An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-142
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 2 September 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
JAMES SPENCER Wake County
No. 13 SPC 05
Appeal by respondent from order entered 27 June 2013 by
Judge Jacqueline Brewer in Wake County District Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 11 August 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Josephine Tetteh, for the State.
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Matthew W. Wolfe and
Robert A. Leandro, for petitioner Holly Hill Hospital.
Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant
Appellate Defender Mary Cook, for respondent.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Respondent James Spencer appeals from a trial court’s
order, involuntarily committing him to an inpatient facility for
a period not to exceed sixty (60) days. Based on the reasons
stated herein, we reverse the order of the trial court and
remand this case to the trial court for the making of
appropriate findings of fact.
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I. Background
On 19 June 2013, Arlene Midgett filed an affidavit and
petition for involuntary commitment in Tyrrell County District
Court. The affidavit and petition for involuntary commitment
stated that respondent James Edward Spencer was “mentally ill
and dangerous to self or others or mentally ill and in need of
treatment in order to prevent further disability or
deterioration that would predictably result in dangerousness.”
The affidavit also provided that the Sheriff’s Department had
received numerous calls from respondent’s family about
respondent’s erratic behavior. Respondent had walked to a
cemetery where his mother and brother are buried and told
deputies that “he was going to sleep on the graves tonight.”
When deputies attempted to return respondent to his home,
respondent replied that “they had just as well call Hitler from
the dead and draw guns and go ahead and kill him now.”
A hearing was held at the 27 June 2013 session of Wake
County District Court. Dr. Muhammed Saeed examined respondent
at Holly Hill Hospital on 24 and 25 June 2013. Dr. Saeed
determined that respondent was mentally ill and suffered from
chronic schizophrenia with an acute exacerbation. Dr. Saeed
testified that respondent was “very paranoid” and had “grandiose
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delusions.” According to Dr. Saeed, respondent threatened the
staff of Holly Hill Hospital as they were attempting to give
respondent his medication. Consistent with reports contained in
respondent’s medical records, respondent threatened that he
would stab the staff with a pen. Dr. Saeed recommended that
respondent be committed to inpatient care for a period of sixty
(60) days.
Respondent’s sister, Auray Midgett, testified that she had
a healthcare power of attorney to act on behalf of respondent.
In May 2013, respondent was committed for six (6) days at
Washington County Hospital in Plymouth, North Carolina.
Respondent was released to outpatient treatment, but began
calling various state prisons, offices in Washington, D.C. and
President Barack Obama. Respondent seemed agitated, and based
on his behavior, Ms. Midgett petitioned for involuntary
commitment on 19 June 2013.
Angela Spencer, respondent’s daughter, testified that one
evening prior to his commitment in June 2013, respondent was at
her home. Respondent was agitated and paranoid, and Ms. Spencer
saw him pushing a fingernail file through her cable box. She
called the police and respondent voluntarily left her home.
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Respondent also testified at his hearing. He did not
believe he needed to be treated at Holly Hill Hospital, but
rather, preferred to be treated by a psychiatrist he had seen in
the past.
The trial court entered an order on 27 June 2013, finding
“by clear, cogent and convincing evidence” that “the respondent
contests commitment. Stipulate to mental illness, a danger to
self, and others, and in need of treatment.” The trial court
concluded that respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to
himself and others. Based on the foregoing, respondent was
involuntarily committed to an inpatient facility for a period
not to exceed sixty (60) days.
From this order, respondent filed notice of appeal on 25
July 2013.
II. Discussion
Respondent’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred by involuntarily committing him when the 27 June
2013 order was not supported by sufficient written findings of
fact. The State and petitioner Holly Hill Hospital agree with
respondent that the findings made in the involuntary commitment
order were insufficient and urge our Court to reverse the trial
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court’s order and remand this case to the trial court for the
making of appropriate findings of fact.
We first note that
even though the term for respondent’s
involuntary commitment has passed, a prior
discharge will not render questions
challenging the involuntary commitment
proceeding moot. When the challenged order
may form the basis for future commitment or
may cause other collateral legal
consequences for the respondent, an appeal
of that order is not moot.
In re Allison, 216 N.C. App. 297, 299, 715 S.E.2d 912, 914
(2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
On appeal of a commitment order our
function is to determine whether there was
any competent evidence to support the
“facts” recorded in the commitment order and
whether the trial court’s ultimate findings
of mental illness and dangerous to self or
others were supported by the “facts”
recorded in the order. We do not consider
whether the evidence of respondent’s mental
illness and dangerousness was clear, cogent
and convincing. It is for the trier of fact
to determine whether the competent evidence
offered in a particular case met the burden
of proof.
In re Collins, 49 N.C. App. 243, 246, 271 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1980)
(citations omitted).
Section 122C-268(j) of the North Carolina General Statutes
provides that
[t]o support an inpatient commitment order,
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the court shall find by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence that the respondent is
mentally ill and dangerous to self, as
defined in G.S. 122C-3(11)a., or dangerous
to others, as defined in G.S. 122C-3(11)b.
The court shall record the facts that
support its findings.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-268(j) (2013).
In the case sub judice, the trial court checked the box on
the printed form that reads “[b]ased on the evidence presented,
the Court by clear, cogent and convincing evidence finds these
other facts: the respondent contests commitment. Stipulate to
mental illness, a danger to self, and others, and in need of
treatment.” The trial court did not make additional findings of
fact or record any facts to supporting these findings.
It is well established that we may not determine whether
the evidence was sufficient because the trial court failed to
make any findings of fact based on the evidence presented at the
27 June 2013 hearing for us to review. See In re Booker, 193
N.C. App. 433, 437, 667 S.E.2d 302, 304-305 (2008). Thus,
because the trial court’s order is insufficient to support the
trial court’s determination that respondent was dangerous to
himself and to others, we reverse the trial court’s order and
remand this case to the trial court for the making of
appropriate findings of fact. See In re Allison, 216 N.C. App.
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at 300, 715 S.E.2d at 915 (reversing and remanding for
appropriate findings when the trial court failed to make written
findings of fact or failed to incorporate by reference a
physician’s report in the respondent’s involuntary commitment
order).
III. Conclusion
Because the involuntary commitment order contained
insufficient findings of fact to support its determination that
respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to himself and others,
we reverse the order of the trial court and remand this case to
the trial court for the making of appropriate findings.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges STEELMAN and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).