An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-80
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 1 July 2014
IN THE MATTER OF: Rockingham County
Nos. 13 J 82–84
S.C.R., A.C.R., & G.C.W.
Appeal by respondent-mother from orders entered 24 October
2013 by Judge James A. Grogan in Rockingham County District
Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals on 16 June 2014.
No brief filed for petitioner-appellee Rockingham County
Department of Social Services.
Leslie Rawls for respondent-appellant mother.
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Eric D. Welsh, for
guardian ad litem.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from the district court’s
adjudication order concluding that her children S.C.R.
(“Scott”),1 A.C.R. (“Amy”), and G.C.W. (“Gail”) were neglected
1
Pseudonyms are used for ease of reading and to protect the
identity of the juveniles.
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juveniles, as well as the court’s resulting disposition order.
After careful review, we affirm.
On 10 June 2013, the Rockingham County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) obtained nonsecure custody of Scott, Amy, and
Gail and filed a juvenile petition alleging that they were
neglected and dependent juveniles. DSS filed an amended
petition the same day with more detailed factual allegations.
According to the petition, respondent-mother left the children
with her mother (hereinafter, the “grandmother”) on 3 May 2013.
One-year-old Scott became ill, and the grandmother took Scott to
the emergency room. However, the grandmother had difficulty
obtaining medical treatment for him because respondent-mother
failed to make necessary arrangements, and DSS was notified.
Additionally, all three children were behind on their
vaccinations and had not seen a physician in a year.
The petition also alleged that respondent-mother’s home was
unfit for the children. According to the petition, it lacked
electricity and respondent-mother had no income to have it
restored or to pay rent. Respondent-mother kept four dogs and
two cats in the home, and allowed them to urinate and defecate
inside. A social worker visited the home and advised
respondent-mother not to bring the children back, given the
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home’s condition. The social worker reported that the odor of
animal feces and urine was so strong he had to leave the
residence. Following this visit, DSS and respondent-mother
agreed that the children would remain in a placement with the
grandmother.
According to the petition, respondent-mother was offered
in-home services in mid-May 2013, but respondent-mother missed
the meetings to discuss a service agreement with Lacey Johnston,
a social worker. Respondent-mother then became uncooperative
with DSS and unsupportive of the children’s placement. The
petition further alleged that on 6 June 2013, respondent-mother
attempted to forcibly remove her children from the grandmother’s
home and physically assaulted her teenage brother in the
process.
Following a hearing, the trial court adjudicated the
children neglected after concluding that DSS had proven the
allegations contained in the petition by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence. The court, however, dismissed the
dependency allegation, determining the children were not in need
of assistance or placement because there was an appropriate
alternative child care arrangement with the grandmother and
stepfather. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9) (2013). The trial
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court entered a written order on 24 October 2013 containing
findings of fact that closely tracked the allegations contained
in DSS’s amended petition. In a separate disposition order, the
trial court continued custody of Scott and Gail with DSS. Amy’s
father had been given temporary custody of Amy on 1 July 2013,
and the trial court gave him full custody in the disposition
order. Respondent mother gave notice of appeal on 13 November
2013.
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by
failing to make proper findings of fact to support its
adjudication of neglect. Specifically, respondent-mother argues
that the trial court’s substantive findings of fact are copied
almost verbatim from the allegations contained in the petition.
We have previously held that Rule 52 of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure “requires three separate and distinct
acts by the trial court: (1) find the facts specially; (2) state
separately the conclusions of law resulting from the facts so
found; and (3) direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.”
In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 96, 564 S.E.2d 599, 601–02
(2002) (citing N.C. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1)). “Thus, the trial
court must, through ‘processes of logical reasoning,’ based on
the evidentiary facts before it, ‘find the ultimate facts
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essential to support the conclusions of law.’” In re O.W., 164
N.C. App. 699, 702, 596 S.E.2d 851, 853 (2004) (quoting In re
Harton, 156 N.C. App. 655, 660, 577 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2003)).
The findings “must be the ‘specific ultimate facts . . .
sufficient for the appellate court to determine that the
judgment is adequately supported by competent evidence.’”
Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at 602 (citation
omitted). As a result of the foregoing principles, we have
stated that “the trial court’s findings must consist of more
than a recitation of the allegations” contained in the juvenile
petition. O.W., 164 N.C. App. at 702, 596 S.E.2d at 853 (citing
Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at 602).
Respondent-mother cites to both O.W. and Anderson in
support of her argument. In each case, this Court reversed the
adjudication order. Id. at 704, 596 S.E.2d at 854; Anderson,
151 N.C. App. at 100, 564 S.E.2d at 603. In O.W., fifteen of
the trial court’s twenty findings were “a verbatim recitation of
the facts stated in DSS’s petition for abuse and neglect, some
of which [were] unsupported by any evidence.” Id. at 702, 596
S.E.2d at 854. Moreover, several of the findings “[were] not
even really facts as they simply recite[d] what some unknown
source said . . . .” Id. Another finding was similarly
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deficient in that it merely recited a social worker’s testimony.
Id. at 703, 596 S.E.2d at 854. In Anderson, the trial court’s
order contained only three findings of fact, two of which
“merely recite[d] that DSS filed a petition and that service was
proper . . . .” Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at
602. The third finding stated that “[t]he grounds alleged for
terminating the parental rights are as follows” and proceeded to
list the grounds and case history. Id. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at
602. In each instance, this Court held that the findings of
fact were a mere recitation of the allegations in the petition.
Id. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at 602; O.W., 164 N.C. App. at 702–03, 596
S.E.2d at 854.
We find O.W. and Anderson to be distinguishable from the
instant case. We acknowledge that several of the trial court’s
findings are verbatim recitations of DSS’s petition allegations.
However, some of the allegations were omitted entirely from the
order, and several findings contain language which was altered
from that of the petition. Unlike O.W. and Anderson, all of the
trial court’s findings are phrased as findings of fact, not
allegations or statements that recite what an unknown source
said. See O.W., 164 N.C. App. at 702–03, 596 S.E.2d at 854;
Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at 602. Most notably,
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the trial court specifically declined to find that the children
were dependent juveniles, and the corresponding allegation was
omitted from the order.
Most importantly, all of the trial court’s findings of fact
are supported by evidence in the record, and respondent-mother
does not challenge the evidentiary support for any of the
findings. During the adjudicatory phase of the hearing, six
witnesses testified for DSS: two social workers involved in the
case, respondent-mother, the children’s grandmother, the
grandmother’s husband, and the father of Scott and Amy. The
testimony of DSS’s witnesses provide ample support for the
findings contained in the trial court’s order, despite the fact
that they closely track, or repeat, the allegations contained in
the petition.
We therefore find the trial court’s findings sufficient to
support the adjudication of neglect. The trial court found that
respondent-mother had taken her three children to live with the
grandmother because she could no longer care for them. A social
worker confirmed that respondent-mother’s residence was not
suitable, as respondent-mother allowed her dogs and cats to
urinate and defecate inside. Additionally, the residence did
not have electricity, respondent-mother did not have income to
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restore it, and she also had been evicted from her previous
apartment.
In addition to the problems with her home, the trial
court’s findings show that respondent-mother failed to provide
her children with medical care, despite having Medicaid coverage
for them. At the time of the petition, the children had not
seen a physician in a year and were behind on their
vaccinations. While acknowledging that her children were not up
to date on vaccinations, respondent-mother informed the social
worker that her animals were up to date on their shots.
Additionally, the grandmother needed to take Scott to the
emergency room and had difficulty obtaining treatment because
respondent-mother failed to make appropriate arrangements for
his care.
Lastly, the trial court found that respondent-mother was
interfering with the children’s placement. She was hostile to
her mother and threatened to remove the children. Respondent-
mother’s hostility culminated in an incident on 6 June 2013,
during which respondent-mother attempted to forcibly remove the
children and assaulted her teenage brother in the process.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s
findings of fact are sufficiently specific for this Court to
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determine that the order is supported by competent evidence.
See Anderson, 151 N.C. App. at 97, 564 S.E.2d at 602. We
therefore reject respondent-mother’s argument.
In her second argument, respondent-mother contends that the
trial court erred by entering a dispositional order where there
was no proper adjudication order. Because we affirm the trial
court’s adjudication, we need not address this argument.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge ELMORE concur
Report per Rule 30(e).