Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the Jun 04 2014, 9:37 am
purpose of establishing the defense of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the
law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
PETER D. TODD GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Elkhart, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. WHITEHEAD
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DENNIS DANIELS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 20A05-1310-CR-517
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ELKHART CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Thomas Murto, Magistrate
Cause No. 20C01-1210-CM-1823
June 4, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ROBB, Judge
Case Summary and Issue
Dennis Daniels was charged in Goshen City Court with criminal recklessness, a
Class A misdemeanor. Daniels requested a jury trial, and the case was transferred to
Elkhart Circuit Court. Ten months later, the Circuit Court held a bench trial and found
Daniels guilty. Daniels now appeals his conviction, raising one issue for our review:
whether it was fundamental error for Circuit Court to conduct a bench trial. Concluding
the trial court did not err because Daniels waived his right to a jury trial by his
acquiescence, we affirm his conviction.
Facts and Procedural History
Following an on-road altercation with another driver, Daniels was charged in City
Court with criminal recklessness. On two occasions, City Court provided Daniels a
“Misdemeanor Rights” form which Daniels signed, acknowledging that he had read and
understood it. The form explained, in part, that he has the right “[t]o a public and speedy
trial by jury or by the bench. The request for a jury trial must be in writing and must be
filed with the Court no later than ten (10) days before the scheduled trial date.”
Appellant’s Appendix at 8 (dated August 27, 2012) and 11 (dated September 17, 2012).
A bench trial was set for November 29, 2012. On October 10, 2012, Daniels moved for a
jury trial. The motion was granted, and the case was transferred and filed in Circuit
Court on October 31, 2012.
At a status conference in Circuit Court on March 28, 2013, Daniels’s case was set
for a bench trial on May 14, 2013. The Circuit Court Chronological Case Summary
(“CCS”) shows that Daniels was present at that conference and “acknowledges trial date
in person.” Id. at 64. On May 10, 2013, the State filed a written motion captioned
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“State’s Motion to Continue Bench Trial” seeking to “continue the bench trial scheduled
before this Court on May 14, 2013.” Id. at 32. The May 14 trial was continued, and a
status conference set for May 30, 2014. The CCS shows Daniels appeared in person and
by counsel at that status conference, at which time the “[c]ause set for bench trial Au. 6,
2013 . . . . [Daniels] acknowledges trial date in person . . . .” Id. at 64. The bench trial
was held on August 6, 2013 as scheduled, at the conclusion of which the trial court found
Daniels guilty as charged. Daniels did not object at any time to the case being tried to the
bench. He now appeals his conviction, claiming he was denied his right to a trial by jury.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
Both the United States and Indiana Constitutions guarantee the right to a jury trial.
See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13. In misdemeanor cases, the procedure
for asserting the right to a jury trial is governed by Indiana Criminal Rule 22:
A defendant charged with a misdemeanor may demand trial by jury by
filing a written demand therefor not later than ten (10) days before his first
scheduled trial date. The failure of a defendant to demand a trial by jury as
required by this rule shall constitute a waiver by him of trial by jury unless
the defendant has not had a least fifteen (15) days advance notice of his
scheduled trial date and of the consequences of his failure to demand a trial
by jury.
A defendant charged with a misdemeanor can therefore waive his right to a jury trial by
inaction. Duncan v. State, 975 N.E.2d 838, 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). It is nonetheless
fundamental error to deny a defendant a jury trial unless he has made a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent waiver of that right. Gonzalez v. State, 757 N.E.2d 202, 205
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. “A voluntary waiver occurs if the conduct
constituting the waiver is the product of a free will; a knowing waiver is the product of an
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informed will; an intelligent waiver is the product of a will that has the capacity to
understand . . . .” Duncan, 975 N.E.2d at 842-43 (citation omitted). Further, the waiver
must be personal; in a misdemeanor case, a personal waiver “can be inferred where the
defendant fails to assert the right to a jury trial and there is evidence that the waiver is
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. at 843. We consider the entire record to
determine whether a defendant has made such a waiver. Id. at 842.
II. Jury Request
Daniels contends he was denied his fundamental right to a jury trial when the trial
court held a bench trial despite his earlier written request for a jury trial. The State first
responds that Daniels’s jury trial assertion in City Court does not carry over to Circuit
Court and he should have reasserted that right once the case was transferred.
Nonetheless, the State also argues that even if the jury demand carries over such that the
trial court should have held a jury trial, Daniels invited any error in its failure to do so.
We cannot agree with the State that the jury demand does not carry over. It
appears that Daniels’s case was transferred out of City Court because of his jury request.
The City Court Chronological Case Summary shows that on October 10, 2012, Daniels
filed a motion for jury trial and thereafter, on October 17, 2012, “File transferred to
Elkhart City Court for Jury Trial.” Appellant’s Appendix at 15-16. See Elkhart County
Rules of Court, LR20-AR00-NAFC-2(C)(7) (“All . . . city courts [other than Elkhart City
Court] receiving requests for jury trial shall be transferred to Elkhart Circuit Court for
assignment to an appropriate court or magistrate.”). Under these circumstances, we do
not believe Daniels was required to reassert his wish for a jury trial by filing a separate
demand in Circuit Court.
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However, Daniels’s case was set for bench trial when it was transferred. Daniels
personally appeared at several status conferences in Circuit Court, was present in court
when the cause was set for bench trial on May 14, 2013 and acknowledged the date, was
again present in court when the cause was reset for bench trial on August 6, 2013 and
acknowledged the date, and was present in court on August 6, 2013 when his trial began
before the judge alone. At no time after the case was transferred did Daniels, personally
or by counsel, point out that he had requested a jury trial instead of a bench trial. On this
record, despite his earlier assertion, we hold that Daniels made a knowing, voluntary,
intelligent, and personal waiver of his right to be tried by a jury when he remained silent
during the proceedings leading up to and including his bench trial.
Conclusion
The trial court did not err in trying Daniels to the bench when he did nothing to
protect his earlier-asserted right to a jury trial. Daniels’s conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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