An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-299
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 19 August 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
S.B.O. Brunswick County
K.G.O. Nos. 12 JT 9-11
K.J.O.
Appeal by respondents from orders entered 30 December 2013
by Judge Sherry Dew Prince in Brunswick County District Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 July 2014.
Jess, Isenberg & Thompson, by Elva L. Jess for appellee
Brunswick County Department of Social Services.
Peter Wood for appellant mother.
Batch, Poore & Williams, PC, by Sydney Batch for appellant
father.
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, by Beth Tyner Jones
and Carolyn C. Pratt, for guardian ad litem.
STEELMAN, Judge.
The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to
terminate mother’s parental rights and its order contained
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sufficient jurisdictional facts. The court did not abuse its
discretion by terminating father’s parental rights.
I. Factual and Procedural History
D.E.O. (father) and S.T.C.O. (mother) appeal from orders
terminating their parental rights in the minor children S.B.O.,
K.G.O., and K.J.O. The Brunswick County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) became involved with mother and father in
August 2011 due to the unsafe and unsanitary conditions of their
home. On 25 January 2012, DSS filed petitions alleging that the
juveniles were neglected and dependent, and obtained nonsecure
custody orders placing the children in DSS’s custody.
At the adjudication hearing held on 13 March 2012, mother
and father admitted that the juveniles were neglected in that
“the home in which the children resided was dirty . . . and
infested with roaches[.]” Information before the trial court
also indicated that mother and father’s home was unsanitary and
filled with dog feces; that dirty laundry, trash, and food
covered the floors and countertops; and that both mother and
father used drugs. On 19 March 2012 the court entered an order
adjudicating the juveniles neglected, and a disposition order
directing mother and father to comply with the provisions of the
case plan developed by DSS. The case plan required mother and
father to abstain from using drugs and submit to random drug
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tests, to engage in therapy as recommended, complete parenting
classes, and maintain clean and appropriate housing. Review
orders were entered in May 2012, August 2012, and November 2012,
in which the trial court found that mother and father had made
little progress towards compliance with their case plan.
Specifically, mother and father failed to establish a safe and
sanitary home, did not complete parenting classes, had positive
drug tests, and did not consistently attend therapy sessions.
Mother and father also moved several times, but failed to
demonstrate the ability to maintain an appropriate and sanitary
home and denied DSS access to their homes for inspection. In
addition, father was twice arrested for assault during this
period.
On 27 March 2013, the trial court entered a permanency
planning order finding that although the children had been in
DSS custody for over a year, mother and father had failed to
comply with their case plan. The court changed the permanent
plan for the children from reunification with mother and father
to adoption and termination of parental rights. On 30 December
2013, the trial court entered an order finding that grounds for
termination existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a) (1)
(neglect), (2) (12 months in care without progress), and (3)
(failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of foster
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care). On the same day, the trial court entered an order
terminating mother and father’s parental rights after concluding
that it was in the best interests of the children for their
parental rights to be terminated.
Mother and father appeal.
II. Appeal by Mother
Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
“committed prejudicial error” by failing “to make sufficient
findings about whether or not the court had subject matter
jurisdiction.” Mother does not argue that the trial court
actually lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the termination
proceeding, but only that the court erred by basing its exercise
of jurisdiction on the parties’ stipulation, and by failing to
make required findings regarding subject matter jurisdiction. We
disagree.
A. Standard of Review
“‘Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a
court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the
action before it[,’] . . .‘[and] is conferred upon the courts by
either the North Carolina Constitution or by statute.’” In re
McKinney, 158 N.C. App. 441, 443, 581 S.E.2d 793, 795 (2003)
(quoting Haker-Volkening v. Haker, 143 N.C. App. 688, 693, 547
S.E.2d 127, 130 (2001), and Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666,
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667, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987)). “‘Jurisdiction is the power of
a court to decide a case on its merits; it is the power of a
court to inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to enter
and enforce judgment.’” In re A.T., 191 N.C. App. 372, 375, 662
S.E.2d 917, 919 (2008) (quoting Jones v. Brinson, 238 N.C. 506,
509, 78 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1953) (internal citations omitted).
“The law is settled that jurisdiction cannot be created by the
parties’ stipulation, consent, or waiver[.]” McKinney, 158 N.C.
App. at 447, 581 S.E.2d at 797 (citation omitted).
Subject matter jurisdiction over proceedings to terminate
parental rights is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101, which
provides in relevant part that:
The court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and determine any
petition or motion relating to termination
of parental rights to any juvenile who
resides in, is found in, or is in the legal
or actual custody of a county department of
social services . . . at the time of filing
of the petition or motion. . . . Provided,
that before exercising jurisdiction under
this Article, the court shall find that it
has jurisdiction to make a child-custody
determination under the provisions of G.S.
50A-201, 50A-203, or 50A-204. . . .
Although characterized in the statute as a finding, the
determination that jurisdiction exists is a conclusion of law:
“Matters of judgment are not factual; they
are conclusory and based ultimately on
various factual considerations. Facts are
things in space and time that can be
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objectively ascertained by one or more of
the five senses or by mathematical
calculation. Facts, in turn, provide the
bases for conclusions.”
In re M.N.C., 176 N.C. App. 114, 121-22, 625 S.E.2d 627, 632
(2006) (quoting State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Public Staff,
322 N.C. 689, 693, 370 S.E.2d 567, 570 (1988) (internal citation
omitted). “Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction
is a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.” McKoy v.
McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201(a)(1) authorizes a court to
exercise jurisdiction over a child custody determination if
North Carolina “is the home state of the child on the date of
the commencement of the proceeding[.]” Although this Court has
recognized that findings of fact related to a trial court’s
jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A–201(a)(1) “would be the
better practice,” the statute “states only that certain
circumstances must exist, not that the court specifically make
findings to that effect[.]” In re T.J.D.W., J.J.W., 182 N.C.
App. 394, 397, 642 S.E.2d 471, 473-74 (2007). Therefore, where a
trial court’s order terminating parental rights asserts its
jurisdiction and the evidence supports its determination as to
the statutory requirements for jurisdiction, “the trial court
properly exercise[s] subject matter jurisdiction over th[e]
case.” Id. at 397, 642 S.E.2d at 473–74.
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B. Analysis
In this case, the uncontradicted evidence establishes that
the children lived in North Carolina for their entire lives,
that DSS was the petitioner in the termination of parental
rights case, and that when the petitions were filed the children
had been in the legal custody of DSS since January 2012. Mother
does not challenge these facts, or dispute that they establish
the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the
termination proceeding, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-
201(a)(1) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101. Rather than challenging
the existence of jurisdiction, mother challenges only the
sufficiency of the trial court’s findings on this issue. Mother
asserts that the trial court relied exclusively on the parties’
stipulation that subject matter jurisdiction existed and made no
findings supporting its exercise of jurisdiction. We disagree.
In its termination order the trial court, found in relevant
part, that:
. . .
9(b). That the Petitioner is [DSS.] . . .
That the minor children who are the subject
of the petitions are in the legal and
physical custody of the petitioner.
. . .
10. That the minor children were taken into
custody by [DSS] on January 25, 2012
pursuant to a non-secure custody order on
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allegations of neglect and dependency. The
children were adjudicated neglected
juveniles on March 13, 2012. . . .
Based on these and other findings, the trial court concluded “as
a matter of law” that “the Court has jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter[.]” The trial court properly
exercised jurisdiction over the termination proceeding, and its
exercise of jurisdiction was supported by its findings of fact.
In urging us to reach a contrary conclusion, mother asserts
that the trial court was required to make “specific findings”
which she contends are missing from the order. However, mother
does not identify the missing findings or direct our attention
to any requirement for exercise of jurisdiction that is not
addressed in the court’s order. Mother also directs our
attention to several cases that presented a substantive issue
regarding the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
requiring the court to make findings of fact resolving disputed
questions of fact. None of the cases cited by mother hold that,
where the trial court asserts jurisdiction, its order finds that
the DSS is the petitioner and has custody of the minor children,
and the facts establishing jurisdiction are not in dispute, a
termination of parental rights order is nonetheless “null and
void” without other unspecified findings. In this case, there
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was ample evidence to support the court’s assertion of
jurisdiction.
This argument is without merit.
III. Father’s Appeal
Father’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
abused its discretion when it determined that it was in the best
interest of the children to terminate his parental rights. We
are not persuaded.
A. Standard of Review
Once statutory grounds for termination have been
established, the trial court is required to “determine whether
terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best
interest.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). When determining
whether it is in the juvenile’s best interest to terminate the
parent’s rights, the statute requires the court to make written
findings regarding:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the
juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental
rights will aid in the accomplishment of the
permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the
parent.
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(5) The quality of the relationship between
the juvenile and the proposed adoptive
parent[.]
(6) Any relevant consideration.
“We review the trial court’s decision to terminate parental
rights for abuse of discretion.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App.
94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) (citation omitted). The trial
court is “subject to reversal for abuse of discretion only upon
a showing . . . that the challenged actions are manifestly
unsupported by reason.” Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 129, 271
S.E.2d 58, 63 (1980).
B. Analysis
Father acknowledges that the trial court made appropriate
findings regarding the ages of the children, the likelihood of
adoption, whether termination of parental rights would
facilitate achievement of the permanent plan, and the bond
between the children and the proposed adoptive parents. He
contends, however, that the trial court failed to give adequate
consideration to his bond with the children and his efforts to
comply with his case plan.
In support of its conclusion that it was in the children’s
best interest to terminate father’s parental rights, the trial
court incorporated its findings in the adjudication order
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finding grounds for termination. These findings, unchallenged
and thus binding on appeal, include the following:
. . .
10. That the minor children were taken into
custody by [DSS] on January 25, 2012
pursuant to a non-secure custody order on
allegations of neglect and dependency. The
children were adjudicated neglected
juveniles on March 13, 2012. . . .
11. The parents entered into an out of home
family services agreement on February 20,
2012[.] . . . The case plan required [father
and mother to] . . . submit to random drug
screens . . . allow inspection of the home
by DSS . . . [and] maintain their home in a
clean and sanitary manner[.] . . .
. . .
14. On March 26, 2012 . . . the parents’
home [was] found to be in disarray and
unclean. The conditions were unsanitary[.] .
. .
. . .
16. . . . [T]hroughout the course of [DSS’s]
involvement there remained many issues with
regard to cleanliness including roaches,
flies and dirty dishes on every flat
surface, [and] debris on floors[.] . . .
17. On several occasions, [DSS] was denied
access to inspect the home to ascertain if
it was being kept clean and safe for the
children. The parents did not contact [DSS]
to have them inspect the home during the
pendency of this action between April 9,
2012 and April 15, 2013.
. . .
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19. On September 24, 2012, [a DSS employee
inspected mother and father’s home and]
noted the presence of pests, a lack of
cleanliness of walls and carpets, debris in
the yard, dirty dishes, and dirty laundry. .
. .
. . .
21. . . . [H]omes in which the parents lived
prior to the filing of the petition each
presented with an infestation of bugs. . . .
. . .
25. The parents did not demonstrate an
ability to maintain their homes in a
sanitary fashion, even after intensive in-
home services were provided.
. . .
34. [Father] stated that he did not have
time to help clean the house as he was
always working, “daylight to dark.” . . .
. . .
36. [Father] understood the terms and
conditions of the case plan. . . .
37. [Father] had anger issues due to the
fact that he was working all day and had to
clean the house as well.
. . .
39. [Father and mother] separated from each
other on February 16, 2013. . . . [Father]
began to live in a camper for several months
that he acknowledged was not appropriate for
the minor children. . . .
40. Neither [father nor mother] paid any
monies to [DSS] for the benefit of the minor
children prior to the filing of the
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petitions to terminate parental rights. . .
.
. . .
44. A review hearing was held on July 17,
2012 . . . [at which the] court found that
[mother and father] had not enrolled in
parenting classes . . . had denied [DSS]
entry into their home for inspection and
had not been compliant with drug screen
requests. . . .
In its disposition order, the trial court made additional
findings, including the following:
. . .
3. . . . The permanent plan to secure a
safe, stable home for the children within a
reasonable period of time is adoption and
that has been the plan since the Court held
a permanency planning review hearing on
March 14, 2013. In order to achieve the
permanent plan, termination of parental
rights must be accomplished.
4. . . . The children have been in foster
care since [March 2012.] . . .
5. The parents have not been actively
involved in their daily care since March
2012 due to their failure to comply with
case plan goals and objectives.
. . . .
11. . . . [Father] has not called to arrange
for a home inspection.
12. . . . [Father] has not demonstrated an
ability to maintain a safe, clean home . . .
during the Department’s involvement between
March 2012 and April 2013.
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13. The children have been in an “at-risk”
adoptive placement since May 10, 2013. . . .
14. The children, ages four, six and seven,
are bonded to each other and get along well
together, are in the same home, a two parent
household, where the foster parents have
been able to insure that the children attend
all of their medical appointments, obtained
a mental health assessment, secured speech
services for [S.B.O.], and participate in a
number of activities including trips to the
zoo, fine art events and sporting events.
They are doing well in school[.]
15. The children and the foster parents
display reciprocal affection for each other.
. . .
. . . .
19. The children are being properly cared
for and all of their needs are being
addressed and met in the foster home.
20. The foster parents are financially in a
position to provide for the children.
. . . .
23. It is necessary in order to promote the
healthy and orderly physical and emotional
well being of the minor children that a
permanent plan for their care be made at
this time.
Father does not challenge the above findings of fact, and they
are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408
S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). Father argues that the trial court
failed to give adequate consideration to evidence of the bond
between him and the children and his efforts to comply with the
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case plan. The court did not ignore evidence favorable to
father, as demonstrated by its findings that:
. . .
4. . . . The children know their parents and
the visits went well.
. . . .
9. . . . [Father] began to participate in
therapy . . . on February 19, 2013. It was
recommended that he participate in treatment
two times a month. . . . Since August he has
attended one session per month. His
therapist believes that he is actively
engaged in treatment sessions[.]
10. [Father] secured a vehicle on February
12, 2013 and showed evidence of valid
insurance[.]
11. [Father] executed a lease agreement
dated October 1, 2013 for a mobile home with
three bedrooms and two baths.
12. [Father] is working forty-seven hours a
week, but represents that he has flexibility
with his employment to provide for the needs
of his children on a daily basis. . . .
. . . .
16. [K.J.O.] has inquired with regard to how
her father is doing.
The trial court weighed the evidence and used its
discretion to conclude that, despite some findings that
reflected positively on father, he still had not demonstrated he
could “maintain a safe, clean home” for the children. The court
therefore determined it was in the children’s best interest that
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father’s parental rights be terminated so they could be adopted
by a family who would best be able to provide them with a “safe,
stable home[.]” Given the substantial findings of fact
supporting the trial court’s conclusion, we cannot agree that
the trial court’s best interest determination was “manifestly
unsupported by reason.” In re A.R.H.B., 186 N.C. App. 211, 218,
651 S.E.2d 247, 253 (2007).
The court did not err in its findings of fact and
conclusions of law pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction and
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it was in the
children’s best interest to terminate father’s parental rights.
We affirm the trial court’s orders terminating mother and
father’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Judges McGEE and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).