IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1476
Filed May 14, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KIMBERLY ANN LANE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Nancy S. Tabor
(plea) and Gary D. McKenrick (sentencing), Judges.
Kimberly Lane appeals from the sentencing proceedings following her
guilty pleas to manufacturing methamphetamine and child endangerment.
AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, Michael L. Wolf, County Attorney, and Amanda W. Myers, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ. Tabor,
J., takes no part.
2
POTTERFIELD, J.
Kimberly Lane appeals from the sentencing proceedings following her
guilty pleas to manufacturing methamphetamine and child endangerment. She
argues the district court erred in considering the sentences of codefendants and
the effect of methamphetamine manufacture on the community. We affirm
finding consideration of these factors is permissible.
I. Facts and proceedings.
In 2013, Lane, her son, her father, and two other individuals lived in a
home where methamphetamine was manufactured. On May 28, 2013, the State
charged Lane, her father, and the two other individuals with manufacture or
conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance (methamphetamine),
possession of precursors with intent to manufacture, and child endangerment for
exposing Lane’s young son to methamphetamine. On August 1, 2013, Lane’s
father was sentenced to a term of no more than five years in prison each for
possession of precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine and for
child endangerment.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Lane pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
manufacture methamphetamine and child endangerment. On August 15, 2013,
Lane was sentenced by the court to serve two concurrent indeterminate
sentences: not to exceed ten years on the manufacturing count, and not to
exceed five years on the child endangerment count.
During the sentencing, the court noted, among other things, that it would
consider “sentences that have been imposed in connection with codefendants in
the same case, because it’s important to the community that similarly-situated
3
defendants be treated in a similar fashion.” The court reasoned that this
consideration would assure the community the judicial system would treat
“similarly-situated people in the same fashion” which would enhance respect for
the system.1 The court also noted the danger of the manufacture of
methamphetamine in the local community: “within this judicial district alone,
[there is] probably a fire a week or a significant pollution incident weekly related
to the manufacture of methamphetamine.” Lane appeals, arguing the trial court
abused its discretion in considering impermissible factors during her sentencing.
We affirm.
II. Analysis.
We begin our analysis of the challenge to the sentence in
this case by observing that the decision of the district court to
impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked
with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned
for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate
matters. State v. Pappas, 337 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Iowa 1983). An
abuse of discretion will not be found unless we are able to discern
that the decision was exercised on grounds or for reasons that
were clearly untenable or unreasonable. State v. Loyd, 530
N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995). In applying the abuse of discretion
standard to sentencing decisions, it is important to consider the
societal goals of sentencing criminal offenders, which focus on
rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the community
from further offenses. See Iowa Code § 901.5 [(2013)]. It is
equally important to consider the host of factors that weigh in on the
often arduous task of sentencing a criminal offender, including the
nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age,
character and propensity of the offender, and the chances of
reform.
State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724–25 (Iowa 2002). We evaluate each of
the factors challenged by Lane under this framework in turn.
1
The record shows that Lane’s father received his sentence by the time Lane was
sentenced, but that at least one other codefendant was awaiting sentencing.
4
A. Reference to the sentences of co-defendants
Iowa courts have not yet expressly ruled on the consideration of the
sentences of codefendants as a sentencing factor. See, e.g., State v. Null, 836
N.W.2d 41, 47 (noting information about codefendants’ sentences gave court a
“frame of reference” for defendant’s role in offense). However, federal law
expressly requires the consideration of “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct” when sentencing a defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(6) (2013).
While the federal determinate sentencing scheme, including the use of the now-
advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines, is separate and distinct from
Iowa’s indeterminate sentencing system, we find the federal factors illustrative of
the types of factors properly considered by a sentencing court. See, e.g., State
v. Washington, 832 N.W.2d 650, 658 (Iowa 2013) (referring to the federal
guidelines in evaluating the court’s consideration of a defendant’s refusal to
participate in a presentence investigation evaluation as a sentencing factor).
Here, the district court was provided with information regarding the
sentence imposed on Lane’s father.2 Lane’s father was similarly charged with
child endangerment, though ultimately convicted of possessing precursors
instead of conspiracy to manufacture the methamphetamine. While we are
mindful that “the punishment must fit the particular person and circumstances
under consideration; each decision must be made on an individual basis, and no
single factor, including the nature of the offense, will be solely determinative,” the
2
We note the consideration of the sentence of a codefendant is distinct from
consideration of additional charges brought against codefendants. Formaro, 638
N.W.2d at 725.
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district court did not err in considering the sentence of Lane’s codefendant as
one of many sentencing factors. See State v. McKeever, 276 N.W.2d 385, 387
(Iowa 1979).
B. Consideration of the effect of methamphetamine on the community.
Iowa Code section 901.5 expressly instructs the court to keep in mind two
goals when sentencing: “rehabilitation of the defendant” and “protection of the
community from further offenses by the defendant and others.” Our supreme
court has interpreted this wording to include, among many other things, the
“seriousness of the offense.” See e.g., State v. Hansen, 344 N.W.2d 725, 731
(Iowa Ct. App. 1983). The court’s consideration of the effects on the community
from the manufacture of methamphetamine expressly spoke to the seriousness
of the crime and need to protect the community from Lane and others like her.
We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.