, he
seemed not to understand that she had broken up with him, then remained in the hallway
twenty minutes after their conversation ended. Ms. Garbe felt uncomfortable and afraid, so
her friend remained in her apartment with her through the night. Mr. Prince continued to send
text messages that night and through the morning, finally culminating in a 4:46 a.m. text in
which he stated, “You told me you loved me and hoped we could get married one day. You
brought another man in your bed tonight. How could you live with yourself?” Mr. Prince also
had a conversation in the parking garage in the early morning hours with two other residents
of the complex (whom he had never met), telling them in depth about the relationship and
his dismay that Ms. Garbe chose to end it.
The next morning, Ms. Garbe discovered that someone had vandalized her car during
the night. The doors, trunk, roof, and hood of the car were dented and both the side mirrors
had been ripped off. On the recommendation of police officers who responded to her call,
she obtained a no-contact order against Mr. Prince that same day. When Mr. Prince learned
2
about the order, he asked Ms. Garbe by text to withdraw it. He said he did not believe that
she had no other romantic interest, and he continued texting her throughout the evening.2 For
the remainder of Labor Day weekend, September 5 and 6, though, the two did not
communicate.
Sometime between 7:00 and 7:30 a.m. Tuesday morning, September 7, Ms. Garbe
went to her car, which was parked on the third floor of the parking garage. She climbed in
the driver’s side, but before closing the door she sensed movement, looked up, and saw Mr.
Prince on a ramp between the third and fourth floors of the garage, where he “had just
stooped down and had a rifle pointed at me.”3 When asked to describe the rifle, she explained
it was “[j]ust a very large gun that he had over one shoulder directly pointed at me.”
(Emphasis added.) Ms. Garbe scrambled out of the car and hid behind the rear bumper. The
two or three times she looked up, she “saw [Mr. Prince] with the gun just pointed directly at
[her], taking full aim at [her].”
After she heard a gunshot, Ms. Garbe looked again and saw that Mr. Prince was no
longer aiming at her, so she ran into the apartment building and called 911. Minutes later, she
received a new series of texts from Mr. Prince:
2
Mr. Prince sent texts sporadically, but in groups that would appear rapidly in a series.
The messages varied in tone from matter-of-fact to highly emotional.
3
From her testimony it appears that the higher ramp, where Mr. Prince stood, sat a
half-floor higher than the level on which Ms. Garbe was parked, so he could not have turned
the corner on foot to get to her car even though he was only a short distance away. An
investigating officer measured the distance and testified that Mr. Prince was crouched seven
to eight feet away from the driver’s seat of Ms. Garbe’s vehicle.
3
• “I never would have hurt you honestly”;
• “I pictured my life without you and you with another man and I
snapped”;
• “I know I can’t take this back”; and
• “I know I just threw away my life.”
Ms. Garbe responded (having been told by the police to do so), and encouraged Mr.
Prince to turn himself in, which he did. An investigation of the fourth-floor ramp in the
garage uncovered a garment bag, a live round of ammunition, and a cartridge casing. Police
also searched Mr. Prince’s apartment and found an open rifle case by his bedside. Moreover,
after hearing a recorded conversation between Mr. Prince (incarcerated at the time) and a
friend, police interviewed the friend, who produced a box of ammunition that Mr. Prince had
asked him to hide and from which three rounds were missing.
The State charged Mr. Prince with attempted first-degree murder, first-degree assault,
carrying a dangerous weapon with intent to injure, and failing to comply with a peace order.
He underwent a mental health evaluation at Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center by
psychologist Inna Toller. In January 2011, Dr. Toller rendered a report in which she found
him competent to stand trial and criminally responsible. Although she acknowledged that Mr.
Prince suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) from his military experience
in Iraq as a medic, Dr. Toller concluded that it played no role in his conduct: “[T]here is no
evidence that [his PTSD] symptoms caused him to have significant impairment in every day
function.” She opined, based on how Mr. Prince acted on the morning of the incident, that
4
“the PTSD and the adjustment disorder did not cause him to lack substantial capacity either
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law.”
Trial was scheduled to begin on Monday, March 26, 2012. On the afternoon of Friday,
March 23, 2012, Mr. Prince moved for a continuance. He argued that he had obtained a
preliminary report from a psychologist, Rona Fields, Ph.D. (the “Fields Report”), in which,
he said, she opined that Mr. Prince “most likely suffered” from PTSD at the time of the
incident (emphasis added).4 According to the motion, Mr. Prince had only recently been able
to gather funds for Dr. Fields’s preliminary evaluation and she needed more time to complete
testing and determine whether he might suffer organic brain damage or whether his PTSD
contributed to the incident. The State opposed the motion, citing the facts that the incident
had taken place over a year and a half earlier, that there had already been an aborted plea
deal, that the case had been continued twice already, and that Ms. Garbe objected strongly
(even at the time of trial, Mr. Prince apparently still was attempting to contact her).
The trial court denied the motion on the morning of trial, explaining (over five pages
of transcript) that Dr. Toller had reviewed all the relevant history and documents, and had
concluded Mr. Prince’s mental health issue had nothing to do with the events in question:
the PTSD and the adjustment order did not cause him to lack
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his
4
As we discuss below, the Fields Report does not, on closer examination, express that
opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
5
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law. Therefore, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
Prince was found [by Dr. Toller] to be criminally responsible.
The court noted that Dr. Toller believed Mr. Prince “had a clear secondary gain to avoid
incarceration and be found not criminally responsible,” and, as a result, had diagnosed him
with malingering. For these reasons, the court found no good cause to continue the trial and
it went forward as scheduled.
The State presented seven witnesses in its case-in-chief, beginning with Ms. Garbe
and including two police officers whose testimony Mr. Prince challenges here. Detective
Brian Stafford, who responded to the 911 call, interviewed Ms. Garbe, videotaped the scene,
and documented the area where Mr. Prince stood at the time of the shooting. Officer Ryan
Costello examined Ms. Garbe’s car after it was brought in to police for processing and, as
part of his examination, placed “trajectory rods” through the bullet holes in the car and
photographed the rods in place.5
Neither Officer Costello nor Detective Stafford was offered or qualified as an expert
witness. The State had notified counsel for Mr. Prince two weeks before trial that it planned
to call expert witnesses “in crime scene and trajectory” (Officer Costello) and “in weapons
and ballistics” (Detective Stafford), but counsel for Mr. Prince moved in limine to preclude
5
The remaining witnesses included the law enforcement officers who served the
peace order on Mr. Prince, responded to Ms. Garbe’s 911 call, and executed the search
warrant in Mr. Prince’s apartment, and the resident at the apartment complex who spoke to
Mr. Prince in the early morning hours of September 4.
6
the testimony based on the State’s lack of formal or timely notice of the experts. At a hearing
on the morning of trial, the State informed the court that it had intended to call Officer
Costello as an expert, but had changed its mind: “[i]n reality, his testimony is really factual,
so we have no problem . . . we don’t need to qualify him as an expert, so we won’t.” In
response, counsel for Mr. Prince acknowledged voluntarily that his motion was moot. The
parties did not discuss Detective Stafford’s testimony at that point (the whole colloquy
occupies less than a page of transcript), either by naming him or by talking generically about
any ballistics testimony.
When the time came for Detective Stafford to testify, he offered a detailed
account—without objection from Mr. Prince’s counsel—about the live round found on the
scene:
Q. And could you please describe what type of ammunition
that is?
A. It’s a 7.62 NATO full metal jacket round, standard
military loading.
Q. You say that like we should all know. Give us the
numbers that you first said?
A. 7.62 NATO.
Q. What does that mean? What is the 7.62?
A. The 7.62 refers to the diameter of the bullet.
Q. Okay.
7
A. It’s basically a 30 caliber bullet. NATO, it refers to the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the 1950s, NATO
wanted to come up with a common round for all the
member countries to use. This is the ammunition they
standardized, largely because the United States insisted
on a 30 caliber cartridge.
Q Okay. And what is the significance of the markings on
here?
A. These are what are called head stamp markings. They’re
on the head of the case. This one says NATO on it. There
is a letter on there, F, and then there’s a number, which
is 81. 81 would be for the year of manufacture, the year
that this ammunition was manufactured.
Q. So in 1981?
A. Yes. And the F would identify the armory or the factory
where it was made.
Q. Okay, anything . . . that you note of significance on
[Exhibit] 32?
A. Well, this doesn’t have a firing pin.
Q. Oh, I’m sorry.
A. This has a primer, which is struck by the firing pin when
you fire the round.
Q. Okay, and is there anything of significance that would
indicate how this bullet came to be ejected from a rifle?
A. There is. There’s a small dimple or marking in the
middle of the primer. It’s consistent with where the firing
pin would have struck the primer in order to fire the
round. It’s not very deep. It’s really just a superficial
mark, but it indicates to me that it was most likely a
misfire.
8
Q. Okay. What’s this green stuff[6] that we’re seeing?
A. On there? Sometimes the—
[Counsel for Mr. Prince]: I would object, Your Honor. Can we
approach?
THE COURT: Sure.
(Bench conference follows:)
[Counsel for Mr. Prince]: Your Honor, I would note an
objection. It seems apparent that [the State] is qualifying Mr.
Stafford as an expert in this case. She’s asking for him to draw
conclusions. I don’t know what his testimony is to proffer or
what evidence was recovered from the scene. But at this point,
she’s asking questions outside of what I believe are expert
boundaries in regards to ammunition and markings as such on
the bullets.
[Counsel for the State]: Your Honor, it’s all contained within the
police report. The types of ammunition, how the ammunition is
observed to be—
* * *
[Counsel for the State]: We’ll move on, but we feel it’s relevant.
(Emphases added.) Later in his testimony, Detective Stafford revisited the live round:
[Counsel for the State]: Okay. Detective Stafford, very briefly,
what does a misfire mean?
6
The State explained the reference to “green stuff” in its brief: “Subsequent testimony
established that a plastic-wrapped green box of ammunition was in [Mr.] Prince’s apartment.
The cartridges bore the same head stamp as the live round at the scene and the cartridges also
had some green discoloration on them, as did the live round at the scene.”
9
A. It means you pull the trigger and a round doesn’t go off.
It could be attributable to a number of things, either the
primer that’s in the base of the cartridge might be bad
and just doesn’t go off. It can also be [attributed] to a
malfunction of the firearm. Sometimes if you’ve got like
a dirty firing pin channel, the firing pin will come
forward far enough to actually strike—
[Counsel for Mr. Prince]: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Same basis?
[Counsel for Mr. Prince]: Same basis, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
(Emphasis added.) Detective Stafford went on to provide further detail regarding the officers’
investigation of the scene.
Before Officer Costello testified, counsel for Mr. Prince objected to admission of the
photographs of Ms. Garbe’s car that showed the trajectory rods the officer had placed in the
bullet holes. According to his counsel, “the trajectory is all speculation in terms of the path
of the bullet and whatnot.” Counsel for the State responded that the testimony was not expert
testimony, and specifically that Officer Costello would testify only to fact information about
the rods’ placement:
what these yellow rods are and what they’re used for. And that
they placed them to follow the path that the bullet took through
the car. And that it ended, went through the bumper here and
ended on that metal place.
And again, he’s not testifying as an expert.
10
The Court ultimately determined that the placement of the rods was not a subject of
expert testimony, and clarified the universe of appropriate testimony from Officer Costello:
THE COURT: But this doesn’t require expert testimony. The
testimony will be that they looked at the car. That there was a
hole in the roof. That they put these rods through the hole. That
it came out inside the car. There was a hole in the back seat.
They put the rod through that. It went all the way through.
The testimony will be that they didn’t make these holes. They
didn’t drill them in there.
***
THE COURT: But you have to stay away from . . . any sort of
technical language as regards to . . . trajectory and that sort of
thing.
***
THE COURT: Now, counsel [for Mr. Prince], for the record you
obviously need to make your objection at the point that they are
offered.
[Counsel for Mr. Prince]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: But I will overrule the objection.
[Counsel for Mr. Prince]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: But you need to make a good record.
(Emphasis added; omitting interjections from State’s counsel.)
Officer Costello testified that he examined Ms. Garbe’s car at the vehicle processing
facility and performed a “reconstruction” analysis, explaining—again without objection from
Mr. Prince’s counsel—what that meant:
11
A. Meaning basically I wanted to or attempted to show
trajectory or the path that was taken by a suspected bullet
through the vehicle.
Q. And do you use any tools to do that?
A. Yes, trajectory rods.
Q. What is that?
A. So they’re basically just standard rods that you kind of
place through holes or in this case suspected bullet holes
to show the directionality of travel, the path of travel.
Q. I’m going to show you what’s been marked as State’s
[Exhibits, the photographs]. Can you identify those?
A. Yes, I can.
Q. And what are they?
A. Those are photographs that I took on that day.
Q Generally, what are they of?
A. Of the trajectory rods that I spoke of, just now.
Q. And the trajectory rods that are in those photographs, did
you place them where they are in those pictures?
A. I did. Yes.
After the State moved the photographs into evidence, counsel for Mr. Prince objected
for the first time. The court overruled his objection and Officer Costello proceeded to explain
how he placed each trajectory rod through a suspected bullet hole—first through the roof of
the car, next through the driver’s headrest, next through the rear seat on the driver’s side, and
12
finally through the rear of the trunk and the interior bumper of the vehicle. Again, this
testimony came in without objection from counsel for Mr. Prince until the State sought to
move the photographs into evidence.
After the close of the State’s case, Mr. Prince moved for a judgment of acquittal that
the court denied. He then rested without testifying or putting on any evidence. The jury
convicted Mr. Prince of all charges, and after a sentence review hearing, the court imposed
a sentence of life with all but 25 years suspended on the conviction for attempted first-degree
murder, and concurrent sentences on the remaining counts. He was committed to Patuxent
Institute, ordered to serve five years of supervised probation on release, and was to have no
contact with Ms. Garbe. He filed a timely appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Prince argues on appeal that the trial court should not have permitted Detective
Stafford and Officer Costello to testify as lay witnesses regarding information that was
properly the subject of expert testimony.7 We take each officer’s testimony in turn, but before
7
He phrases the questions presented as follows:
1. Did the trial court clearly abuse its discretion when it
allowed Detective Brian Stafford, a lay witness, to testify that a
live round found at the scene had misfired?
2. Did the trial court clearly abuse its discretion when it
allowed Officer Ryan Costello, a lay witness, to testify about the
alleged trajectory and termination point of the bullet through the
car?
(continued...)
13
reaching that question, we address as to each the State’s argument (with which we agree) that
Mr. Prince’s counsel failed to lodge timely objections to the testimony. As to Mr. Prince’s
second claim, that he was entitled to a continuance, we conclude that because one expert had
already determined he was competent to stand trial, and in light of the timing of his request,
the trial court properly exercised its discretion not to allow him another opportunity, literally
on the eve of trial, to try to rebut that finding.
A. The Trial Court Properly Admitted The Testimony Of
Detective Stafford And Officer Costello.
We start by clarifying the issues the two law enforcement witnesses have in common
and how they differ. Mr. Prince claims that both officers inappropriately testified as experts,
and that the “cumulative prejudicial effect” of their testimony requires reversal. A close
reading of the transcript and the parties’ briefs reveals, though, that the State really isn’t
contesting the characterization of Detective Stafford’s testimony as expert testimony and that
Officer Costello didn’t offer expert testimony at all. And in any event, we agree with the
State that these objections were not preserved as to either witness.
7
(...continued)
3. Were the errors in admitting Detective Stafford’s and
Officer Costello’s testimonies prejudicial and not harmless?
4. Did the trial court clearly abuse its discretion when it
denied Defense Counsel’s motion for a continuance to secure
critical evidence regarding Mr. Prince’s mental state?
14
1. Detective Stafford
Mr. Prince argues that Detective Stafford’s testimony about the alleged misfire was
expert testimony and “should not have been admitted over [d]efense [c]ounsel’s objections.”
According to Mr. Prince, these objections were “repeated” throughout the State’s direct and
redirect examinations of Detective Stafford. The State views the transcript differently,
arguing that Mr. Prince did not preserve the question of its admission for review given the
timing of his objections and, to the extent he did, its admission was harmless.
We assume without deciding that the testimony constituted expert testimony, but we
agree with the State that Mr. Prince failed to object to the testimony in a timely manner at
trial, and therefore failed to preserve these arguments. Moreover, the evidence showed not
just the misfire but that Mr. Prince affirmatively fired a second bullet which, combined with
Ms. Garbe’s testimony that Mr. Prince took aim directly at her and the remaining evidence
the State introduced at trial, rendered harmless the admission of any testimony relating to the
misfire.
First, Mr. Prince’s characterization of his counsel’s objections does not square with
the trial transcript. Although counsel did object on occasion, the objections were sufficiently
delayed that they did not preserve his objections regarding the expert (or not) character of
Detective Stafford’s testimony. Maryland Rule 4-323(a) states that “[a]n objection to the
admission of evidence shall be made at the time the evidence is offered or as soon thereafter
as the grounds for objection become apparent.” (Emphasis added.) We agree with Mr. Prince
15
that there is no bright-line rule to determine when an objection should be made. See Holmes
v. State, 63 Md. App. 159, 164 (1985). But the objection must come quickly enough to allow
the trial court to prevent mistakes or cure them in real time:
The requirement of a contemporaneous objection is a necessary
and salutary one, designed to assure both fairness and efficiency
in the conduct of trials. A party cannot be permitted to sit back
and allow the opposing party to establish its case, or any part of
its case, through unchallenged evidence and then, when it may
be too late for the opposing party to recover, to seek to strike the
evidence. The “sporting theory” of trial does not go that far.
Perry v. State, 357 Md. 37, 77 (1999) (emphasis added).
Here, counsel did “sit back” until it was too late. When Detective Stafford was called
to testify, counsel let things go on for quite some time before he lodged any objections
relating to the expert character of the testimony. He did not object when the State first called
the detective to the stand, throughout the entirety of his qualifications (including his
familiarity with firearms), or during his testimony about the investigation of this incident
until after the State’s question about the “green stuff.” By then, Detective Stafford was well
into and then well past his testimony relating to the misfire, and the objection came too late
to preserve the issue for appeal.
Indeed, counsel for the State even signaled, wittingly or not, that the detective’s
testimony could require greater than a layperson’s knowledge. After he described the
ammunition as a “7.62 NATO full metal jacket round, standard military loading,” counsel
stated “You say that like we all know.” (Emphasis added.) Detective Stafford responded
16
with further detail about the markings and explained that the “dimple” in the middle of the
primer indicated a misfire. Mr. Prince’s counsel objected only after the State had moved on
to ask about the green discoloration on the live round, and even then objected only to the
pending question about the “green stuff.”8 At that time the court neither sustained nor
overruled the objection, and the State simply “moved on.” Counsel for Mr. Prince did not
ask for any curative instruction or a ruling on the admission of Detective Stafford’s
testimony. And when counsel objected several pages later to Detective Stafford’s testimony
about the misfire (and then in the course of his answer, not when the State asked the
question, “what does a misfire mean”), that area had already been covered and admitted on
direct. By then, the claimed “damage” had already been done—that is, the State’s question
about the misfire simply repeated a question that had already been asked and answered
without objection, rendering the testimony cumulative in either event. Dove v. State, 415 Md.
727, 743-44 (2010) (“[C]umulative evidence tends to prove the same point as other evidence
presented during the trial”).
Counsel did not follow the requirements of Rule 4-323 or the rationale behind Perry
by waiting until the misfire was out of the bag, so to speak. The timing of his objections also
undercuts Mr. Prince’s argument that the State thwarted one purpose of discovery—“to avoid
8
Although Mr. Prince reads the objection at this point in the trial broadly to cover all
of Detective Stafford’s prior testimony, we disagree. In hindsight, it may appear to refer back
to testimony about the misfire, but the trial court did not err in interpreting the objection at
the time to pertain only to the “green stuff” about which the detective had just been asked.
17
surprise at trial and to give the defendant sufficient time to prepare a defense.” Hutchinson
v. State, 406 Md. 219, 227 (2008). Although counsel argued in passing in his written Motion
in Limine that he had been deprived of the opportunity to get experts in opposition to the
State’s (“Counsel for [Mr. Prince] has looked into obtaining an expert in ballistics . . . but has
not been able to do so due to the late notice.”), his counsel made no such argument at the
hearing. Instead, he withdrew his categorical objection to Officer Costello’s testimony as
moot and failed to press the court for a ruling as to Detective Stafford.
Second, even if we were to conclude that the court erred in overruling the belated
objection, the error was harmless. This case stands in stark contrast to Ragland v. State, 385
Md. 706 (2005), in which the trial court allowed police officers to testify as lay witnesses
about their conclusions that the defendant was engaged in a drug deal.9 The Court of Appeals
concluded that the trial court’s error was not harmless because the State had relied heavily
on the officers’ testimony and the remainder of the case was correspondingly weak:
The primary witness against Ragland was . . . an impeached
witness, a participant in the alleged crime, and a witness
testifying pursuant to a plea agreement with a promised benefit
from the State. The remaining evidence was circumstantial, and
depended upon an inference that [that witness] had obtained his
piece of crack cocaine from [Ragland]. To support this
inference, the State relied in large part on the police officers’
opinion testimony that the events [in question] had constituted
a drug transaction. Under these circumstances, we cannot say
9
We discuss Ragland again below with regard to whether Officer Costello’s
testimony should be treated as expert or lay witness testimony.
18
beyond a reasonable doubt that this testimony did not contribute
to the verdict.
Id. at 726-27.
Here, we find beyond a reasonable doubt that this testimony could not have influenced
the jury’s verdict. See Dionas v. State, 436 Md. 97, 108 (2013) (noting that “[b]ecause a
criminal conviction must be based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt in order to satisfy
the constitutional requirements of due process, ‘an appellate court should not arrive at a
conclusion about the impact of an error upon a jury verdict with any less degree of certainty’”
(quoting Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976))). The State introduced abundant
evidence that Mr. Prince acted with the intent to kill Ms. Garbe. He sent numerous texts to
Ms. Garbe in the time preceding the incident that showed his escalating emotional state. He
vandalized her car, showing a propensity to violence. Physical evidence in his room reflected
that he planned the attack ahead of time. And—most damning of all—the misfire was not the
shot that counted or that established Mr. Prince’s intent. Ms. Garbe specifically testified that
she saw Mr. Prince aiming right at her as the next bullet went into and through her car,
intentional conduct that by itself qualified as behavior that could support a conviction for
attempted first-degree murder. Compare People v. Lamprey, 398 N.E.2d 1076, 1079-80 (Ill.
App. 1979) (permitting a conviction for attempted murder to stand in the face of evidence
of two misfires alone, without the firing of an actual shot). In this case, Mr. Prince did not
shoot blindly in the air or even fire a warning shot. With or without any misfire, the
undisputed evidence at trial established that he crouched seven to eight feet from his victim,
19
aimed the rifle directly at her, and fired a shot directly into her car. We are comfortable that,
in light of the totality of the evidence presented (and not presented) at trial, the testimony
about the misfire could not have affected the jury’s decision to convict.
2. Officer Costello
Mr. Prince challenges the admission of Officer Costello’s testimony about the
trajectory rods, again, he says, “[o]ver [d]efense [c]ounsel’s repeated objections.” He claims
that Officer Costello gave expert testimony that was self-contradictory and confused the jury,
rather than assisting it, and that the error was not harmless.10 As above, we begin by
addressing the State’s argument that Mr. Prince failed to preserve his objections, and again
we find that he did not preserve them, even after the court specifically reminded him to make
any objections when the testimony was offered. We also hold that the court properly admitted
Officer Costello’s testimony as that of a lay witness.
First, as to the timing of Mr. Prince’s objections, counsel engaged in a lengthy
colloquy with the trial court in which the court ultimately held that Officer Costello could
testify as a lay witness—this after counsel for Mr. Prince withdrew the Motion in Limine as
moot at the hearing the morning of trial. The court made clear to the State that it could not
10
Although he also seems to suggest that the State’s counsel improperly argued in
closing that Ms. Garbe was seated in the front of the car when Mr. Prince fired the weapon,
he did not raise this point on appeal with specificity and we decline to address it here. Md.
Rule 8-131(a); Jones v. State, 379 Md. 704, 715 (2004) (appellate court may exercise its
discretion in determining whether to hear unpreserved legal arguments); Rollins v. Capital
Plaza Assocs., L.P., 181 Md. App. 188, 202 (2008) (dismissing appeal where, among other
failings, appellant raised arguments unsupported by any legal authority).
20
get into “technical language” or opinions regarding the bullet’s trajectory. The court then
warned counsel for Mr. Prince, “you need to make a good record.”
Officer Costello then testified at length about his reconstruction with no objection
from Mr. Prince’s counsel. He explained his process for placing the trajectory rods and where
each rod appeared in the car, drawing objections from counsel only later, when the State
attempted to move the photographs into evidence. This objection, seemingly only to the
photographs in any event, failed to heed the court’s prior admonition that counsel make the
appropriate objection when the testimony was offered.
Second, even though it wasn’t preserved, we feel compelled to address the question
Mr. Prince presses on appeal, i.e., whether the trial court improperly permitted Officer
Costello to testify as a lay witness. We review that decision for an abuse of discretion: the
decision as to whether to require a witness to testify as an expert “‘is a matter largely within
the discretion of the trial court, and its action in admitting or excluding such testimony will
seldom constitute a ground for reversal.’” Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 659 (1992) (quoting
Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 350 (1984)); Whittington v. State, 147 Md. App. 496, 539
(2002). Maryland Rule 5-701 governs admissibility of lay witness testimony:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’s
testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to
those opinions or inferences which are (1) rationally based on
the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of
a fact in issue.
21
Md. Rule 5-701. Expert testimony, on the other hand, is governed by Rule 5-702, which lists
specific factors that the trial court must examine in order to determine its admissibility:
Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue. In making that determination, the court shall determine
(1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness
of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether
a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony.
Md. Rule 5-702.
In Ragland, the Court of Appeals reviewed both these rules under the then-existing
standard and concluded it was appropriate to prohibit admission as “lay opinion” testimony
that is based on “specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.” 385 Md.
at 725. The officers had testified at trial that they observed the defendant engaging in what
they believed to be a drug transaction. Id. at 709-10. One of the officers testified that “in his
opinion” he saw a drug transaction taking place; the State, while claiming he was not
testifying as an expert, explained that the officer brought “special knowledge about drug
deals” to the table. Id. at 726. The officer himself stated that his opinion was “based” in part
on his prior experience in a narcotics unit and his involvement in over 200 drug arrests. Id.
The Court recognized that “[t]he connection between the officers’ training and experience
on the one hand, and their opinions on the other, was made explicit by the prosecutor’s
questioning,” and the reliance on the officer’s expertise meant that his testimony was
improperly admitted as lay testimony. Id.
22
The witness in Ragland presented testimony that indisputably was grounded in his
expert knowledge and experience—he relied specifically on his training to determine the
drug transaction was taking place and interpreted the incident subjectively as he saw it
unfold. As the Court described the facts, it was dark, none of the officers could see the face
of the defendant or the items the parties exchanged, id. at 709-10, and the officers were
required to base their conclusions on their training and experience in light of the “numerous
possible explanations for the events” of that evening. Id. at 726; see also People v. Stewart,
55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002) (en banc). So too in Stewart, in which the Supreme Court of
Colorado held that an officer’s testimony constituted expert testimony when he testified to
an accident reconstruction that he performed based on witness testimony, and in which he
interpreted skid marks at the scene. 55 P.3d at 122. Although the officer’s testimony about
his observations of the crime scene and his investigation of the incident were proper areas
of lay testimony, the Court held that “it was inappropriate for the court to permit him to
testify as a lay person about his reconstruction of the crime scene and his deductions about
such matters as the vehicle’s direction, position, and speed.” Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
This case is different—as we discuss below, the process of sliding trajectory rods through
existing bullet holes, taking photos of the result, and reporting his actions does not require
expertise or analysis grounded on an officer’s particular training or experience.
We also are not persuaded by State v. Walters, 551 A.2d 15 (R.I. 1988), or by the
other cases Mr. Prince cites for the proposition that trajectory analysis can only be the subject
23
of expert testimony. In Walters, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that a police officer
could not properly testify about the “trajectory check” he performed on the victim’s car that,
according to the prosecution, went to show that the defendant had assumed a “combat
position” directly in front of the vehicle as he shot at the victim. Id. at 17. The officer had
testified that he reconstructed the path of the bullet by passing a piece of string starting at
approximately the point where the bullet would have entered the victim’s chest, passing it
“through the bullet hole near the inspection sticker on the passenger’s side of the
windshield,” and then taking it out the right fender of the car. Based on that testimony, the
officer inferred that further extension of the rope would “reach the approximate shoulder
height of a man five-foot-eleven-inches tall”—i.e., the defendant. Id. The Court did not hold
that the police officer was improperly permitted to testify, but that the trajectory check was
unreliable:
Because this trajectory check lacked any scientific basis and
because a jury might be inclined to give weight to the apparent
opinion testimony of a seasoned and experienced police officer
describing his investigative methods, we hold that its admission
constituted reversible error.
Id. And although the court clarified that the testimony would have been confusing to the jury
if it had been permitted under the guise of lay witness testimony (simply placing
“unnecessary and irrelevant evidence” before the jury, id. at 18), the Walters Court premised
its holding on the unreliable nature of the police officer’s testimony, which rested on his
subjective opinion about where the bullet hit the victim and his approximation of where
24
further extension of the rope would lead. We have no such unreliable testimony here, just the
factual and objective placement of trajectory rods in holes.
The mere fact that a witness is a law enforcement officer does not automatically
transform his testimony into expert testimony. In In re: Ondrel M., 173 Md. App. 223 (2007),
we considered whether a police officer could testify that he knew the smell emanating from
the car of a juvenile (ultimately adjudged a delinquent) was marijuana, even though the
officer had not been qualified or admitted as an expert. Id. at 243. This presented a question
of first impression, and we looked to a Texas case in which the court reasoned that although
the smell gave rise to the conclusion that a crime was being committed, that alone did not
make the officer’s testimony that of an“expert”: “It does not take an expert to identify the
smell of marihuana smoke. Testimony as to the identity of an odor is admissible in some
instances even though the person testifying is not an expert.” Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d
531, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
We agreed in Ondrel M. that “[n]o specialized knowledge or experience is required
in order to be familiar with the smell of marijuana.” 173 Md. App. at 243. We also noted that
“[i]n determining whether an opinion offered by a witness is lay opinion or expert testimony,
it is not the status of the witness that is determinative. Rather, it is the nature of the
testimony.” Id. at 244. We endorsed the Texas court’s holding that “training and experience”
do not automatically render an opinion an expert opinion:
“While [the police officer] may have had the potential to be
qualified as an expert because she possessed knowledge, skill,
25
experience and education, she was not testifying as an expert
when she identified the marihuana. Rather, she was testifying
based on her firsthand sensory experiences.”
Id. at 244-45 (quoting Osbourn, 92 S.W.3d at 538).
This distinction drives our conclusion that Officer Costello’s testimony was
appropriate testimony for a layman. A police officer who does nothing more than observe the
path of the bullet and place trajectory rods (in the same manner as any layman could) need
not qualify as an expert to describe that process. Officer Costello relied on his own
observations and placed the rods into the holes made by the bullet fired by Mr. Prince. He
conducted no experiments, made no attempts at reconstruction, and “was not conveying
information that required a specialized or scientific knowledge to understand.” People v.
Caldwell, 43 P.3d 663, 668 (Colo. App. 2001). In Caldwell, police recovered two bullets
from the vehicle, and an investigating officer testified regarding “the appearance and location
of the two bullet holes on the outside of the car, the hole inside the car, and the dimpling of
the metal inside the car. From his own observations and the use of a dowel and string, the
technician testified that he tracked the paths of the two bullets.” Id. at 667. The Colorado
Court of Appeals (affirming the conviction) held that although the officer had not been
qualified as an expert, none of the information that he testified to required that he rely on his
expertise—and “he testified about the location of the bullet holes and the paths of the bullets
that were evident from the photographs without any additional explanation.” Id. at 668.
26
The same is true here. Even if Mr. Prince’s counsel had objected in a timely manner,
Officer Costello’s opinion fell well within the universe of lay testimony, and the trial court
properly admitted it.
B. The Trial Court Properly Denied Mr. Prince’s Request for
A Continuance.
Mr. Prince seems to suggest that the circuit court incorrectly interpreted the law as to
whether he could offer the fact that he suffered from PTSD to negate the element of mental
state. But the circuit court never got to that question—the court denied him a continuance for
the purpose of developing expert testimony about his mental state, and he appeals from that
decision, not a decision on the merits.
We review the decision to deny a motion for a continuance for an abuse of discretion:
“[t]o grant or deny a . . . motion for continuance is ‘in the sound discretion of the trial
court.’” Serio v. Baystate Props., LLC, 209 Md. App. 545, 554 (2013) (quoting Das v. Das,
133 Md. App. 1, 31 (2000)); see also Md. Rule 2-508. Unless we conclude that the trial court
acted arbitrarily, we will not review its decision on appeal, Das, 133 Md. App. at 16, and will
reverse only in “exceptional instances where there was prejudicial error.” Thanos v. Mitchell,
220 Md. 389, 392 (1959). We have described such an abuse of discretion as occurring only
“‘where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,” North v.
North, 102 Md. App. 1, 13 (1994) (quoting In re: Marriage of Morse, 607 N.E.2d 632, 640
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993)), or where the court acts “‘without reference to any guiding rules or
principles,’” id. (quoting Long John Silver’s, Inc. v. Martinez, 850 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.
27
App. 1973)). To establish an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying a continuance,
the requesting party must show:
(1) that he had a reasonable expectation of securing the evidence
of the absent witness or witnesses within some reasonable time;
(2) that the evidence was competent and material, and he
believed that the case could not be fairly tried without it; and (3)
that he had made diligent and proper efforts to secure the
evidence.
Smith v. State, 103 Md. App. 310, 323 (1995) (citations omitted).
We find no abuse of discretion here. First, Mr. Prince offered no information on
which the circuit court could have based a “reasonable expectation” that admissible or
relevant evidence would be secured; at most, he offered a hope. As Dr. Fields herself put it,
“there are reasons to believe that [Mr. Prince] suffers from Dissociative episodes, particularly
when stressed in interpersonal relationships.” (Emphasis added.) But with nothing more to
connect that possibility to the incident in question, her general assertion did not compel the
circuit court to find that she would reach a meaningful opinion at all, much less “within some
reasonable time.” Second, Dr. Fields offered no “competent and material” evidence—again,
only a prospect that she might be able to tie Mr. Prince’s previously diagnosed PTSD to the
crime at issue. Finally, the circuit court did not err in finding that Mr. Prince’s efforts did not
constitute “diligent and proper efforts to secure the evidence” within the meaning of that
phrase under Smith. Mr. Prince was diagnosed at Perkins in January 2011. Dr. Fields did not
complete her preliminary diagnosis until fourteen months later, on March 11, 2012, and then
it took another twelve days before that preliminary opinion was provided to the State, on the
28
Friday afternoon before the Monday of trial. The court would have been within its discretion
either way, but we see no basis on this record to second-guess the court’s thorough and well-
thought-out explanation.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY
AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.
29