Approximately ten months after Blickle filed the complaint, Hill
filed an answer to the complaint. After Hill answered, Blickle sought t
arrange an early case conference pursuant to NRCP 16.1(b). Shortl
thereafter, Hill filed a motion to dismiss the complaint due to Blickle's failure
to comply with the timelines set forth in NRCP 16.1(e). The district cour
noted that a plaintiff bears the burden of holding a case conference, bu
denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the parties to comply with NRCP
16.1's conference and reporting requirements. Hill then petitioned this court
for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to dismiss the complaint,
arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion t
dismiss
"A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance o
an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, o
station[,} or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion." hit'
Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3
556, 558 (2008); NRS 34.160. It is within this court's discretion to determin
whether to consider a writ petition. Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 10
Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991).
NRCP 16.1(b)(1) requires a plaintiff to hold an early cas
conference at which the parties must "confer and consider the nature an
basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for a promp
settlement or resolution of the case." The parties must then file a repor
regarding the conference in the district court. NRCP 16.1(c). A district cour
may dismiss a case without prejudice if a plaintiff fails to hold an early cas
conference within 180 days of a defendant's appearance "unless there ar
compelling and extraordinary circumstances," or if a plaintiff fails to file
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case conference report within 240 days of a defendant's appearance.' NRCP
16.1(e)(1)-(2).
We review a district court's decision on a motion to dismiss due to
failure to comply with NRCP 16.1(e) deadlines for an abuse of discretion.
Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 415, 168 P.3d 1050, 1053 (2007). When decidin
such motions, district courts should consider factors such as "the length of the
delay, . . . whether the delay has otherwise impeded the timely prosecution o
the case, [and] general considerations of case management." Id. at 415-16,
168 P.3d at 1053. We have also recognized that, where a defendant has no
yet filed an answer to a complaint, holding the NRCP 16.1 conference may be
"fruitless." Dougan v. Gustaveson, 108 Nev. 517, 522, 835 P.2d 795, 799
(1992), abrogated on other grounds by Arnold, 123 Nev. at 415, 168 P.3d a
1053.
Hill argues that the district court abused its discretion because i
did not find that compelling and extraordinary circumstances justifie
Wickle's delay. However, such a finding is not required for a district court t
deny a motion to dismiss pursuant to NRCP 16.1(e). Rather, such a findin
would have barred the district court from dismissing the case, but th
absence of such a finding does not mandate dismissal. See NRCP 16.1(e)(1).
The NRCP 16.1(e) deadlines expired before Hill filed an answe
to the complaint, and holding the conference before then may have bee
fruitless. See Dougan, 108 Nev. at 522, 835 P.2d at 799. It may have bee
entirely reasonable for Blickle to want to wait until an answer was filed i
liks an alternative basis on which to deny the petition, Blickle argue
that the deadlines set forth in NRCP 16.1(e) do not begin to run until
defendant files an answer, and therefore, they had not expired when Hil
moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to NRCP 16.1(e). Because th
deadlines set forth in NRCP 16.1(e)(1) and (2) clearly begin to run upon "a
appearance by a defendant," we reject this argument.
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order to make the conference more productive. See id.; NRCP 16.1(b)(1)
(requiring the parties to "confer and consider the nature and basis of thei
claims and defenses"). Moreover, the majority of the delay occurred whil
Hill's NRCP 12(b)(5) motion was pending, and Blickle sought to arrange th
conference shortly after the answer was filed. Therefore, it does not appea
that "the delay has otherwise impeded the timely prosecution of the case,"
that "general considerations of case management" mandate dismissal.
Arnold, 123 Nev. at 415-16, 168 P.3d at 1053. We therefore cannot conclud
that the district court abused its discretion by denying Hill's motion t
dismiss. 2
Accordingly, we
ORDER the petition DENIED.
C.J.
Gibbons
, J. J.
Hardesty
Par aguirre
Cherry
2 Hillalso -argues that the district court abused its discretion b
ordering the parties to meet and confer because the deadline for th
conference may not be extended beyond 180 days after a defendant' •
appearance "[absent compelling and extraordinary circumstances." NRC
16.1(b)(1). However, we have recognized "the inherent power of the judiciar
to economically and fairly manage litigation," Borger v. Eighth Judicial Dist
Court, 120 Nev. 1021, 1029, 102 P.3d 600, 606 (2004), and ordering parties t•
meet and confer falls within this inherent authority. Accordingly, w:
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by taking this stes
to manage the case.
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cc: Hon. Patrick Flanagan, District Judge
Robison Belaustegui Sharp & Low
Jeffrey K. Rahbeck
Washoe District Court Clerk
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