An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-40
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 1 July 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Johnston County
No. 12CRS002813
TERRY LYNN HALL
Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 28 June 2013 by
Judge Kendra D. Hill in Johnston County Superior Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals on 5 May 2014.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy
Attorney General Harriet F. Worley, for the State.
Sharon L. Smith, for Defendant-appellant.
DILLON, Judge.
Terry Lynn Hall (“Defendant”) appeals from convictions for
two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, felony possession of
cocaine, and attaining the status of an habitual felon. For the
following reasons, we find no error in Defendant’s trial.
Defendant was indicted separately on one charge of felony
possession of cocaine, two counts of assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and for
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attaining the status of habitual felon. Defendant was tried on
these charges at the 24 June 2013 Criminal Session of Johnston
County Superior Court. The State’s evidence tended to show that
shortly after midnight on 10 August 2012, Willie James Walker,
who lived in a homeless shelter in Raleigh, had been drinking
beer and using cocaine, and went to the parking lot of a service
station in Smithfield to panhandle. Mr. Walker observed
Defendant in the parking lot and approached Defendant to ask him
what he wanted. Defendant told him that he was looking to buy
some crack cocaine. Mr. Walker told Defendant that he knew
someone that sold crack cocaine just around the corner and he
would take him there. Mr. Walker hoped that if he helped
Defendant get some, he would share with him. After he rode down
the street in Defendant’s car and stopped, Defendant gave Mr.
Walker a one-hundred dollar bill, even though he only wanted
fifty-dollars-worth of crack cocaine, and Defendant wanted his
change.
Mr. Walker ultimately found Willie Watson, who told him
where he could buy some cocaine. However, before Mr. Walker
could go buy the cocaine, Defendant got out of his car and
started fighting with Mr. Watson, and then he started cutting
both Mr. Walker and Mr. Watson with a razor blade knife. Mr.
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Walker testified that it was Defendant who started the fight.
Mr. Walker testified that after Defendant attacked them, he and
Mr. Watson ran into some bushes to hide. Defendant, however,
got back into his car and came after them, running his car into
Mr. Walker’s right side and knocking Mr. Walker against a tree.
Defendant retrieved his money from Mr. Walker, then hit a picket
fence before leaving the scene in his car.
Officer Victor Denoble, of the Smithfield Police
Department, responded to a call and arrived at the scene around
12:25 a.m. where he discovered fencing, wooden posts and debris
in the roadway. Mr. Walker was lying down on the side of the
road covered in blood, and Mr. Watson was waiving at Officer
Denoble to stop. Mr. Watson, while pointing down the street,
said, “He’s down there, he’s down there[.]” Officer Denoble saw
Defendant’s vehicle getting ready to make a left hand turn and
initiated a stop on the vehicle. Upon approaching the vehicle,
Office Denoble saw blood on the side of Defendant’s car door and
on Defendant’s shirt. He placed Defendant in handcuffs. Upon
further inspection of the area, Officer Denoble found a piece of
the same type of fencing he observed in the roadway stuck in the
left side wheel well of Defendant’s car, a green razor blade
knife on the floorboard of the car underneath the steering
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wheel, and a fifty dollar bill covered in blood 10 to 15 feet
from Defendant’s car. Officer Denoble arrested Defendant and
took him to the Smithfield Police Department.
Other officers arrived at the crime scene and observed that
someone had backed into a picket fence in someone’s yard as
there were pieces of vehicle metal molding and a reflector on
the back side of the damaged fence. They also observed damage
to Defendant’s car, as it appeared it was missing the piece of
molding and reflector which matched the fender collected at the
crime scene.
As a result of this altercation, Mr. Walker was treated for
lacerations to his left jaw, left forearm, stomach, and back and
was given intravenous fluids due to a risk of going into shock
from the loss of blood. Likewise, Mr. Watson was treated for
lacerations to his side, back, and neck. The laceration on his
neck was deep and wide and close to the jugular vein and carotid
artery.
Defendant testified at trial that he acted in self-defense
as he feared that Mr. Watson and Mr. Walker were going to rob
him. Defendant also testified that after he cut both victims,
one of them told him to wait while he gave him his money back.
Defendant waited in his car and one of the victims went into a
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house and returned with Defendant’s $50 and gave it to him,
while he was bleeding. However, Defendant admitted that he
never saw either Mr. Walker or Mr. Watson with a weapon before
he cut them and that he was taller and younger than either of
them. Defendant also testified that he did not remember hitting
the fence because it was “foggy” and “messy” outside, and he was
“terrified trying to get away from [that] place.”
On 27 June 2013, a jury found Defendant guilty of two
counts of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious
injury. Defendant pled guilty to the charge of felony
possession of cocaine and of attaining the status of an habitual
felon, while reserving the right to appeal his convictions for
assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. The
trial court consolidated Defendant’s convictions and sentenced
him based on his habitual felony status to a term of 88 to 118
months of imprisonment. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal.
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In his only argument on appeal, Defendant, citing State v.
Thompson, 328 N.C. 477, 402 S.E.2d 386 (1991) and State v.
Holland, 161 N.C. App. 326, 588 S.E.2d 32 (2003), contends that
the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight because
there was no evidence showing that his departure from the crime
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scene “was carried out with a consciousness of guilt and in an
effort to avoid apprehension or prosecution” because he was not
speeding or driving erratically to elude police and did not
dispose of the razor blade knife or attempt to destroy evidence.
Defendant contends that the evidence shows that he merely left
the scene of the fight because he was “terrified”, which is
insufficient to support an instruction on flight. Defendant
concludes that this instruction regarding flight was prejudicial
to his self-defense argument at trial and therefore he is
entitled to a new trial.
As a general rule, a defendant’s flight is admissible as
evidence of guilt, State v. Self, 280 N.C. 665, 672, 187 S.E.2d
93, 97 (1972), but does not create a presumption of guilt but
may be considered with other factors “in deciding whether the
circumstances amount to an admission of guilt or reflect a
consciousness of guilt.” State v. Rainey, 198 N.C. App. 427,
439, 680 S.E.2d 760, 770 (citation and quotation marks omitted),
appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 661, 686
S.E.2d 903 (2009). “A flight instruction is proper so long as
there is some evidence in the record reasonably supporting the
theory that defendant fled after commission of the crime charged
. . . . The fact that there may be other reasonable
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explanations for defendant’s conduct does not render the
instruction improper.” State v. Norwood, 344 N.C. 511, 534, 476
S.E.2d 349, 359 (1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1158, 137 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1997). However,
“[m]ere evidence that defendant left the scene of the crime is
not enough to support an instruction on flight[;] [t]here] must
also be some evidence that defendant took steps to avoid
apprehension.” State v. Blakeney, 352 N.C. 287, 314, 531 S.E.2d
799, 819 (2000). Also, “[e]vidence that the defendant hurriedly
left the crime scene without rendering assistance to the . . .
victim may warrant an instruction on flight.” State v. Taylor,
362 N.C. 514, 540, 669 S.E.2d 239, 262 (2008). When a defendant
challenges a jury instruction, in making our determination we
consider the evidence presented in the light most favorable to
the State. Norwood, 344 N.C. at 535, 476 S.E.2d at 360.
“[Arguments] challenging the trial court’s decisions regarding
jury instructions are reviewed de novo by this Court.” State v.
Osorio, 196 N.C. App. 458, 466, 675 S.E.2d 144, 149 (2009).
“Where jury instructions are given without supporting evidence,
a new trial is required.” State v. Porter, 340 N.C. 320, 331,
457 S.E.2d 716, 721 (1995) (citation omitted).
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Over Defendant’s objection, the trial court gave the
following jury instruction as to flight:
Evidence of flight may be considered by you
together with all other facts and
circumstances in this case in determining
whether the combined circumstances amount to
an admission or show a consciousness of
guilt. However, proof of this circumstance
is not sufficient in itself to establish
Defendant’s guilt.
This instruction was justified as the State presented “some
evidence . . . reasonably supporting” the theory that Defendant
quickly fled the crime scene. See Norwood, 344 N.C. at 534, 476
S.E.2d at 359. Evidence was presented that as he was leaving
Defendant backed his car into a picket fence in someone’s yard
with enough force to destroy part of it and leave it strewn in
the roadway, along with part his car’s fender at the scene.
Officer Denoble observed Defendant leaving the scene and after
he stopped him, noticed part of the fence lodged in his wheel
fender. Also, there was evidence presented that Defendant
attempted to dispose of evidence, namely the bloody $50 bill
that was found by police 10-15 feet outside Defendant’s car
after he was stopped by police, showing some “consciousness of
guilt[,]” see Rainey, 198 N.C. App. at 439, 680 S.E.2d at 770,
and that he was taking steps to “avoid apprehension[.]” See
Blakeney, 352 N.C. at 314, 531 S.E.2d at 819. Further, there
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was evidence which showed that he “hurriedly left the crime
scene without rendering assistance” to Mr. Watson and Mr. Walker
after he cut them multiple times with a razor blade knife and
struck Mr. Walker with his car. See Taylor, 362 N.C. at 540,
699 S.E.2d at 262. Considering this evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, we hold that this was sufficient
evidence to establish that Defendant did more than just leave
the scene. Furthermore, the trial court instructed that
evidence of flight was “not sufficient in itself to establish
Defendant’s guilt.” Accordingly, we find no merit in
Defendant’s arguments.
We find the cases cited by Defendant in support of his
argument distinguishable from the facts before us. In State v.
Thompson, 328 N.C. 477, 402 S.E.2d 386 (1991), the trial court
denied the defendant’s request for a jury instruction
“caution[ing] the jury that it could not consider flight as
evidence of premeditation and deliberation in order to convict
him of murder in the first degree.” Id. at 489, 402 S.E.2d at
392. Our Supreme Court, in agreeing with the trial court, noted
that evidence was presented that the defendant left the scene of
the stabbings, drove towards Fort Bragg where he was stationed,
mistakenly turned and drove down a road leading to an off-limits
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area, and, upon seeing military police, starting driving away.
Id. at 490, 402 S.E.2d at 392-93. The Court held that “[t]his
evidence alone is not enough to warrant an instruction on
flight.” Id. at 490, 402 S.E.2d at 393.
In State v. Holland, 161 N.C. App. 326, 588 S.E.2d 32
(2003), we held that an instruction on flight was inappropriate
where there was no evidence showing that the defendant tried to
avoid apprehension as the “defendant left the crime scene with
his accomplices and drove to the home of one of the accomplices.
Following this, defendant was driven to a girlfriend’s
residence.” Id. at 330, 588 S.E.2d at 36 (holding that
“[v]isiting a friend at their residence is not an act that, by
itself, raises a reasonable inference that defendant was
attempting to avoid apprehension”). In the present case,
however, unlike Thompson and Holland, there was evidence that
Defendant did more than merely drive away from the scene to go
to another destination, as described above.
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s
instruction to the jury.
NO ERROR
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).