judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and other evidence, when viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, indicate that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; NRCP 56(c).
A complaint against a design professional in a construction
defect case must be filed with an attorney's affidavit stating that the
attorney has reviewed the facts of the case, discussed the case with an
expert, and concluded that the action has a reasonable basis in fact and
law. NRS 40.6884(1). In addition, an expert's report indicating that there
is a reasonable basis for the action must also accompany the complaint.
NRS 40.6884(3).
Here, the LaFriedas' original attorney filed an attorney's
affidavit and an expert's report with the LaFriedas' complaint in 2008.
The LaFriedas' case was later consolidated with other similar cases and
different counsel represented the consolidated plaintiffs. In 2011, counsel
for the consolidated plaintiffs (previous counsel)" moved to withdraw.
Previous counsel sent a letter to another attorney who was considering
representing the consolidated plaintiffs for the purpose of opposing the
motion to withdraw (withdrawal counsel). In the letter, previous counsel
admitted that the experts found no reasonable basis for the action against
BEC and made various assertions regarding her management of the
consolidated plaintiffs' case. Withdrawal counsel submitted this letter to
the district court in support of the opposition to the motion to withdraw.
Based on the letter, BEC moved for summary judgment. In the opposition
to BEC's motion for summary judgment, previous counsel made further
'The LaFriedas are represented by a different attorney on appeal.
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admissions that the experts could not conclude that BEG was liable. The
expert's report never mentioned BEG, and previous counsel's admissions
indicate that the report was not intended to refer to BEG. Based on
previous counsel's admissions, the district court concluded that the
attorney's affidavit and expert's report filed with the LaFriedas' complaint
were faulty and could not be relied upon to maintain the action. See NRS
40.6884(1), (3). Therefore, the district court granted BEC's motion for
summary judgment, and the LaFriedas appealed.
First, the LaFriedas argue that previous counsel's letter was
protected by the attorney-client privilege. We assume, without deciding,
that the letter referenced privileged communications between previous
counsel and the experts, and that the letter was itself a privileged
communication between previous counsel and withdrawal counsel. See
NRS 49.095. Although the client is the holder of the attorney-client
privilege, see NRS 49.105; Fink v. Oshins, 118 Nev. 428, 435, 49 P.3d 640,
645 (2002), an attorney has authority to make admissions of fact that bind
the client. Gottwals v. Rencher, 60 Nev. 35, 52, 98 P.2d 481, 484 (1940).
This authority necessarily includes the authority to disclose some
privileged communications, unless the attorney acts in bad faith. Sprader
v. Mueller, 121 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Minn. 1963); see also Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence: Evidentiary
Privileges § 6.12.3 (2d ed. 2010) ("Absent contrary instructions from the
client, the attorney has extensive implied authority for• disclosures related
to litigation."). There is no evidence that withdrawal counsel disclosed the
letter in bad faith, and the record indicates that withdrawal counsel
provided the letter in order to demonstrate that the consolidated plaintiffs
needed more time to retain new counsel. Accordingly, we conclude that
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withdrawal counsel acted within the scope of his authority by disclosing
previous counsel's letter, and the LaFriedas are bound by this waiver of
any attorney-client privilege that may have protected the letter. See
Sprader, 121 N.W.2d at 180. The district court thus properly refused to
exclude the letter.
Next, the LaFriedas argue that the district court misconstrued
the letter by adopting BEC's interpretation of the letter. Before the
district court, previous counsel described the letter as her candid views on
the case against BEC and admitted that she learned shortly before writing
the letter that the experts could not conclude that BEC was liable, but
never argued that the letter was not intended to apply to the LaFrieda&
Because the LaFriedas make this argument for the first time on appeal, it
is waived. See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d
981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes to the
jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and will not be
considered on appeal.").
The LaFriedas further argue that if the district court did not
err by considering the letter, summary judgment was nevertheless
improper. However, BEC showed an absence of evidence of its liability
using the letter and counsel's additional admissions. Therefore, the
LaFriedas bore the burden of coming forward with evidence to show that a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to BEC's liability. See Cuzze v.
Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598,602-03, 172 P.3d 131, 134
(2007). However, the LaFriedas did not produce any evidence
contradicting counsel's admissions. Accordingly, the district court did not
err by granting BEC's motion for summary judgment.
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The LaFriedas also argue that the district court abused its
discretion by denying their request for additional discovery under NRCP
56(1). Although discovery was stayed pending mediation, the record
reflects that the LaFriedas received substantial information regarding
BEC's work on their home, including admissions that BEC performed on-
call inspection services at the LaFriedas' home. While the information
that BEC provided may have been incomplete or confusing, the LaFriedas
failed to show that additional discovery would enable their experts to
conclude that BEC was liable, and thus they failed to show that additional
discovery would create a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the LaFriedas'
request for additional discovery. See Francis v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 127
Nev. , 262 P.3d 705, 714 (2011).
Alternatively, the LaFriedas argue that the district court
erred by granting summary judgment on their negligent
misrepresentation claim because this claim was not subject to the
requirements of NRS 40.6884. NRS 40.6884 applies to all claims that
arise "as the result of a constructional defect, except a claim for personal
injury or wrongful death." NRS 40.635(1). We have previously
interpreted similar statutory language in the context of nonresidential
construction defect statutes to include negligent misrepresentation claims.
See In re CityCenter Constr. & Lien Master Litig., 129 Nev. „ 310
P.3d 574, 578-79 (2013) (interpreting NRS 11.2565(1)(b)). Accordingly, we
construe NRS 40.635(1) broadly and conclude that the LaFriedas'
negligent misrepresentation claim against BEC was subject to NRS
40.6884 because this claim arose out of BEC's role in the construction and
later inspection of the LaFriedas' home. Therefore, because the LaFriedas'
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experts found no basis for BEC's liability on any claim and the LaFriedas
did not present any evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact
relative to their negligent misrepresentation claim, the district court did
not err by granting summary judgment as to all of the LaFriedas' claims. 2
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Pickering
PiekoA (iv J.
J.
Parraguirre
Cli J.
Saitta
2The LaFriedas argue that the district court abused its discretion by
awarding BEC attorney fees and costs because summary judgment was
improper. Given our conclusion that summary judgment was proper, we
reject this argument. The LaFriedas also challenge the district court's
calculation of prejudgment interest. The LaFriedas raised this argument
for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before the district court,
but this motion was never submitted for decision. Thus, we decline to
address this argument. See Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 417, 168 P.3d
1050, 1054 (2007) (stating that this court may consider arguments raised
for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before the district court
when the motion and an order considering its merits are properly in the
record on appeal).
Finally, while we affirm the district court's judgment, we note that
the LaFriedas' remedy, if any, is against previous counsel rather than
BEC.
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cc: Hon. Connie J. Steinheimer, District Judge
Margaret M. Crowley, Settlement Judge
Law Office of James Shields Beasley
Fahrendorf, Viloria, Oliphant & Oster, LLP
Washoe District Court Clerk
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