Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Mar 08 2013, 9:23 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the
case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JOHN T. WILSON GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
MONIKA PREKOPA TALBOT
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ANDREW ABBOTT, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 33A01-1201-CR-16
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE HENRY CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Bob A. Witham, Judge
Cause Nos. 33C03-1109-FD-245, 33D02-1105-FD-132
March 8, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BROWN, Judge
Andrew Abbott appeals his conviction for receiving stolen property as a class D
felony.1 Abbott raises three issues, which we revise and restate as:
I. Whether the court committed fundamental error in permitting the
State to refile the charge against him;
II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; and
III. Whether the trial court erred in denying pre-trial detention credit.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
In August 2010, Matt Huffman, a real estate agent, was hired to help sell a house
owned by the father of Mike McKown. Huffman initially placed a key to the house in a
realtor lock box. At some point in November 2010, Huffman made a copy of the key in
the lock box, placed one of the keys without a tag back in the lock box, and gave the
other key with a tag on it to Mike McKown so that he could have access to the house.
McKown placed the key in his truck, which he parked at his house near the north side of
New Castle, Indiana, and near State Road 3.
A short time after midnight on December 28, 2010, Nancy Weesner, who lived
along State Road 3 outside the city limits of and to the north of New Castle, Indiana,
observed Abbott outside her home on the other side of State Road 3 who “periodically
would stop and turn around and look the opposite way, like maybe someone was going to
come and get him.” Transcript at 65. Weesner observed that Abbott walked around the
house across the street a couple of times, stood behind some bushes at an adjacent
property, walked around the garage a couple of times, and eventually “just laid down on
1
Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (Supp. 2009).
2
the ground and there was snow on the ground.” Id. Weesner called the police and
described her observations.
Henry County Deputy Sheriff Landon J. Dean arrived at the location and Deputy
Sheriff Jordan Pruett eventually joined him in searching the area. The officers observed
footprints in the snow which led around a residence and garage, located Abbott “against
the garage and/or bushes” or “leaning up against the garage,” and observed a baseball bat
on the ground next to Abbott. Id. at 94. The officers conducted a pat down search of
Abbott and discovered a “labeled key,” which had a tag attached to it which contained the
address of the house owned by McKown’s father, and a yellow Stanley tape measure. Id.
at 83. The officers arrested Abbott. The police contacted the owner of the residence
where Abbott was arrested, and the owner did not personally know Abbott and had not
given him permission to be on the property.
On December 29, 2010, McKown met at his father’s house with police, Huffman,
and McKown’s property manager. McKown and Huffman opened the lock box and
observed that the key was still in the box. McKown and his property manager searched
the house to make sure that everything was still there. McKown’s truck was parked at his
residence and so he traveled to his home to check the truck for the key. McKown noticed
that the truck, which he had not locked, “had been opened,” that “[t]here was some
paperwork laying on the floor of the truck,” that he did not see his garage door opener or
boat keys, and that a yellow tape measure was missing. Id. at 112. McKown later
identified the key with the tag and the yellow tape measure discovered in Abbott’s
possession as belonging to him. At some point, Abbott sent a letter to McKown stating
3
that he had found the key in a Walmart parking lot and had planned to return the key to
the address on the key.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 18, 2011, the State charged Abbott with receiving stolen property as a
class D felony and with being an habitual offender under cause number 33D02-1105-FD-
132 (“Cause No. 132”). Specifically, the information alleged that Abbott “did knowingly
retain the property, to-wit: one (1) house key of another person, to-wit: Mike McKown,
said property having been the subject of a theft, to-wit: said property having been
removed from a realtors key box, without the authorization of Mike McKown.”
Appellant’s Appendix at 5. An entry in the chronological case summary (“CCS”) on
May 23, 2011, indicates that a jury trial was scheduled for August 17, 2011.
On August 17, 2011, the State filed a motion to amend information providing that
it desired to change the wording from “said property having been removed from a realtors
key box” to the wording “said property having been removed from his vehicle.” Id. at
12. The court heard arguments on the motion and found that the State’s requested
amendment appeared to be “more than just kind of a minor change” and that the change
“certainly could affect the defendant’s ability to be prepared to proceed with trial today.”
August 17, 2011 Transcript at 13. The court asked the State if it wished for the court to
dismiss the case without prejudice and to refile the case or for the court to grant the
motion to amend and grant a continuance to the defense in order to prepare for the trial.
Abbott did not object. After a recess, the State asked the court to dismiss the case
without prejudice, and the court granted the motion to dismiss.
4
On September 7, 2011, the State filed a charging information under cause number
33C03-1109-FD-245 (“Cause No. 245”), alleging that Abbott committed the offense of
receiving stolen property as a class D felony and was an habitual offender. Specifically,
the information alleged that Abbott “did knowingly retain the property, to-wit: one (1)
house key of another person, to-wit: Mike McKown, said property having been the
subject of a theft, in that said property had been removed from his truck, a 1997 burgundy
Chevy truck, without the authorization of Mike McKown.” Appellant’s Appendix at 26.
A jury trial was held on November 16, 2011, and the jury found Abbott guilty of
receiving stolen property as a class D felony.
Abbott admitted to two prior felony convictions, and the court found him to be an
habitual offender. The court sentenced Abbott to two and one-half years for the
conviction for receiving stolen property as a class D felony and enhanced the sentence by
three and one-half years for being an habitual offender, to be served in the Department of
Correction (“DOC”). The court ordered Abbott’s sentence under Cause No. 245 to be
served consecutively to his sentence under cause number 33C01-0005-CF-12 (“Cause
No. 12”). The court then stated:
I will show, at this point, that the three hundred and fifty-one (351) actual
days credit will be eligible to be applied towards any parole revocation in
the Circuit Court case.[2] If it turns out that the [DOC] does not allow that
credit against the parole violation, then I certainly would, upon request of
the parties or Mr. Abbott himself, show that he would be entitled to [351]
actual days credit against service in this sentence, but that’s only if the
[DOC] does not award credit against the parole violation.
2
Based upon the abstract of judgment, the court appears to be referring to Cause No. 12.
5
November 16, 2011 Transcript at 175. The abstract of judgment provides: “Credit time
of 351 actual days to be applied to [Cause No. 12].” Appellant’s Appendix at 37.
On May 30, 2012, Abbott, pro se, filed a handwritten letter with the trial court
stating that “on or around 2/14/2012 the parole board choose [sic] to void my parole
violation warrant,” that “[f]or whatever reason, which I am very grateful, the board didn’t
give me anymore time,” and that “[i]n light of these events, I am respectfully requesting
that my jail time credit of 351 [days] be allowed to apply to my current committment?”
Id. at 48-49. Abbott, pro se, filed another letter on June 11, 2012, requesting an amended
abstract of judgment showing the credit time applied under Cause No. 245. The State
filed a response stating that Abbott “has provided no proof to establish what he states in
his letter.” Id. at 53. The trial court denied Abbott’s request. Upon Abbott’s request,
this court agreed that Cause No. 132 and Cause No. 245 would be consolidated for
appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
The first issue is whether the court committed fundamental error in permitting the
State to refile the charge against Abbott. Abbott argues that the court’s decision to permit
the State to dismiss the charge under Cause No. 132 and refile the charge under Cause
No. 245 substantially prejudiced his rights. Abbott argues that “[i]f the State, after the
Court’s ruling, could not have prevailed at trial, Abbott’s jeopardy rights are affected by
allowing the State to have another bite at the apple” and that “[i]f the State may
circumvent an adverse ruling by simply dismissing and re-filing the original charge,
6
defendant’s [sic] will as a practical matter be unable to avail themselves of legitimate
procedural rights.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. The State maintains that the court did not
commit fundamental error when it allowed the State to dismiss and subsequently refile
the charge against Abbott, that Abbott’s substantial rights were not affected and jeopardy
had not yet attached, that Abbott failed to show that his speedy trial rights were affected
by the dismissal and refiling of the charges, that contrary to Abbott’s argument the State
did not receive an adverse ruling to its motion to amend, and that Abbott “has not shown
that he was prejudiced by the solution the State chose and that he did not ultimately
receive a fair trial.” Appellee’s Brief at 14.
A prosecuting attorney may obtain a dismissal at any time prior to sentencing, and
the granting of such a motion does not by itself bar a subsequent trial of the defendant for
the same offense. Malone v. State, 702 N.E.2d 1102, 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citing
Ind. Code § 35-34-1-13; Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 393 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied),
trans. denied. “Absent the attachment of jeopardy, the State’s dismissal of criminal
charges does not preclude it from refiling and prosecuting a charge for the identical
offense.” Id.
The State may not refile if doing so will prejudice the substantial rights of the
defendant. Id. The State does not necessarily prejudice a defendant’s substantial rights
when, on the refiled information, it amends the original information but charges the same
offense. Id. The State is entitled to amend charges, even as to theory and identity, when
it can be done without prejudicing the substantial rights of the accused. Id. (citations
omitted).
7
In this case, the State did not receive an adverse ruling and was not seeking to
“escape the ruling of the original court.” See id. at 1104 (citations omitted); see also
Beason v. State, 690 N.E.2d 277, 280 n.9 (Ind. 1998) (noting that “the prosecutor here
used none of the powers or authority of that office to circumvent any court order or to
prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.”). Further, Abbott has not demonstrated
that the court permitting the State to refile the charge substantially prejudiced him based
upon the fact that the State alleged in its refiled charging information that the house key
was taken from McKown’s truck rather than the lock box. Our review of the record
shows that the State initially charged Abbott on May 18, 2011 under Cause No. 132; that
on the day of the initially-scheduled jury trial on August 17, 2011, the court dismissed
without prejudice the case due to the State’s request to amend the charging information as
it pertained to the location from which the key had been taken; that the State filed the
amended charging information on September 7, 2011 under Cause No. 245; and that
Abbott’s jury trial was held on November 16, 2011. The record reveals that Abbott was
not deprived of adequate time to prepare a defense. See id. (noting that the defendant’s
trial date was reset and that he had adequate time to prepare a defense). Neither was
Abbott deprived of a fair trial as the record reveals that Abbott presented a defense before
the jury which included an explanation for how he came into possession of the key, and
he cross-examined the State’s witnesses. Abbott has not demonstrated that his substantial
rights were prejudiced by the filing of the amended charging information or that the State
was barred from refiling the receiving stolen property charge. See id. (concluding that
8
the defendant’s rights were not substantially prejudiced by the State’s dismissal and
refiling of the charges).
II.
The next issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Abbott’s conviction
for receiving stolen property. In a review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we do
not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. Rohr v. State, 866
N.E.2d 242, 248 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied. We view the evidence most favorable to the
verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom and will affirm the conviction if there is
substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable jury could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Identification testimony need not necessarily be unequivocal to sustain a
conviction. Heeter v. State, 661 N.E.2d 612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Elements of
offenses and identity may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence and the
logical inferences drawn therefrom. Bustamante v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1313, 1317 (Ind.
1990). As with other sufficiency matters, we will not weigh the evidence or resolve
questions of credibility when determining whether the identification evidence is sufficient
to sustain a conviction. Id. Rather, we examine the evidence and the reasonable
inferences therefrom that support the conviction. Id.
The offense of receiving stolen property as a class D felony is governed by Ind.
Code § 35-43-4-2, which provides in part that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally
receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another person that has been the subject of
theft commits receiving stolen property, a Class D felony.” The amended charging
9
information alleged that Abbott “did knowingly retain the property, to-wit: one (1) house
key of another person, to-wit: Mike McKown, said property having been the subject of a
theft, in that said property had been removed from his truck, a 1997 burgundy Chevy
truck, without the authorization of Mike McKown.” Appellant’s Appendix at 26. Thus,
to convict Abbott of receiving stolen property as a class D felony, the State needed to
prove that he knowingly retained McKown’s house key that had been the subject of theft.
Abbott contends that “the naked possession without proof that the defendant
received the goods knowing they had been stolen will not sustain the charge” and that the
State “failed to prove anything more other than the fact that he merely had the key in his
possession.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. Abbott argues that the owner of the key did not
know it was missing or remember he had the key. Abbott argues that McKown testified
that he had used his truck to plow snow on December 27th, and that he could have
possibly gone to Walmart around this period. Abbott further argues that, while the State
presented aerial views of the location of the homes and neighborhoods, it did not present
evidence as to the exact distances between the location where the key was allegedly
stolen and the location Abbott was discovered. Abbott also argues that witnesses testified
that they were with Abbott when he found the key.
The State maintains that the evidence was sufficient and that Abbott’s possession
of the key is to be considered along with the other evidence in the case. The State argues
that Abbott was in possession of McKown’s recently stolen key to his parents’ residence,
that the key had been removed from McKown’s truck along with other items, at least one
of which was in Abbott’s possession at the time of the arrest, that the key was clearly a
10
key to a residence because it had a label on it with the residence’s address, and that there
is no reasonable explanation for Abbott’s legal possession of such a key. The State
further argues that the jury clearly rejected the explanation that Abbott found the key in a
Walmart parking lot. The State asserts that Abbott’s unexplained possession of a key
which had been stolen from a truck along with other items, coupled with the fact that the
key was marked as a key to a residence to which Abbott had no connection, is
circumstantial evidence that Abbott knew the key had been stolen.
While the mere unexplained possession of recently stolen property standing alone
does not automatically support a conviction for theft or receiving stolen property, such
possession is to be considered “along with the other evidence in a case, such as how
recent or distant in time was the possession from the moment the item was stolen, and
what are the circumstances of the possession (say, possessing right next door as opposed
to many miles away).” Donovan v. State, 937 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
(quoting Fortson v. State, 919 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ind. 2010)), trans. denied. The fact of
possession and all the surrounding evidence about the possession must be assessed to
determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.; see also Girdler v. State, 932 N.E.2d 769, 772-773 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010) (noting that, in the context of charges for theft or receiving stolen property,
possession of recently stolen property is to be considered along with the other evidence in
a case and the circumstances of the possession). The trier of fact must assess all of the
evidence instead of focusing upon one piece of evidence, such as possession of recently
stolen property. Donovan, 937 N.E.2d at 1226.
11
In this case, Abbott’s possession of the key to the house of McKown’s father is to
be considered in light of the other evidence in the case. The evidence most favorable to
the verdict reveals that Abbott was observed and ultimately apprehended a short time
after midnight on December 28, 2010, near the home of Weesner, that Abbott had walked
around the residence and garage and was “against the garage and/or bushes” or “leaning
up against the garage,” see Transcript at 94, and the officers discovered that Abbott was
in possession of a house key with the tag on it and a yellow Stanley tape measure which
had been taken from McKown’s truck. The State introduced an exhibit containing an
aerial photograph depicting the location of McKown’s residence where his truck was
parked, the location where Abbott was arrested near Weesner’s residence on State Road
3, and the relative distance and relation between the two locations. McKown testified
that when he checked his truck on December 29, 2010, he noticed that the truck, which
he had not locked, “had been opened,” that “[t]here was some paperwork laying on the
floor of the truck,” that he did not see his garage door opener or boat keys, and that a
yellow tape measure was missing. Transcript at 112. When asked when he recalled “last
being in the truck,” McKown testified “[t]he night before the incident.” Id. at 113.
Abbott presented testimony that he had found the key in a Walmart parking lot. When
McKown was asked whether he recalled going to Walmart at any time around Christmas
2010, McKown testified that he did not recall.
To the extent that Abbott requests that we reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the
credibility of witnesses, we cannot do so. See Rohr, 866 N.E.2d at 248. Further, we note
12
that, in Gibson v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court discussed theft and receiving stolen
property and held:
If the State meets its burden of proof with respect to all the necessary
elements of either the theft or receiving stolen property offense as alleged
in the charging instrument, it is of no consequence whether the accused was
the person who actually took the stolen property from its authorized
possessor because, once this burden is met, the State has proved that the
accused, whether actual thief or not, has done precisely what is forbidden
by both subsection (a) and (b) [of Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2]—knowingly or
intentionally exercising unlawful control over property of another with a
purpose to deprive.
643 N.E.2d 885, 892 (Ind. 1994) (footnote omitted).
While the jury could have made different inferences from the evidence, we cannot
say that the inferences made by the jury as the trier of fact here were unreasonable.
Based upon the evidence, a rational factfinder could have found that Abbott knowingly
retained the property of McKown that had been the subject of theft and knowingly
exercised unlawful control over the property with a purpose to deprive. Thus, we
conclude that evidence of probative value exists from which the jury could have found
Abbott guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of receiving stolen property as a class D felony.
See Donovan v. State, 937 N.E.2d 1223, 1226-1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Fortson
and holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for auto
theft), trans. denied.
III.
The next issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Abbott’s request for pre-
trial detention credit. Abbott argues that a “trial judge must give pre-trial credit time
immediately, not later,” that the court “should have immediately applied the credit time
13
to the charge that Abbott was being sentenced on, not to a possible unrelated parole
violation,” and that Abbott is entitled to the 351 days credit toward his sentence in Cause
No. 245. Appellee’s Brief at 12-13. The State argues that “[i]f a defendant receives
consecutive terms, he or she is only allowed credit time against the total or aggregate of
the terms,” that Abbott “of course, is entitled to the 351 days somewhere, and he is not
without remedy,” and that Abbott “has recourse under Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1,
Section 1(a)(3),”3 but that Abbott “has to show the court with proof other than a self-
serving statement that he did not receive credit in [Cause No. 12].” Appellee’s Brief at
11.
In Tate v. State, the defendant was charged in 1999 with several offenses arising
out of his operating a vehicle while intoxicated and later pled guilty to those charges and
was placed on probation. 813 N.E.2d 437, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In 2003, the
defendant was charged with operating a vehicle after being adjudged an habitual traffic
offender and another charge and days later was released on his own recognizance. Id. In
June 2003, the State claimed that the defendant had violated the probation he received
after he pled guilty in 1999. Id. In August 2003, the defendant admitted the probation
violation and also pled guilty to operating a vehicle after being adjudged an habitual
traffic offender. Id. In September 2003, the trial court sentenced the defendant to four
and one-half years incarceration for the probation violation and three years upon the
guilty plea conviction. Id. The trial court did not award the defendant any credit time for
3
Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1, Section 1(a) provides in part: “Any person who has been convicted
of, or sentenced for, a crime by a court of this state, and who claims: . . . (3) that the sentence exceeds the
maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise erroneous; . . . may institute at any time a proceeding under
this Rule to secure relief.”
14
his pretrial incarceration but rather “stated that the credit time would be saved for the
disposition of a pending case.” Id. at 437-438. At the time of his sentencing, the
defendant had entered no plea on the pending charge. Id. at 438.
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court was without authority to
“save” the pretrial detention credit time and apply it upon disposition of the pending
charge. Id. This court observed the requirements of Ind. Code § 35-38-3-2, which
provided in part:
(a) When a convicted person is sentenced to imprisonment, the court
shall, without delay, certify, under the seal of the court, copies of the
judgment of conviction and sentence to the receiving authority.
(b) The judgment must include:
*****
(4) The amount of credit, including credit time earned, for
time spent in confinement before sentencing. . . .
(Burns Code Ed. Repl. 1998) (subsequently modified by Pub. L. No. 119-2008, § 17 (eff.
July 1, 2008); Pub. L. No. 106-2010, § 12 (eff. July 1, 2010)).4 The court also observed
the requirements of Ind. Code § 35-50-60-35 and that, in Stephens v. State, 735 N.E.2d
4
The relevant portions of the current version of Ind. Code § 35-38-3-2 are substantively similar
to the version discussed in Tate.
5
At the time, Ind. Code. § 35-50-6-3 provided:
(a) A person assigned to Class I earns one (1) day of credit time for each day
the person is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or
sentencing.
(b) A person assigned to Class II earns one (1) day of credit time for every
two (2) days the person is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting
trial or sentencing.
(c) A person assigned to Class III earns no credit time.
15
278, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied, the court noted that determination of a
defendant’s pretrial credit time “is dependent upon two factors: (1) pretrial confinement
and (2) the pretrial confinement being a result of the criminal charge for which the
sentence is being imposed.” Tate, 813 N.E.2d at 438. The court then held:
Given the clear mandate set forth in I.C. § 35-38-3-2 that the trial
court must provide a copy of the judgment of conviction and sentence to
the receiving authority and that it must include the amount of credit time
earned for time spent in confinement before sentencing, in addition to case
law which has consistently held that the pretrial credit must arise from
pretrial confinement for the criminal charge for which the defendant is
sentenced, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to award Tate his
credit time when he was sentenced. Thus, we remand to the trial court to
revise the sentence so that [the defendant] receives the credit time which he
earned. In so doing, we recognize that we do not know whether any
subsequent action has been taken in regard to the third charge which was
pending at the time of [the defendant’s] sentencing. If [the defendant] has
been sentenced upon that charge, it may very well be that the credit time
was applied to that charge. If such is the case, the sentence upon that
charge will have to be amended to reflect any changes made to the prior
sentence so that [the defendant] does not receive double credit, which was
appropriately the trial court’s concern . . . .
Id. at 439.
Ind. Code. § 35-38-3-2 (Supp. 2010) requires that a judgment include the amount
of credit time a defendant receives. Specifically, subsection (b) provides: “The judgment
must include: . . . (4) the amount of credit, including credit time earned, for time spent in
confinement before sentencing . . . .” See also Bischoff v. State, 704 N.E.2d 129, 130
(Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“Credit is to be applied for time spent in confinement that is the
result of the charge for which the defendant is being sentenced.”) (citing Willoughby v.
State, 626 N.E.2d 601, 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)), trans. denied.
(Burns Code Ed. Repl. 1998) (subsequently modified by Pub. L. No. 80-2008, § 2 (eff. July 1, 2008)).
16
In this case, the trial court ordered Abbott’s sentence for his conviction under
Cause No. 245 to be served consecutively to his sentence under Cause No. 12 and
ordered that Abbott’s credit time of 351 actual days be applied to his sentence under
Cause No. 12 unless the DOC did not allow the credit under that cause number. Based
upon Ind. Code. § 35-38-3-2 and Tate and the cases cited above, we conclude that the
court erred in ordering that Abbott’s credit time be applied to his sentence or pending
revocation under Cause No. 12. Therefore, we reverse on this issue and remand with
instructions for the trial court to revise the sentence which Abbott received to reflect that
he is entitled to have the credit time applied to his sentence under Cause No. 245 and, if
there is any evidence that any of the credit time was applied to any sentence or revocation
under Cause No. 12, to make any revisions necessary so that Abbott does not receive
double credit. See Tate, 813 N.E.2d at 439.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Abbott’s conviction for receiving stolen
property as a class D felony and reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion to reflect that Abbott is entitled to pretrial detention credit under Cause No. 245
to the extent he would not receive double credit.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
BAILEY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
17