An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-358
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 16 September 2014
IN THE MATTER OF:
Randolph County
Nos. 12 JT 33-36
R.J.C.M., R.J.M.,
T.M.M., and J.R.M., Jr.
Appeal by respondent from orders entered 18 November 2013
and 20 December 2013 by Judge James P. Hill in Randolph County
District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 18 August 2014.
No brief for petitioner-appellee Randolph County Department
of Social Services.
Edward Eldred Attorney at Law, PLLC, by Edward Eldred, for
respondent-appellant.
Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Kari R. Johnson, for
guardian ad litem.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Respondent, the father of the juveniles R.J.C.M., R.J.M.,
T.M.M., and J.R.M., Jr., appeals from orders terminating his
parental rights. After careful review, we affirm.
Background
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On 13 February 2012, the Randolph County Department of
Social Services (“DSS”) filed petitions alleging that R.J.C.M.,
R.J.M., T.M.M., and J.R.M., Jr. were neglected and dependent
juveniles. DSS stated that respondent and the mother had
engaged in domestic violence in the presence of the juveniles;
the mother had left the juveniles alone in their home without
proper supervision on multiple occasions; and respondent and the
mother had cared for the juveniles while under the influence of
illegal substances. Additionally, on 13 February 2012, the
mother was admitted to the hospital due to suicidal ideations.
While in the hospital, she tested positive for benzodiazepines,
cocaine, marijuana, and methadone. Upon the mother’s admission
to the hospital, the juveniles were placed with relatives
because respondent admitted to DSS that he could not care for
the children. The relatives, however, were unable to care for
the juveniles, and neither respondent nor the mother was able to
provide alternative child care arrangements for DSS’s
consideration. The juveniles were taken into non-secure custody
and were subsequently adjudicated neglected and dependent.
On 29 January 2013, the trial court ceased reunification
efforts. On 22 March 2013, DSS filed motions to terminate
respondent’s parental rights. On 18 November 2013, the trial
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court entered an adjudicatory order in which it determined that
grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1),
(2), and (3) (2013) to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
The trial court further concluded that grounds existed to
terminate the mother’s parental rights. On 20 December 2013,
the trial court entered a dispositional order in which it
concluded that it was in the best interests of the juveniles
that respondent’s and the mother’s parental rights be
terminated. The trial court therefore terminated their parental
rights. Respondent appeals.
Discussion
Respondent’s counsel has filed a no-merit brief on
respondent’s behalf in which he states that he has “conducted a
conscientious and thorough” review of the record and trial
transcript and was “unable to identify any issues of merit on
which to base an argument for relief.” Consequently, counsel
conceded that he could not in “good faith” argue that the trial
court erred in terminating respondent’s parental rights.
Pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.1(d),
he requests that this Court conduct an independent examination
of the case. In accordance with Rule 3.1(d), counsel wrote
respondent a letter on 28 April 2014 advising him of counsel’s
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inability to find error, his filing of a “no-merit” brief, and
of respondent’s right to file his own arguments directly with
this Court within thirty days of the date of the filing of the
no-merit brief. Respondent has not filed his own written
arguments.
In addition to seeking review pursuant to Rule 3.1(d),
counsel directs our attention to potential issues with regard to
certain of the trial court’s conclusions that grounds existed to
terminate respondent’s parental rights. However, counsel
acknowledges that any one ground is sufficient to terminate
respondent’s parental rights. See In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App.
57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990) (noting that a finding of
any one of the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to
support termination). Counsel concedes that he cannot in good
faith argue that all three grounds found by the trial court to
support termination of respondent’s parental rights were
erroneous.
Conclusion
After carefully reviewing the transcript and record, we are
unable to find any possible prejudicial error in the trial
court’s orders terminating respondent’s parental rights.
Accordingly, we affirm.
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AFFIRMED.
Judges DILLON and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).