130 Nev., Advance Opinion 33
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
CHARLES DORNBACH; AND JAKE No. 62771
HUBER,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FILED
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, MAY 15 2014
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 4AK. LINDEMAN
CHURCHILL; AND THE HONORABLE CL
BY 1 : 10 -
THOMAS L. STOCKARD, DISTRICT CHIEF DA CLEFTK
JUDGE,
Respondents,
and
FRANCIS A. ELLINGWOOD, TRUSTEE
OF THE FRANCIS A. ELLINGWOOD
TRUST; PAUL THOMAS BRUNELLE
AND SUSAN GAYLENE BRUNELLE,
TRUSTEES OF THE BRUNELLE
FAMILY TRUST; EDELTRAUT
RUPPEL, SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE OF
THE RUPPEL FAMILY TRUST;
STUART V. DAWSON, TRUSTEE OF
THE STUART V. DAWSON
REVOCABLE TRUST; JURGE
SCHLICKER; MICHAEL J.
SOUTHARD, SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE
OF THE JEAN PIERRE IRISSARY 2005
RESTATEMENT OF THE 1993
REVOCABLE TRUST; AND JOSEPH
LOUDEN AND LINDA LOUDEN,
HUSBAND AND WIFE,
Real Parties in Interest.
Original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district
court order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint under NRCP 16.1(e).
Petition denied.
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Robison, Belaustegui, Sharp & Low and Mark G. Simons, Reno,
for Petitioners.
Jeffrey K. Rahbeck, Zephyr Cove,
for Real Parties in Interest.
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANG.
OPINION
By the Court, PARRAGUIRRE, J.:
NRCP 16.1(b) directs plaintiffs in civil cases to meet and
confer with defendants concerning how to best manage the litigation and
discovery. Thereafter, a report on the case conference must be filed.
NRCP 16.1(c). When a plaintiff fails to meet the deadlines for complying
with these provisions, a district court may dismiss the complaint without
prejudice under NRCP 16.1(e).
In this original writ proceeding, we discuss the extent to which
a district court has discretion to deny an NRCP 16.1(e) motion to dismiss
and to order the parties to meet and confer beyond the rule's deadlines.
We conclude that a district court may consider its own internal delays
when deciding an NRCP 16.1(e) motion to dismiss, and that, here, the
district court properly exercised its discretion by extending the deadlines
of NRCP 16.1 after finding that compelling and extraordinary
circumstances warranted the extension. Accordingly, we deny the petition
for a writ of mandamus.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 6, 2011, real party in interest Francis A.
Ellingwood, as trustee for the Francis A. Ellingwood Trust, and other
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plaintiffs (collectively, Ellingwood) filed a complaint for a deficiency
judgment against petitioners Charles Dornbach and Jake Huber
(collectively, Dornbach) in the Churchill County district court. On
February 27, 2012, Dornbach filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5). Due to the death of Churchill County's
only sitting district judge and related delays in the district court, the
hearing on the NRCP 12(b)(5) motion did not occur until January 7, 2013,
and the motion was eventually denied. While the motion remained
pending, Dornbach did not file an answer to Ellingwood's complaint.
On December 6, 2012, 284 days after Dornbach filed the
NRCP 12(b)(5) motion, Dornbach filed a motion to dismiss the case
without prejudice due to Ellingwood's failure to comply with NRCP
16.1(e), which allows a district court to dismiss a case if the plaintiff fails
to hold an early case conference and file the case conference report within
set deadlines. The district court implicitly recognized that Ellingwood
failed to comply with the rule but denied Dornbach's motion, explaining
that the death of the district judge and the significant resulting delays
constituted compelling and extraordinary circumstances that justified
extending the NRCP 16.1 deadlines. Dornbach then sought a writ of
mandamus from this court to compel the district court to dismiss the case.
DISCUSSION
In this petition, Dornbach argues that the district court
improperly denied the NRCP 16.1 motion to dismiss and ordered the
parties to meet and confer after the NRCP 16.1 deadlines expired.
Whether to consider the petition for a writ of mandamus
We have discretion to consider a petition for a writ of
mandamus. Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124
Nev. 193, 197-98, 179 P.3d 556, 558-59 (2008). "A writ of mandamus is
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available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or stationE,1 or to control an arbitrary
or capricious exercise of discretion." Id. at 197, 179 P.3d at 558. A writ is
not available, however, "when an adequate and speedy legal remedy
exists." Id. Generally, we "decline to consider writ petitions that
challenge interlocutory district court orders denying motions to dismiss"
because an appeal from a final judgment is an adequate legal remedy. Id.
Nevertheless, we may consider such petitions if "an important issue of law
needs clarification and considerations of sound judicial economy and
administration militate in favor of granting the petition." Id. at 197, 179
P.3d at 559.
Because NRCP 16.1 is relevant in nearly all civil cases, its
construction and application involve important legal issues in need of
clarification. See id. at 198, 179 P.3d at 559. Moreover, although we
ultimately determine that writ relief is not warranted, our consideration of
this petition promotes judicial economy and administration because
questions concerning the early case conference necessarily arise early in
the proceedings, affect the remainder of the case, and cannot be
adequately addressed on appeal after a case has proceeded through the
full extent of litigation. Therefore, we will consider the petition.
The meaning of "appearance" in NRCP 16.1(e)
NRCP 16.1(b)(1) requires a plaintiff to hold an early case
conference, where the parties must "confer and consider the nature and
basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for a prompt
settlement." NRCP 16.1(c) requires the parties to file a report regarding
the conference with the district court. In order "to promote the
prosecution of litigation within adequate timelines," Arnold v. Kip, 123
Nev. 410, 415, 168 P.3d 1050, 1053 (2007), deadlines are given for both the
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early case conference and the report. NRCP 16.1(b)(1) provides that the
early case conference must be held within 30 days after the defendant files
an answer to the complaint, and this deadline may be extended no later
than 180 days from when the defendant's appearance is served, unless
compelling and extraordinary circumstances justify an extension. The
case conference report must be filed within 30 days after the conference.
NRCP 16.1(c). NRCP 16.1(e) provides, in relevant part, that the district
court may dismiss a case if these deadlines, with any extensions, are not
followed:
(1) If the conference ... is not held within
180 days after an appearance by a defendant, the
case may be dismissed as to that defendant upon
motion or on the court's own initiative, without
prejudice, unless there are compelling and
extraordinary circumstances for a continuance
beyond this period.
(2) If the plaintiff does not file a case
conference report within 240 days after an
appearance by a defendant, the case may be
dismissed as to that defendant upon motion or on
the court's own initiative, without prejudice.
(Emphases added.)
While Dornbach and Ellingwood agree that NRCP 16.1(e)'s
deadlines began running when Dornbach made his first "appearance" in
district court, they disagree as to when this appearance occurred.
Dornbach argues that he first appeared by filing the NRCP 12(b)(5)
motion to dismiss and that NRCP 16.1(e)'s deadlines ran from this date.
Ellingwood argues that a defendant does not appear for purposes of NRCP
16.1(e) until filing an answer to the complaint. According to Ellingwood,
because Dornbach had not yet answered Ellingwood's complaint when
Dornbach filed the NRCP 16.1(e) motion to dismiss, the rule's deadlines
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had not expired, and the district court therefore properly denied
Dornbach's motion.
Ellingwood points to NRCP 16.1(b)(1)'s requirement that the
early case conference be held "within 30 days after filing of an answer by
the first answering defendant." (Emphasis added.) Because NRCP
16.1(b)(1) uses the word "answer" while NRCP 16.1(e) uses the word
"appearance," Ellingwood argues that the rule is ambiguous and this court
should interpret "appearance" in NRCP 16.1(e) as being synonymous with
"answer." We find this argument unpersuasive.
"A district court's interpretation of court rules is reviewed de
novo." Moon v. McDonald, Carano & Wilson, L.L.P., 126 Nev. ,
245 P.3d 1138, 1139 (2010). "[T]he rules of statutory interpretation apply
to Nevada's Rules of Civil Procedure." Webb ex rel. Webb v. Clark Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 125 Nev. 611, 618, 218 P.3d 1239, 1244 (2009). Unambiguous
language in a rule "is given 'its ordinary meaning unless it is clear that
this meaning was not intended." State, Dep't of Taxation v. Am. Home
Shield of Nev., Inc., 127 Nev. „ 254 P.3d 601, 603 (2011) (quoting
State, Dep't of Taxation v. DaimlerChrysler Servs. N. Am., L.L.C., 121 Nev.
541, 543, 119 P.3d 135, 136 (2005)).
An "appearance" is "[a] coming into court as a party or
interested person, . . . esp[ecially] a defendant's act of taking part in a
lawsuit. . . by an answer, demurrer, or motion." Black's Law Dictionary
113 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). In contrast, an "answer" is "[a]
defendant's first pleading that addresses the merits of the case." Id. at
107. Because "appearance" and "answer" have different, well-settled
definitions, we conclude that the time periods set forth in NRCP 16.1(e)
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unambiguously begin to run when a defendant appears, regardless of
whether that appearance is by motion or answer.
It is undisputed that Dornbach filed the NRCP 12(b)(5) motion
more than 240 days before filing the NRCP 16.1(e) motion. Filing the
NRCP 12(b)(5) motion constituted Dornbach's appearance, and because
the NRCP 16.1(e) time periods begin to run when a defendant appears, the
NRCP 16.1(e) deadlines expired before Dornbach filed the NRCP 16.1(e)
motion to dismiss.
The district court did not arbitrarily or capriciously exercise its discretion
by denying Dornbach's motion to dismiss
NRCP 16.1(e)(1) and (2) provide that a "case may be
dismissed" if a plaintiff fails to comply with the rule's deadlines.
(Emphasis added.) Based on this permissive language, this court has
repeatedly recognized a district court's discretion to dismiss a case under
NRCP 16.1(e). For example, in Arnold v. Kip, we upheld a district court's
order of dismissal, explaining that "Wile decision to dismiss an action
without prejudice for a plaintiffs failure to comply with the timing
requirements of NRCP 16.1(e)(2) remains within the district court's
discretion." 123 Nev. at 415, 168 P.3d at 1053 (emphasis added). In
evaluating an NRCP 16.1(e)(2) dismissal in Moon v. McDonald, Carano &
Wilson, L.L.P., we again noted that "the district court exercised its
discretion to dismiss [the plaintiffs] case." 126 Nev. at , 245 P.3d at
1140 (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, Dornbach argues that the district court's
reasoning was arbitrary and capricious because a district court's internal
delays are not among the relevant factors for deciding an NRCP 16.1(e)
motion to dismiss. When exercising its discretion under NRCP 16.1(e), a
district court should consider factors such as "the length of the delay,
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whether the defendant ... caused the delay, whether the delay has
otherwise impeded the timely, prosecution of the case, general
considerations of case management. . . , or whether the plaintiff has
provided good cause for the delay." Arnold, 123 Nev. at 415-16, 168 P.3d
at 1053. This list of factors is "nonexhaustive," id., and we have
recognized, "as a proper guide to the exercise of discretion, the basic
underlying policy to have each case decided upon its merits." Hotel Last
Frontier Corp. v. Frontier Props., Inc., 79 Nev. 150, 155, 380 P.2d 293, 295
(1963). Further, although the NRCP 16.1(e) deadlines unambiguously
begin to run upon a defendant's appearance, we have stated that it may be
"fruitless" to hold a case conference before a defendant has filed an answer
to the complaint simply for the purpose of complying with NRCP 16.1.
Dougan v. Gustaveson, 108 Nev. 517, 522, 835 P.2d 795, 799 (1992),
abrogated on other grounds by Arnold, 123 Nev. at 415, 168 P.3d at 1053.
Here, Dornbach's NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss remained
pending for several months due to the district court's own delays, and
while this motion was pending, Dornbach did not file an answer to the
complaint. Although Elling-wood had a duty to hold the early case
conference and file the case conference report even without Dornbach
having answered the complaint, doing so may have been fruitless. See
Dougan, 108 Nev. at 522, 835 P.2d at 799. In addition, the district court's
internal delays are relevant to "general considerations of case
management." See Arnold, 123 Nev. at 416, 168 P.3d at 1053. Therefore,
we conclude that the district court's consideration of its internal delays
and their effects on the progression of the case was not improper, and
thus, the district court did not arbitrarily or capriciously exercise its
discretion by denying Dornbach's motion to dismiss.
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The district court did not arbitrarily or capriciously exercise its discretion
by ordering the parties to comply with NRCP 16.1 after the deadlines
expired
Dornbach also argues that the district court improperly
ordered the parties to comply with NRCP 16.1 after the deadlines expired.
NRCP 16.1(b)(1) provides in relevant part: "Absent compelling and
extraordinary circumstances, neither the court nor the parties may extend
the time [for holding the conference] to a day more than 180 days after an
appearance is served by the defendant in question."
We have recognized "the inherent power of the judiciary to
economically and fairly manage litigation." Borger v. Eighth Judicial Dist.
Court, 120 Nev. 1021, 1029, 102 P.3d 600, 606 (2004). Adherence to
deadlines promotes the efficient prosecution of cases, Arnold, 123 Nev. at
415, 168 P.3d at 1053, but so does allowing district courts to manage the
cases before them. See Burger, 120 Nev. at 1029, 102 P.3d at 606.
Here, the district court explicitly found that the death of the
district judge and the resulting delays were extraordinary circumstances
that justified an extension of the deadline for the conference. But
Dornbach argues that the district court's own delays could not justify an
extension because they did not impact Ellingwood's ability to hold the
conference.
Even though NRCP 16.1(b)(1) generally precludes a district
court from extending the deadline for the NRCP 16.1 conference, a district
court also has inherent authority to manage a case, including the
authority to order parties to meet and confer. See Burger, 120 Nev. at
1029, 102 P.3d at 606. Moreover, a district court has the express
authority to extend the deadline for the conference where warranted by
compelling and extraordinary circumstances. NRCP 16.1(b)(1). NRCP
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16.1(b)(1) does not explicitly state that these compelling and extraordinary
circumstances cannot arise from within the district court itself, and we
decline to determine that the rule implicitly creates such a limitation. See
Webb, 125 Nev. at 618, 218 P.3d at 1244 (stating that "the rules of
statutory interpretation apply to Nevada's Rules of Civil Procedure").
Therefore, a district court's consideration of its own internal delays may,
in certain circumstances, be relevant to determining whether compelling
and extraordinary circumstances justify an extension under NRCP
16.1(b)(1).
In this case, we conclude that the district court did not
arbitrarily or capriciously exercise its discretion by finding that the judge's
death and the substantial resulting delays constituted compelling and
extraordinary circumstances. Indeed, the record shows that Dornbach's
NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss was pending for approximately 11
months because of these delays. It was entirely reasonable for Ellingwood
to want a ruling on this motion prior to holding the conference in order to
maximize the conference's utility. Cf. NRCP 16.1(b)(1) (requiring the
parties to "consider the nature and basis of their claims and defenses" at
the early case conference); Dougan, 108 Nev. at 522, 835 P.2d at 799
(recognizing that, in certain circumstances, it may be "fruitless" to hold a
case conference simply for the purpose of complying with NRCP 16.1's
deadlines). As a result, we conclude that the district court did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously by extending the deadline for the NRCP 16.1
conference beyond 180 days.
CONCLUSION
The deadlines set forth in NRCP 16.1(e) clearly begin to run
upon a defendant's appearance, not the filing of an answer, and therefore
these deadlines expired before Dornbach filed a motion to dismiss
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Ellingwood's complaint pursuant to NRCP 16.1(e). But the district court
explicitly found that compelling and extraordinary circumstances excused
Ellingwood's delay and justified an extension of time to complete the
conference and the report. As a result, we cannot conclude that the rule
requires dismissal here, or that the district court acted arbitrarily and
capriciously by denying Dornbach's motion to dismiss and ordering the
parties to meet and confer. Accordingly, we deny the petition for a writ of
mandamus.
Parraguirre
C.J.
Pitt
Pickering 7 J.
AA; J.
Hardesty
J.
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