An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-116
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 17 June 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
S.L.B.B. Catawba County
No. 11 JA 177
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 6 November
2013 by Judge J. Gary Dellinger in Catawba County District
Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 May 2014.
Staff Attorney Valeree R. Adams, for petitioner-appellee
Catawba County Department of Social Services.
Alston & Bird LLP, by Matthew P. McGuire, for guardian ad
litem.
Levine & Stewart, by James E. Tanner, III, for respondent-
appellant mother.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Respondent-mother (“respondent”) appeals from the trial
court’s order terminating her parental rights to her minor child
“Shaney.”1 We affirm the trial court’s order.
1
A pseudonym is used to protect the identity and privacy of the
juvenile.
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Respondent was fourteen years old when she gave birth to
Shaney in 2009. Respondent was unable to identify Shaney’s
biological father. When Shaney was approximately eight months
old, respondent assaulted her by shaking her excessively.
Respondent was subsequently adjudicated delinquent for the
assault.
On 29 June 2011, the Catawba County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) filed a juvenile petition alleging Shaney was
abused, neglected, and dependent. On 30 June 2011, the trial
court entered a non-secure custody order placing Shaney in DSS
custody. On 8 November 2011, the trial court adjudicated Shaney
as an abused and neglected juvenile. The court ordered
respondent to enter into and comply with a family services case
plan. The case plan required respondent to obtain a
psychological evaluation and comply with all recommendations;
obtain a parenting assessment and follow the recommendations;
obtain an assessment of her intellectual functioning; comply
with mental health services; demonstrate improved capacity as a
result of participation in services; and attend school daily.
On 4 June 2012, the trial court conducted a permanency
planning hearing. The court found that “[i]t is uncertain
whether the minor child will return to the home of her mother
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within six months due to the uncertainty regarding
[respondent’s] ability to learn and demonstrate parenting
skills.” The trial court implemented a concurrent permanent
plan of adoption and reunification.
Another permanency planning hearing was conducted on 10
September 2012. Respondent had failed to take her medications
as directed, and the trial court found that “[d]espite the
services offered to her and the various parenting classes in
which she has participated, [respondent] is unable to care for
herself, let alone provide care for her minor child.” The court
changed the permanent plan to adoption.
On 9 November 2012, DSS filed a motion to terminate
respondent’s parental rights on the grounds of neglect,
willfully leaving the minor child in foster care for more than
twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the
conditions which led to the removal of the child from the home,
and incapability of providing for the proper care and
supervision of the minor child. After a hearing, the trial
court found the existence of all grounds alleged by DSS and
concluded that termination of respondent’s parental rights was
in the best interests of the minor child. On 6 November 2013,
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the trial court entered its order terminating respondent’s
parental rights. Respondent appeals.
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding and
concluding that grounds existed for terminating her parental
rights. We disagree.
“The standard for review in termination of parental rights
cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in
turn, support the conclusions of law.” In re Clark, 72 N.C.
App. 118, 124, 323 S.E.2d 754, 758 (1984). Unchallenged
findings of fact are deemed supported by competent evidence and
are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408
S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). In the instant case, respondent does
not challenge any of the trial court’s findings. Thus, we must
only determine if these unchallenged findings support the trial
court’s conclusion that grounds existed to terminate
respondent’s parental rights.
A trial court may terminate parental rights based on a
finding that the parent has neglected the juvenile. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). A neglected juvenile is defined, in
part, as one who “does not receive proper care, supervision, or
discipline” from a parent or caretaker, or “who lives in an
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environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare[.]” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2013). Generally, “[a] finding of neglect
sufficient to terminate parental rights must be based on
evidence showing neglect at the time of the termination
proceeding.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 248, 485 S.E.2d 612,
615 (1997) (citation omitted). However, when
there is no evidence of neglect at the time
of the termination proceeding . . . parental
rights may nonetheless be terminated if
there is a showing of a past adjudication of
neglect and the trial court finds by clear
and convincing evidence a probability of
repetition of neglect if the juvenile were
(sic) returned to her parents.
In re Reyes, 136 N.C. App. 812, 815, 526 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2000)
(citation omitted).
Respondent contends the trial court erred in terminating
her parental rights based on neglect because there was no
evidence “that suggested [respondent] posed any threat of anger
or violence toward Shaney at the time of the termination
hearing[,]” nor was there evidence that respondent’s parents’
home “posed the same risk of neglect to a three-year-old Shaney
with an almost 18-year-old [respondent] in it as it did when
Shaney was an infant and [respondent] was a misbehaving and
unruly 14-year-old.”
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Contrary to respondent’s contentions, the trial court’s
order includes ample findings that would support a conclusion
that she would continue to neglect Shaney if the child was
returned to respondent’s care. The court specifically found
that respondent did not believe she needed to correct her
behavior, that respondent’s intellectual disabilities and
behavioral problems would make it difficult for respondent to
put Shaney’s needs before her own, and that respondent did not
have the financial resources to care for Shaney or herself. The
trial court also found that respondent’s therapist did not
observe any improvement in her behavior following respondent’s
participation in therapy. Finally, the trial court found that
respondent
is not a fit and proper person to have
custody of the minor child . . . . She
continues, to this date, to engage in the
same behaviors which led to the adjudication
of neglect. She has not taken seriously the
efforts to correct her behaviors and the
likelihood of continued neglect is high if
the child were to return home.
We conclude that the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact
support the court’s conclusion that respondent’s neglect of
Shaney would likely be repeated if she was returned to
respondent’s care. Accordingly, respondent’s contention that
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the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights on the
ground of neglect is overruled.
Since we have determined that termination was proper on the
ground of neglect, it is unnecessary for us to consider the
additional grounds for termination found by the trial court.
See In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426
(2003) (a finding of one statutory ground is sufficient to
support the termination of parental rights). We affirm the
trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights.
Affirmed.
Judges STROUD and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).