State v. Matthews

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-109
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 19 August 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Mecklenburg County
11 CRS 219314
MEGAEL JERMAINE MATTHEWS

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 22 April 2013 by

Judge C. Thomas Edwards in Mecklenburg County Superior Court.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 June 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Alexandra M. Hightower, for the State.

Tin Fulton Walker & Owen PLLC, by Matthew G. Pruden, for
Defendant-Appellant.

McCULLOUGH, Judge.

Megael Jermaine Matthews (“Defendant”) appeals from

judgments entered upon his convictions for attempted first

degree murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill

inflicting serious bodily injury, and discharging a firearm into

occupied property inflicting serious bodily injury. For the

following reasons we find no error.

I. Background
 -2-
On the evening of 24 April 2011, Charlotte-Mecklenburg

police responded to a report of a single vehicle accident at the

intersection of West Sugar Creek Road and Hubbard Road in

Charlotte. Officer Derrick Bowlin responded to the call, and

when he arrived at the scene he found a single vehicle parked in

the grass off of the road with several bullet holes in the side.

When Officer Bowlin approached the car, the passenger in the

driver’s seat told him that he had been shot. Later, Officer

Bowlin joined other police officers at an address in the 4500

block of Christenbury Hills Lane, about a mile and a half from

the scene of the car accident, after reports had come in earlier

that day that shots had been fired in that vicinity.

Earlier that same afternoon, upon hearing gun shots,

Tiffany Amaya looked through her living room window on

Christenbury Hills Lane and observed two men walking toward the

back of a house. She later described these men as black and

approximately 5’9” in height. She described one of the men as

in his early 20’s with short dreads and wearing a bright blue

shirt.

Based on information from neighbors, Detective Ritter and

other officers were posted outside of 4542 Christenbury Hills

Lane at approximately 10:00 p.m. when two men were seen exiting

from that residence, one of whom was later identified as
 -3-
Defendant. As soon as Defendant exited the building, Detective

Ritter placed him in handcuffs and frisked him for weapons.

Immediately after, while still in handcuffs, Defendant was

placed in the back seat of a patrol car on the scene. During

the approximately forty-five minutes that Defendant was detained

in the back of the patrol car an officer was present outside of

the car. Defendant has testified that at this time he did not

feel free to leave, but that he was told several times that he

was not under arrest.

After forty-five minutes in the police cruiser, Defendant

was uncuffed and asked to exit so that a show-up identification

could be performed. It was at this time that Ms. Amaya was

asked to perform the show-up identification of a suspect. Ms.

Amaya observed that the suspect, Defendant, was approximately

5’9”, had dreads, and was wearing a navy blue shirt, which she

identified as a different color from the shirt worn by the

person she had observed walking behind the house. She was

unsure whether the suspect was the person that she had observed

previously in the afternoon.

At the scene, Detective Manassah questioned Defendant about

what he had done that day, and then requested that he accompany

the officers to the Law Enforcement Center (“LEC”) for

questioning. With Detective Manassah’s permission, Defendant
 -4-
called his father, who drove to the scene and accompanied

Defendant to the police station. During the ride, Defendant was

unrestrained, sat in the front seat, and used his cell phone.

At the LEC, Defendant was placed in an interview room and

the questioning began at 12:09 a.m. During the questioning,

Defendant gave several different accounts of his story.

Eventually, Defendant confessed to shooting the victim after

discovering that the $100 bill the victim had paid Defendant in

a marijuana transaction was counterfeit. At this time, 4:31

a.m., Defendant was placed under arrest and read his Miranda

rights.

During the interview, Defendant was left alone several

times, and was told that there was a bathroom down the hall if

he needed to use it. Defendant was also able to privately speak

with his father in the interview room shortly after 3:00 a.m.

Defendant was later indicted by a Mecklenburg County Grand

Jury on one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of

assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting

serious injury, one count of discharging a firearm into occupied

property inflicting serious bodily injury, and six counts of

discharging a firearm into a vehicle in operation. Prior to

trial, Defendant moved to suppress the statements he made to
 -5-
police. A hearing on the motion to suppress was held on 11-12

April 2013. This motion was denied on 15 April 2013.

On 15 April 2013, Defendant’s case was called for trial in

Mecklenburg County Superior Court, the Honorable C. Thomas

Edwards, Judge presiding. After the State presented its

evidence, Defendant moved for a dismissal, which was denied.

Defendant presented no evidence, and the jury returned verdicts

finding Defendant guilty of all charges on 22 April 2013. That

same day, the trial judge sentenced Defendant to a term of 125

to 161 months in prison for the charge of attempted first degree

murder, under which the judge consolidated the charge of assault

with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious

bodily injury. The Judge also sentenced Defendant to a

consecutive term of 72 to 96 months for the charge of

discharging a firearm into occupied property inflicting serious

bodily injury, and consolidated the remaining charges under this

sentence. That day, 22 April 2013, trial counsel for Defendant

allegedly entered an oral notice of appeal in open court. The

notice, however, was not recorded by the court reporter and does

not appear in the transcript of the trial.

II. Discussion

Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1)

whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to
 -6-
suppress statements made to the police during a period of

questioning that occurred before Defendant was read his Miranda

rights; (2) whether Defendant received ineffective assistance of

counsel where his attorney did not raise a Fourth Amendment

argument in his motion to suppress Defendant’s statements to

police; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of discharging a

firearm into an occupied vehicle in operation where there was no

direct evidence that the vehicle was in operation at the time

the shots were fired.

A. Notice of Appeal

Defendant appeals to this Court as of right under N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7A-27(b) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(a). Now on

appeal, Defendant contends trial counsel orally entered notice

of appeal per Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate

Procedure at trial. However, Defendant’s oral notice of appeal

does not appear in the transcript. In an attempt to remedy this

situation, Defendant’s trial counsel has filed an affidavit in

the record that certifies he entered such oral notice of appeal

at trial on 22 April 2013.

Furthermore, Defendant points to State v. Williams, in

which this Court held that it had jurisdiction to address the

merits of a defendant’s appeal where
 -7-
the record reflect[ed] that the State, the
trial court, and Defendant’s counsel all
proceeded as if proper notice of appeal had
been properly noted. Upon Defendant’s
request, the trial court appointed the
Appellate Defender’s Office to represent
her, and stayed the execution of judgment
pending resolution of the matter in the
Court of Appeals. The trial court stated in
its Appellate Entries form that “[D]efendant
has given Notice of Appeal to the N.C. Court
of Appeals,” and “ordered that [Defendant]
is allowed to appeal as an indigent.”

State v. Williams, 215 N.C. App. 1, 4, 714 S.E.2d 835, 837

(2011) (alterations in original), affirmed, 366 N.C. 110, 726

S.E.2d 161 (2012).

In the case before us, all parties have proceeded as if

notice of appeal had been properly noted: the trial court

appointed the Appellate Defender’s Office to represent

Defendant, the trial court noted in its appellate entries that

“[t]he defendant has given Notice of Appeal to the N.C. Court of

Appeals,” and “ordered that the defendant is allowed to appeal

as indigent.”

Under these circumstances, in comporting with our holding

in Williams, we hold that Defendant’s right to appeal is

preserved and this court has the appropriate jurisdiction to

resolve this case on the merits.1

1
Out of precaution, Defendant has also petitioned this court for
writ of certiorari. Having determined Defendant’s right to
appeal is preserved, we dismiss defendant’s petition as moot.
 -8-
B. Motion to Suppress Confession

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress. The North Carolina Supreme

Court has previously held that:

On review of a motion to suppress evidence,
an appellate court determines whether the
trial court’s findings of fact are supported
by the evidence and whether the findings of
fact support the conclusions of law. The
trial court’s findings of fact are
conclusive on appeal if supported by
competent evidence, even if the evidence is
conflicting. The conclusions of law,
however, are reviewed de novo.

State v. Haislip, 362 N.C. 499, 499-500, 666 S.E.2d 757, 758

(2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Furthermore, “[w]here a defendant fails to challenge any of the

trial court’s findings of fact relating to the motion, our

review is limited to whether the trial court’s findings of fact

support its conclusions of law.” State v. Allen, 200 N.C. App.

709, 712–13, 684 S.E.2d 526, 529 (2009) (citations omitted).

Here, the Defendant has not contested any of the findings

of fact on appeal, merely the application of the law to the

facts. Therefore, our review of the motion to suppress is on an

entirely de novo basis.

As the State notes in its brief, the law differentiates

between the “free to leave” test under the Fourth Amendment for

the purposes of the seizure of a person and the “restraint of
 -9-
movement” test found under the Fifth Amendment for the purposes

of a detainment that rises to the level of a formal, custodial

arrest. State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 340, 543 S.E.2d 823,

828 (2001). In Miranda v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court held

that “custodial interrogation” involves “questioning initiated

by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any

significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L.

Ed. 2d 694, 706 (1966) (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court later elaborated that

a noncustodial situation is not converted to
one in which Miranda applies simply because
a reviewing court concludes that, even in
the absence of any formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement, the
questioning took place in a “coercive
environment.” Any interview of one
suspected of a crime by a police officer
will have coercive aspects to it, simply by
virtue of the fact that the police officer
is part of a law enforcement system which
may ultimately cause the suspect to be
charged with a crime. But police officers
are not required to administer Miranda
warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor
is the requirement of warnings to be imposed
simply because the questioning takes place
in the station house, or because the
questioned person is one whom the police
suspect. Miranda warnings are required only
where there has been such a restriction on a
person’s freedom as to render him “in
custody.”
 -10-
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 719

(1977).

In Mathiason, the Supreme Court held that even though a

suspect was being voluntarily questioned at the police station

behind closed doors, and where the police lied to the suspect

and warned him about his truthfulness, the questioning was not

custodial, and did not require Miranda warnings. Id. at 493, 50

L. Ed. 2d at 718.

Finally, in California v. Beheler, the Supreme Court held

that “[a]lthough the circumstances of each case must certainly

influence a determination of whether a suspect is ‘in custody’

for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the ultimate

inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint

on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal

arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 77 L. Ed.

2d 1275, 1279 (1983) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 50 L.

Ed. 2d at 719).

In the present case, the actions of the police do not

appear tantamount to placing Defendant under custodial arrest.

Defendant was initially placed in handcuffs for the safety of

the officers. At that time he was in “investigatory detention,”

which was warranted because the police had reasonable suspicion
 -11-
that a crime had been committed and that he had been involved.

In North Carolina,

[o]nly unreasonable investigatory stops are
unconstitutional. An investigatory stop
must be justified by a reasonable suspicion,
based on objective facts, that the
individual is involved in criminal activity.

A court must consider the totality of the
circumstances——the whole picture in
determining whether a reasonable suspicion
to make an investigatory stop exists. The
stop must be based on specific and
articulable facts, as well as the rational
inferences from those facts, as viewed
through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious
officer, guided by his experience and
training. The only requirement is a minimal
level of objective justification, something
more than an unparticularized suspicion or
hunch.

State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441-42, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

Here, the police had specific articulable facts, including

the fact that the house where Defendant left from was close to

the shooting and there was a witness that saw two men walk into

the home shortly after hearing gun shots. The investigatory

detention, though forty-five minutes long, was not improper

because during this time the police were checking Defendant’s

record and attempting to set up a show-up identification.

Defendant was taken out of handcuffs for this show-up and
 -12-
remained out of handcuffs until his eventual arrest early the

next morning.

After the police uncuffed Defendant, he was told he was not

under arrest; he was asked to come to the station for voluntary

questioning; he was allowed to call his father and have his

father accompany him to the police station; he rode in the front

seat of the police vehicle; the door to the questioning room

remained open until Defendant closed it himself; he was allowed

to use the bathroom unaccompanied while at the station; and he

was allowed to use his cell phone during breaks. In light of

these circumstances, it does not appear that Defendant was

restrained in his freedom of movement to a degree comparable to

a lawful, custodial arrest. Although the questioning may have

had coercive aspects, and the officers may have appeared tough

on Defendant in questioning, this alone is not sufficient to

require Miranda warnings.

Therefore, Defendant was not under a custodial

interrogation when he made his confession to the police, and

Miranda warnings were not required. Further, the voluntariness

of the questioning, and thereby the confession, were not tainted

by the initial investigatory detention of Defendant because the

police had reasonable suspicion to detain him at that time.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
 -13-
Defendant next claims that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel when his trial counsel did not argue a

violation of the Fourth Amendment in support of Defendant’s

motion to suppress his confession. The law on claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel is well settled and several

precedential decisions dictate our scope of review.

As to whether an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim can be dealt with on appeal,
[the Supreme] Court has stated,
[i]neffective assistance of counsel claims
brought on direct review will be decided on
the merits when the cold record reveals that
no further investigation is required, i.e.,
claims that may be developed and argued
without such ancillary procedures as the
appointment of investigators or an
evidentiary hearing. Therefore, on direct
appeal we must determine if these
ineffective assistance of counsel claims
have been prematurely brought. If so, we
must dismiss those claims without prejudice
to the defendant’s right to reassert them
during a subsequent motion for appropriate
relief proceeding.

State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 691, 617 S.E.2d 1, 30 (2005)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

Further, when claims are ripe for review,

this Court must be highly deferential and
“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance[....]”
Defendant may rebut this presumption by
specifically identifying those acts or
omissions that are not “the result of
reasonable professional judgment” and the
court determining, “in light of all the
 -14-
circumstances, the identified acts [or
omissions] were outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance.”

State v. Banks, 210 N.C. App. 30, 49, 706 S.E.2d 807, 821 (2011)

(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90, 80 L.

Ed. 2d 674, 694-95 (1984)) (alterations added). “[T]he court

should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have

rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions

in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695.

“When a defendant attacks his conviction on the basis that

counsel was ineffective, he must show that his counsel’s conduct

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” State v.

Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 561-62, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1985).

North Carolina has adopted and followed the two-part test laid

out in Strickland for determining whether counsel’s conduct fell

below such an objective standard:

In order to meet this burden, a defendant
must satisfy a two-part test: “First, the
defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires
showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.”
 -15-

Campbell, 359 N.C. at 690, 617 S.E.2d at 29 (2005) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693).

In further defining these terms, the North Carolina Supreme

Court followed Strickland in defining that “[p]rejudice is

established by showing ‘that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.’” Id. at 690, 617 S.E.2d at 29-30 (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698). Furthermore, “[b]oth

prongs of this test must be met to prevail on an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim.” Id. at 690, 617 S.E.2d at 30.

“This Court has held that ‘[c]ounsel is given wide latitude

in matters of strategy, and the burden to show that counsel’s

performance fell short of the required standard is a heavy one

for defendant to bear.’” Id. (quoting State v. Fletcher, 354

N.C. 455, 482, 555 S.E.2d 534, 551 (2001), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 846, 154 L. Ed. 2d 73 (2002)). “Moreover, this Court

indulges the presumption that trial counsel’s representation is

within the boundaries of acceptable professional conduct.” Id.

(citing State v. Fisher, 318 N.C. 512, 532, 350 S.E.2d 334, 346

(1986)).
 -16-
In the case before us, it does not appear that Defendant

has met the “heavy burden” of proving that trial counsel was

ineffective. The absence of a Fourth Amendment argument as to

the admissibility of Defendant’s statement does not, by itself,

render counsel’s assistance “below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” Defendant would have to prove (1) that the

performance of his trial counsel was deficient, and (2) that

this deficiency worked a prejudice against his defense.

The defense’s argument that trial counsel’s performance was

deficient is based on the assumption that suppression of the

confession was warranted due to the “unlawful detention” of

Defendant during the time of the show-up identification. As we

discussed above, we do not find that this investigatory

detention was unlawful, and therefore it would have been

unnecessary, and indeed unfruitful, if trial counsel had pursued

it.

As Defendant has failed under the first prong of the

Strickland test, we need not discuss the second. However, it

would seem clear that Defendant cannot be prejudiced by the

absence of an unfruitful argument, and this Court’s confidence

in the outcome of the case is in no way undermined as a result

of the absence of said argument.
 -17-
Because this Court is required to “indulge in a strong

presumption [that] counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance,” we do not find that

Defendant has met the burden of proving this case. Furthermore,

it is appropriate to decide this issue at this time because the

cold record reflects all of the relevant facts and there does

not appear to be any reason for instigating an investigation

into trial counsel’s conduct.

Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of

counsel. Trial counsel is given a wide latitude in trial

strategy, and Defendant has not proven that the absence of a

Fourth Amendment argument to accompany a Fifth Amendment

argument was a decision that rendered counsel’s performance

below an objective standard of reasonableness or that the

absence of such an argument worked a prejudicial effect into the

outcome of the trial.

D. Motion to Dismiss

In Defendant’s final argument on appeal, Defendant contends

that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the

charges of discharging a firearm into a vehicle in operation.

The standard of review for an appellate court’s review of a

motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence is well settled.

Evidence is sufficient to sustain a
conviction when, viewed in the light most
 -18-
favorable to the State and giving the State
every reasonable inference therefrom, there
is substantial evidence to support a jury
finding of each essential element of the
offense charged, and of defendant’s being
the perpetrator of such offense.

Evidence is substantial if it is relevant
and adequate to convince a reasonable mind
to accept a conclusion. In considering a
motion to dismiss, the trial court does not
weigh the evidence, consider evidence
unfavorable to the State, or determine any
witness' credibility. Evidence is not
substantial if it is sufficient only to
raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either
the commission of the offense or the
identity of the defendant as the perpetrator
of it, and the motion to dismiss should be
allowed even though the suspicion so aroused
by the evidence is strong. This Court
reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss
for insufficient evidence de novo.

If substantial evidence, whether direct,
circumstantial, or both, supports a finding
that the offense charged has been committed
and that the defendant committed it, the
motion to dismiss should be denied and the
case goes to the jury.

State v. Bettis, 206 N.C. App. 721, 728-29, 698 S.E.2d 507, 512

(2010) (quoting State v. Wilkerson, 196 N.C. App. 706, 708-09,

675 S.E.2d 678, 680 (2009)) (internal citations and quotations

omitted).

Our Supreme Court has held that:

When determining the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a charged offense, we
must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, giving the State the
benefit of all reasonable inferences. A
 -19-
defendant’s motion to dismiss must be denied
if the evidence considered in the light most
favorable to the State permits a rational
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of each element of the charged
crime and that defendant was the
perpetrator.

Whether the evidence presented is direct or
circumstantial or both, the test for
sufficiency is the same. Circumstantial
evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss
and support a conviction even when the
evidence does not rule out every hypothesis
of innocence. If the evidence supports a
reasonable inference of defendant’s guilt
based on the circumstances, then it is for
the [jurors] to decide whether the facts,
taken singly or in combination, satisfy them
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is actually guilty.

State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 447, 509 S.E.2d 178, 191 (1998)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

Here, taking all inferences in the light most favorable to

the State, the denial of the motion to dismiss was appropriate.

Although there is no direct evidence that the vehicle was in

operation at the time of the shooting, it is a reasonable

inference that arises from the other undisputed facts, such as

the fact that the victim’s car was found crashed on the side of

the road with tire tracks being found behind it, spent shell

casings were found at the intersection of Emma Lynn Court and

Christenbury Hills Lane, and a bullet was found in the road, as
 -20-
well as several other bullets found in the victim’s driver’s

side door.

With the evidence standing as such, “it is for the [jurors]

to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination,

satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is

actually guilty.” The denial of the motion to dismiss for lack

of evidence of an essential element of a charged crime was

appropriate here because the circumstantial evidence was

sufficient to provide the jury with a reasonable inference of

Defendant’s guilt.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, this Court finds no error in

the findings or holdings of the Superior Court of Mecklenburg

County.

No error.

Judges STEPHENS and STROUD concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).