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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-11279
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-02959-VEH
JIM WINDWALKER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
GOVERNOR OF ALABAMA,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(September 2, 2014)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Jim Windwalker appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his
amended complaint challenging the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and
Community Notification Act (“ASORCNA”), Ala. Code §§15-20A-1 et seq.
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Windwalker was convicted in Florida in 1985 for having oral sex with a child
under 12. Windwalker later moved to Clay County, Alabama, and because of his
Florida conviction, was required to register as a sex offender under ASORCNA. In
2012, he challenged its constitutionality in this lawsuit, which the district court
dismissed for failure to state a claim. On appeal, Windwalker argues that the
district court erred in concluding that ASORCNA does not violate: (1) the Ex Post
Facto Clause; (2) due process; (3) equal protection; and (4) the free exercise of
religion. He also argues that he was entitled to an opportunity to amend his
complaint. After careful review, we affirm.
We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6), accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010). To survive dismissal for failure to
state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff must assert “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
First, we are unpersuaded by Windwalker’s argument that ASORCNA
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. As a general rule, a law may constitute an ex
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post facto violation if it is intended to impose a retroactive punishment or if it has
the effect of transforming an otherwise civil remedy into a criminal penalty. Smith
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003). To make this determination, the Supreme Court
says that we first must look to the statutory text and structure to determine whether
the legislature “either expressly or impliedly [indicated] a preference for one label
or the other.” Id. at 93 (quotation omitted). “If the intention of the legislature was
to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry.” Id. at 92. “If, however, the intention
was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further
examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as
to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it civil.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The second step -- the “effects” analysis -- involves consideration of the
factors set out in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, which include whether, in its
necessary operation, a regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and
traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; requires a
finding of scienter; applies to behavior that is already a crime; promotes traditional
aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is
excessive with respect to this purpose. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). “Because we
ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent, only the clearest proof will suffice
to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil
remedy into a criminal penalty.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (quotation and citation
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omitted; emphasis added). In Smith, the Supreme Court addressed whether “a sex
offender registration and notification law constitute[d] retroactive punishment
forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause,” and concluded “that respondents [did not]
show, much less by the clearest proof, that the effects of the law negate[d]
Alaska’s intention to establish a civil regulatory scheme.” Id. at 91, 105.
Here, the stated purpose of ASORCNA is to regulate sex offenders for the
sake of public safety. See Ala. Code §15-20A-2(5) (declaring its intent “not to
punish sex offenders but to protect the public and, most importantly, promote child
safety.”). The act has three main parts: (1) quarterly in-person registration with
law enforcement to provide personal information, and, in case of travel for more
than three days, information for a travel permit; (2) community notification about
sex offenders’ identity and location, and a sex offender designation on drivers’
licenses; and (3) restrictions on sex offenders’ proximity to vulnerable potential
victims. Having reviewed the statute, we conclude that Windwalker has not
offered the necessary “clearest proof” to override the legislature’s intent that the
act be nonpunitive and transform it into a criminal penalty. Indeed, of the several
factors to consider, many cut against Windwalker, and we need only mention three
-- affirmative disability or restraint, rational connection, and excessiveness.
As for whether ASORCNA imposes an affirmative disability or restraint,
this factor does not tip the balance in favor of Windwalker. In analyzing this issue,
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we must keep in mind that “[i]f the disability or restraint is minor and indirect, its
effects are unlikely to be punitive.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 100. As a result, we’ve
found no punitive restraining effect even where the federal Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) required in-person reporting and
mandated dissemination on the internet of information regarding the whereabouts
of convicted sex offenders. See United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848, 857 (11th
Cir. 2011). We said that “[a]ppearing in person may be more inconvenient, but
requiring it is not punitive.” Id. We also recognized that “[a]lthough the public
availability of the information may have a lasting and painful impact on the
convicted sex offender, these consequences flow not from the Act’s registration
and dissemination provisions, but from the fact of conviction, already a matter of
public record.” Id. (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 101). To the extent ASORCNA
imposes additional burdens, we still fail to find it punitive.
As for rational connection, we remain unconvinced. Whether the regulatory
scheme has a “rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose” is the most
“significant” factor in the ex post facto analysis. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102.
Nevertheless, the requirement of a “rational connection” is not demanding: A
“statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with
the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance.” Id. Thus, in W.B.H., we disposed of
this factor quickly: SORNA’s “registration requirements have a rational
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relationship to promoting public safety in the same way that those involved in
[Smith] did.” 664 F.3d at 859. We reach the same result for ASORCNA.
Lastly, as for excessiveness, the Supreme Court has already permitted sex
offenders to be regulated as a class regardless of individualized risk assessments:
The Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable
categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail
particular regulatory consequences. We have upheld against ex post facto
challenges laws imposing regulatory burdens on individuals convicted of
crimes without any corresponding risk assessment. . . . . Doubtless, one who
has violated the criminal law may thereafter reform and become in fact
possessed of a good moral character. But the legislature has power in cases
of this kind to make a rule of universal application.
Smith, 538 U.S. at 103-04 (quotation and citation omitted). Citing sex-offender
recidivism studies, the Supreme Court specifically approved a state’s conclusion
“that a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial risk of
recidivism.” Id. at 103. What’s more, Smith acknowledges that “[c]ontrary to
conventional wisdom, most reoffenses do not occur within the first several years
after release, but may occur as late as 20 years following release.” Id. at 104
(quoting National Institute of Justice, R. Prentky, R. Knight, & A. Lee, U.S. Dept.
of Justice, Child Sexual Molestation: Research Issues 14 (1997)).
We also rejected a similar claim in W.H.B. -- that SORNA was excessive
because he was convicted as a youthful offender at age eighteen, and, according to
W.B.H, those who are young when they commit sex offenses have a lower rate of
recidivism than those who do so as adults. 664 F.3d at 860. We said that “when it
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comes to answering the excessiveness question, the Supreme Court has warned
against ‘determining whether the legislature has made the best choice possible.’”
Id. (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 105). So too here -- if those who claim a lower rate
of recidivism cannot claim excessiveness, then neither can Windwalker. In short,
Windwalker has failed to show us that ASORCNA is “so punitive either in purpose
or effect” that it has overridden the legislature’s stated intent that it be a civil
regulatory statute. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (quotation marks omitted). As a result,
the district court did not err in dismissing his ex post facto claim.
Windwalker’s substantive due process claim fails as well. We analyze a
substantive due process claim by first crafting a “careful description of the asserted
right.” Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).
Second, we determine whether the asserted right is “one of those fundamental
rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Windwalker says that ASORCNA violates several of his fundamental rights:
“e.g., his right to privacy, his right to find and retain housing, his right to find and
keep employment, his right to free travel and movement, his right to be free from
interference in his religious practices, and his right to be free of threats and
harassment.” However, in Doe, we held that “[t]hough the Supreme Court has not
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addressed whether substantive due process invalidates sex offender registration
statutes, we can find no history or tradition that would elevate the issue here to a
fundamental right.” Id. at 1345 (citation omitted); see also id. at 1344 (“The circuit
courts that have considered this substantive due process argument regarding sex
offender registries have upheld such registration and publication requirements
finding no constitutional infirmities.”). Indeed, when “carefully described” in the
context of a regulation designed to protect the public from sex offender recidivism,
none of Windwalker’s asserted rights are so “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Id. at 1344 (quotation
omitted). This reasoning applies notwithstanding differences between the sex-
offender statute at issue in Doe and the one at issue here. Thus, the district court
did not err in dismissing the substantive due process claim.
We also reject Windwalker’s equal protection claim. As we explained in
Doe, where the appellants “argue[d] that the Sex Offender Act impermissibly
treat[ed] sex offenders differently from other felony offenders,” “[s]ince sex
offenders are not considered a suspect class in general, and the various sub-
classifications presented by the Appellants do not implicate a suspect class, we
review those classifications under a rational basis test asking whether they are
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. at 1346 (citations and
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quotations omitted). Because Windwalker has not presented any classifications or
subclassifications under the ASORCNA that would trigger heightened equal
protection scrutiny, consistent with Doe, ASORCNA is subject to the rational-basis
test.1 Further, under this test, where a statute is constitutionally sufficient “when
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for it,” id. (quotations omitted), Windwalker cannot state a rational-basis equal
protection claim, especially given ASORCNA’s expressly incorporated legislative
findings articulating several reasonable bases for enacting the law, see Ala. Code §
15-20A-2(1)-(5).
Finally, we find no merit to his free exercise claim. While his complaint
does not clarify how the ASORCNA might burden his exercise of religious
freedom, regardless, Windwalker cannot plausibly state a Free Exercise Clause
claim. In particular, the Supreme Court has made it clear that “the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012)
(quotation omitted). Moreover, nothing contained in the ASORCNA relates to a
1
Moreover, to the extent Windwalker argues that strict scrutiny is appropriate because he “has
alleged violations of his fundamental rights,” we’ve already concluded that no fundamental
rights are involved here, and thus, strict scrutiny does not apply.
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person’s religious practice except in a single provision permitting sex offenders to
change their name for religious reasons. See Ala. Code § 15-20A-36(a) (“No sex
offender shall change his or her name unless the change is incident to a change in
the marital status of the sex offender or is necessary to effect the exercise of the
religion of the sex offender.”).
A court should give leave to amend freely “when justice so requires.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). We’ve said that “[w]here a more carefully drafted complaint
might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the
complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice,” unless the
plaintiff has indicated that he does not wish to amend his complaint or if a more
carefully drafted complaint could not state a valid claim. Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d
1108, 1112 (11th Cir.1991), overruled on other grounds by Wagner v. Daewoo
Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir.2002) (en banc). Here,
however, Windwalker knew how to ask to amend his complaint. He had already
done so once, and the district court instructed him on how to do it and then
accepted his amended complaint. But in any event, we fail to see how a more
carefully drafted complaint might state a claim in this case. Accordingly, the
district court did not err in dismissing the case with prejudice.
AFFIRMED.
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