J-S33039-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
KEVIN GERARD PINCKNEY
Appellant No. 3194 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered October 30, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at No: CP-39-CR-0000622-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2014
Appellant, Kevin Gerard Pinckney, appeals from the judgment of
sentence the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County entered October 30,
2013. Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress. Specifically, Appellant avers the trial court should have granted
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which [Appellant] was a
ief at 9. Upon review, we disagree. Accordingly,
we affirm.
1
Appellant, in fact,
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1
Accordingly, we incorporate here the findings of fact as set forth by the trial
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S33039-14
what they observed, may have
had suspicions that there was criminal activity involving at least one
e
Id. We disagree.
suppression motion [we are] limited to determining whether the
factual findings are supported by the record and whether the
legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Since the
[Commonwealth] prevailed in the suppression court, we may
consider only the evidence of the [Commonwealth] and so much
of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when
read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record
supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by
those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn
therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Cauley, 10 A.3d 321, 325 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotation
omitted).
an investigative detention such that there must be reasonable suspicion that
Commonwealth
Washington, 63 A.3d 797 (Pa. Super. 2013) and Commonwealth v. Cruz,
21 A.3d 1247 (Pa. Super. 2011)).
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
court in its Rule 1925(a) opinion filed December 24, 2013. We direct that a
filings in this case.
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Reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than probable
cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest, and depends
on the information possessed by police and its degree of
reliability in the totality of the circumstances. In order to justify
the seizure, a police officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot.
In assessing the totality of the circumstances, courts must also
afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn
acknowledge that innocent facts, when considered collectively,
may permit the investigative detention.
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa. 2011) (citations,
quotation marks, and alteration omitted).
As summarized in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court found:
Here, from the totality of the circumstances [the detectives] had
[reasonable suspicion2] to believe that they had witnessed a sale
of illegal drugs and that the occupants of the [Cadillac CTX] were
the sellers of drugs. The detectives were patrolling in an area
known for its high volume of crime and drug activity. They
observed the [Cadillac CTX] being followed through alleys by the
[Ford Focus] in a manner often associated with drug
transactions. They witnessed the two cars stop abruptly in Brick
Street and the driver of the [Ford Focus] exit his vehicle and
approach the driver of the [Cadillac CTX]. [One detective] saw a
hand-to-hand exchange between these men. The detectives
then observed a man exit the rear passenger door of the
[Cadillac CTX]. [One detective] saw this man holding what
appeared to be crack cocaine. The detectives made all of these
observations at close range in that they were parked
immediately behind the stopped [Ford Focus]. The sum of these
observations was sufficient to give a reasonable law enforcement
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2
The trial court found the officers had probable cause to forcibly stop the
vehicle, but provided no authority for the proposition that probable cause
was needed to perform a stop. In his argument, as noted, Appellant
acknowledges reasonable suspicion was sufficient to conduct a stop under
Washington, supra, and
Cruz, supra).
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officer cause to believe that he was witnessing drug transactions
and that the occupants of the [Cadillac CTX] were selling drugs.
Thus, the detectives had [reasonable suspicion] to stop the
[Cadillac CTX].
Trial Court Opinion, 12/24/13, at 6-7.
We agree. Based on the circumstances of the case, as summarized in
the trial court opinion, we conclude the detectives had reasonable suspicion
to believe the occupants of the Cadillac CTX were involved in criminal
activity such as to warrant stopping the vehicle.
Appellant also argues there was no evidence he was involved in a drug
the front right side passenger seat until the veh Id. If
anything, the argument goes to the weight of the evidence, and does not
address the dispositive issue in this matter: did the officers have reasonable
suspicion to stop the vehicle in which he was an occupant? As noted, the
answer is yes.
judgment by making them see drug activity occurring in even innocent
Id. Appellant seems to ignore the officers here relied on
their experience as well as their direct observations of an exchange involving
a substance which looked like crack cocaine. Additionally, Appellant ignores
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that officers need only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, not
certainty, and that even innocent facts, in combination, may give rise to
reasonable suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (innocent
facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/25/2014
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