FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT June 30, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
DILLON ANDREW YEAMAN;
MICHAEL YEAMAN; CATHY
YEAMAN,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
No. 12-6254
v. (D.C. No. 5:10-CV-01097-F)
(W.D. Okla.)
HILLERICH & BRADSBY CO., d/b/a
Louisville Slugger,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before HARTZ, O'BRIEN, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Should a manufacturer be required to pay damages because a product performs its
intended function too well? High school pitcher Dillon Yeaman was seriously injured
when he was struck in the face by a baseball hit from a bat designed, manufactured, and
*
This order and judgment is an unpublished decision, not binding precedent. 10th
Cir. R. 32.1(A). Citation to unpublished decisions is not prohibited. Fed. R. App. 32.1.
It is appropriate as it relates to law of the case, issue preclusion and claim preclusion.
Unpublished decisions may also be cited for their persuasive value. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Citation to an order and judgment must be accompanied by an appropriate parenthetical
notation B (unpublished). Id.
sold by Hillerich & Bradsby (H&B), d/b/a Louisville Slugger. Claiming the bat was
defective because it propelled the ball too fast, he and his parents brought a products
liability action against H&B based on defective design and failure to warn. A jury
awarded them damages of $951,095.85. Notwithstanding the jury’s verdict, the district
judge granted H&B’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. He concluded, inter alia,
the Yeamans had failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find (1) a
defect in the bat making it unreasonably dangerous (defective design claim) or (2) a
dangerous characteristic of the bat triggering a duty to warn (duty to warn claim).
Because the Yeamans failed to present any objective evidence showing the bat to be
dangerous beyond that reasonably to be contemplated by the ordinary consumer, we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Incident
Dillon Yeaman was, and apparently still is, an extraordinarily gifted baseball
player. On June 28, 2006, Norman High School and Westmoore High School squared off
in a Pure Prairie League baseball game.1 It was a night game and the home team,
Norman, was losing. Dillon, then fifteen-years-old, was called upon to pitch for Norman.
The batter, seventeen-year-old Chad Hyde, stepped to the plate. Hyde was over six feet
1
The Pure Prairie League is a summer baseball league in Oklahoma. It is
basically an extension of the high school baseball season but includes incoming freshman
and excludes graduated seniors.
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tall and weighed 220 to 225 pounds. He was the “clean-up” man—the fourth batter in the
batting line-up—a spot reserved for better hitters. (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. VIII at
2045.) It was late in the game, the bases were loaded or near loaded, and the pitch count
was a full count (three balls, two strikes). The catcher called for a fastball. Dillon
delivered.2 Hyde hit a line drive headed straight at Dillon. The ball hit Dillon in the face,
fracturing his frontal bones, frontal sinuses, nasal bones, and the orbital walls of both
eyes. Dillon underwent surgery. Doctors inserted a mesh plate in his forehead and two
splints under his nose and rebuilt the bridge of his nose with titanium. Dillon lost his
sense of smell and his sense of taste was permanently altered.3
B. The Bat
The line drive came from a 33-inch, 30-ounce Louisville Slugger Exogrid bat,
Model No. CB71X, first manufactured in 2005. It was designed with a stiff handle and
flexible barrel for “maximum trampoline effect” or “rebound.” (Appellants’ App’x, Vol.
VII at 1813; Vol. XI at 2704.) Its advertisement speaks for itself:
The Exogrid concept is simple: Increase handle stiffness and strength
without increasing weight.
2
The speed of Dillon’s pitch is not known. Hyde estimated the pitch speed was in
the upper 70’s to lower 80’s (mph). Dillon’s coach estimated Dillon’s pitching speed in
2006 was between 80 and 85 mph.
3
Fortunately, Dillon returned to playing baseball but during the remainder of his
high school baseball career, he always wore a protective mask when he was on the field.
At the time of trial, he was playing for the University of Oklahoma. Because he is a .400
hitter and college pitchers do not bat, Dillon plays in the outfield.
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To achieve this, we start with a one-piece bat, then metal is trimmed from
the handle in a grid pattern to reduce overall handle weight. The metal is
replaced with carbon inserts that are several times stiffer and lighter than
the metal it replaces. For optimum stiffness, we then insert a carbon sleeve
with unidirectional fibers that run the length of the handle. Finally, using a
combination of heat and extreme pressure, the inserts, sleeve and metal wall
are bonded together to work as a single, solid unit. This results in stiffness
and strength never possible with aluminum alone.
Optimum performance comes from a stiff handle combined with a flexible
barrel for maximum trampoline effect. And it doesn’t get any stiffer than
the Exogrid.4
(Appellants’ App’x, Vol. XI at 2704.)
C. Bat Performance Standards
At the time of Dillon’s injuries, the Pure Prairie League required all non-wood
bats used in the league to be BESR-certified. BESR stands for “Ball Exit Speed Ratio.”
(Appellants’ App’x, Vol. X at 2465.) In order to obtain BESR certification, a bat
manufacturer must present a prototype bat to a laboratory for testing and the bat must not
exceed the BESR limit. At the time the Exogrid was manufactured, the BESR limit
4
The collision between a baseball and a bat is a study of kinetic energy, the
energy of moving objects. When a baseball is struck by an aluminum bat, the aluminum
deforms inward toward the center of the bat. The kinetic energy from the collision is
stored temporarily in the bat. Due to the elasticity of metals, the bat returns to its normal
shape. When it does so, the stored kinetic energy is transferred to the ball, propelling it
forward. This is referred to as the “trampoline effect.”
George Manning, an engineer at H&B from 1979 to 2000, explained the
“trampoline effect” as follows:
I think everyone is familiar with the trampoline children jump on, and basically it
gives as you apply load to it, and then it gives back that energy in order to propel
you off of it. The trampoline effect on a hollow bat is where the barrel gives under
the impact of the ball, and then springs back, and helps propel the ball away from
the bat.
(Appellants’ App’x, Vol. X at 2464.)
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corresponded to a maximum ball exit speed of 97 mph under laboratory conditions. This
limit was set by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and was based on
the best-performing wood bats. The trial evidence was conflicting as to whether the
Exogrid was BESR-certified.5
At the time of trial, the BESR standard was obsolete; the NCAA replaced it with
the BBCOR (Ball-Bat Coefficient of Restitution) standard. According to George
Manning, a former H&B engineer, the trampoline effect is “essentially null” with
BBCOR-certified bats because spacers are placed in the barrel of the bat to prevent the
phenomenon from occurring.6 (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. X at 2465.)
D. Pitcher Vulnerability to Batted Balls
A pitcher, more than any other player on the field, is particularly vulnerable to
being hit by a batted ball. Besides the catcher, he is the closest offensive player to home
plate. But unlike the catcher (who wears protective gear) and the other offensive players
on the field, the pitcher must deliver the pitch before he can move into a defensive stance.
Thus, pitchers are taught to have “their glove up” and be square to the plate upon
5
As the district judge instructed the jury, whether the bat was BESR-certified
matters not in determining whether it is defective and unreasonably dangerous under
Oklahoma law. But, the BESR standard is significant for another reason: the existence
of bat performance standards demonstrates the ability to measure bat performance—
testing which was not done in this case.
6
The district judge told the jury “this case is certainly not about whether the bat
involved in this case should have been certified to a BBCOR standard, because it didn’t
even exist at that time.” (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. VII at 1633.) Again, we mention the
BBCOR standard simply as an example of yet another way to measure a bat’s
performance.
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completing their follow-through and to “[n]ever take your eye off the ball.” (Appellants’
App’x, Vol. VII at 1569, 1588.) Dillon admitted to knowing the unique danger pitchers
face, but he claimed not to know a ball could be hit so fast he would have no time to
defend himself.
E. Daubert Motion
The Yeamans retained Dr. James Kent, a kinesiologist, to opine on the speed of
the ball when it impacted Dillon’s face, the amount of time Dillon had to react to the
batted ball, the amount of time an ordinary fifteen-year-old pitcher needs to react to a
batted ball, and the cause of Dillon’s injuries. As to causation, he opined: “It is more
probable than not [Dillon’s] injuries were the direct result of the use of a baseball bat
which possessed mechanical properties allowing a batted ball to [] attain a flight velocity
in excess of a velocity that would otherwise allow for a reasonable time span by a pitcher
of his age and developmental level in a follow-through position to safely respond to the
oncoming batted ball.” (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. II at 331-32.) H&B filed a motion to
exclude this opinion (as well as his others) under Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
At the Daubert hearing, Kent admitted factors other than the physical properties of
the bat factor into the ball exit speed; these factors include the speed of the bat and the
speed of the pitched ball. Because he did not know Hyde’s swing speed or the speed of
Dillon’s pitch, Kent conceded his causation opinion was unsound: “[My causation
opinion] probably would have been better written comparing [the Exogrid] to a wood
bat . . . . [T]hat’s really the intent there is, its comparison between wood and engineered
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bats.” (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. VI at 1345.) Thus, the district judge granted the Daubert
motion as to this opinion. As we will discuss, Kent’s admission is telling.
F. The Trial
The judge denied H&B’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the case
went to trial before a jury.
The Yeamans’ theme throughout trial was that the Exogrid hit the ball “too fast,”
was “too hot of a bat” and had “enhanced performance.” (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. VII
at 1525; Vol. IX at 2334.) To support this theory, they called several eye-witnesses to the
incident. They generally reported Dillon to be an excellent defensive player with sound
pitching mechanics who had insufficient time to react to the ball coming from Hyde’s
line drive simply because it was traveling too fast.7 Dillon himself said “[he] had no
chance.” (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. VII at 1753.) He explained “[the ball] went from a
pea to a beach ball in almost (snap fingers) like that.” (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. VII at
1752.)
Several lay witnesses also testified to the “huge difference” between wood bats
and aluminum bats, in particular, BESR-certified bats. (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. VII at
1608.) They said they can hit the ball harder and farther with a BESR-certified bat. They
also said BESR-certified bats have more “pop” and are more “forgiving” than wood—“if
you mishit [a ball with a BESR-certified bat], it’s still got [a] better opportunity to go into
7
When not pitching, Dillon mostly played third base, which one witness described
as the “hot box”—the position “for the guys with the best reaction.” (R. Vol. VII at
1619.)
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play”; “[i]f you mishit a ball with a wood bat, it’s not going to go anywhere.”
(Appellants’ App’x, Vol. VII at 1597, 1609.) Some of these witnesses also testified that
BBCOR-certified bats performed like wood bats and the ball can be hit farther with a
BESR-certified bat than a BBCOR-certified one.
The Yeamans also called two experts—William Coleman, a metallurgist, and
Kent. Coleman cut open an exemplar Exogrid bat, measured the wall thickness, and
performed hardness testing and chemical analysis of the materials making up the bat. He
told the jury the bat was constructed to optimize handle strength and stiffness. Thus,
when the bat impacts with the ball, increased deflection occurs at the barrel instead of the
handle. This design, he explained, maximizes the trampoline effect or energy transfer to
the ball at impact, increasing the ball’s exit speed and reducing the time a player in the
field has to react to the ball. Importantly, Coleman did not test the performance of the
Exogrid, determine the exit speed of balls off the Exogrid, or compare its performance
with that of wood bats or other metal bats. He admitted such tests could have been done
but “that was not my role.” (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. VII at 1824.)
Kent examined the medical imaging of Dillon’s injuries and concluded the force
necessary to cause those injuries (the force-to-fracture) was, conservatively speaking,
2,684 pounds.8 Plugging this number into a simple physics formula, he determined the
8
Kent primarily relied on a study where a 48-millimeter spherical steel anvil was
dropped vertically down on the skulls of twelve unembalmed intact human cadaver heads
(ages 50 to 76 years-old) at 16 to 18 mph and the force necessary to fracture the skulls
was recorded. The mean force necessary to do so in the dynamic load tests was 2,684
(Continued . . . )
-8-
speed of the ball at impact with Dillon’s face was 100 to 105 mph.9 Thus, he concluded
the ball must have left the bat at least at this speed. He then figured the distance the ball
must have traveled to hit Dillon was 52 to 55 feet.10 Again, plugging both the speed and
the distance into a simple formula,11 he determined the time Dillon had to react to the ball
was 336 to 374 milliseconds. Looking to the scientific literature, he said a typical fifteen-
year-old pitcher needs, at a minimum, 380 to 400 milliseconds to react.12 Dillon’s
reaction time fell short by at most 64 milliseconds.
pounds. According to H&B, Kent improperly relied on this study to support his force-to-
fracture estimate because it does not adequately imitate a person being hit horizontally by
a lighter and smaller baseball at a high speed and the anvil did not strike the cadaver
skulls in the same location where Dillon was struck by the baseball. As we will explain,
the issue is whether the Yeamans presented sufficient evidence of the ball exit speed
expected from a bat by the ordinary bat consumer and whether the ball exit speed
produced by the Exogrid exceeded those expectations. Even accepting Kent’s opinions,
the answer is no. Thus, we need not decide whether Kent’s opinions should have been
stricken under Daubert.
9
fd=½mv2. The force (f) was 2,684 pounds. Considering the depths of Dillon’s
fractures as well as the deformation of the ball and Dillon’s soft tissue, Kent determined
the total distance (d) over which the velocity (v) of the ball was acting was .03904 to
.0433 feet. The mass (m) of the baseball was .00097 slugs. Plugging these numbers into
the equation led to a velocity of 146.98 to 154.8 feet per second or 100.2 to 105.52 mph.
10
The standard distance between home plate and the pitching rubber is sixty feet,
six inches. Kent figured a pitching follow-through of five to eight feet. In other words,
he estimated Dillon was five to eight feet closer to home plate after pitching the ball.
Dillon testified his pitching stride is approximately six feet.
11
Time (t) equals distance (d) divided by velocity (v).
12
H&B countered Kent’s opinion with the testimony of its own expert, Dr. Doug
Young, also a kinesiologist. Young opined “a player or pitcher who has the general age,
skill and experience of [Dillon] would reasonably be expected to avoid a ball hit back at
him at about 105 miles an hour or so” and thus Dillon could have avoided the ball hit by
Hyde. (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. IX at 2240.) He based his opinion on a study he
(Continued . . . )
-9-
Notably, Kent did not present himself as a bat expert. And he did not consider or
rule out other potential causes for the accident such as pitcher fatigue or inattention.
Consistent with the judge’s Daubert ruling, he did not offer an opinion as to whether the
performance of the bat or a failure to warn of the bat’s capabilities were the cause of
Dillon’s injuries.
G. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
The jury found for the Yeamans on both the defective design and failure to warn
claims, awarding $871,000 to Dillon and $80,095.85 (the amount of Dillon’s medical
expenses) to his parents.13 The victory was short-lived.14 The district judge granted
H&B’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. As to the defective design claim, he
started with the Yeamans’ theory—the Exogrid is defective and unreasonably dangerous
because it hits the ball too fast, not allowing an ordinary fifteen-year-old sufficient time
to react. Thus, he reasoned, an “acceptable” bat, i.e., a non-defective bat, is one which
allows balls to be hit only at speeds which an ordinary fifteen-year-old has time to react
conducted in 2001 for H&B in which he attempted to analyze pitcher reaction time. The
study involved high school and collegiate pitchers. The participants pitched the ball and
if the ball hit the strike zone a pitching machine or air cannon would fire a ball back at
the participant. The maximum speed of the ball fired at the participants was 111 mph for
the high school participants and 129 mph for the collegiate participants. Not one
participant was hit with the ball; all were able to track it. But his study was not perfect—
the participants wore protective gear, there was a slight delay between the pitch hitting
the strike zone and the ball being fired back at them, and there was an element of
anticipation—all participants knew a ball would be fired back at them.
13
The jury rejected H&B’s assumption of the risk defense and the Yeamans’
demand for punitive damages. Neither of these issues is before us.
14
“It ain’t over till it’s over.” Yogi Berra
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to. Therefore, he concluded the Exogrid must be judged on a relative scale, not an
absolute one. Using this standard, he found the Yeamans’ evidence missed the mark—
there was no evidence upon which a jury could rationally find the performance of the
Exogrid bat exceeded the performance of an acceptable bat. “Where the difference
between an acceptable bat and an actionable bat is on the order of 64 milliseconds (64
thousandths of one second), the subjectively perceived performance of the Exogrid bat as
seen at the ballpark one night simply cannot provide a rational basis for a finding that the
performance of the Exogrid bat, as wielded by Chad Hyde, made it defective and
unreasonably dangerous versus the performance of an acceptable bat.” (Appellants’
App’x, Vol. V at 1282.) Rather, the judge said the Yeamans were required to show how
fast the Exogrid could make a ball fly as compared to an “acceptable bat”—testing which
could have been done but was not. (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. V at 1282.)
For the same reasons, the judge set aside the jury’s verdict on the failure to warn
claim. On a relative scale, the Yeamans’ evidence failed to show the Exogrid has a
dangerous characteristic—propels the ball too fast—triggering a duty to warn.15
II. DISCUSSION
The Yeamans say the judge should have let the jury’s verdict stand. H&B, of
course, claims the judge simply applied the law. It also provides an alternative basis for
affirming. It suggests a baseball bat cannot, as a matter of law, be deemed defective for
15
The district judge also decided the Yeamans had failed to show causation on
either the defective design or failure to warn claim. Given our resolution of the case, we
need not address the causation element.
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hitting a ball too well because that is its intended purpose. We address the latter
argument first.
A. Defective as a Matter of Law
A bat’s purpose is to propel a baseball. Indeed, consumers gauge the desirability
of a bat on how well it performs that function. According to H&B, a bat cannot be
defective, as a matter of law, when it performs that function too well. “Just as a Boy
Scout knife is not defective because had it been duller it would not have cut a hand, a bat
is not defective because it could have been designed to hit the ball softer and slower.”
(Appellee’s Br. at 26 (footnote omitted).) The district judge found this argument
“appeal[ing]” but decided it was outside the realm of settled Oklahoma law. (Appellants’
App’x, Vol. V at 1281.) We agree.
Under Oklahoma law, a products liability plaintiff must prove, among other
things, a defect in the product making it unreasonably dangerous. Kirkland v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1363 (Okla. 1974). The jury was instructed: “A product is
defective when it is not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which such product is
intended or may reasonably be expected to be used.” (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. III at
839.) It was also told for the Exogrid to be unreasonably dangerous, it “must be
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by a person who might
be reasonably expected to be affected by the bat with the ordinary knowledge common to
baseball players.”16 (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. III at 840.) See Kirkland, 521 P.2d at
16
These instructions derive from Instruction Nos. 12.2 and 12.3 of the Oklahoma
(Continued . . . )
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1362-63. This is referred to as the consumer expectations test. Lamke v. Futorian Corp.,
709 P.2d 684, 686 (Okla. 1985); see also Braswell v. Cincinnati Inc., 731 F.3d 1081,
1087 (10th Cir. 2013).
In Lamke, Lamke suffered severe burns when her cigarette fell and ignited the sofa
upon which she was sitting. 709 P.2d at 685. She brought a products liability action
against the cigarette manufacturer. Id. She claimed the cigarette was unreasonably
dangerous because it had special paper that prolonged its burning and increased the
intensity of the cigarette’s fire; she also argued the cigarette should have been self-
extinguishing. Id. at 686. Applying the consumer expectations test, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court concluded the cigarette was not unreasonably dangerous because Lamke
had failed to show a defect in the cigarette rendered it less safe than expected by the
ordinary consumer:
This is particularly true in cases such as the instant case where the
“defect” alleged is the failure to minimize an obvious danger which is
inherent in the product itself. In order for a cigarette to be used, it must
burn. The simple allegation that the cigarette should have been self-
extinguishing or that some other cigarettes would not have burned as long,
nor as intensely, does not establish that the cigarettes involved in this case
were more likely to cause the fire than might be expected by the consumer.
Id.
Similarly, in Wheeler v. HO Sports, Inc., Wheeler’s husband drowned while
wakeboarding wearing a life-vest sold by the defendant. 232 F.3d 754, 756 (10th Cir.
Uniform Jury Instructions—Civil. Neither side raises any objections to the jury
instructions.
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2000). Wheeler sued claiming, inter alia, the vest was defective because it contained less
flotation material (7.1 pounds) than necessary to float an average person (10 pounds). Id.
at 758. But the vest was not designed for use by the average person; rather, it was
designed for use by the experienced wakeboarder, one who is willing to forego some
degree of flotation for enhanced mobility. Id. Thus, “[p]laintiff’s assertion that the vest
was not designed to function as an ordinary life vest is answered squarely by the fact that
the vest was not designed to be an ordinary vest.” Id. We concluded (under Oklahoma
law) Wheeler had failed to show the vest’s design made it unreasonably dangerous for its
intended purpose, i.e., “that ordinary consumers expect more than 7.1 pounds of flotation
material in this type of vest.” Id. at 758.
Lamke and Wheeler are not helpful. In neither case did the court hold as a matter
of law the product could never be considered unreasonably dangerous when the injuries
occurred due to a “defect” inherent in the product itself (a cigarette) or when used for its
intended purpose (life-vest for experienced wakeboarders). Rather, the courts determined
the relevant products were not defective under the consumer expectations test.
A closer case is Atkins v. Arlans Dep’t Store of Norman, Inc., 522 P.2d 1020
(Okla. 1974). Ten-year-old Brett misthrew a lawn dart, hitting twelve-year-old Thomas
in the eye. Id. at 1021. Thomas and his parents brought a products liability action
against the manufacturer of the lawn dart game. Id. at 1020. They said the manufacturer
“designed and manufactured a weighted projectile with a sharp metal shaft protusion
possessing the inherently dangerous capability of penetration of the human body and the
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skull and was therefore unsafe for its intended use.” Id. at 1021 (quotations omitted).
The court decided:
[T]he dart was not dangerous to the extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics.
There are many toys and playthings, perfectly harmless and
inoffensive in themselves, but whose common use can be perverted into a
dangerous use or design, and there are very few of the most harmless toys
which cannot be used to injure another. The dart’s propensities to cause
injury is demonstrated by the injury sustained but the fact that an injury was
sustained does not necessarily mean that the manufacturer or retailer are
liable for those injuries.
Id. at 1022. It relied on two Illinois court decisions, one involving an air dart and the
other a boomerang. Id. at 1021. Both courts said toys, such as baseballs, baseball bats,
and darts, cannot be categorized as dangerous instrumentalities even though they have the
capacity to injure the user or others in the course of their ordinary use. Id.
Atkins’ reliance on the Illinois cases could be interpreted as its adoption of a per se
rule: baseball bats cannot be considered unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law, at
least when the alleged defect is they perform their intended function too well. But that
stretches Atkins too far. Like Lamke and Wheeler, the court applied the consumer
expectations test to conclude the lawn dart was not unreasonably dangerous.
Moreover, as the Yeamans point out, Atkins was decided in 1974; the Illinois cases
relied on by Atkins in 1966 and 1967. As the evidence at trial bore out, the baseball bat
has substantially evolved since then.17 Thus, as the district judge aptly stated: “[I]t is
17
H&B made its first baseball bat in 1884. The first bats it manufactured were
(Continued . . . )
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quite easy to accept the proposition that there is, at least conceptually (whether or not
within the realm of actual design capability), some upper limit of acceptable performance
of a bat . . . .” (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. V at 1281.) Maurice Archer, the President of
H&B’s Louisville Slugger Division at the time the Exogrid was developed, admitted so.
And Bill Clark, the President of the Louisville Slugger Division at the time of trial,
conceded a pitcher should be allowed enough time to react to a batted ball. Moreover, by
adopting standards governing (and limiting) the performance of non-wood baseball bats,
the regulators of college and youth baseball seem to suggest a baseball bat could be too
powerful to be used safely in the sport.18
Finally, H&B relies on cases from other circuits involving the enhanced
performance of BB guns. See Moss v. Crosman Corp., 136 F.3d 1169, 1173-75 (7th Cir.
1998) (enhanced muzzle velocity); Marzullo v. Crosman Corp., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1337
(M.D. Fla. 2003) (same). In considering a failure to warn claim, the Moss court
concluded the BB gun was not unreasonably dangerous because it “did not place users at
risk of injuries different in kind from those an average consumer might anticipate” and
made from wood. In 1974, the NCAA first allowed aluminum bats to be used in
collegiate baseball games. Several years later, H&B began manufacturing aluminum
bats. The aluminum bat has evolved from a pure aluminum bat to a bat consisting of both
aluminum and composite materials. Indeed, the Exogrid is made of both aluminum and a
carbon composite. Thus, it is technically improper to refer to the Exogrid or any metal
bat as an aluminum bat; these bats are more appropriately referred to as “non-wood” bats.
18
Metal bats are not allowed to be used by professional baseball players.
Interestingly, one of the main reasons the NCAA began allowing metal bats to be used in
collegiate play was economics—wood bats break and have to be replaced.
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the evidence “overwhelmingly [showed] the average person in the community knew the
general kind of physical risk posed by a BB gun.” 136 F.3d at 1175. Similarly, the
Marzullo court held the muzzle velocity of a BB gun “is not, as a matter of law, a design
defect and is not a defective condition.” 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1342. These cases are not
binding in Oklahoma. Moreover, as the district judge aptly observed—BB guns are not
normally used on other people whereas baseball bats are designed to propel a ball directly
at human beings. Thus, “[t]he analogy . . ., though instructive, is not perfect.”
(Appellants’ App’x, Vol. V at 1281.)
It is not clear, as a matter of Oklahoma law, that a baseball bat cannot be
considered unreasonably dangerous for propelling a ball too fast.19 Rather than speculate,
we can affirm on other grounds, to which we now turn.
B. Judgment as a Matter of Law
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of
law. Bannister v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 692 F.3d 1117, 1126 (10th Cir. 2012).
We will affirm if “a reasonable jury would not have had a legally sufficient evidentiary
basis to find for” the Yeamans on their claims. Id. (quotations omitted). In conducting
19
H&B says a ruling in its favor on this ground is important because it would
broadly preclude as a matter of law “ill-conceived claims of ‘over-performing’ bats,” like
those raised by the Yeamans. (Appellee’s Br. at 24.) But in diversity cases, like this one,
our task is “simply to ascertain and apply the state law.” Kokins v. Teleflex, Inc., 621
F.3d 1290, 1304 (10th Cir. 2010) (“It is axiomatic that state courts are the final arbiters of
state law.”) (quotations omitted). If H&B wanted such a ruling, it could have kept the
case in Oklahoma state court, where it was originally brought, rather than removing it to
federal court.
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our review, we “construe the evidence and inferences most favorably to the nonmoving
party, and refrain from weighing the evidence, passing on the credibility of witnesses, or
substituting our judgment for that of the jury.” Id. (quotations omitted). In diversity
cases, like this one, federal law dictates whether judgment as a matter of law is
appropriate but “we examine the evidence in terms of the underlying burden of proof as
dictated by state law,” in this case, Oklahoma law. Id. (quotations omitted).
1. Design Defect Claim
Oklahoma law requires a plaintiff in a products liability action to prove: (1) the
defective product was the cause of the injury; (2) the defect was in the product at the time
it left the manufacturer’s possession and control; and (3) the defect made the product
“unreasonably dangerous” to the consumer. Kirkland, 521 P.2d at 1363. Unreasonably
dangerous means “[t]he article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics” (the consumer
expectations test). Id. at 1362-63 (adopting definition of Restatement (Second) of Torts §
402A). Evidence a product could be made “safer” does not establish it was less safe than
would be expected by an ordinary consumer. Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 765 P.2d
770, 775 (Okla. 1988). Moreover, the mere fact an accident occurs creates no
presumption the product was defective. Kirkland, 521 P.2d at 1363.
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The Yeamans complain the district judge erroneously required evidence
comparing the Exogrid to an “acceptable” bat and laboratory tests measuring the
performance of the Exogrid. They say neither is required under Oklahoma law. Rather,
according to them, the consumer expectations test is a flexible one and simply asks
whether the product’s dangers are beyond that which an ordinary consumer would
contemplate. The Yeamans allege their evidence showed an ordinary consumer, in this
case a fifteen-year-old pitcher, expects a bat to hit a ball at such a speed as to allow him
sufficient time to react to it, and the Exogrid did not satisfy this standard because it
allowed Hyde to hit a ball at a speed too fast for Dillon to defend himself.20 Thus,
according to the Yeamans, the jury reasonably found the Exogrid was unreasonably
dangerous and the judge erroneously set aside the jury’s verdict.
The Yeamans misinterpret the trial judge’s decision. He did not say Oklahoma
law requires comparison or laboratory testing in all instances. Rather, he properly looked
to the theory advanced by the Yeamans. See, e.g., Bohnstedt v. Robscon Leasing LLC,
993 P.2d 135, 136 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999) (construction worker killed when motor grader
backed over her; while defendant argued its motor grader was not defective because
20
Yet they declined to say at oral argument that any bat which could hit the ball at
a speed giving the average fifteen-year-old pitcher insufficient time to react to it is
unreasonably dangerous.
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someone had tampered with the motor grader’s reverse warning alarm, plaintiff’s theory
was the motor grader was defective because its alarms were easily tampered with and
such tampering was foreseeable to defendant). The Yeamans contended the Exogrid is
unreasonably dangerous because it hits the ball “too fast,” i.e., it allows a batter to hit a
ball at a speed (the ball exit speed) which does not allow an average fifteen-year-old
pitcher the time he needs to react to the ball to avoid being hit. Accordingly, Oklahoma’s
consumer expectations test requires the Yeamans to show the ball exit speed produced by
the Exogrid renders it dangerous or less safe than expected by the ordinary consumer.
Logically then, they had to establish (1) the ball exit speed reasonably expected by the
ordinary baseball bat consumer (what the district judge referred to as an “acceptable bat”)
and (2) the ball exit speed of the Exogrid. (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. V at 1282.) Only
with this evidence could the jury rationally determine whether the Exogrid was
unreasonably dangerous because it hit the ball beyond that contemplated by the ordinary
baseball bat consumer. (Appellants’ App’x, Vol. V at 1282.) Their evidence fell short.
As noted above, several lay witnesses testified to aluminum bats, in particular
BESR-certified bats, having more pop than wood or BBCOR-certified bats. In other
words, a ball can be hit farther and faster with a BESR-certified bat than with a wood or
BBCOR-certified bat. But, even assuming the ball exit speed of a wood or BBCOR-
certified bat is what is reasonably expected by the ordinary consumer, these witnesses
failed to present any objective evidence quantifying the ball exit speed of the various
bats.
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The Yeamans’ experts did not fill the gap. While Coleman explained the
Exogrid’s design resulted in maximum trampoline effect and the evidence at trial showed
the trampoline effect does not occur with wood or BBCOR-certified bats, Coleman did
not test the ball exit speed of a wood or BBCOR-certified bat. He admitted he could have
but was never asked to do so. Neither did Kent conduct any such testing.
The Yeamans also failed to present any evidence establishing the ball exit speed of
the Exogrid. Several eye-witnesses testified they had never seen a ball hit as hard or as
fast as the one hit by Hyde. Dillon himself testified the ball was hit so fast he did not
have time to react. None of these lay witnesses, however, quantified the exit speed of the
ball.21
21
Nor could they. H&B moved to exclude any opinions from lay eye-witnesses
regarding whether Dillon had sufficient time to react to the ball. The district judge ruled
such testimony was admissible if the necessary foundation was established, i.e., the
witness actually observed the incident and had a good understanding of the game of
baseball, in particular, the Pure Prairie League level of play. In so ruling, the judge
relied, in part, on the proposition that lay witnesses may offer their opinion on matters
such as the speed of a vehicle. See, e.g., Gust v. Jones, 162 F.3d 587, 595 (10th Cir.
1998); United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 535, 552 (5th Cir. 1986); Jordan v. Great W.
Motorways, 2 P.2d 786, 788 (Cal. 1931); St. Louis –San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Fox, 359
P.2d 710, 713 (Okla. 1961). But we appreciate a discernable difference in estimating the
speed of a vehicle and estimating the speed of a baseball traveling less than sixty feet in
less than one second. And when reaction time is measured in milliseconds it is hard to
imagine how the average lay witness sitting in the bleachers could offer comparative
testimony meeting any of the requirements of Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence—rationally based on perception, helpful in determining a fact and not based on
specialized knowledge. Scientific testing was necessary to establish the critical speeds
and times in this case, events well beyond the ken of almost every lay witness. Even an
extraordinarily gifted lay witness would have to be strategically located in order to offer
anything close to a useful opinion. The lay opinion evidence appears to be little more
than partisan cheerleading.
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Coleman said the Exogrid’s stiff handle and flexible barrel maximizes its
trampoline effect which in turn results in greater ball exit speed. However, he did not test
the Exogrid to determine its ball exit speed. Again, he admitted such tests could have
been done but it was simply not his role to do so.
Kent did opine as to the exit speed of the ball which hit Dillon—100 to 105 mph.
However, he did not consider or rule out other causes contributing to the speed. As the
evidence at trial bore out, and as Kent himself admitted at the Daubert hearing, numerous
variables, besides the performance of the bat, affect how fast a ball exits a bat. These
factors include, among other things, the speed and type of pitch and the ability and swing
speed of the batter. Kent’s testimony simply estimates the ball exit speed in a unique
event on a certain day in June 2006, not the ball exit speed produced by the Exogrid in
general.
In sum, without any objective evidence as to the ball exit speed expected by the
ordinary baseball bat consumer or the ball exit speed produced by the Exogrid, there was
no basis for a rational jury to reasonably find the Exogrid to be dangerous beyond that
expected by the ordinary bat consumer.22 The district judge did not err in correcting the
22
The Yeamans rely on a district court case and state court cases from Montana
and California in which pitchers prevailed in products liability actions against H&B after
they suffered serious injury or death from a ball struck with a non-wood bat
manufactured and designed by H&B. See Brett v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., d/b/a
Louisville Slugger, Case No. CIV-99-981-C (W.D. Okla. Jan. 24, 2002); Patch v.
Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 257 P.3d 383 (Mont. 2011); Sanchez v. Hillerich & Bradsby
Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 529 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). Sanchez is distinguishable. It
merely determined summary judgment was inappropriate; it involved an incident which
(Continued . . . )
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jury’s verdict based on defective design.23
occurred after the NCCA had adopted rules to decrease the ball exit speed of non-wood
bats but before the rules were implemented, and the plaintiffs’ evidence included the
testimony of the bat’s designer who said the bat allowed a batter to hit balls at speeds in
excess of that which would allow a pitcher sufficient time to react. Sanchez, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 707, 709, 713-15. In Patch, the jury found the bat was not designed
defectively but concluded H&B was liable for failing to warn of the enhanced risks
associated with the bat’s use. 257 P.3d at 243. While the court noted the evidence
demonstrated Patch had 376 milliseconds to react to the batted ball when he needed 400
milliseconds, whether this evidence was sufficient to establish the bat was defective or
unreasonably dangerous was not before the court. Id. at 243 n.2, 244-51. Finally, in
Brett, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs on a defective design claim.
Case No. CIV-99-981-C at 1-2. It appears the evidence in that case was similar to that
presented here but did not include any expert testimony. Id. at 5-7. Nevertheless, the
district court denied H&B’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 8. Brett
appears to have been wrongfully decided and entitled only to a place in ether of
anomalous results.
23
If, as we hold, the district judge is correct, the Yeaman’s claim to be entitled to a
new trial. They cry havoc—the judge provided them no notice prior to trial (when they
could have done something to fix it) they would be required to conduct laboratory testing
of the Exogrid and compare it to an “acceptable bat.” We are not persuaded. The cases
they rely on (1) are misstated, see Walker v. Kelly, 593 F.3d 319, 331 (4th Cir. 2010)
(affirming the district court, not remanding for lack of fair notice), (2) involve a change
in the legal standard applicable to the case, see United States v. Pacheco, 434 F.3d 106,
115-17 (1st Cir. 2006) (the district court narrowed the criminal charges to a “spoke”
conspiracy but instructed the jury on a “hub” conspiracy); or (3) involve a change in the
law while the case was on appeal, see Lee Cnty. Branch of NAACP v. City of Opelika,
748 F.2d 1473, 1479-81 (11th Cir. 1984) (significant change in law after trial). Here, the
district judge did not change the legal standard applicable to the case nor did the law
change. The Yeamans knew at all times their burden of proof; their evidence failed to
meet it.
Moreover, at the summary judgment hearing, the judge specifically asked the
Yeamans’ counsel:
What will be your objective evidence—and I use the word “objective” advisedly.
I’m not talking about coaches saying, gosh, almighty, that bat really makes that
ball fly fast. That’s subjective.
What will be your objective evidence that this bat significantly increased
the risk to the pitcher beyond that which was already inherent in the game?
(Appellants’ App’x, Vol. VI at 1421.)
(Continued . . . )
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2. Failure to Warn
The district judge recognized some inconsistency in Oklahoma law regarding the
failure to warn, specifically, whether a product must be unreasonably dangerous or have
dangerous characteristics in order to trigger the duty to warn or whether a failure to warn
in and of itself can render a product unreasonably dangerous. Compare Edwards v. Basel
Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 301 (Okla. 1997), with Duane v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 833 P.2d
284, 285-86 (Okla. 1992). Relying on Oklahoma’s uniform jury instructions, he
concluded the product must have dangerous characteristics in order for the manufacturer
to have a duty to warn. The jury was so instructed. Again, neither side contests the jury
instructions given.
For the same reasons they believe the judge erred in concluding they had failed to
show the Exogrid was unreasonably dangerous, the Yeamans claim he erred in
concluding there was insufficient evidence to conclude the Exogrid did not have a
dangerous characteristic triggering the duty to warn. But, for the same reasons the
Yeamans failed to show the Exogrid was unreasonably dangerous, they failed to show it
had a dangerous characteristic. The duty to warn was not triggered and the jury’s verdict
in favor of the Yeamans on this claim cannot stand.
The judge also informed the Yeamans he had “serious concerns” with the case,
was not particularly in agreement with the district court decision in Brett, see supra n.22,
and denied summary judgment with “some serious misgivings.” (Appellants’ App’x,
Vol. VI at 1431-32.) He repeated his concerns at the close of the Yeamans’ evidence
(outside the presence of the jury). It is disingenuous for the Yeamans to now claim they
had no notice.
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AFFIRMED. We GRANT the Yeamans’ motion to file Volumes XII-XVII of
the appendix under seal.24
Entered by the Court:
Terrence L. O’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
24
While the Yeamans’ motion only seeks to seal Volumes XIII-XVII, it is clear
they meant to include Volume XII. The materials sought to be sealed are: (1) Dillon’s
medical records which are not readily amenable to redaction, (2) materials from the
NCAA which were provided pursuant to a confidentiality agreement among the parties,
and (3) H&B’s trade secrets. Although we have a strong policy against sealing of the
record, the limited sealing requested in this case is appropriate. The materials are not
necessary to an understanding of the facts, arguments, or our decision.
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