IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 3-1243 / 13-0126
Filed March 26, 2014
MICHAEL SHAWN REYNA,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas F. Staskal,
Judge.
Michael Shawn Reyna appeals the district court ruling denying his
application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Jesse Macro of Gaudineer, Comito & George LLP, West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget Chambers, Assistant Attorney
General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Non Horvat, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
2
BOWER, J.
Michael Shawn Reyna appeals the district court ruling denying his
application for postconviction relief. Reyna claims the district court erred in
finding his application was time-barred by the statute of limitations, and his trial
attorney was not ineffective for waiving his defenses and constitutional rights.
We find the application was time-barred, however, the State failed to raise the
defense at any time. We also find the transcript of the criminal proceeding
makes clear Reyna was properly informed of his constitutional rights and his
attorney performed appropriately. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Michael Reyna was charged with three counts of attempted murder and
one count of injury and/or interference with a police service dog. Reyna
eventually filed a notice of diminished responsibility and later agreed to execute a
written waiver of his right to jury trial. By agreement of the parties, the court
considered a stipulated record consisting of the minutes of testimony,
depositions, and police reports. Reyna also waived the use of a pre-sentence
investigation so he could be sentenced immediately. On February 3, 2006,
following an in-court colloquy, and pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement,
Reyna was sentenced to three concurrent twenty-five year terms of imprisonment
for attempted murder. The injury and/or interference with a police service dog
charge was dismissed on the State’s motion. Reyna did not appeal.
On May 16, 2011, Reyna filed an application for postconviction relief. In it,
he claimed his trial attorney was ineffective in several ways, all of which were
3
denied. In this appeal, Reyna claims his attorney was ineffective by failing to
explain the practical effects of a waiver of his constitutional rights, specifically his
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to present evidence and testify on
his own behalf. He also claims the effect of his stipulation to a trial on the
minutes of testimony was not properly explained to him. The district court denied
the application finding it was: time-barred by the statute of limitations; denied the
claims on the merits; found the trial court had adequately informed Reyna of his
rights; found the waiver of the right to jury trial was properly obtained; and his
attorney was not ineffective by allowing Reyna to accept a plea bargain.
II. Standard of Review
We review postconviction relief proceedings for errors at law except for
when the basis of relief is constitutional, in which case our review is de novo.
Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 519 (Iowa 2003).
III. Discussion
A. Statute of Limitations
Before deciding the merits of his claims, the district court found the
application should be denied as it was time-barred by the statute of limitations.
Reyna claims the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that was waived
as it was not raised by the State.
Applications for postconviction relief must be filed “within three years from
the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the
date the writ of procedendo is issued.” Iowa Code § 822.3 (2011). An exception
exists for grounds of fact or law that could not have been raised within the
4
required period. Id. Because no such ground of fact or law was claimed by
Reyna, the district court correctly determined the application was filed outside the
three-year limitation period. However, Reyna is correct that the affirmative
defense was waived by the State’s failure to seek dismissal of the action.
Discussing the limitation defense in a postconviction relief proceeding, our
supreme court has restated the general rule that the “defense must be
affirmatively asserted by a responsive pleading.” Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d
707, 708 (Iowa 1989). The Davis court supported the rule by citing to Pride v.
Peterson, 173 N.W.2d 549, 554 (Iowa 1970), which held the limitation defense “is
primarily an affirmative defense to be specially asserted in a separate division of
the responsive pleading to the claim for relief.” Id. In situations where the
defense is obviously applicable, the responding party is allowed to raise the
defense by filing a motion to dismiss. See Davis, 443 N.W.2d at 708; Pride, 173
N.W.2d at 554.
The State did not raise the limitation defense in its answer1 or in a motion
to dismiss. In fact, the issue was not discussed during the postconviction relief
trial. The State claims the issue was raised during the deposition of Reyna, the
transcript of which was introduced during the postconviction relief trial.
Considering the issue was not raised and discussed in any pleading or during the
trial, we find the State waived the affirmative defense and the district court erred
by applying the statute of limitations sua sponte.2
1
No answer by the State appears in the record provided on appeal.
2
The district court also found Reyna had waived his arguments because they could
have been raised in an earlier proceeding. Our supreme court has long held, and the
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B. Constitutional Issues
Reyna claims his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object or
explain the waiver of his constitutional rights, specifically the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses, the right to present evidence and testify on his own
behalf. He also claims the true nature of his stipulation to a trial on the minutes
was not explained to him.
To establish his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Reyna must
demonstrate his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that failure
prejudiced him. See State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, Strickland v.
Washington, 378; 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The burden is on Reyna to
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, both prongs. See State v. Cook,
565 N.W.2d 611, 613–14 (Iowa 1997). We employ a strong presumption counsel
performed reasonably and competently. Id. at 614. Counsel cannot perform
ineffectively by “merely failing to make a meritless objection.” State v. Bearse,
748 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Iowa 2008).
Reyna claims his trial attorney was ineffective by failing to object to the
proceeding or explain to him there would be a limited record and the effect of the
stipulated record. He claims his attorney was similarly ineffective by not
explaining the waiver of his right to confront witnesses, present evidence, and
testify on his own behalf. We find each of these rights was sufficiently explained
to him by the district court during the colloquy. The trial court judge asked Reyna
Iowa Code establishes, because trial counsel cannot be expected to raise a claim
against himself or herself, ineffective assistance claims may be raised for the first time in
an application for postconviction relief. See Iowa Code § 814.7(1); State v. Lucas, 323
N.W.2d 228, 232 (Iowa 1982).
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if he needed more time to discuss the issues with his attorney and whether
Reyna was satisfied with the performance of his attorney. Reyna responded by
replying the issues had been adequately discussed and he was satisfied with the
services of his attorney. The court then went on to explain Reyna was waiving
his right to a jury, to issue subpoenas and require witnesses to testify on his
behalf, to testify (or not) on his own behalf, and to confront witnesses for the
State through cross-examination. Reyna understood and waived each of these
rights. The extent of the waiver was adequately discussed by the trial court
judge and further explanation by his attorney would have accomplished nothing.
An objection to the proceeding by his attorney would have been meritless and
not required.
Reyna also complains his trial attorney was ineffective by agreeing to “an
unholy hybridization of guilty plea, [and] trial by judge and trial by minutes.” This
type of trial is not the equivalent of a guilty plea, and guilty plea type procedures
are not required. State v. Sayre, 566 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Iowa 1997). There is
nothing in the record indicating Reyna intended to plead guilty by stipulating to
the minutes of testimony, which might require a different procedure. See id. at
196. The trial court in this case complied with the requirements of Sayre during
the colloquy and the nature of the proceeding was adequately explained to
Reyna. Reyna’s attorney was under no additional duty to object to the
proceeding or engage in further in-court explanations. Additionally, considering
the plea bargain offered by the State, and ultimately followed by the court,
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counsel’s suggestion to proceed with a trial on the minutes of testimony was
reasonable.3
Having found Reyna was properly advised of his rights during the in-court
colloquy, we affirm the decision of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
3
Reyna gives us no testimony from his trial counsel that might allow us to more
accurately assess counsel’s reasons for proceeding with a bench trial on the minutes.
We will not speculate as to an improper or ineffective motive on counsel’s part.